


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
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
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SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

- I. The Outline of an Elective Course of Study. Part III. Pauperism. *Professor Tucker*. 188, 639.
- II. Sociological Notes. *Professor Wells*. 192.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

- A General View of Missions. Second Series. X. India. *Rev. Chas. C. Starbuck*. 76, 300.
- Professor Briggs's Response to the Charges and Specifications submitted to the Presbytery of New York. 623.
- Report of the Committee of Prosecution in the Case of Dr. Briggs, with Charges and Specifications. 529.
- The Congress of Catholic Savants. *Professor Raoul Allier*. 410.

NOTES FROM ENGLAND. *Mr. Joseph King, M. A.* 86, 418, 642.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

- Adams's Christian Types of Heroism. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 102.
- Arnold's The Light of the World. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 427.
- Bacon's Japanese Girls and Women. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 315.
- Case's Physical Realism. *Charles A. Strong*. 89.
- Dawson's The Makers of Modern English. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 425.
- Dewey's Outlines of Ethics. *J. H. Hyslop*. 95.
- Faber's The Church for the Times. *Egbert C. Smyth*. 314.
- Fiske's The American Revolution. *Chas. C. Starbuck*. 205.
- Gatty's The Book of Sun-Dials. *Caroline Hazard*. 199.
- Grébillat's Exposé de Théologie Systématique. Tome Quatrième. *Charles H. Oliphant*. 98.
- Griffis's Honda the Samurai. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 103.
- Hale's James Freeman Clarke. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 423.
- Hughes's Principles of Natural and Supernatural Morals. *J. H. Hyslop*. 646.
- Johnson's What is Reality? *George Harris*. 645.
- Kautzsch's Die Heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments. *George F. Moore*. 197.
- Kautzsch und Socin's Die Genesis. *George F. Moore*. 198.
- Larcom's As it is in Heaven. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 317.
- Lewes's Problems of Life and Mind. *J. H. Hyslop*. 93.
- Orr's Life and Letters of Robert Brown-ing. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 650.
- Palmer's The Odyssey of Homer. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 655.
- Parsons's The Professor's Letters. *Chas. C. Starbuck*. 103.
- Pearse's Elijah the Man of God. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 103.
- Perry's The General Ecclesiastical Constitution of the American Church. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 317.
- Petavel-Olliff's Le Problème de L'Immortalité. *Charles H. Oliphant*. 99.
- Petavel-Olliff's Les Droits et les Torts de la Papauté. *Charles H. Oliphant*. 100.
- Phelps's Fourteen to One. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 320.
- Plummer's The Expositor's Bible. *William H. Ryder*. 314.
- Sanford's A Concise Cyclopædia of Religious Knowledge. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 201.
- Schelling's Poetic and Verse Criticism of the Reign of Elizabeth. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 655.
- Secrétan's Études Sociales. *Charles H. Oliphant*. 100.
- Secrétan's Les Droits de l'Humanité. *Charles H. Oliphant*. 100.
- Sell's The Church in the Mirror of History. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 422.
- Simcox's The Writers of the New Testament. *William H. Ryder*. 315.
- Todd's Christian Missions in the Nineteenth Century. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 319.
- Towle's Plato: Protagoras. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 654.
- Toy's Judaism and Christianity. *Henry Preserved Smith*. 311.
- Woodberry's Studies in Letters and Life. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 652.
- Wright's Charles Grandison Finney. *Charles C. Starbuck*. 203.
- Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche. *George F. Moore*. 649.

BOOKS RECEIVED, 429, 543, 656.

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THE RELATION OF THE CHURCH TO MODERN
SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT.¹

WE have all heard — are still hearing — of the traditional conflict between the church and science. What is the cause of this conflict? The fundamental cause, I am convinced, is the radically wrong conception of the nature and the limits of human knowledge; not, indeed, confined to the church, but characteristic of all early ages, and still lingering in our own. We mistake human knowledge for *absolute* truth, — truth in its final and perfect form. Spirit, indeed, is immortal, but the material form which it takes on must grow and develop. So also truth, indeed, is eternal, but the human forms of it which we call knowledges, beliefs, creeds, must ever change to higher and higher forms.

Now science has always recognized this. It is the chief glory of science that she is progressive. So long as the church holds the notion that she possesses absolute truth in its final form, so long the warfare will continue. But observe an apparent anomaly in the history of this war. From every conflict science seems to have come out victorious, and yet from every apparent defeat the church has come out purer and stronger. It is this function of science in relation to the church, namely, that of purifying, ennobling, and strengthening, — ennobling by elevating the plane of our religious conceptions, strengthening by making more rational our religious belief, — it is this regenerating function of science that I wish to bring briefly before you this evening.

All human progress is a process of expansion of the mental

¹ An address delivered at the Presbyterian Church of Berkeley, November 7, 1890.

horizon, — an expansion from the narrow limitations of the animal to the universality of the spiritual. Now science is the type of human progress in the field of thought. This law of expansion, of generalization, and finally of universalization is not only conspicuous in her own domain, but by a sort of intellectual contagion she has gradually infected every other department with her own spirit and methods.

I said the law is conspicuous in her own domain. Let me illustrate. There was a time, and that not many decades ago, when each department of science was a *separate province* of thought, with its own group of phenomena, and its own characteristic force governing phenomena by its own special provincial laws. Now, on the contrary, all laws are coextensive with nature, only modified by varying conditions. All forces — life, chemical affinity, electricity, gravity — by correlation are but different forms of *one* universal energy. Nature, once broken up into many provinces, each with its own provincial laws, administered by its own petty sovereign force, is now become a great empire, governed by universal laws.

It is true the same process of expansion is seen everywhere, and in every department of thought, but in science alone the progress is steadily onward without ebb, because it is by the use of methods which she clearly understands and deliberately applies. The method of science, therefore, is the method of reason, and must be applicable to the whole domain of thought. It is already being applied, and will continue more and more to be applied, to the traditional beliefs of the church. The effect will undoubtedly be revolutionary, but also, I am convinced, in the highest degree beneficent. Like all else human, Christian beliefs were at first narrow, local, provincial. They have all along been slowly expanding; but the effect of science, by the contagion of her example, by the application of her methods, and the logical consequences of her discoveries, has been to hasten the process of expansion of religious conceptions to a degree that is terrifying to those who still remain in the provincial state. But this condition of alarm is only temporary. The introduction of a great truth — like the law of gravitation or the law of evolution — necessitates the readjustment of our whole mental furniture on a new and higher plane, and in a nobler order. But unfortunately the furniture of most people's minds, by long traditional use, has become so fixed, so screwed down to the floor, that it is impossible to readjust without tearing up the whole mental flooring. But the *final* effect must be, what it has ever

been, only beneficent. The mission of science in relation to the church is to elevate the plane of religious thought and test the validity of religious beliefs; to purify the temple of truth by driving out the false and low, and to strengthen its foundations by verifying the true and the noble.

I wish now to give, very briefly, some examples of these effects. But the subject is so vast that I can only give the barest outline.

I. *Conception of God.*

This, the most fundamental of all religious conceptions, has gradually changed from a gross anthropomorphism to a true spiritual theism, and the change is largely due to science.

There are three main stages in the evolution of the idea of God. (1.) The first, as already said, is a low anthropomorphism. He is altogether such an one as ourselves, but larger and stronger. His action on nature, like our own, is direct. His will is wholly manlike, — capricious and *without law*. (2.) The second stage is still anthropomorphism, but of a nobler sort. He is manlike still, but also *kinglike*. He is not present *in* nature, but sits enthroned above nature, in solitary majesty. He acts on nature, not directly in person, but *indirectly* by physical forces and natural laws. He is an absentee landlord, governing his estate by means of appointed *agents*, which are the natural forces and laws established in the beginning. He interferes personally and by direct action only occasionally, to initiate something new or rectify something going wrong. This idea culminated in the eighteenth century, and was the necessary result of, or at least in full accord with, the scientific ideas then prevalent, namely, the ideas of *pre-established eternal stability* of cosmic order and *fixedness of organic types*. God was the great *artificer*, the great *architect*, working as it were on *foreign* material, and conditioned by its nature. He established all things as they are in the beginning, and they have continued substantially the same ever since.

This conception still lingers in the religious mind, and is even perhaps the prevailing one now. It is a great advance on the preceding one, but alas! it removes Him beyond the reach of our love. He is the architect of worlds, the artificer of the eye, the omnipotent sovereign of the universe, but not our Father. We are his *creatures*, but not his *children*.

(3.) The last stage of the evolution of the conception of God is true spiritual theism. God is immanent, resident in nature. Nature is the house of many mansions in which He ever dwells. The forces of nature are the different forms of his energy, acting

directly at all times and in all places, and determining all its phenomena. The laws of nature are the modes of operation of the omnipresent divine energy, invariable because He is perfect. The objects of nature are the objectified, externalized, materialized states of divine consciousness, — divine thoughts objectified by the divine will. In this view we return again to direct action, but in a nobler, spiritual, godlike form. He is again brought very near to every one of us, and restored to our love. In Him we live and move and have our being. By Him all things exist, in Him all things consist; without Him there would be and could be nothing. This view has been held by noble men in all ages, especially in early Christian ages, but is now at last *verified*, and well-nigh demonstrated, by the theory of evolution. No other view is any longer tenable.

This is the most fundamental of all changes in religious conception. All others flow as necessary consequences from this one. Some of these necessary outcomes, especially the nature, the origin, the immortality of man's spirit, and the relation of man's spirit to the Divine Spirit, I have already explained on other occasions,¹ and cannot repeat now. But there are some others which flow so directly and obviously that they may be presented in very brief space.

II. *The Question of First and Second Causes.*

Among the most obvious of these is the question of first and second causes. This distinction, I suppose, did not exist in early thought. It is peculiar to the second stage of the conception of God mentioned above. It is a necessary corollary of the idea of God as the great Architect and Governor, sitting outside of nature and acting on nature as on foreign material. According to this view, God is the original and primary cause of all things, but He *delegates* his power to secondary forces, such as gravity, heat, electricity, etc., which are therefore the *immediate causes* of phenomena. I believe that most people hold this view still. But it is now being displaced by the idea of God immanent or resident in nature, as already explained. This view is a complete *identification* of *first and second causes*. All causes are mere modes of the first cause. They seem to us secondary, that is, *necessary and unconscious*, only because they act according to invariable law. But law itself is only the mode of operation of the first cause.

¹ *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought*, Part III., chaps. iv., v.; also, *Andover Review*, July, 1890.

Thus we have necessarily the same three stages of evolution here also. (1.) First, all is first cause, *direct*, manlike, capricious, without law. (2.) Then the first cause acts kinglike, *indirectly*, by many appointed agents subject to preënnacted laws. These agents, or secondary causes, directly determine all natural phenomena. (3.) Lastly comes the complete combination and reconciliation of these two extremes. All is by first cause and direct action like the first; all is by invariable law like the second, the law being only the mode of operation of his perfect will.

III. *The Question of General vs. Special Providence.*

So also providence, general and special, is only another phase of the same question, and solved in the same way. At first all is *special* providence, — the result of caprice and favoritism without law. Then all, or nearly all, becomes *general* providence, operating by invariable law, except that from time to time the general law is broken through for special purposes when necessary. Is not this the prevailing view now? Lastly, these two must be combined and reconciled in a third. All is alike general and special. — general, that is, according to law; and special, that is, by direct action. There is no real distinction between the two, — the distinction vanishes in the presence of a higher view.

IV. *The Natural and the Supernatural.*

In precisely the same category falls the question of the natural and the supernatural. Here also the same three stages are evident, and the same solution applies. (1.) First, all is supernatural and lawless, and nature is viewed with stupid wonder and abject fear. (2.) Then nature is reduced to mechanical laws, and subject to man. Wonder and fear give place to indifference, and perhaps to contempt. We practically live without God in the world. It requires now miracles, or a violent breaking through of law, in order to startle us out of our indifference, and awaken in us a sense of the Divine Presence. (3.) But, lastly, we must come to a higher philosophy than either of these. We must recognize that all is natural and all is supernatural according as we view it. All is natural, that is, according to law: but all is *supernatural*, that is, above nature, as *we usually regard nature*; for all is permeated with the immediate Divine Presence. Wonder in the contemplation of nature returns, or rather exalted reverence and rational worship is given in place of open-mouthed wonder and superstitious fear. Once clearly conceive the idea of God permeating nature and determining *directly* all its phenomena, and the distinction between the natural and the

supernatural disappears from view. And with it disappears also the necessity of miracles *as we usually understand miracles*. In fact the word, as we usually understand it, has no longer any meaning.

I must stop here a moment to explain, lest I be misunderstood; and to enforce, lest I be supposed to speak lightly. Miracles in the sense of violation of law are simply *impossible*, because law, both physical and moral, and one as much as the other, is the expression of the *essential nature and perfection* of God. It is as impossible for God, *in this sense*, to perform a miracle as it is for Him to lie; and for the same reason, namely, that it is contrary to his essential nature, and therefore unthinkable to the philosophical mind. In what sense, then, is a miracle possible? I answer, only as an occurrence *according to a law higher than any we yet know*. If we define nature as consisting only of phenomena governed by physical and chemical laws, then *life* becomes supernatural and miraculous. If we reduce the phenomena of life to law, and include these also in our definition of nature, but limit it there, then the *self-determined phenomena of a free moral agent* becomes supernatural, and therefore miraculous. Even these are doubtless subject to law, and may be included in our definition of nature; but there may well be other and higher modes of divine activity, the law of which we do not and may never understand. These are above our definition and conception of nature, and therefore to us supernatural and miraculous. If we are to believe in miracles, it is only in this sense.

V. *Question of Design in Nature.*

So, again, the question of design or purpose or mind in nature is similarly solved. It has been said — it is continually now being triumphantly said — that evolution has destroyed forever the teleological view of nature, that is, the idea of design or purpose in nature. Yes, if we mean the manlike, cabinet-making, watch-making design of Paley and the older writers, — a separate petty design for each separate object. It has, indeed, destroyed this; but only to replace it by a far nobler conception, a truly godlike design, — a design embracing all space and running through all time, including and absorbing all possible and separate designs, and predetermining them by a universal law of evolution.

Or the same question may be put another way; as, "*Mind vs. Mechanics in Nature.*" In the evolution of thought on this subject, at first all was *mind*, but lawless, capricious, like our own. Then one department after another of nature was reduced

to mechanical, physical, necessary law, until all have been, or will be, or conceivably may be, thus reduced; and mind seems at last driven out of nature entirely. The friends of religion and of the church in despair cry out for at least some small corner left for mind. Thus we see only recently going on, in an English scientific periodical,¹ a discussion on the subject of "Mind as One of the Causes of Evolution." And has it come to this? God, the Divine Mind, begging, as it were, for recognition as *one* of the causes of evolution? The true solution of this question is evident. It is the same as in the other cases. *All* is mind, or none; also, *all* is mechanics, or none. *All is mind through mechanics.* Mechanics is but the mode of operation of the Divine Mind.

VI. *Question of Mode of Creation.*

I might multiply examples, almost without limit, of questions the solution of which depends on this one of the relation of God to nature. I give one more, namely, the *method of creation*.

The creation of the universe *at once*, and then *rest ever since*, — this old anthropomorphic idea is now replaced by that of *continuous* creation, *unhasting*, *unresting*, by an eternal process of evolution. For if the universal law of gravitation is the divine mode of sustentation of the universe, the no less universal law of evolution is the divine process of creation.

But it will be objected that this view of the relation of God to nature is nothing less than Pantheism; that it destroys the personality of Deity, the necessary foundation of all effective religion; that by this view God becomes a sort of vital principle of nature operating *unconsciously* and by necessary law. I will not stop to argue this question, as I might, because I have already done so elsewhere.² I will now only make one remark. It is this: In our view of the nature of God, the choice is *not* between personality and something *lower* than personality, namely, a blind unconscious force operating by necessity, as the pantheist and materialist would have us believe; but between *our* personality and something immeasurably *higher* than personality as we know it. Our language is so poor that we are compelled to represent even *our* mental phenomena by physical images; how much more, then, the divine nature by its *human image*! *Self-conscious personality* is the *highest* thing we know or *can conceive*. We offer Him the very best thing we have when we call Him a Person,

¹ Duke of Argyle, *Nature*, vol. xxxiv., p. 335; S. B. Mitra, p. 385, 1886.

² *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought*, Part III., chap. vi.

even though we know that this, our best, falls far short of the infinite reality.

THE CHRIST.

Thus far I have touched only our ideas of God as being the most fundamental of all, and therefore controlling all other religious ideas. But religion and the church are concerned also with *man*. Thus far I have spoken of the expansion and elevation of our most fundamental religious *conceptions*; but science ought also to *verify* whatever is truest and noblest in our religious *beliefs*. Here I touch on still more delicate ground. Shall I go on?

What, then, think ye of Christ? This is, indeed, *the* test question, and we ought frankly to meet it. Does science have anything to say on this question also? I think it does. I shall not trouble myself and you with stating and attempting to combat the diverse and often crude views held on this subject, but shall only state the view to which I am led both by science and, as I think, by a rational Christianity. According to this view, as *organic evolution* reached its goal and completion in *man*, so human evolution reaches *its* goal and completion in the ideal man, — “*the Christ*.” Observe, I say *the* Christ. Whether this ideal has ever appeared in the flesh is a distinct question which I shall speak of later. According to this view, the Christ is the *ideal man*, and therefore, — (mark the implication), — and *therefore* the *divine* man. We are all as *men* (as contradistinguished from *brutes*), — we are *all*, I say, *sons of God*; the Christ is the *well-beloved Son*. We are all in the *image* of God; He is the *express and perfect image*. We are all *partakers* in various degrees of the *divine nature*; in Him the divine nature is *completely realized*. It is not necessary that the ideal man — the Christ — should be perfect in knowledge or infinite in power. On the contrary, we ought to expect Him to grow in wisdom and in stature like other men. But He *must* be perfect in *character*, — in moral nature. *Character is essential spirit*. All else, even knowledge, is only *environment for its culture*. In the blaze of the light of modern science we are apt to forget this. Character is the *attitude* of the human spirit toward the Divine Spirit. If I should add anything to this definition, I would say that it is spiritual attitude and spiritual energy. In the Christ this attitude must be wholly right; the harmony, the union with the divine, must be perfect. This perfect union gives of necessity, also, fullness of spiritual energy.

I fear you may think I am treading on holy ground. But no

ground is too holy to be trodden by reason, if only with reverent spirit, — with shoes removed. I have gone so far that I *must* go on. I dare not stop without explaining myself more fully. I wish especially to show that, although the Christ must be human, — yes, even more intensely human than any one of us, — yet, by the law of evolution, we ought to expect Him to differ from us in an inconceivable degree. This I do by a series of illustrations.

We have said that the Christ is the ideal, and, therefore, the divine Man; that He is the goal and completion of humanity. But in evolution a goal is not only a completion of one stage, but also the *beginning* of a *new* stage, on a higher plane of life, with new and higher powers and capacities *unimaginable from any lower plane*. Let me illustrate this important point.

(1.) As man is the ideal, the goal and completion of animal evolution, and yet is he also a birth into a new and higher plane of life — the *spiritual*; so the Christ, the ideal Man, may be only the goal and completion of human evolution, and yet is He also a *birth* into a new and higher plane, — the *divine*.

(2.) As the *human spirit* preëxisted in embryo in animals, slowly developing through all geological times, and finally came to birth and immortality in man; so the *divine spirit* is in embryo in man in various stages of development, and comes to birth and completion of divine life in the Christ.

(3.) As animals reached *conscious relations* with God in man, even so man reaches *union* with God in the Christ.

(4.) As man, the *ideal of animal* evolution, is a union of the animal with the spiritual; so the Christ, the *ideal of human* evolution, is a union of the human with the divine.

(5.) As, with the appearance of man, there were introduced into the world new powers and capacities unimaginable from the animal point of view, and therefore from that point of view seemingly *supernatural*, that is, above their nature; so with the appearance of the Christ there ought to be new powers and capacities unimaginable to the human point of view, and therefore to us seemingly supernatural, that is, above our nature.

The Christ as defined above, that is, as the ideal man, is undoubtedly a true object of rational worship. There are two, and only two, fundamental moral principles, — love to God and love to man. Both must be embodied in a rational worship. In Christianity the one is embodied in the worship of an Infinite Spirit, — God; the other in the worship of the ideal man, — the Christ. How much more effective this, as an agent of human culture, than

the worship of the impersonal abstraction, called Humanity, of the Positivists !

But now comes the last, the burning question, but distinctly a different question : Has the Christ ever come any otherwise than, in the human imagination, as an ideal ? Has he ever come in the flesh ? In a word, Is Jesus the Christ ?

Let it be admitted that Jesus was not perfect in knowledge (He himself said, "Of that day and hour knoweth no man, not even the Son, but the Father only") ; nor infinite in power (He felt human weakness like others, and prayed to be delivered). Let it be admitted that He *increased* in wisdom and in stature like other men. But in character, in the perfect rightness of the *attitude of his spirit toward the Divine Spirit*, the completeness of the conformity of his will to the Divine Will, who has been able to find any defect ? May we not, then, accept Him as the Christ, as the best ideal, not only that we know, but that we can conceive ? And since ideals are the great agents in the formation of character, are we not *bound* to accept him as our *leader*, as the Captain of our salvation ?

But it will be objected that this is inconsistent with the idea of evolution ; for the goal, or completion, or ideal of any stage cannot come *until the end*. I answer, this is true of *organic* but *not* of *human* evolution. There is an essential difference in this regard between these two kinds of evolution. In addition to all the factors of organic evolution, in human evolution there is introduced a new and higher factor which immediately takes precedence of all others. This factor is the *conscious, voluntary coöperation of the human spirit in the work of its own evolution*. The method of this new factor consists essentially in the formation and especially in the *pursuit of ideals*. In organic evolution *species* are transformed by the *environment*. In human evolution *spirit or character* is transformed by *its own ideals*. Organic evolution is by *necessary* law ; human evolution is by voluntary effort, that is, by *free* law. Organic evolution is by a *pushing* upward and onward from below and behind ; human evolution, by a *pulling* upward and onward from above and in front by the attractive force of ideals. Thus the ideal of organic evolution cannot come *until the end* ; while the attracting ideals of human evolution *must* come — whether only in the imagination or realized in the flesh — but *must come somehow in the course*. The most powerfully attractive ideal ever presented to the human mind, and therefore the most potent agent in the evolution of human char-

acter, is *the Christ*. Thus ideal must come — whether in the imagination or in the flesh, but must come somehow — *in the course* and not at the end. *At the end the whole human race must reach that ideal*, — must reach “the measure of the stature of the fullness of the Christ.” But this can never be except by the attractive force of the ideal already come in the course. The Christ must reveal the right way of life before we can follow and transform our characters thereby.

But it will be again objected that all ideals are only *partial* and *temporary*. We are drawn onward and upward by many successive ideals. Ideals are only milestones in our course which we successively reach and put behind us, while we press on toward another. They are but rounds of a ladder which we successively put beneath us as we climb higher. This ideal, too, — the Christ, — is only temporary ; we will put this also behind us and pass on.

On this objection I make two brief remarks : First, Let it be admitted that such in many ways is the course of human progress, but who has been able to reach this ideal and conceive a higher ? When we have realized this one in our character and conduct, it will be time enough to seek another. Again : It is true that the human race in all its earlier stages has advanced, and in many directions is still advancing, only by means of partial and temporary ideals, which are replaced when they have served their purpose ; but this itself is a temporary phase of evolution. There must come, and does in fact come, a time when we catch glimpses of the *absolute* Ideal. Then the gaze becomes fixed, and we are drawn onward and upward forever. The human race has already reached the stage at which the absolute moral Ideal is *attractive*. This Divine Ideal can never again be lost, because it is itself the agent of its own realization.

Joseph Le Conte.

BERKELEY, CAL.

JOHN WILLIAMSON NEVIN, 1803-1886.¹

“As I take it,” says Thomas Carlyle, “universal history, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the history of the great men who have worked here. They were

¹ *The Life and Work of John Williamson Nevin, D. D., LL. D.* By Theodore Appel, D. D. Philadelphia : Reformed Church Publication House, 907 Arch Street. 8vo, pp. 776. \$3.00.

the leaders of men, these great ones ; the modelers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain ; all things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization and embodiment, of thoughts that dwelt in the great men sent into the world." To those who knew him, these words will appear strikingly applicable to John Williamson Nevin. In one sense, he wrought in obscurity. Leaving a large and well-known communion, — not because he was dissatisfied, but because he felt called to a work which happened to lie outside of it, — he went into another ; one smaller in numbers, and with even less prestige than its size would have seemed to claim. In that smaller body he wrought out all his most characteristic thoughts, and saw them take form in a movement of which we might say, in the manner of Carlyle, that it is *himself* ; a movement, however, so true to the original faith, the historic life, the present needs of the church catholic, that its significance cannot fail to appear more and more, as the general questions concerning the church and her unity are pressed upon our attention, and demand some worthy answer. We are well aware that this will seem extravagant praise to the reader, who is even now wondering whether he has ever heard the name. But that we are writing words of soberness, let the following quotation from Dean Stanley attest. In an address in March, 1879, after his return from the United States, he said : " Döllinger, when asked what theologians the Americans had produced, answered, ' Only two, — Channing, and the German Reformed pastor, Nevin,' the author of ' The Spirit of Sect,' and father of the accomplished chaplain to the American Episcopal Church at Rome."

John Williamson Nevin was born in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, on February 20, 1803, and spent his boyhood on a farm. His father, John Nevin, was a cultivated man, a college graduate, and the family, of Scotch-Irish stock, were in good circumstances. From the atmosphere of old-fashioned Presbyterian family religion, he passed into a very different one when, at fourteen, he came to Schenectady, New York, to enter Union College. The type of religion prevalent there was emotional rather than educational and churchly ; and his earnest nature was deeply impressed during a time of " revival," in which, after a period of gloom, he came out as one of the " converted." His training, up to the time of his leaving home, had been thoroughly and seriously Christian ; baptized in infancy, he had been " taught to pray, to abhor

sin, to fear God, and to obey the Lord Jesus Christ." If evidence of piety were asked, we could but point to the marked purity and strict conscientiousness of his conduct. He was a Christian youth. But he had not had that "experience" through which others had passed, and which was deemed indispensable if one would be saved. So, under the pressure of his surroundings, like many another young Christian since, he was thrown into a state of great anxiety about his soul, and was led to think that his religious condition thus far had been one of dead formalism, from which he resolved to rouse himself; and finally, though not even then in a way satisfactory to himself, he "entertained a hope," and was considered to have "become a Christian."

That in this awakening there was a genuine element, we would not deny. His Christian standing needed, of course, to become a matter of conscious choice, of personal reaffirmation, with himself; and in its poor, distorted form this process served that purpose. But the remainder of his college course, instead of being filled with a higher joy, was turned into a period of morbid introspection, and when he graduated in 1821, he was, as he himself many years later described it, "dyspeptic both in body and mind."

At the age of eighteen he was considered still too young to enter upon professional studies, even if his health had permitted; moreover, he had not yet been able to come to a decision as to his calling in life. So he spent two years more in the quiet country home, and at the end of that time entered Princeton Seminary; not, indeed, sure that he was called to the gospel ministry, but hoping that before the close of the course his duty would be made clear to him. In linguistic and exegetical studies he led his class, and at his graduation he accepted an invitation to take charge of the department of Dr. Charles Hodge, who was to spend two years in Europe. Upon the return of the regular professor, young Nevin was called to a chair in the new Presbyterian Seminary to be established at Allegheny; and thither, after delays incident to the beginning of the undertaking, he went in 1830 to assume duties which in this later day are divided among several professors. Here he remained for ten years, with but a single colleague in the work, devoting himself specially to Biblical literature, but adding to his seminary duties such outside tasks as frequent (and gratuitous) supply of vacant pulpits, editing a reform journal, and in other ways putting forth efforts on behalf of temperance and the abolition of slavery. In fact, so pronounced was

he in advocating these great causes that the conservatives of the General Assembly, on one occasion, informally begged him to desist. Nevertheless he retained throughout the confidence of his brethren, and was not molested in his position as a church teacher.

It was during his ten years' professorship at Western Seminary that the great schism between the Old and the New School Presbyterians took place. Professor Nevin's ties all bound him to stand on the Old School side; it is worthy of note, however, that he requested an entry to be made on the records of his presbytery to the effect that in voting his adherence to the Old School Assembly he must not be understood to unchurch the New School Assembly, or to deny its legitimate succession. It was thought by his brethren that he was over-scrupulous in the matter, but they granted the request; when the two bodies came together many years after, it gave him pleasure to recall an action in which, in 1838, he had stood almost alone.

During the latter part of his connection with the seminary at Allegheny, his views were in a transition state. His necessarily wide reading and study, reinforcing his extensive and thorough Biblical learning, served to broaden and vitalize his dogmatic views; and, to set him upon a different track, Neander's works in church history did the rest. But this was a very far-reaching intellectual and spiritual experience, and it did not at once come to full consciousness within him. Christological elements lay in his mind side by side with those of the mechanical and unhistorical system in which he had been instructed, and his master-principle was still in the latter, even while he was groping for a better.

There is no evidence that, when a unanimous call was sent him in 1840 by the Synod of the German Reformed Church, he was at all disaffected toward the Presbyterian Church. The Seminary of the Reformed Church, then located at Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, had suffered greatly from changes in the professorships, and by a series of providential events the attention of the Synod had been directed, greatly to his surprise, to Professor Nevin. Throughout life it was characteristic of him to pay the most scrupulous heed to everything that appealed to him as duty, and to submit every important question to his God in prayer. And although in this case he found many things to consider, and much to dissuade him from the step, his sense of duty became so clear and strong that he resigned his chair at Allegheny, received dis-

missal from his presbytery, and cast in his lot with a people that were strangers to him. He gave himself to them without reservation, and they warmly reciprocated by rallying about him, and allowing him all freedom in public teaching and discussion. In the long controversies that arose later, the great body of his Synod were always with him, giving him a calm and undisturbed support; for their confidence in his ability, his entire unselfishness, and his perfect sincerity could only grow the more he was really put to the test.

In fact, a new life now opened before him. At Mercersburg he found Dr. Augustus Rauch, President of Marshall College, a man of great gifts, a thorough master in philosophy, whose "Psychology and Anthropology," published the same year, elicited high praise in many quarters. This man, whom the "Princeton Review" admired as "the elegant scholar, the tasteful critic, the philosophical guide to the interior of art," found in the new theological professor a most congenial co-worker; while the latter, in his turn, having long paid attention to German writers, felt it a precious privilege to have beside him a guide who was thoroughly at home in German literature and thought. To Dr. Rauch it was a new inspiration; to Dr. Nevin it was better than a course at European universities. The friendship so happily formed and so full of promise was, alas! to be of short duration. Within less than a year Dr. Rauch was taken ill and died, — an irreparable loss to the college and the church.

But practical affairs, and not merely academic pursuits, soon engaged Dr. Nevin's attention. He wrote for the church paper, seeking to awaken a deeper religious life; he went about among the churches, and by speech and pen enlisted popular interest in the endowment of the institutions at Mercersburg; he prepared, for the laity as well as the clergy, a series of articles on "The Heidelberg Catechism," in which he portrayed the beginnings of the Reformed Church, and set forth its true historic character, — a character which he believed was in danger of being lost, and needed watchful effort to retain and restore. And in this he was not mistaken. Indeed, so soon was he to have proof of this in his own person that he had no time left him to anticipate the crisis. We refer to the once famous "Anxious Bench" controversy. The Reformed Church at Mercersburg, being without a pastor, was temporarily supplied by professors and students, and afterward, at Dr. Nevin's own suggestion, by a former Princeton Seminary friend of his. This preacher had adopted the so-called *new*

measures, and, having by his emotional sermons drawn large congregations, suddenly one Sunday evening, while Dr. Nevin was seated in the pulpit, produced the "Anxious Bench" paraphernalia, and in a short time converted the staid old church into a scene of noise and disorder. At the close of the "service" Dr. Nevin was requested to add a word, which he did — in a somewhat different vein from the address preceding it. He showed the difference between coming up to the altar and coming to Christ; between excited feeling and true faith; and warned his hearers against self-deception. But this was not the end. The people loved to see their church crowded, felt that they could raise more salary for such a man, and decided to extend him a call. Distasteful as it all must have been to Dr. Nevin, he could, nevertheless, not suffer such a state of things to come upon the only Reformed Church in the place, the church which he himself, as well as the students, must regularly attend. He wrote a letter to the candidate, frankly telling him that while he hoped the call would be accepted, he also hoped that the "new measures" would be laid aside, and the catechetical system, as the legitimate system of the Reformed Church, consistently used and faithfully adhered to; otherwise they two would be unable to work together harmoniously. The result was a very long and indignant letter in reply, and the candidate's refusal to come.

Meanwhile, however, this emotional system had gained adherents among his own students; to whom, in his lectures on Pastoral Theology, he explained the reasons for his position, and the evils of this new type of religion as being in the end hurtful to true spirituality. These lectures he amplified and published under the title, "The Anxious Bench, a Tract for the Times," and the little book, which was soon translated into German, had an immense circulation.

"Simeon the Stylite," the writer said in the course of his tract, "distinguished himself in the fifth century by taking his station on the top of a pillar, for the glory of God and the benefit of his own soul. This whimsical discipline he continued to observe for forty-seven years. Meanwhile he became an object of widespread veneration. Vast crowds came from a distance to gaze upon him and hear him preach. The *measure* took with the people wonderfully. Thousands of heathen were converted and baptized by his hand. Among these, it may be charitably trusted, there were some whose conversion was inward and solid. God may have made use of Simeon's pillar — sixty feet high — to

bring them to himself. The seal of his approbation might, therefore, seem to have rested upon it to an extraordinary extent. No wonder the device became popular. The quackery of the pillar took possession of the Eastern world and stood for a century, a monument of the folly that gave it birth. We laugh at it now; and yet it seemed a good thing in its time, and carried a weight of popularity with it, such as no new measure can boast of in our day. Monkenry was to many, in fact, the means of conversion and salvation; and to this day an argument might be framed in its favor, under this view, no less plausible, to say the least, than any that can be presented for the use of the Anxious Bench."¹

The publication of this tract was, in its day, a bold thing. The system it denounced had not only made great inroads upon the so-called Puritan denominations; it had entered also the Lutheran and the Reformed churches, and was in some regions threatening to efface entirely their historic identity as Reformation churches. What Dr. Nevin intended, therefore, was not to make an onslaught upon those bodies whose genius was that of the Anxious Bench, but rather to contend for the recovery of the heritage of his own communion; for the restoration of its own proper life; for the development of its own best resources, along those catholic lines which, running down from the apostles' time, and loyally within the Reformation movement of the sixteenth century, might most surely lead to a grander church of the future by being loyal to the church of the past. And so it was that, almost at the outset of his career at Mercersburg, he began to deal practically with the *Church Question*; he was forced to face it, and forced to speak his mind, whether he would or no. Considering the prevalence of the views he was compelled to antagonize, it must be said that even the copious abuse he received was less than might have been expected, and, so far from endangering his official position or weakening his influence, his fearless utterance only strengthened his hold upon the church at large.

Dr. Rauch had passed away, and to the duties of his seminary chair, Dr. Nevin added some of the college work which had been done by the late lamented president. Enormous as were his powers, Dr. Nevin was now without doubt overtaxed, and the Synod set about finding a colleague for him at the seminary. They found a man whose acceptance of the call to Mercersburg was in its way one of the most fortunate things that ever befell American Christendom, — Dr. Philip Schaff, then a young lec-

¹ *Life and Work of John Williamson Nevin*, p. 166.

turer at Berlin, already rising in fame. He entered upon his duties in 1844, and prepared an inaugural address, which was in reality a solid theological essay, and which was published the following year in an English translation, with Introduction by Dr. Nevin, and also, in an appendix, a sermon by Dr. Nevin, on Catholic Unity. The title of the inaugural was, "The Principle of Protestantism as related to the Present State of the Church," and the volume, containing thus the utterances of the two Mercersburg professors, naturally attracted some attention. The position taken by the writers would not to-day seem startling, however far the reader might be from holding such a position himself: this, namely, that Protestantism was neither a revolution in the sixteenth century, nor a mere restoration of ancient Christianity, but a true advance in the history of the church; not, therefore, itself the final and perfect form of Christianity, but only a transition stage on the way to a higher consummation, in which all branches of the church shall merge in a real unity, though in what form, it would be impossible to predict. Now to hold a view like this — a view of historical development — implies a sort of vindication of the mediæval Latin church, hence, by inference, of Roman Catholicism, of "Popery;" and to say a good word for "Popery" was in the year 1845, far more than in the year 1890, a sin not to be covered. Not, indeed, that either of the writers had, even indirectly, intimated that in the great issue Romanism was in any degree in the right and Protestantism in the wrong. It was simply the assertion that the Church of Rome occupied a legitimate position (now transcended) in the course of historical development; that, in other words, she was not, simply and purely, of the Devil. But even this was too strong doctrine for a Dr. Joseph F. Berg, a violent anti-popery lecturer, pastor of one of the Reformed churches in Philadelphia, and editor of "The Protestant Banner," who began in an irregular way to prefer charges against Dr. Nevin as betraying his trust in his official capacity as a seminary professor. The assailed professor was equal to the emergency. He wrote a series of articles on "Pseudo-Protestantism," in which he showed the evils and dangers of a merely negative Protestantism, whose fundamental tenet is not the truth of the gospel, but the falsity of Rome. He held up to the light its uncharitableness; its resort to unworthy weapons, its participation in the very vices of which Popery is accused; its rationalism, incurred by a zeal to avoid Romish errors, ending in virtual denial of the mysteries of sacraments and the church.

Of the charge of "Romanizing tendencies" on his own part, he cleared himself most effectually by taking his stand upon the positive faith of the Reformation.

But Dr. Berg would not allow the matter to drop there. He found a way to bring the *Principle of Protestantism* up for trial before the Synod. An exhaustive discussion, lasting several days, absorbed the attention of that body, and served to bring the merits of the case clearly to view. When the vote was taken the professors were all but unanimously acquitted. Thus was the Mercersburg movement well under way; and full account having been demanded of it and full account given, it still had the confidence and support of the Synod.

From this time on, the reader of the biography before us will see Dr. Nevin drawn into frequent controversies with leading theologians outside his own church; within his church, the victory, as we have seen, is for the present decidedly on his side. These larger controversies are the more significant as they show us men of most widely separated churches and most widely different schools of thought in turn attacking his views, or under the fire of his criticism of their own, and through them all Dr. Nevin occupying essentially the same position. The Revivalism of the Anxious Bench, the mechanical Orthodoxy of Princeton, the modern Puritan Evangelicalism, the Anglicanism of *jure divino* Episcopacy, the Romanism of Brownson, — he combats each in turn, from the same central stronghold; not as a mere polemic, intent only on victory, but with an ever-deepening enthusiasm for the unity of the church and the real enthronement of Christ as Head over all things.

It may as well be confessed at once that Dr. Nevin's writings are difficult reading. Not altogether because of the profundity of the subjects with which he dealt, though that will account for much of their obscurity; but still more, it seems to us, because of the necessary haste in which he was compelled to write, and partly, also, because of his increased absorption in German thinkers, whose style is often execrable in direct proportion to the magnificence of their ideas. Here lay one great defect in Dr. Nevin's writing; energy it possessed in abundance, clearness and elegance it often lacked, — elegance, which may be dispensed with, clearness, which is the prime and indispensable requisite. With the vast amount of work he carried on, it followed as a matter of course that the numerous papers he wrote could not undergo very careful revision, and in consequence suffered in point of literary form.

There is an occasional lack of proportion, there is a recurrence of phrases the use of which had become second nature to him, but which to the uninitiated obscured rather than illuminated his thought; in short, it is the "*ex tempore* manner" committed for all time to cold type. This is the more to be regretted because of the brilliant gifts of expression with which Dr. Nevin was by nature endowed: to the profundity of the thinker and the grasp of the thorough scholar he added fluency of language, wealth of imagination, a vein of humor side by side with a mystic, devotional fervor, — all contributing to a style which, at its best, is very like Carlyle's in rugged force and exhilarating power. And while it is never to be forgotten that some of the world's greatest men can give but little to literature simply because they give so much to life, and that Dr. Nevin was lavishly spending his energies upon the uplifting of the church and the furnishing of men to minister to her, one cannot help regretting that he could not also have left behind him works of such finished literary form as more abundant leisure and painstaking attention to that matter could have produced.

This by the way. The Synod at York had vindicated its theological professors, but Dr. Berg and his adherents could not rest satisfied. Dr. Nevin had made some statements regarding "the mystical union between Christ and his people," which to them savored of we know not what pernicious errors; and newspaper charges continued to rain in upon him, although the statements in question, being contained in the book that had been on trial, had been officially indorsed. So, during the next year, he wrote "*The Mystical Presence: a Vindication of the Reformed or Calvinistic Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist.*" The discussions to which this book gave rise we can barely mention in passing.¹ Dr. Charles Hodge, of Princeton, tried to set aside its careful and painstaking argument by what Dr. Nevin used to call "a magisterial wave of the hand," and took his leave of the author with a general fling at "German mystics." "Germanism" was in those days a grave offense. It is very different now, but in some quarters the prejudice has not yet passed away. The writer well remembers how, a few years ago, he was naively cautioned, by a brother of very orthodox sentiments, against the use of Meyer's "*Kommentar*," because "he was afraid of those Germans"! As for Dr. Nevin's view of the Lord's Supper, we may give the sub-

¹ In Germany *The Mystical Presence* was reviewed at length by Dr. Ebrard, who commended it, and Dr. Nevin's views generally, in the highest terms.

stance of it briefly in his own words: "The sacrament is not the elements used in its celebration, nor the outward service only in which this consists, but a divine *transaction*, comprehending, along with such visible and earthly forms, the invisible power of the very verities themselves that are thus symbolically represented." Being but a restatement, in more modern terms, of the original Calvinistic teaching, we need not be surprised to find that the same view, essentially, as that of "The Mystical Presence" is maintained by Dr. Henry J. Van Dyke, one of the most honored divines in our Presbyterian Church, in the "Presbyterian Review" for April, 1887.¹

Proofs were not lacking that, in spite of a few opponents, the theological labors of Dr. Nevin were increasingly appreciated by his brethren in the church. In 1848 the Marshall College alumni founded the "Mercersburg Review," chiefly to serve as an organ for their leader. He was tendered the editorship, which, however, he declined; but, in the nature of the case, became the leading contributor. In the pages of this "Review" we must look for the works of Dr. Nevin.² During the first few years his pen was remarkably prolific, and the productions of this period are among his strongest and most strikingly original. It was the time when in England the Oxford movement had come to a crisis, many of its leaders having gone over to Rome; in New England the brilliant Orestes A. Brownson had taken the same step, and was now publishing his "Review;" old issues, long considered dead, were revived, and questions deemed settled were found to be very far from settled; startling light was thrown upon the history of the early church by such a writer as Isaac Taylor, who affirmed that in that church were more corruptions and superstitions than in the modern Roman, and sought thus to disparage the Oxford cult of a patristic Christianity; while in fact the new impulses beginning to be felt in church history, since the advent

¹ *Life and Work of John Williamson Nevin*, p. 295.

² Dr. Nevin's contributions to the *Review* were about one hundred in number, and filled some 2,800 pages. In addition to the few of which specific mention is made in this paper, we quote the titles of several of the more noteworthy: The Sect System; Historical Development; The Liturgical Movement; Bible Christianity; Catholicism; The Church Year; Christian Hymnology; Hodge on Ephesians; The Natural and the Supernatural; Theology of the New Liturgy; Presbyterian Union Convention; Dorner's History of Protestant Theology; The Old Catholic Movement; Christianity and Humanity; "Apollos, or the Way of God," and Reply to an Anglican Catholic; The Pope's Encyclical; Inspiration of the Bible.

of Neander, compelled students of the Church Question to make a reëxamination of the terms of their problem. With the freedom of the scholar and the zeal of the prophet, upheld and stimulated by the expressed confidence of his brethren in him, and with a journal whose pages were at his disposal without restriction as to limit, Dr. Nevin addressed himself to his task with an enthusiasm and yet a solemnity which his reader is made to feel in every line. How he makes the days of Cyprian live before us; how he brings us into the very atmosphere of those early ages; how he portrays the true life of the Apostolic Symbol, and turns to our vision the "grand and glorious objectivities of the Christian faith"! A prominent bishop of the Episcopal Church once referred to these as "the palmy days of the 'Mercersburg Review.'"

There was a common and not altogether strange misapprehension that the views and conclusions which Dr. Nevin had come to hold must consistently lead him to Puseyism or to Rome. Men should, of course, have known better, when his utterances on that matter were so very clear and explicit. But it is the common fate of those who do justice to the truth there may be in some other system, to be regarded as traitors to their own and abettors of the enemy. This sort of thing never deterred Dr. Nevin, nor, indeed, did it ever cease to follow him. Within this very year it has come to the knowledge of the present writer that Dr. Nevin was still being charged with disloyalty to Protestantism; and there are doubtless to-day those who regard him as a crypto-papist.

But, as we say, Dr. Nevin pursued his course, in the fear of God, and in adoring devotion to the mystery of his Incarnate Son; in this latter he was, indeed, of the very temper and spirit of St. John. This it was that both necessitated his passionate faith in a holy Catholic Church, and at the same time forbade his acceptance of the poor, carnal substitutes which the current ecclesiasticisms had to offer. Thus it was that, similarly to Dr. Frederick Denison Maurice (though the two men are utterly different in temperament as in race), the more he prophesied, the more was he cursed of both sides. Yet there he stood: he could do no otherwise. To deny a Catholic Church, to relegate it to the realm of effete superstitions, as was done by the rationalism of so-called "Evangelical" thinkers, — that he could not do without relegating the glorious supernatural fact of the Incarnation thither also. And to make a church by outward aggregation of

units (the old, exploded "social contract" theory in theology), — this all his philosophical postulates made utterly abhorrent to him ; made, again, precisely equivalent to the denial of the church as an object of faith. Or to rest in an invisible church, whose members are all the elect as known to God alone, — elect out of every age and race and clime, — this also (well enough in its place) still left unexplained "His Body the Church," "the fullness of Him that filleth all in all ;" in other words, left unexplained the organic connection between the historic incarnate Christ and the new-born society of Pentecost Day. On the other hand, to limit the holy Catholic Church to the obedience of the Pope, or the communion of bishops, might be to believe in a visible, supernatural order : the trouble was, it seemed to him, that that order was not the church ; that it was not a body organically one with the Christ, instinct with the life of the glorified Lord, but a mechanical arrangement running alongside the society of the Faithful, to keep that society in order, to preserve truth for it and keep it in touch with Heaven. And to believe in a holy Mechanical Arrangement was to him forever not the same as to believe in a holy Catholic Church.

But we are anticipating.

Events in the English Church stirred him deeply. He had no patience with those enlightened persons to whom the Oxford movement signified nothing but puerility destitute of all reason. "The movement," he writes in his article on "The Anglican Crisis," "is of far too high and ominous a character, has enlisted in its service far too great an amount of powerful intellect and learning and study, and has gone forward with far too much prayer and fasting and inward spiritual conflict, and has taken hold far too deeply of the foundations of the best religious life of the nation, and has led and is still leading to far too many and too painful sacrifices, to be resolved with any rationality whatsoever into views and motives so poor as those which are called in to account for it by the self-sufficient class of whom we now speak. . . . The main significance of the crisis lies just here, that it goes so thoroughly to the heart and core of the Church Question, and shuts men up to the necessity of answering it in a direct way, if they answer it at all, with full view of what that answer means. The force of the question in the end is nothing less than this : Whether the original Catholic doctrine concerning the church, as it stood in universal authority through all ages before the Reformation, is to be received and still held as a necessary part of the Christian

faith, or deliberately rejected as an error dangerous to men's souls and at war with the Bible. . . . We ought to see and feel that this is a question, not for Episcopalians as such only, but for all Protestants.

"But the crisis carries with it a sifting efficacy, also, in other directions. It bears with trying severity on the pretensions of Episcopacy, which in England and this country admits either too little or too much for the stability of its own claims. Take the Low Church ground in its communion, and it sinks at once plainly to the order of the sects around it, which have, by their open profession, discarded the proper church theory altogether. . . . It would be far more honest and manly, we think, if the school here noticed, both in England and in this country, would at once forsake Anglicanism as it now stands, and either pass over into the bosom of other denominations, or, if more to their taste, form a new Episcopal sect in open and free fellowship with other sections of orthodox Protestantism."¹

This was certainly a striking prophecy of Reformed Episcopalianism more than a score of years before the event.

But let us follow the writer a little farther. "What shall we now say of that other form of Episcopacy which calls itself *high* only because it is more exclusive in theory as well as practice, and lays greater stress on the legal obligation of its system, while the whole is still taken in the light of a merely mechanical appointment or law? . . . It is possible to take very high ground with this view, to be very aristocratic and very exclusive; but the view itself is low, and proceeds on the want of faith in the proper supernatural character of the church, rather than on the presence of such faith; on which account, the farther it is pushed, it only becomes the more plainly empty and pedantic.

"Faith in the church, in the old ecclesiastical sense, is not a stiff persuasion merely that certain arrangements are of divine appointment; it is the apprehension, rather, of the church as a living, supernatural fact, back of all such arrangements, having its ground in the mystery of the Incarnation, according to the order of the ancient Creed. . . . If Episcopacy and a liturgy be found to grow forth conclusively from the nature of the church, in such catholic view, it is all right and good; let them come in for their proper share of respect."²

In this striking article (from which we regret our inability to

¹ *Life and Work of John Williamson Nevin*, pp. 310, seq.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 314, 315.

quote more) there is much which has the appearance of favoring Rome. It is well that, in the articles on "Brownson's Quarterly Review," Dr. Nevin has left us an admirable criticism of the Roman system. It is too extended an argument to be reproduced here, even in synopsis; but we cannot forbear making a brief quotation:—

"The theory rests on a wrong conception of what authority is in the world of mind, and so, on a wrong conception of the true nature of the church as the divinely constituted organ and bearer of Christ's will to the end of time. . . . This *ecclesia docens* is no organic product or outbirth of the new creation among believers generally, whom it was appointed to save. Its prophetic, priestly, and kingly functions are not, after all, the activity of Christ's mystical body, actualizing itself as a living body by appropriate organs created for such a purpose. The ministry is to be regarded as a body independent of the church, and it must possess a life of its own; in a word, it is a separate organization of its own, through which the higher powers of Christianity must needs be carried forward, by a wholly distinct channel, for the use of the world from age to age." . . . Again: "As a supernatural constitution, it [the church] must not in any sense conform to the order of nature. It must not be organic, nor historical, nor human, in its higher life; but one long monotony rather of mere outward law and authority, superseding or crushing the natural order of the world, and contradicting it, age after age, to the end of time. The Roman system carries in it thus a constant tendency to resolve the force of Christianity into magic, and to fall into a mere *opus operatum* in the worse sense."¹

If Dr. Nevin thus regarded Romanism as directly contradicting the views and principles which governed all his thinking, what room is there to say or to suppose that he was at heart friendly to it? It may be added, in passing, that Mr. Brownson courteously acknowledged his gratification at having met, in this discussion, an opponent very different from those he commonly encountered.

We are becoming painfully conscious of the length to which this paper has already grown, with so much yet remaining to narrate. But we cannot pass over the famous articles on "Early Christianity," "Cyprian," and "The Apostles' Creed," without at least a word. The upshot of the argument was that early Christianity was a very different thing from modern Protestantism, especially in the so-called Evangelical form, very different, to—

¹ *Life and Work of John Williamson Nevin*, pp. 327, 328.

from Anglicanism ; that, therefore, the Reformation was not a restoration of Ante-Nicene religion, but that in many things, and those, too, such as are most distasteful to modern American Protestants, the present counterpart of Ante-Nicene religion (so far at least as outward form or embodiment is concerned) is Roman Catholic religion. That, however, the great distinguishing feature of the life of that early church was its high consciousness of the supernatural order of grace which had come into the world by the Incarnation, and was now embodied in the church ; and that this faith was not in any such degree a living power to-day, but that to recover it — to make the Apostles' Creed once more truly, deeply, the creed of Christians — would in the end solve the whole question of church unity, and every other question of church life. That, moreover, the peril of modern Protestantism lay precisely in its neglect and dislike of the Creed, and in its corresponding evils of sectism and rationalism, leading, unless checked, to the forfeiture of all consciousness of a supernatural kingdom of grace. Setting forth, with forceful reiteration and amplification, startling propositions like these, he at the same time well guarded his own position by recurring to the attitude of the Reformers toward the Creed, showing especially how Calvin's "Institutes" were structurally built upon its framework ; and how, in the milder, more irenic Heidelberg Catechism of his own church, that same venerable Creed was the formative principle, the vital soul.

As a matter of course, every striking utterance of this character called forth protest from some paper or journal, and the result was a very thorough discussion of these topics, and the successive restatement of Dr. Nevin's views from some slightly different angle ; his contributions appearing in almost every number of the "Mercersburg Review," and being often of great length.

The Mercersburg views were from the outset given a more practical direction by being associated with the liturgical movement in the Reformed Church. Nowhere more quickly than in forms of worship will views like these, or their opposites, make their presence felt. The Book of Common Prayer, in its various editions, is a history of the Anglican Church and of English Protestantism. While the Reformed Church is, historically, a liturgical church, yet under the influences prevalent in this country the consciousness of the fact had been largely lost ; and now that the question was before the Synod, it was found that such conception of the church as had come to be held required a
ov that should be more than a mere repristination of sixteenth

century Palatinate or Swiss forms, — while yet the original intention had been simply to restore, not to formulate anything new. It is easy to see what an opportunity this would afford an opposition party. Dr. Nevin served upon the committee, together with Dr. Schaff, — not of his own choice, but as a duty assigned him. It was a long, weary struggle, not without episodes that afforded him the opportunity to witness for the truth as he held it, but, on the whole, oftentimes disheartening. And yet the result was an immense improvement in the worship of the Reformed Church as a whole, for which it was well worth the while to have spent years in toil and controversy.

It was in more immediate connection with this liturgical movement that Dr. Dorner, of Berlin, was led to make some criticisms on the Mercersburg theology, to which Dr. Nevin replied in his "Review," in an exhaustive article of one hundred and twelve pages.¹ The truth is, Dr. Dorner was not accurately informed on all points at issue, — we mean as to the facts of the situation on this side, — and that he held no such faith in a holy Catholic Church as did Dr. Nevin, and hence could not but diverge from Dr. Nevin's views on many other points. We regret that Dr. Appel could not in his biography have given more space to this great debate; but we realize too well what must have been his constant embarrassment from too much material.

And now, as we are confronted by the necessity of bringing this sketch to a close, we feel deeply how little, after all, we have told the reader who John Williamson Nevin was; how he lived and wrought; what he accomplished. We regret our inability to portray the personality of so interesting a man in detail. His biographer, a former pupil and afterward a colleague in the faculty of the college at Mercersburg and at Lancaster, gives us many delightful glimpses of him, many charming bits of reminiscence that serve to relieve the solidity of theological and philosophical chapters. Dr. Nevin's outward life was, in a sense, uneventful; yet, as being conspicuously the foremost figure in his church for a whole generation, as called to lead in one campaign after another, and summoned to one burden of responsibility after another, it was a most eventful life, too; eventful in the romance of high, unwearying, difficult, noble service. He was the teacher, the "doctor," of his church; not the less so, though he might be in retirement on his lovely farm, Caernarvon Place, near Lancaster, for even there intellectual labors of one kind and another —

¹ *Mercersburg Review*, October, 1868.

so long as his hand was able to wield the pen, so long as his strength sufficed him for the college pulpit of Franklin and Marshall — still served to inspire readers and hearers.

But it must not be inferred that he was a mere student, shut up in his library, withdrawn from the world of men. His life was a life of *action*, a life of efforts, directed to *practical ends*. Much in meditation, much in prayer, he never ceased to do as at Princeton and at Allegheny he had always done, — to go out of his study and his lecture-room into the active work of counseling, aiding, and organizing efforts to promote reforms or to advance the church. And, as we have seen, in such steps he was not wont to take counsel of his fears.

Strange as it may sound in view of his theological position, we cannot but say with Dr. Gast, in his admirable Introduction, that Dr. Nevin was a Puritan. As Dr. Richard S. Storrs has recently re-defined the "Puritan spirit" for us,¹ we are struck with the aptness of the characterization as applying to Dr. Nevin: "An intense conviction of apprehended truth," "a masterful sincerity," "a majestic Ideal," "a superb and shining courage," — all these were his in marked degree. If, however, there was in him the austere spirit of a Hebrew prophet, there was something more; rather let us say, if there was in him the spirit of the Boanerges, there was also, and much more, the spirit of him who had "beheld the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth," and who to his latest days bore witness of Him who is "the true God and the Eternal Life." The glory of Christ, his unique Personality, his Headship over the church, over humanity, over the world, his testimony in the Scriptures, — this was that "apprehended Truth" for which he contended with "superb and shining courage," and which served to shape his "majestic Ideal."

Has his work any *present* significance for us? Very much, we believe.

The Mercersburg movement, viewed on its own merits, is a great movement. It sought to recover, in a more philosophical and spiritual way, what the Oxford movement sought to recover in the English Church. We are not saying that the Mercersburg leaders were better men or greater men than the Oxford leaders, or that the former movement, for picturesqueness or for visible results, is once to be mentioned with the latter; but we do say that the answer which Dr. Nevin gave to the Church Question will increasingly appear the right answer, when the answer of John

¹ *The Puritan Spirit*, an Oration delivered at Boston, December 18, 1890.

Henry Newman and the answer of Professor Pusey will be seen to have been wrong.

Upon this view of the case, the American church has not yet done with Dr. Nevin; indeed, in a sense, is but beginning to seek him; and if those who know him shall make him better known, he may yet teach us all very much. For we do not agree with those who consider the Church Question a dead issue: there are some church questions which are dead issues, though not yet so recognized by their valiant champions; but the more such questions are clearly seen to be dead, the more does the CHURCH QUESTION itself loom up in magnitude and compel attention. Every question of social readjustment and reintegration bears relation to it. The industrial world, the political world, are interested in it. It is, in its last analysis, the question whether there is in reality a Christian society, and, if there be, whence it derives its vital principle, and what limits are to be set to the operations of that principle in the activities of the common life of man; not idle or curious speculations, but matters of greatest import to the cause of Christianity at this time, and to the nation no less.

Within the present year, the "Church Review" has published a large number of articles as a symposium on Christian unity. To ourselves, reading these papers, it is sadly evident that most of the writers on both sides could with great advantage sit at Dr. Nevin's feet. There is much of the same unhistorical, unchurchly, self-complacent denominationalism on the one side, much of the same unphilosophical, mechanical ecclesiasticism on the other, that forty years ago Dr. Nevin began to combat in the name of History and of the Creed. What in these circumstances gives the writer most pleasure is the fact that in his own Presbyterian Church some of the best men are, in regard to these points, coming to stand just where Dr. Nevin stood; and that the present forward movement in theology in the Congregational communion is especially marked in the new emphasis laid upon the Historic, Christocentric, and Positive aspects of Christian truth. The Apostles' Creed *is* coming to rule once more. And while it is possible to exaggerate the importance of the greatest of men; while it is true that Dr. Nevin failed to see certain aspects of truth, that, in a word, he had "the defects of his qualities;" while no doubt it is also true that there are great questions soon to be faced by us which Dr. Nevin had not to face,—it is safe to say that we shall be ill-prepared to face such questions without having learned those truths of which he was so conspicuous a teacher, and that,

till we have first risen to his position, we certainly shall not attain to a better. And to that, as we think, the Christian thought of the time has not yet risen.

William Frederic Faber.

WESTFIELD, NEW YORK.

THE SUN'S SONG.

IN turning the leaves of the elder Edda, we meet only with poems inspired by the Odin faith or the Viking age. It is difficult, indeed, if not impossible, to distinguish the Christian elements, that undoubtedly have entered into the very texture of the old Norse cosmogony and hero-worship depicted in these poems, from the primitive Germanic traditions.

The Odin faith yielded, about the year 1000, its throne in Norseland to the apostles of the white Christ. But the old memories were still fondly cherished. In the age of writing (circa 1140-1220) the Icelandic clerks did not scorn the sagas, that contained the oft-told tales of heathen times, the records of the stirring days of the settlement. Where the ethnic and heroic poems came into being is not as yet determined. But the parchments, upon which faithful scribes copied down for Icelanders the alliterating strophes, date from a period long posterior to the introduction of Christianity.¹

It is this primitive Norse spirit, pervading saga and song alike, strong with the strength of the northern world, glowing with all that magnificent life in sound, color, and form that distinguishes old Norseland, Norway, Iceland, the Faroes, the Shetlands, the Orkneys, the Hebrides, — it is this that places Norse literature side by side with the Greek.

The classic art of Norseland is not statuesque and noble in perfect symmetry of form, nor clad in that wonderful harmony of coloring or of rhythmical measures that Greek art borrowed from Greek nature, but rude, massive, strong. Its rhythms are attuned to the pulsings of its storms; its characters and imagery are as bold and rugged as its mountain and coast lines, as dread and mysterious as its fogs.

To us, there is such perfect consonance between the literature

¹ The most important MS., the Codex Regius, dates, according to Vigfusson, from about 1230; the poems themselves, from 800 to 1100.

and the physical aspects of Norseland that, wherever we have wandered in the North, it has seemed as though we heard again in the air about us the same strong, broken harmonies of sound, and almost knew the presence, the companionship of the Norse gods and demigods, the brave, reckless, and pitiless Vikings, or the strong, simple Icelandic farmers.

The verses of which we offer a translation are not contained in the codices from which the collection of old Norse poetry known as the Poetic Edda has been drawn. They are found only in paper transcripts of the seventeenth century. The "*Sólar-Ljóth*" (Sun's Song), though distinctly the work of a Christian poet, belongs, however, without question, to a late section of that same early period that produced the Eddic poems. Vigfusson assigns it to the early part of the eleventh century. With its Scandinavian traditions, its Odin figures, dimly outlined in the background of a canvas depicting the mediæval Christian cosmos, it serves as a fitting link between the old and the new. According to Vigfusson, there is no mention of its existence during the Middle Ages. The first reference thereto is found in an unpublished writing of Björn of Skardsá (1574-1655).

The name of Saemund, the once reputed author of the Eddic poems, became at a late period connected with this song. It was currently reported that this poem was his last, and had been recited by him, rising upon his bier, after having been three days dead.

The verses we have translated form only a part of the entire continuous composition contained in the MS. Our introductory verse, "Thereof I will speak," is preceded in the MS. by thirty-two others that treat a distinct theme, and Vigfusson has, we hold rightly, regarded this part as a separate poem. Its first twenty-four verses contain moral teachings, illustrated by parables; the last eight, "friendly counsels in wisdom fashioned."

Toward the close of the poem, also, after the prayer, there are four verses that have no connection with what precedes or follows, nor any manifest inter-relation. They are heathen in character, and so clearly an interpolation that we have no hesitation at all in following also here Vigfusson's dictum and rejecting them.

The poem itself is a northern Divina Commedia, lacking the Purgatorio. A father appears in a vision to his son and tells him, first, how painful was the passing away from the happy world of mortals. Sorely and long he struggled against the stronger one, Death, but in vain.

The sun was sinking in the ocean, all bathed in blood, when

Death summoned him. The contrasts here, and the gradual, sure progression of the shadow and the power of death, are very forceful and beautiful.

Immediately after death, there seems to be a double consciousness. He is wandering spiritually with the "spark of hope," the immortal part (?), seeking a resting-place. Meanwhile his mortal body is being cleansed with laving waters. It lies stark upon the straw — how long that night seemed! — and a bed of sand is being prepared for it. The waters of purification are loathsome to the body, and the soul, as it goes forth alone, yearns for the companionship of kindred.

"For nine days he remained seated in the chair of the Norns." This would seem to refer to the funeral couch upon which his body reposed for nine days. With the commitment to earth, the mortal consciousness ceases.

Mounted upon a horse, he now passes swiftly through all the seven worlds.¹

With the description of the Inferno, the poet returns to his introductory half-line, "Thereof I must speak." The spirit horseman finds mock-suns (or moons) lighting up the Inferno. Immense winged dragons are flying from the east, leaving trains of fire behind. There is an obvious allusion here to a verse of that noblest of the Eddic poems, the "Völuspá" (The Spying of the Sibyl). We read in the "Völuspá:" —

"There comes the dark-hued
Dragon flying,
A fiery serpent,
From the fells of darkness."

The sun's hart, "whose feet press the earth and antlers reach unto heaven," is on his way from the south. This mythological stag would seem to be related to Oak-thorn (Eik-thyrnir). It is said in one of the poems of the Edda (Grimnismál, v. 26): "Oak-thorn is the name of a stag, that stands upon the hall of the father of hosts (Odin), and feeds upon the boughs of Laerath (a tree growing upon the roof of Valhalla); but from his horns fall drippings into Hvergelmir (a fountain in the centre of the lowest hell). Other stags are mentioned in the prose Edda that inhabit the world-ash, Ygdrasil. The Inferno would seem to a Christian

¹ This number (7) is unscandinavian, and borrowed from mediæval Christianity. According to the Norse cosmogony there were nine worlds. Egilsson (*Lexicon Poeticum*) refers to the seven heavens mentioned in the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*.

poet a fit place of banishment for all that was connected with the Odin faith.

Nith's children, seven strong, come from the North, and with full horns quaff mead out of the burn of Baug-rori (or Baug-reyr). The wane of the moon, the "no moon" period, was called *nith*. In the "*Völuspá*" we learn that, in the beginning of things, —

"The sun knew not
Where she had her shining ;
The moon knew not
Where she had her mastery ;
The stars knew not
Where they had their station.

Then to the judgment seat
All the powers journeyed,
Highest and holiest gods,
And there held council.
To night and the no-moons
Names were given ;
Morning they named
And midday's hour,
Afternoon, evening,
The years to measure."

The children of Nith we conceive to be evil-working powers, that choose the darkness, the no-moon period. Seven is a mystical number. The burn, Baug-rori (ring-rearer), is, according to Vigfusson, the fountain of Mammon.

Having described the guardian spirits of the world of the doomed, the father now tells what torments one and another class of wretched sinners are enduring. Adulteresses, whose hearts are hanging out of their breasts, are grinding wearily dust into meal for their paramours. Those who by fraudulent practices had made others' possessions their own are faring in throngs to the city of Pluto, the God of Greediness, bearing burdens of lead. Never can human imagination picture the horrors that the damned are enduring.

It is probable that we have lost some verses here, at least one, that served as introduction to the Paradiso. Abounding charity, helpfulness toward the poor, mortification of the flesh with fastings and scourgings, filial devotion to the mother's needs, all the self-denials and innocent sufferings patiently borne on earth, meet here with their reward.

Then the father lifts his thought toward the Almighty and Holy

Trinity, beseeching rest for the dead and mercy for the living. There is here a remote suggestion of Dante :¹ "Lead us not into temptation ; but this petition, dear Lord, is not for us, — we who are in Purgatorio need it not, — but for those who have remained behind us."

"Nostra virtù, che di legghier s'adona,
Non spermentar con l'antico avversaro,
Ma libera da lui, che si la sprona.
Quest'ultima preghiera, Signor caro,
Già non si fa per noi, chè non bisogna,
Ma per color che dietro a noi restaro."

"We shall not meet again until the great gladness-day of mortals, when thou, my son, shalt also enter upon the eternal life. But fail not to repeat the song I have sung to thee ; no mortal ear before thine hath ever heard it, and there is not found therein the least lying word."

THE SUN'S SONG.

Thereof I will speak, how sweet was my life,
In the land of delight ;
And then, beside, how the sons of mortals
Are doomed unto death.

Lust and pride lead many astray
Whose hearts are greedy of gain.
Shining silver leads to sorrows lasting ;
Riches have ruined many.

Men thought me glad in many a wise,
For I knew nought of the morrow.
Mortal's home its Maker hath fashioned
In pleasures plentiful.

Leaning I sat, low bowèd over.
Great was my longing to live :
I strove in vain — the stronger ruled —
Forward lie the paths of the fated.

Hell's cords were in hard claspings
Lashed my loins about ;
I strove to rend them, but they resisted.
Freely walks the unfettered.

I only knew how in every member
Pains oppressed my frame.
Hell's maidens called me every evening,
Beckoning me halting homeward.

¹ *Purgatorio*, Canto XI., lines 19–24.

The sun I saw, the star of day soothly,
Sink in the storm-world ¹ wide,
But hell's doors I heard, on the other hand,
Creaking and clanging.

The sun I saw, stained with blood-symbols,
— I was almost from the living loosed,—
Mightier seemed she, in many a fashion,
Other than of olden time.

The sun I saw, and it seemed to me
I saw the glorious God.
I bent to her, my bowing last,
Ere I left the earth.

The sun I saw, so brightly beaming,
I seemed in swoon to lie.
But Gylfr's ² rivers roared the other side,
Blended deep with blood.

The sun I saw, with sight shuddering,
Filled with fear and sorrow ;
For my burdened heart, breaking asunder,
Like water ran away.

The sun I saw, never more sorrowful,
— I was almost from the living loosed,—
My tongue was like a tree hardened,
And cold as clay without.

The sun I saw, since then never
After that dreary day ;
For, the cold berg-waters closing above me,
I passed from pains released.

Upward the star of hope soared (I was born then)
From my bosom forth.
Aloft she flew, nowhere alighting
So that her wing might have whiling.

Longer than all nights lasted that one night,
When I lay stark on straw ;
And then I found God's word fulfilled,
That man is made of dust.³

¹ The sea.

² Gylfr is either the name of a river of the infernal regions, or an attributive signifying roaring.

³ Literally, mate or son of dust.

Measure Thou and mark this, Almighty God,
 Of heaven and earth, High Creator ;
 How of friends abandoned many fare forth,
 Though called from kinsmen away.

The winning of each is as his working,
 Happy who doeth well.
 Instead of wealth, awaited me
 A bed strewn with sand.

The lust of the flesh leads mortals astray,
 Many have known its mastery ;
 The laving waters were loathsome to me
 Above all other things.

Nine days I sat in the seat of the Norns,¹
 Then high on horse was lifted ;
 The suns of the giantess² shone grimly forth
 From skies charged with clouds.

Methought I wandered through the seven worlds all,
 Inward and outward.
 Upward and downward, I sought open pathways,
 There where my course was clearest.

THE INFERNO.

And now I must say what first I saw
 When I reached the doomed ones' dwellings ;
 Scorched bird-forms — the souls of mortals —
 Fluttered as flies numberless.

From the west I saw coming wingèd dragons,
 And flames marking their flight.
 They shook their wide wings till it seemed to me
 Earth's and heaven's bonds were bursting.

I saw the sun's hart from the south coming,
 His reins were ruled by twain ;
 Firmly the earth his feet were pressing,
 His horns reached unto heaven.

From the north I saw riding Nith's children,
 And they were seven strong.
 They quaffed in full horns the crystal mead
 Out of the burn Baug-rori.³

¹ On the bier.

² Suns of the Inferno, or moons.

³ the name is Baug-reginn, that is, lord of the rings, or Odin, it means Mimir, or the fountain of wisdom. Odin pledged his eye for a from thence.

The wind was silenced, — the waters stirred not,
Then came an awful crash.
Lewd wives were grinding for their lovers
Earth into meal for their eating.

Those dark women whirled blood-dripping stones
Drearily up and down ;
Bleeding hearts from their breasts were hanging,
Wearied with weight of sorrow.

Many a man I saw maimed faring
Over those fiery footpaths ;
All their faces, as I looked at them,
Seemed besmeared in witch-blood.

Many a man I saw (their bodies are mouldering)
Who had left life without the last shriving ;¹
Heathen stars o'er their heads were standing,
Blazing with baleful symbols.

Men I saw who meanly ever
Envied others' fortune.
Bloody symbols on their breasts were deeply
Graven grievously.

Men I saw there, many unhappy,
Wandering 'wilderer and way-lost,
That he has won, whom in this world
Follies infatuate.

Men I saw who by many an artifice
Others defrauded of their own.
In flocks they were faring to the burgh of Greediness,
Bearing burdens of lead.

Men I saw who had robbed from many
Life and loved possessions.
Strong and venomous dragons shot swiftly
Through and through their breasts.

Men I saw who had made nought of
High and holy days.
On hot stones their hands were fastened,
With nails none looseth.

Men I saw whose pride had made them
Arrogant over measure.
Flames their garments coiling enfolded,
Winding wondrously.

¹ Extreme unction.

Men I saw whose many slanders
 Often had others injured.
 Hell's ravens from their heads their eyeballs
 Tore with furious talons.

Ne'er canst thou know all the nameless horrors
 Which the damned are enduring ;
 Sweetest sinning turns to sorest penance,
 Aye cometh pain after pleasure.

PARADISO.

Men I saw who had given much away,
 Even as God ordered.
 Purest candles placed above their heads were
 Burning brightly.

Men I saw who, with hearts merciful,
 Bettered the poor man's portion.
 Holy books and heavenly writings
 Angels read to them all.

Men I saw there who had mortified
 The flesh with frequent fastings.
 God's angels, low-bowing, greeted them all.
 This is the highest happiness.

Men I saw who meat had furnished
 For their mothers' mouths.
 Soft resting-places on the rays of heaven
 Were fashioned for them.

Holy maidens, with healing waters,
 Washed all white from sinning
 The souls of those who, with frequent scourgings,
 Painful penance paid.

A host I saw, high through heaven riding,
 Whose goings lead to God.
 Men who without cause had been murdered
 Ruled the riders all.

Almighty Father, most glorious Son,
 And Holy Spirit of heaven,
 Thee I invoke, Thou Maker of all,
 From evil us deliver.

This song I have taught thee, sing again
 Aloud before the living ;
 The Sun's song, wherein standeth not
 The lightest lying word.

Here we must part, — we shall meet again
On the great gladness day.
Graciously, my Lord, to the dead give rest ;
To men who are living, mercy.

A tale wondrous has in dream been told thee,
Truth unveiled in vision.
Ne'er before to mortal was such knowledge given,
That he heard the Sun-song's story.

Charles Sprague Smith.

NEW YORK, N. Y.

“CHRISTIAN ETHICS” AND “THE SIMPLE GOSPEL.”

ONE occasionally meets certain utterances indicating a degree of opposition between what is called the preaching of the simple gospel and the preaching of what by distinction is known as Christian ethics. It is difficult to find a precise statement of this opposition, for the suggestion of it usually comes quite as much by implication from tone and emphasis as from deliberate and definite charge; yet the presence of contrasted terms similar to these here used gives point to the implication. A contrast is intimated where one would hardly suppose it possible to be found.

That there is some such feeling of opposition, more or less prevalent, no one in clerical circles will be disposed to deny. Its undertone may be detected in ministerial associations, it crops out in examination of candidates for the ministry, and finds voice at installations and ordinations. The spirit animating such criticism seems to be honest, zealous, sincere, and eminently desirous of practical results; while, associated with it, there is a feeling of suspicion, sometimes a reproachful air, a sense of grief, and occasionally a touch of positive resentment toward the preaching which comes under the general charge of being merely ethical. Two paragraphs embodying this general sentiment, and uttered somewhat as a note of warning, have been printed from an address at a recent installation, and given wider currency by means of postal-card distribution, and in this form give occasion for some considerations bearing on the general topic.¹

The term called to do most service, in utterances of the kind

¹ Address by Rev. George H. Gould, D. D. See quotations toward the close of this article.

referred to, is "the simple gospel." No demand can be of more constant worth than that the preaching of any age hold itself close to the simplicity of the gospel. Here is the perennial fountain-head on which the historic stream of Christianity will always be dependent, and if that source is neglected the purity and volume of the river's flow will be impaired. This demand is consonant, also, with the scholarly spirit of the day, which is discontented with information and opinion at second hand, and is hence developing a passion for the investigation of original sources. The gospel in its earliest form is what critical minds are seeking, in order to better apprehend the gospel in its essence. And the tendency appeals to practical minds no less than to critical. It is this wellspring of life, as it first gushed forth, of which every man would fain drink, if he drink of it at all, before it has lost its freshness, or become sullied by the earth over which it has had to pass. Men want to know precisely what Jesus said, and they want it, in the first place, without comment or explanation. It is his authority, and his alone, in which they are interested. If this gospel is what it purports to be, and what those who have espoused it claim it to be, its virtue must reside in its primitive form, while any addition thereto must be not only an intrusion but a perversion. The genuine flavor of the stream can be had at its source as nowhere else.

This demand for a return to the gospel in its simple, primitive form has been met in two ways, and by processes singularly unlike. In the early part of this century, especially in Germany, the spirit of literary criticism grew sensitive to the singular resemblances, and the discrepancies as singular, existing between the first three Gospels. It was recognized by Schleiermacher and others as extremely probable that there must have been a document earlier than either of these three, written in Aramaic, and on which some of them must have depended. In 1838, as Weiss points out, the first clear hint was given by Weisse of the way in which a definite picture might be gained of this earliest apostolic document, and in prosecution of this hint such scholars as Ewald, Reuss, Meyer, and Weiss himself have been working, seeking by the most painstaking method to gain a conception of this earliest source by which all later records might be tested. If there is any simple gospel, in a literary and documentary sense, it is to such men as these, with their successors in England and America, that the effort to discover it must be accredited. Whatever one's opinion as to their success, the candid mind must acknowledge

that their motive has been eminently honest and fearless, their aim radical, and their method scrupulously exacting, at once minute and comprehensive. The closest approach to the original gospel, in its literary and historical form, they have certainly made, and only by appropriating the results of their labors may one hope to gain in this same sense a view of the simple, primitive gospel.

There is, however, as already intimated, another method by which return to the simple gospel has been attempted. It is not the method of critical scholarship. It concerns itself but little with questions as to original documents. It is in the main satisfied with the English translation according to the Authorized Version, and it rejoices to say that it takes the Bible "just as it is." With a naïveté of literary simplicity, it takes the gospel which the seventeenth century has put in its hands, and reverently applies itself to the study of it. Confessedly lacking and disregarding the critical spirit, it relies on a simple-mindedness by which to discover the essence of the gospel, the simple meaning of it as it appeals to the religious instinct, whatever be the character of the channel through which it has come. Hence, under this method, which is the outcome of a genuine, devout, and practical spirit, the "simple gospel" obtains a different signification. Such a method deals with the gospel in its simple outline, its manifest features, and seeks to apply it thus to human needs. The simple gospel, in this sense, is the gospel apprehended by simple minds. The conspicuous value of this method is its eminent practicality, its insistence that the gospel, so far as it is available, be put to immediate use; that its application to the needs of men's souls be constant and untiring. The essential characteristic of the gospel must never be lost sight of. It is a spiritual message of regeneration, and this its keynote must give the fundamental tone for all utterances of it, else there will be a departure from correct gospel harmony, with resulting discord. This is the method that has characterized the great evangelists, from the days of Paul to those of Moody. The spiritual strategy of these men has been to seize upon the obvious truths of the gospel message, and to declare them with a vehemence, earnestness, and directness compelling men's attention, and the result of their labors has furnished abundant evidence of the wisdom of their method. It is the gospel, interpreted simply and declared plainly, that now and ever arrests the conscience and wins allegiance, while the preaching that ignores this method will be shorn of a prime element of power.

Notwithstanding the evident value of the method which thus deals simply with the gospel in its generally accepted form, it must be confessed that the demand for the preaching of the simple gospel has acquired a somewhat technical flavor, and that with it certain characteristics and tendencies have become associated which reveal its limitations, and which ought to temper its spirit of confidence and modify its claims. First, it must be recognized that the simple gospel, in the hands of the ordinary evangelist and of those generally who use the term in this peculiar sense, is a restricted gospel; by which is meant, not that their utterance fails to contain the essential gospel, but that their way of presenting it is avowedly and manifestly adapted to immediate and special effects, and that therefore its form is necessarily restricted to those effects; and this comment should find acceptance, since every worker ought to be willing to stand by the limitations of his method. Those who do a special work ought to be willing to abide by that, thankful that there are others to do other work which they themselves perhaps could not do. The claim of this method to be the exclusive one, which impression it sometimes makes, is, however, an unwarrantable assumption, and sets with ill grace upon those who stand for simplicity of mind. Whenever it does so assert itself, it lays itself open to the charge of advocating a gospel, not for all men but for a special class, which in its genuine spirit it would be most averse to do; for it is undeniable that the plain outlines of the gospel, as any one may find them in the writings of evangelists, than which no preaching can be simpler, do not meet the requirements of all men at every stage of development. It is necessary to a universal religion that its essential features be clearly presented once to every man; it is desirable that they be reiterated until he is brought face to face with them in clear understanding of their import; but when this initial work of declaration has once been done regarding any man, the original conditions are changed, and to keep on declaiming these same features in the same way would be a process of stultification. The one who accepts the gospel as it is first declared to him needs, then, to know it in its expansions, its applications. Its simple form becomes elaborated with the developing needs of his life, and it may be that the failure to appreciate this accounts in some measure for the slow rate of progress in spiritual growth sometimes characterizing those who have been homiletically fed on formal repetitions of the simple gospel. Sameness of form tends to the impression that there is lack of life, and

constant repetition begets dullness of apprehension, and it is not to be wondered at that the accredited phrases of orthodoxy have in some typical instances begotten a sense of spiritual composure akin to spiritual stagnation. On the other hand, the one who rejects the gospel after having it once clearly presented to him, or who fails to accept it through no fault of his understanding touching its main features, needs thenceforth to be dealt with after a different method. He needs no longer a herald to cry in his ears that which he has already heard with perfect distinctness. He needs some one to persuade him, and this introduces an additional element. Mere iteration may seem to prevail with some, but it certainly does not with all. There are men and women in every community throughout our land who know the gospel message in its main and simple outlines as well as do the preachers themselves, and yet they have not been won to it. They do not need to hear the simple gospel in this technical sense. Indeed, it is because they have heard "the old, old story" so often, and with so little variation and so little pertinence to their own way of thinking, that it has become so difficult to secure their attention for a fresh hearing of it. They dread the sound of the gospel phonograph. What they do want, and what they need even beyond their conscious desire, is the gospel in its recognition of modern civilization, in its adjustment to science and philosophy, in its sympathetic interpretation of all human faculties in their present stage of development, — a gospel interpreted to their present consciousness, not an autocratic message demanding of them the attitude of a bygone age. They want the essence of the gospel run in the moulds of current life. This essential gospel is the simple gospel in a true sense, but not in the sense which has evoked this criticism; for the methods of it are utterly inadequate to meet this need. If the gospel had never been elaborated, simple methods might still suffice for every one, as they do now for a large majority; but it was inevitable that each age should leave its own mark upon the gospel form, and this has necessitated a complication through which each succeeding age must pick its way in order to arrive at a simple form which shall be true for itself. And such work is difficult and involved, while the simplicity thus gained is of a different order from that which could exist previous to such effort, even as the simplicity of Humboldt the man differed from that of Humboldt the child. There are two ways to simplicity, — one by ignoring difficulties, a provisionally legitimate and practicable way for many; the other, by

removing difficulties at whatever cost of time and effort, a way which alone will satisfy certain other minds. If there had been no theologies constructed in the past, many of the difficulties of winning a response to the gospel to-day would be reduced; if no churches had been established, other obstacles would not be encountered which now oppose the progress of the gospel; had no creeds been formulated and no catechisms, many misconceptions would not remain to be dispelled. But all these things were necessary and useful at their time, and hence the way to simplicity must be worked back through them rather than a position be taken in spite of them. Man must correct his own errors by which the simplicity of the gospel has been obscured, and this is not a simple task.

The existence of the two classes mentioned—those who have accepted the good tidings, and who, in the apostles' phrase, are fitted to leave the principles, the simple rudiments, and go on to perfection; and those who, on the other hand, are sincerely perplexed over the matter, whether in spirit committed to it or not—indicates that any method tending to ignore their peculiar requirements is not the only method by which the universal gospel of peace demands to be preached. Christ's message is to all men, and accordingly must meet all men at their own level of intelligence, whether that be high or low. Such emphasis is sometimes placed on the fact of Christ's having come to the poor and ignorant that we almost incline to believe He showed special favoritism toward that class, overlooking the true significance of his coming to the lowest rank of human life, and thereby including all, without distinction. And while the church has not learned any too well the lesson of ministering to those who are poor in worldly goods, it still needs to remember that there is a possible poverty of another sort to which it can minister only by a wise adaptation and a method sympathetic with the need which it seeks to meet. The query sometimes arises, if the Master should come again to earth for a few short years of exemplary living, would He not teach a new phase of his universal love by sitting down with some humble-minded scholar, agnostic perchance in his tendencies, and by transcendent logic and luminous exposition resolve his doubts, and lead him to the heights of rational Christian philosophy, whereon his mind rejoicing, his heart should stir anew? Might He not condescend to intellectual uncertainty, as once He did to bodily infirmity? It is not inconceivable; and might it not have its lesson? Christianity must not allow itself

to become estranged, either from the poor on the one hand, or from the learned on the other, for the hand needs the head, as the head needs the hand, while the body consists with both.

A second characteristic, frequently observable in connection with the plea for a simple gospel, is a peculiar deference to the literal authority of the Bible. It welcomes dictation from the pages of this collection of books, it seizes upon all the imperatives employed between its covers and writes them in large letters, and then repeats them with the urgency of all possible emphasis. It exalts the dogmatic side of these ancient writings, and defers to them implicitly. It finds here the all-sufficient rule of life and practice. Such procedure is perfectly legitimate, provided only that its limitations are recognized, and that it is seen to be both arbitrary and provisional. Man's approaches to ultimate and absolute authority must of necessity be tentative and gradual. Every one is at liberty to impute authority to an external standard on satisfactory evidence, provided he regard it as a school-master to lead him to some more interior authority, while all the time it must be recognized that such authority rests in the first place simply on the individual's choice. The Bible may prove, and doubtless does prove, to be a singularly clear exponent of the divine authority that has been operating in human history; but plainly it must not be itself confounded with that ultimate authority, for that would be to substitute effect for cause, thus wrongfully limiting the cause. This may suffice to indicate the character of the simplicity secured through a formal or traditional prejudgment of the nature of the Bible record, and it may be commended with entire heartiness as useful, practical, and legitimate, only at the same time must be entered a disclaimer of its pretensions to exclusiveness and finality. The theory of inspiration, which takes the Bible as ultimate authority, would, if consistent, fail to see in Jesus, the historic personage, a more radical authority, and also would miss the still deeper truth of the final authority of the Holy Spirit. Fortunately it has not always been consistent, and so is not seriously open to this charge. Different degrees of authority are suitable to different persons: to one that of practical helpfulness, to another that of moral obligatoriness, to a third that of rational satisfaction; and each one is entitled to his appropriate sort, only the authority of the letter must not be forced upon him who is instinctively craving for the authority of the spirit, for it will not satisfy him. Correspondingly, the simplicity which commends itself to one must not be insisted

all. The simple gospel has taken on at least three simple forms, all containing its essential quality, — the Bible, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit, — and from among these there must be freedom to select.

The third feature, conspicuous in connection with this plea for the simple gospel, associates itself with the word "salvation." Here, as throughout the course of this discussion, criticism is directed, not against the term itself and its main idea, but against the assumptions which seem to have gathered about it, and the hope is that some of these may be removed through the process of qualification and restriction. The call for the preaching of the simple gospel, in this technical sense, then, emphasizes very properly some of the essentials in salvation. That it is for all men, that it is available at any time, that it is immediate in its effect, are impressions gained through such preaching, for which every one must be grateful. The way is made plain, the exact terms of the transaction are formulated in Biblical language, and the condition of every man is reduced to a dilemma whereby the way to be chosen becomes perfectly obvious. Under this sort of presentation, it is inevitable that salvation be regarded in its more superficial aspects. It is treated somewhat as a bargain that may be driven between man and God, the terms of which may be taken from almost any text of Scripture lending itself to such treatment. The preacher quotes, "He that believeth . . . shall be saved," and, following it up incisively, says, "Do you believe? Then you are saved." Now, that certainly is a simple gospel, grasped after a commercial fashion. The man who could sell goods could deal in such a gospel effectually, and so doing would render desirable service, provided he did not overstep the limits of his method. This is the gospel at its entering edge, but it is not the gospel in its length and breadth, it is not a comprehensive statement either of the conditions of salvation or of the nature of that result. It is evident with what technical simplicity such appeals are frequently made, in that the belief is made to appear as such a momentary action, and the salvation as such an instantly completed result. The drowning man to whom the rope is thrown, when once he catches hold of it, is potentially saved, provided he has strength to keep his hold, and so is the man who in faith grasps one of Christ's conditions; but the completed result awaits the drawing of the man to shore, awaits the completion of the process under the persistency of faith, and the initial act should not be so exalted as to obscure the fact of a subsequent process, the completion of which this initial step finds its confirmation

and worth. John the Baptist must have his Jesus the Christ; the preachers of the gospel in its first stage of acceptance must have their work supplemented by those who watch and further the process; and neither should assume to be distinctively preachers of the simple gospel.

At this point appears most naturally and inevitably the vital connection between ethics and the gospel. It is a commonplace to say that salvation consists in transformation of character. Accordingly, if such a vital salvation is to be effected by means of the gospel, this gospel must have its application to man in the development of his character, and such application to the conduct of life, out of which character emerges, is nothing less than Christian ethics. The way Christ himself lived is the fair and mature fruit of the gospel in its essence. Sadly barren would be the simple gospel were it not for this expansion and application in human life. If the gospel saves, men require to see evidence of its power here and now, without having the result relegated altogether to a future world; they want to be saved from their sins, not merely from the consequences of them, and this means that their salvation must be of an ethical character. For if it is to result in better living, it follows that its terms of application must be those pertaining to conduct, and such terms constitute the department of ethics. "Christian ethics instead of the gospel," "the alarming vice and weakness of many of our modern pulpits!" As well dissociate the apple-blossom and its fruit from the root whence they spring, as well strip from the stalk the leaves and the ears of forming corn, as to separate the science of Christian conduct from the cross of Christ. "The uplifted cross of a dying and an atoning Saviour" is luminous with the radical principle of Christian ethics, namely, the law of self-sacrifice. There is a singular reactive irony in the statement made in the address which has been taken as the occasion of this discussion, "that there is not enough Christian ethics in all the peerless utterances of the incarnate Son of God when on earth to save one human soul." One of two inferences is clear, either that the Son of God himself was guilty of this same "alarming vice and weakness" which scourges the modern pulpit in thus giving so much time and attention to ethical teaching, or that there is some vital and indissoluble connection between the redeeming work of Christ and these peerless utterances which form so large a part of his work. It is admitted that "they are an essential factor in all Christian character-building," while in the same breath it is affirmed that "they are not the gospel." What is the gospel if it is not the glad and

welcome announcement that all men may be built up into Christ, may have their characters transformed into his? Is there any salvation without a change of character? Repentance itself is the introduction to a new course of ethics, and the preaching that fails of impressing the essential identity between salvation and character-building is setting forth a caricature of the gospel one-sided and radically defective.

There is a sort of ethical preaching, in no sense entitled to be called Christian, which lacks the inspiration and the authority of the person of Christ as its basis and its sufficient credential, and which contemplates an abstract ideal rather than its concrete embodiment. Such preaching may be helpful in a measure, but it lacks the distinctive excellence of Christianity in that it substitutes an ideal for a person.

The question recurs, then, as to what is the simple gospel. Its simplicity is not that of a formula, but that of a person, even the simplicity that is in Christ, a simplicity so comprehensive that no one form of utterance can do it full justice. It is the simplicity of personal character, which must be disclosed and proclaimed in as many ways as there are different characters to respond to it and be affected by it, and no set of phrases may lay exclusive claim to this function. There are trademarks of speech by which one may hope to be assured that the simple gospel, and that alone, is being preached. All literal tests are inadequate when applied to that which, from its nature, must be a vital process. The simple seed, a single enfolded germ of vegetable life, as soon as it begins to grow has passed out from its primitive simplicity, and in that form may never again be recovered, though its essential character is found throughout the plant that has sprung from it, in leaf and flower and fruit. Just because the simplicity that is in Christ is of so vital a nature, and has permeated human life so extensively, the test of its presence must be qualitative and essential, not formal. That seed of divine-human life sprouted in Bethlehem, and matured throughout Galilee and Judæa, is not confined to the Oriental shell in which it was once encased, but, having burst its early covering, is capable of being propagated by many a method, if only its essence be retained. The simple gospel is the gospel in its essence, that is, the life of Christ in its personal, vivifying power, and whatever proclaims its fitness to human life is genuine preaching. On this test let the insistence be placed.

Charles F. Carter.

SOCIALISM AND SPIRITUAL PROGRESS, — A
SPECULATION.

WE are all talking about socialism to-day. We discuss its abstract principles. We question, emphatically, whether it is practicable with such beings as men, in a world like the present. Granting it to be practicable, we discuss methods of approach. Finally, we debate, *ad infinitum*, the machinery which, were socialism accomplished, would regulate human life. But there is just one thing we do not talk much about, and that is, supposing the socialistic state a fact, supposing we arrive, what sort of men and women shall we be when we get there?

Concerning this phase of the subject, even one of the uninitiated must be permitted to think. Though one dare not discuss the rights of capital or the future of trusts; though he avoid, with unspeakable devotion, all views of the single tax; though he keep a religious silence when contradictory definitions of wealth, value, utility, are hurled at his head, — he cannot shut out earnest speculations on the ethical and spiritual bearings of the socialistic ideal. And he has a right to think, and to speak his thought, though the world call him vague, popular, or sentimental.

For the issue between socialism and individualism is in essence not technical, but vital. Its ultimate sphere of discussion is the practical life of man. And, whether we will or no, whether we be radical or conservative, whether we derive our opinions from hearsay, from temperament, or from strenuous wrestling with truth, in this great science of human life we are perforce, by the very terms of existence, specialists each and all.

It is on great moral issues that the battles of the world are fought and won. The fate of such battles is not determined by the intellectual men, versed in technicalities, wise with the eternal policy of the expedient. It is determined by men who see truly because they see simply; who grasp some great principle out of a seeming tangle of confusion; who glow with moral passion. Peter, not Thomas, is the leader of the early church; Luther, not Erasmus, the hero of the Reformation.

The issue between socialism and individualism is, I believe, the leading issue of this age-weary modern world. The men to come will envy us, as sharers in a battle greater than the antislavery struggle; greater than any phase in the eternal battle of the race for liberty since the convulsion of the Protestant Reformation set

man free in the sphere of religion, as socialism promises to set him free in the sphere of economics. And it will be clear in retrospect, as it cannot be clear in experience, that the question which we are meeting is essentially broad, simple, ethical.

If this be so, it behooves us to question sharply the spiritual ideal inherent in socialism; for this ideal will really determine men's judgments. It is not sufficient to show that the socialistic state will rest on a truer basis than the present order: we must also show that it will develop a nobler personality. Even that form of socialism known as Christian has not shown us this. In common with much earnest thought, it holds the present order to be corrupt at heart; it goes farther, and proclaims that the way of escape is to be found in the application of the teachings of Christ to the outward life of society and business, as well as to the inward life of the soul. But we must go farther yet. We need more than the recognition of evil, than the faith in a principle of escape. We need a distinct ideal to which we may advance. Unless such an ideal is manifest, socialism will never prevail. For, explain it how we will, not our facts, but our ideals, — will-o'-the-wisps, mirages, though they may seem, — our ideals are the lights that fail not, the stars that lead not astray.

More and more is this question concerning the ethical value of socialism coming to the front. Everywhere men are beginning to ask, not "Is socialism practicable?" but "Is it desirable?" The question is not easy to answer. Quite possibly men would be better off in the socialistic state; but it is much more important to know whether they would be any better. Socialism promises that everybody is to be comfortable; yet the end of life is not comfort, but character. What about character? What sort of spiritual environment shall we have? What moral incentives? These are the essential questions, after all. In our much talking about social mechanism, I think they have been in danger of neglect. Let us muse over them a little, and seek at least for the direction of answer.

I shall not attempt closely to define the socialistic state. I do not hold that it will imply of necessity the abolition of private property. I do hold it to imply collective ownership of the means of production. In the socialist state, as I conceive, material wealth will be distributed on the basis, not of service, but of need. Thus physical support will be insured to all. Absolute equality will not perhaps prevail, but outward conditions will be far more equal than at present. There will be no more violent

extremes of riches and poverty, luxury and degradation. Those at the bottom will no longer need to strain every nerve lest the fiend starvation overtake them ; those at the top will no longer be allowed to roll themselves in vast heaps of wealth. At both ends disproportion will be cut away ; no amount of cleverness, snap, effort, will enable a man to get much ahead of his neighbor in the race for wealth, and society will tend towards a dead level of external equality.

I am not pretending to ask whether this can ever be done. In this discussion I take the liberty of assumption. I am only concerned with the result on character of a hypothetically achieved socialism.

A number of our wisest thinkers believe that the results would be disastrous. "All forms of socialism are forms of slavery," — so Herbert Spencer calmly announces. "Materialism and socialism," exclaims that clear, sad soul, Henri Frédéric Amiel, "two modern tendencies which ignore the true value of human personality, and blot it out in the collective life of nature or of society."

Let us expand their thought. The value of life is in struggle ; all individuality springs from the conflict with destiny. This conflict socialism would destroy. For our modern world — stern, strenuous, stirring, with its fierce and eager activities, its vigor, its suspense — socialism substitutes, what ? A mechanism of dull monotony, a vulgarized and cockney ease. Now zest is found in contrast alone. All our artistic pleasure, all our romance, depend upon the strong alternations of light and shade. Take away suspense, and the dramatic element would vanish. What makes men care to live to-day, or exert themselves in living ? The uncertainties of life, — the consciousness of the horror of black failure waiting to engulf them ; of prizes to be won if they shall prove themselves the fittest who survive. In the socialist state, all this will go, and in consequence a desperate ennui, a profound world-weariness, will engulf the human race. To use a phrase of Matthew Arnold's : "We shall all yawn in each other's faces with imperturbable gravity." We shall be bored to death.

Kingsley, in "Water Babies," describes a race of men who lived in a delectable country. All day they sat under soft-foliaged trees, whence dropped into their laps the nicest little hot rolls. Roast pigs, small and succulent, trotted up to them, squealing enticingly : "Come eat me ! come eat me !" But those happy people grew by degrees too lazy to pick up the rolls out of their

laps; too lazy to bite the little pigs. Sad to say, that favored race perished by slow starvation, and the earth knew them no more.

Exactly this will happen in the socialist state. People will no longer be forced to work by the stringent fear of starvation; thus they will not work at all. We shall end by producing a race of dead-beats. And not only will interest and energy vanish; virtue, as we now conceive it, will cease to exist. Courage, endurance, industry, — the militant instincts, — will have no room to play in. Self-sacrifice and charity, with no one left on whom to exercise them, will die a natural death. The mechanical elimination of motives to crime may, indeed, produce a passive virtue, pallid with negation; but a full-blooded, self-disciplined, ascetic character, trained by denial, alert and vigorous through resistance, we shall see no longer. The full, free swing of individual competition which we have to-day is better than this characterless millennium. Many are crushed, physically and morally; this we do not attempt to deny. But the human struggle for existence is simply in line with the struggle in all nature; and it is out of the whirl and fight, the inexorable sternness of difficulties overcome, that evolution has produced its miracles. Human nature itself is a palimpsest of the battles of the past; and the law of conflict must ever, as heretofore, be the law of growth.

Now, this is a very dismal prophecy. And I must confess that all the advocates of socialism whom I know, even the noblest, lend it a good deal of countenance. Socialist Utopias seem to me dreary, lacking in color, interest, life; painfully dull in their suggestions of enervating material prosperity.

The difficulty is not modern. John Stuart Mill felt it clearly sixty years ago. His youth was filled with ardent hopes and plans for the future of humanity, though he had not at this time become a socialist. One day the thought came to him: Suppose his ideal realized, what would life mean? And the answer sprang from his soul in horrified surprise, Nothing! It would be hollow at heart. This discovery threw Mill into a profound melancholy, from which he only rallied by reading the poetry of Wordsworth, — a medicine which, excellent in its place, not the most ardent Wordsworthian would recommend as a solace for the entire human race. Nay, farther back than Mill we find the same suggestion, that if our present evils were removed, life would be hopelessly tame. The poet Shelley, who was a good communist, wrote us a lyrical drama, which he called the "Prometheus Unbound,"

and which represents in all its first glow and glory the democratic ideal that we are trying to realize to-day. The poem is about humanity, — its torture, its bondage, its temptation, its redemption, its final bliss. All through the scenes of suffering and bondage the verse bounds and soars and sings. It is like sunlit waves of the sea, like clouds of dawn, like singing birds, like all that is rapturous with life. But as soon as the redemption is accomplished, and humanity set free, the verse flags and drops; the poem becomes stupid; we yawn over it, despite ourselves. All Shelley has to tell us is that men, when their ideal is reached, are to be “equal, unclassed, tribeless, and nationless, exempt from awe, worship, degree;” and when we imagine them reduced to this freedom of blank negation, we know that they must have been as tedious to themselves as the thought of them is to us.

When I come nearer home, and think of our most recent Utopias, I find much the same trouble. I confess that the life which “Looking Backward” describes for us does not attract me in the least. In its smug materialism, its Philistine pervasiveness of comfort, it seems to me dismal. I would a great deal rather live in the nineteenth century — yes, even if I were a working-girl on five dollars a week — than in Mr. Bellamy’s twentieth century. William Morris, in his last Utopia, “News from Nowhere,” has felt this difficulty, and suggests a mode of escape. His old sage speaks to the waif of our world, who has wandered into an Epoch of Rest: —

“I can at least hint at one of the chief difficulties which had to be met; and that was that, when men began to settle down after the war, and their labor had pretty much filled up the gap in wealth caused by the destruction of that war, a kind of disappointment seemed coming over us, and the prophecies of some of the reactionists of past times seemed as if they would come true, and a dull level of utilitarian comfort be the end for a while of our aspirations and success. . . . But, after all, this dull thunder-cloud only threatened us, and then passed over. Probably, from what I have told you before, you will have a guess at the remedy for such a disaster. . . . That remedy was, in short, the production of what used to be called art, but which has no name among us now because it has become a necessary part of the labor of every man who produces.” And elsewhere he says: “The spirit of the new days, of our days, was to be delight in the life of this world; intense and almost overweening love of the very skin and surface of the earth on which man

dwells, such as a lover has in the fair flesh of the woman he loves. All other moods save this had been exhausted."

Thus Morris would find the meaning of life in art, in nature, and, he adds elsewhere, in love between the sexes. I confess that I am not quite satisfied. I find no progressive element in his idyllic pictures of the easy life to be. I do not admire the men and women he describes. Scope or incentive for the development of character, for the free play of the higher spiritual instincts, I here, as in all other socialist ideals with which I am familiar, fail to discover.

Yet, if socialism be not adapted to produce a higher character than the present order, of socialism we will have nothing. No, not though it bring never so much material comfort in its train; not though it bestow on humanity complete exemption from the grosser forms of vice.

But are these negative conditions of comfort and virtue really all that socialism can promise us? Despite the Utopias of the socialists, I do not think so. Let us search for ourselves the interests and incentives that will exist in the socialist state, and question whether men will be sunk in the dull mechanism of selfish routine, or set free for a fuller life of work and aspiration.

We shall be helped in our speculative inquiry by seeing what conditions now, in our present experience, prove most conducive to the development of character, and by comparing these conditions with those offered by socialism. Whence spring our great men, — great in moral heroism, in intellectual and imaginative reach, in active power?

If the advocates of individualism are right, we should expect to find them at the bottom of the social scale. There the inspiring forces of competition have free play; there the sharp goad of necessity drives men to fiercest exertion; there rages that struggle for existence from whose clash and conflict, we are told, all heroisms, all most strenuous virtues, all clear and strong and forceful personalities, emerge triumphant.

Alas! For these fine, fancy pictures, one looks in vain in the ranks of the very poor. Instead of characters racy, bold, and free, you shall see, if you wander through workshops or slums, sodden faces, natures obtuse to finer issues. I think the testimony of all who have lived among the poor would agree that there is nothing to equal the dull monotony of their lives, the pathetic barrenness of their natures.

Do I say nothing? I mistake. In another region, in a remote

sphere, the same characteristics reign. Think of our very rich ; of our "leisure classes," still, thank Heaven, small. Would you know its interests, its occupations, its aims ? Read Ward McAllister, and you will rise from the book with a profound pity in your heart for our fashionable society, deep as any you can feel for the denizen of the slums.

Two classes in the community are hopelessly bored, — the very poor and the very rich. And from these two classes, to-day and in the long sequence of history, our great men do not spring.

They do not spring from extreme poverty ; there, life is starved. They do not spring from extreme luxury ; there, life is stifled.

They spring, I call all history to witness, from the ranks of the great middle class. They spring from conditions which neither enervate nor crush ; conditions simple, austere, peaceful ; summoning, tempting to work, but, unless in rare cases, not forcing to it. The necessity of self-support has been in the background only of the consciousness of most great men. Shakespeare knew it not ; nor Milton, nor Browning, nor Gladstone, nor Garibaldi, nor Gambetta. Carlyle knew it ; but he refused to let it alter by one whit the grim earnestness with which he uttered unpopular truths, and alienated the British public. John Howard knew it not ; nor Florence Nightingale, nor Arnold Toynbee, nor Father Damien. The long roll of statesmen, saints, poets, and philanthropists is made up principally, though of course not entirely, of men and women who were nurtured in conditions of simple competence and peace.

A life removed from sordid cares, yet freed from choking riches, — this is the life which, so far, has produced the highest type of character. This is the life which Jesus Christ commended. He attacked the rich with unfaltering, revolutionary, sorrowful scorn. Almost, so He declared, was it impossible for a man clogged with riches to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. But the people on whom He looked and said, "Blessed are ye poor," were not the haggard, stunted, stupid products of our fierce competitive industries. They were the agricultural poor of Judæa, — a people hardy, simple, used to labor, to fishing, tilling the soil, carpentry, and all useful trades ; men free, in the healthful simplicity of their lives, untouched by worry or haste, to receive in brooding hearts the message of the Kingdom of God. From such men Christ chose those disciples who remodeled the world ; of such men He himself was one.

Thus the conditions among which our greatest men are found,

the conditions clearly inculcated by the teaching and example of Jesus Christ, are alike those which imply a comparative freedom from material anxieties and material interests. *Just such conditions it is which socialism aims to make universal.*

That socialism would imply absolute equality in material possessions is an assumption not yet proven. It would, however, as has been said, tend to equalize. It would insure to every man, whatever his mode of life, a reasonable, modest, constant maintenance at the hands of the state, thus removing at once material anxiety and material ambition. Our best characters, as we have seen, spring from conditions closely approximating to these. Is it unreasonable to assume that a form of social organization would be wise which should insure to all the conditions proved most favorable to the few?

In return for maintenance, the state will demand from every man and woman a moderate amount of daily labor.

And here we run against one of the stock objections to socialism, — an objection so ethical and so vital that we must stop to consider it. It is claimed that in the socialist state men will do no work.

The contention sounds reasonable enough. Place yon boot-black, scrubbing vigorously at his trade, in the socialist state. Behold his incentives vanish away! No fear that he go hungry if he fail to secure a certain number of five-cent shines; no more chances, on the other hand, that he attain the true democratic ideal of every boot-black, and become, he too, a second Jay Gould. Wherefore should the boot-black then black? He will abjure forever the blacking of boots. He will bask in the sun, consume unlimited tobacco, and rejoice in the social revolution.

The picture has the tints of life; but let us look at it more closely.

Your boot-black was "born tired." He comes of an anæmic race, exhausted by generations of overwork, diseased and run to seed by life under unwholesome conditions.

Suppose — remember our liberty of assumption — suppose socialism to have been in force for three generations. That is, suppose that for three generations everybody had had enough to eat, drink, and wear, and decent houses to live in. A race of children would, it is fair to say, greet our eyes different from the languid, half-alive little waifs who, with pitiful stolidity or a more pitiful and ghastly nervous vivacity, sport around the streets of our slums. We should doubtless not find a perfectly healthy

people, but we should assuredly find a higher average physique than we find to-day.

Now, I claim that in people with physical nerve and muscle nourished for a few generations back, the impulse to work, the delight in productive energy, is innate, instinctive, masterful.

Already, to-day, the work-impulse is strong in the normal man. Every one wants to be busy. Every one feels the inspiration of a sharp summons to action. Who can see the rugged top of a mountain caressed by clouds without a tingling desire to climb thither? Who can think of a great art or science without the quivering of latent energy, longing to conquer? No sane man. What pleasure like that of a piece of work accomplished? What, except the delight of the doing? Few people are absolutely lazy. Even the votaries of pleasure work hard enough; and, preposterous as it may seem, many rich men and women are indolent, or at least unproductive, simply because they do not know what to do; their labor is useless, often, simply because misdirected. It may be that this work-impulse is a late note of evolution; yet some animals possess it; and Adam, in the grand old story, is set, even before the Fall, to dress and to keep the earth-garden. Be this as it may, in man as a product of Western civilization the impulse has come, and come to stay; and joy of productive activity is a primary instinct of every healthy soul. The lethargy of bequeathed exhaustion and the inertia of reaction are, I believe, responsible in our climate for the greater part of the indolence of the race. Numbers of people under our present system are not more than half alive. For these poor creatures, weak, stunted, or heavy in brain and body, little can be felt but the tenderness of sorrowful pity. A better day may surely come; a day when all may know, what many cannot know in this languid civilization, the simple rapture of doing; the delight of the athlete, whose austere activity thrills his every nerve and muscle with the joy of life.

And, beside this initial impulse, there will be plenty of incentives to work. The best work of a community, even in our hard-driven civilization, is not done for money; it has never been done for money. An army of the world's workers — pioneers, physicians, statesmen — rise in protest against the debased pessimism of such a thought. Money is a correlative to labor; it is not — by all that is practical, as by all that is ideal, let us repudiate the idea — it is not the motive. The avoidance of starvation is not the only spur to work. Men have been known to scorn delights and live laborious days for the sake of winning praise from

their fellow-men. The desire for praise is mighty, insistent; demanding that men recognize the work as good, and honor the doer thereof. Honor is a stirring word: it drives soldiers to the act of death; might it not also drive them to the nobler act of useful life? In the very fact of creation there is a mystic rapture; the blessed consciousness of power, which, whether it achieve a table or a poem, knows itself one with the productive energy of the universe. And, finally, we cannot ignore that sense which grows with our growing, and shall spread more and more as organic consciousness deepens, and as socialistic conditions prevail; the sense that every bit of work, however menial or dull, is accomplished not for the self, but for the all. The hour cometh when the performance of a bit of manual work shall be as distinct and happy a piece of service as watching the sick or feeding the hungry; for in those days we shall have learned that to help the positive production of the world is as great as to care for its victims.

Joy of activity, joy of fame, joy of achievement, and joy of service, — these are the joys that might play upon the healthful, eager, sensitive organism, and draw it into a due share in the great labor of the world. And it is claimed that they will not be sufficient; that the fear of starvation must be added, or men, undeterred by vacant days or the pitying scorn of their fellows, will yield themselves to luxurious indolence, because, forsooth, they know that society will treat them kindly as it would treat a stray cat, and will give them shelter and food! Such a contention is false to all faith in our common humanity: more than this, it is false to the facts of human experience.

We have tried to show that socialism need not fear the development of an infesting horde of deadbeats, and also that its aim is to furnish to all the conditions which a partial experience has manifested to us as most potent in the production of character. It remains for us to go farther; to show, or at least to suggest, that socialism is the next phase, the logically inevitable phase, in that grand and gradual sequence of energy which slowly, firmly, by the operation of divinely natural law, is lifting man from the brute to the god.

For, if socialism be true, it must be shown not to deny, but to fulfill, the past. It will eliminate none of those great and stern powers which have so far governed evolution in its progress from body to soul; it must show us those powers working in a higher sphere, with new stringency and new completeness. I

believe that the study of the progressive action of such principles revealed by history, rightly apprehended, carries us straight, by purely scientific induction, to the threshold of the socialistic state.

I might seek to establish this statement through many a line of thought. I will choose one. It shall be taken from the latest word of the science of the human mind, — the “Psychology” of Mr. James. The subject under discussion is the Automatic Life.

“We must” — so he says in trenchant words — “we must make automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we can. The more of the details of human life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work.” And he proceeds brilliantly to expound the scope which the æsthetic and intellectual life may know as the conscious volition becomes more and more relieved of the lower forms of activity. The principle which Mr. James applies to the individual I would apply to the social organism.

We all see how the development of life from babyhood to maturity depends upon this gradual subjugation of volition to instinct. Wretched is the man who has not learned this; to whom the acts necessary to physical well-being — eating, sleeping, dressing — are still the results of conscious effort. This law of progressive unconsciousness, as we may term it, obtains in the ethical as in the practical sphere. Holiness is that state where virtues, once painfully achieved, have become instinctive, automatic. The more of life is intrusted to the automatic sphere, the greater the range of our power. The individual advances by the progressive transference of physical and nervous functions from the sphere of volition to the sphere of instinct.

Now let us apply this law to the collective social body. We shall say: “Society advances by the progressive transference of those material functions necessary for its support from the sphere of conscious effort to the automatic region of instinctive achievement.”

Now this statement lands us straightway in full socialism. Socialism demands nothing but this: that the functions of physical maintenance become in the social organism rather automatic than conscious; and this it would effect by intrusting that anxious supervision of physical needs and responsibility for physical support, which now falls upon the individual, to the collective whole, that is, to the state.

All civilization is, in one sense, but the record of this very

process. The savage, one unit dissociated from his fellows in rude isolation, spends his entire vital force in defending his physical existence through war, or providing for it through the chase. The mediæval knight, in a more organized state of society, is comparatively free for the development of higher virtues, and even to some degree of the arts; yet he also has for his main profession and occupation the struggle to protect the physical well-being of himself and others. The sequence is clear to the scholar or poet of our own day, who, relieved by the shelter of society from care for physical needs, spends his energy in conquering the world of thought. The more society removes from the individual the hampering anxiety for material sustenance, and insures him shelter from violence and need, the nearer we approach the ideal state. Socialism would be but the latest, perhaps not the final, stage in a continuous development.

For that this process is yet accomplished few would be found to claim. A fierce though secret dread of starvation lurks at the heart of modern life. It is safe to assert that the consciousness of nine tenths of the community to-day is dominated, if not absorbed, by material cares. We are at a pitifully short remove from the savage. The greater part of our mental and physical power is imprisoned in the mechanism of life; in the effort of each man to provide for himself and his family food, shelter, clothing. Now the material functions must be performed. They must absorb a certain amount of time. We cannot live like those denizens of Mars imagined by Flammarion, who sustain themselves by breathing in sunshine, like the flowers. Socialism would demand from every one, and receive, as we have tried to show, from at least the majority, a constant quantity of honest, peaceful toil, sufficient in sum to supply the physical needs of the community. Just so the body has to eat and sleep, and plan for eating and sleeping. Work is holy. But worry is sinful; and it is worry which weighs down the lives of our men and women, which forms those harassed faces and nervous forms that surge in breathless procession through the business parts of our American cities. This worry springs from fear. At present, each man works in the dark, ignorant of the harmonious interaction of his power with other power. Hence constant gnawing anxiety; hence feverish unrest; hence the weary tale of economic disturbance, — the uneven distribution of wealth, the spasmodic gluts of over-production, the strikes, the riots, the dull discontent of modern life. Socialism claims that it would eliminate, not work, but worry. It would establish

a general oversight over the whole field of human need. The organization and direction of labor, the plans for the creation and distribution of wealth, it would intrust to the state; and each individual would play his part, as peacefully assured of the wisdom of the general plan as a soldier in an army. We have already produced conditions which insure to the few freedom from gnawing, practical care; from these conditions, as we have seen, spring our greatest men. Is it Utopian to suppose that they might be extended? Work must be done; but socialism claims that it is possible to withdraw from work the element of selfish anxiety, and to transfer it to the unconscious life of the social organism. The claim is in absolute harmony with the scientific law which governs the advance of the race; it is the next step forward in a process already begun: the burden of proof rests, it seems to me, on those who deny, not those who affirm, its possibility.

Thus we have tried to show, not only that socialism seeks to render universal the conditions which experience manifests to us as best, but also that it is in line with the entire sequence of harmonious evolution, and demanded as the next stage of development. We might have reached the same result more simply, more directly. The lucent words of Christ reveal as a moral duty that which history and psychology reveal as a natural law. Socialism would render possible, for the first time for centuries, literal obedience to the commands of the Master; it would enable men to "take no thought for the morrow," for it would remove from them the necessity of constant thought for what they shall eat, what they shall drink, and wherewithal they shall be clothed.

Thus set free from the fierce and absorbing struggle for physical survival, what will be the value, the content, of human life? Nothing! say many. Man will sink back, material comfort once assured, in a mechanical and unspiritual prosperity.

Easily might we brand as pessimists and cynics men who take so low a view of our common humanity, — easily arraign them for ignorance of that witness of history which shows us freedom from sordid care as the primal condition of progress. Yet the fear is not strange. We think of our feverish and hunger-bitten world; of the tumultuous surge of conflict for existence which sways back and forth, breaking in foam of bitter passion in our midst, or tossing its spray upward in heroic, unavailing strife. We turn from this to the vision of a world of outward peace. No wonder that it seems to us at first stagnant and dull!

Yet even to-day it is not from practical struggle that spring the deeds we honor most. The Christ hangs on the cross, not to bestow on men a physical benefit, but to win for them spiritual redemption.

We cast our eyes into the future, into that socialist state which assuredly shall one day be. What do we see?

Not a Utopia. No socialists are fools enough to claim that any change of social machinery would radically alter the spiritual conditions of human life, — would eliminate suffering, disease, and pain. There is no fear lest trouble and difficulty be removed from our path, and men find themselves in an enchanted garden of ease.

Not a dead level of characterless monotony. Character only emerges as we escape from the barren individualism of the savage state. Material equality does not imply spiritual equality, neither does the removal of material conflict imply the cessation of struggle. Character is not leveled to-day, its infinite play is not checked, by equality before the law. Neither would its fascinating and subtle variations be impeded by equality of possessions.

Not a sinless world. Socialism promises no heaven where men shall bask in the sunshine of lazy sainthood. No fear but that plenty of evil will remain to form the spice of life! The same old humanity will meet us; men and women with the same insistent passions, the same sorrowful temptations. A radical change in human nature socialism does not promise nor require.

What it does promise is this: the uplift of the struggle of humanity to a higher plane, the removal of certain external clogs and shackles that bind down to the earth the free spirit of man.

Far from being free for spiritual development, our present society is held in degraded bondage to the flesh. We see extremes of bitter poverty and fatuous luxury, alike deathful to the spirit, alike contrary to the commands of Christ. We see even our middle class held by material struggle; society as a whole absorbed by the dominant and feverish consciousness of physical need. When this bondage shall be relaxed, when that rush for wealth which is the swinging of the pendulum away from the fear of starvation shall be no more, then will unfold countless delicate, spirited powers unguessed to-day in the dreary uniformity of money-making. Longing for glory, longing for truth, longing for service, will play upon a humanity responsive, high-mettled, eager. Socialism will produce neither a race of saints nor a race of heroes; human nature will remain what it is, — strange mix-

ture of divinity and brutality. But it may produce a race of men ready to enter with new zest the domain of new interests which we are to-day too heavily burdened freely to explore.

Let us think for a moment what some of those interests may be. They press upon us, clamoring for speech! A hundred voices will summon us, a hundred ambitions draw us, a hundred delights entice. We need not speak again of the buoyant pleasure in practical work which shall be the heritage of all healthy men and women. Beyond and above this, the world glistens with radiant possibilities.

Here, to begin with, is the whole sphere of art, — art realistic and ideal, *e. g.*, art which seeks accurately to reproduce the wondrous beauty of the world, art which seeks rather to embody the subjective experience of the artist. We may not, indeed, agree with Mr. Morris, that art would be a sufficient occupation for the human race; but a glorious play it is, and for three centuries men have had no chance to play it in freedom. Think what cities might be — nay, what they have been — when men built in peace and gladness, no longer from fear of hunger or of the sullen frown of an employer, but from love of the work itself! Think what pictures might render vivid the great story of the world's waking hours, or the greater story of its dreams! Think what poems remain unsung! This is no sentimental dreaming. There was a Florence in the thirteenth century. What has been may be once more.

Then, there is all the world of thought which awaits us. Truths enough remain to be won, in the sphere of the natural world, in the subtler sphere of the brain and soul. Science and philosophy are yet in their infancy. Here is the chance for consecration, for ardent sacrifice, for strenuous effort. No indolence can conquer the secrets of nature. The vigils of the future shall wrest new knowledge from the stars. Years of unregarded heroism shall end in flashing on the grateful world more hidden secrets of the mystery of human life. It is safe to predict that, when material well-being is secured, intellectual activity will be multiplied tenfold in militant vigor. Even to-day, in our sodden world, scientific and æsthetic passion assert themselves, and the fact is a perpetual witness to the buoyant indestructibility of spirit. But it must be that much power is wasted; that many a latent intellect is held to-day in bondage by the harsh necessity of ceaseless mechanical labor. Yes, and further: the scientist or philosopher is rare — he is day by day growing rarer — who can

serenely pursue his high and recondite wisdom, undisturbed by the moans of his fellows, the sorrow of a kindred humanity. The spiritual atmosphere does not foster to-day the detachment necessary to intellectual effort. It is thunderous, muttering; it fills men with a nameless unrest. Let the storm burst, let the air be clear; then may we bend us to our tasks again, consecrate to the stern and arduous search for the purity of truth: but not yet, my friends, not yet.

Art, science, philosophy, — these are much. These, even, are not enough. Man has an æsthetic nature that craves to receive and reproduce beauty; he has an intellectual nature that strains ever towards the true; but, more than these, first, last, and deepest, he is a spirit. And, whatever may be true of the others, it is at least certain that the spiritual life is a life of action. The soul has to be lost before it can be found. The self has to be vanquished: for this we are sent into the world.

A critic of socialism quotes Faust: —

“ ‘ For man’s activity sleeps all too easily,
And so I gave to him to be his mate
A Devil, who will stir and work and must create.’ ”

Socialism is the Lemure’s canal. Take care, dear Lemure! if you drain the marsh of inequality you are digging Faust’s grave. He will have no spur, and stagnate and die.”

He is right. The intellectual and æsthetic life cannot produce the miracle of full personality. For this we must have the scope, the stir, the passion of moral struggle. There must be temptation to goad us, high sacrifice to inspire, causes to live and die for. We seek the clash of truths, the call to suffer. Through action alone — action strenuous and militant — can salvation be wrought and the soul mount higher to its source. Without darkness, no light; without sin, no holiness; without possible failure, no glory of victory.

O fools and slow of heart to suppose that socialism could ever obliterate this struggle; that any change in the social order could put an end to the eternal battle, breathless, wearisome, glorious, wherein the soul has ever won its spurs! No danger that the Devil, our God-given companion, desert us; no danger lest an equal distribution of wealth entail uniformity of nature! Certain external elements of romance may vanish with the lessening of outward gloom: the novels of Dickens would no longer be possible. But the inward romance of the spirit, with its contrasts of joy and pain, its heroisms, its ardors, its tense efforts, its silent

sacrifices, — all this would remain. Remain? It would develop in a way we hardly imagine. If I mistake not, our interest to-day tends more and more away from material conflict to the subtler conflicts of the soul. The scene of our life-drama is shifting to the inward stage; we are learning that the fight between good and evil is no less deadly when the combatants are thoughts than when they are acts. Our modern fiction reflects this change, in most interesting form. Books like “John Inglesant,” like “Robert Elsmere,” like “Middelmarch,” might essentially have been written in the socialist state. They can hardly be called devoid of passion or of problem. We see a Dorothea bending her fair spirit to save the soul of her mean rival; we see in real life a man who has spent years in perfecting an invention destroying his machine in silence because another man, whose need of fame is greater than his own, has made the same discovery; we see, again, a man withdrawing from a friendship which has been as wine to him, because his presence casts a shadow between wife and husband. And we realize that there is no danger lest opportunities for heroism fail us, and lest no battles remain to fight.

This transference from outward to inward, from physical to spiritual, is the law of all human development. A Darwin, not an Achilles; a Father Damien, not an Æneas — is the hero of modern life. Already the literature of external conflict begins to have for us a symbolic rather than a literal value. Already, as we read of the wrath of an Achilles, of the rage of a Macbeth, we translate these titanic woes into the language of the inward life. Socialism will never eliminate struggle; it will simply free us from the crude battle with material obstacles for the contest with spiritual foes. And it is reasonable to expect that life in the future, in delicacy, in fire, in sensitiveness to fine moral issues, will bear to our own life the relation which ours bears to the fierce and crude morality of the elder world.

This change is in harmony with the teachings of Christ himself. Our Lord Jesus transferred the external commands of the Mosaic law to the region of the mind and heart. This more secret and subtle wisdom, incomprehensible to the Hebrews of old, we, too, fail fully to apprehend; yet into its high mystery we are bound to penetrate more and more.

Socialism is often condemned as expecting by external and mechanical means to affect the free spirit of man, to achieve through outward reform what can only be achieved through the purification of the heart. The question is scornfully asked, Does social-

ism — the change in material conditions — expect to make better men and women? And the answer must come clearly. In one sense, *no*. We cannot emphasize this thought too often. Socialism makes no claim to achieve redemption by machinery. But it does claim that this translation of the struggle of man to a higher and more inward sphere is in line with the whole process of evolution; deeper far, that it is the method of Christ himself. The kingdom of God is within us, and that kingdom it is the progressive effort of society to set us free to seek. The removal of incentives to crime does not, indeed, create virtue. The girl who walks the street, the drunkard in the dramshop, may be better in God's sight than you or I. Yet we fight the dramshop, and bring up our young girls in homes we seek to render pure. The whole civilization enjoyed by our upper and middle classes — our churches, schools, and homes — bears witness to our faith in the power of environment. Why should we deny this power when the question of extension arises? If the delicate daughters of the rich are products of whom our society may be more proud than of the girls in the slums, the inference seems clear: let us place the second class under the conditions enjoyed by the first. There is an old prayer which reads, "Lead us not into temptation." The shelter which civilization now affords for the favored few is the effort to realize this prayer in part; socialism is the effort to realize it for all.

I claim, then, to summarize, that socialism is no demand for a destructive evolution, but the next step upward in the journey of the human race. This is made evident, whether we look at the teachings of science or of faith.

Observation tells us that a condition of moderate wealth most favors the development of character; the science of the human mind suggests to us that life advances through intrusting its lower functions more and more completely to the unconscious and automatic life. Christ bids us take no thought for the morrow. These possibilities socialism, and socialism alone, promises to fulfill.

The law of development shows us the interest and value of life progressively transferred from the outward to the inward sphere. Christ translates the Decalogue from terms of act to thought. This process socialism promises to continue.

In socialism the incentives of labor, of art, of thought, of service, will play with new power on the enfranchised nature of man. Then, as now, will be scope for moral struggle; for the choice be-

tween love and self. Only in this struggle the men of the future may, if they will, be strengthened with a new power; for the socialistic state will render possible what is hardly possible to-day, — literal obedience to the commands of Christ.

It is possible to claim that when socialism is realized, the fire of life will be gone, and men sink into indolent comfort. It is possible; but only for a pessimistic nature, devoid of faith in man, in science, and in God. Devoid of faith in man must be he who claims that, if the bare necessary of physical maintenance be removed, honor will avail nothing, ambition nothing, love nothing, to impel to effort strenuous and poor. Devoid of faith in natural law must he be if he believes that the result of æons of patient evolution is this sorry creature on a moral level with the brutes. Devoid of faith in God must he be; for if man be of the earth alone, it is possible to conceive him, when earthly incentives are removed, sinking into animal ease: not so if he be formed in the image of the Heavenly. There is a spark of the Infinite in his finiteness, and so he cannot pause. Step by step, urged onward by an imperious inward stress, he must struggle upward to his Source. Stage by stage he must leave behind him the false dreams of physical strife, the antagonism to his fellows, the sharp pursuit of his individual needs. He will not leave sorrow, he will not leave temptation. At every step will appear new evils to be conquered. This his curse is also his blessing, for only in battle can the soul of man be strengthened for immortality. But these evils will become ever more subtle, more mysterious, more inward; and the soul that treads them underfoot shall mount by them to ever new regions of holiness and power. For this struggle — ceaseless, eternal, glorious; the struggle upward, by means of the perfect law of liberty, into celestial light — I believe that socialism will, in wonderful and unforeseen measure, set free the soul of man.

Vida D. Scudder.

BOSTON, MASS.

EDITORIAL.

GRADED IMMORALITIES.

LESS important facts than the fact that the Prince of Wales gambles have produced serious and even revolutionary results in political as well as in social life. To some it seems absurd that the column of European news should be chiefly occupied for several days with accounts of a trial arising from charges against an English nobleman for cheating at cards, to the exclusion of intelligence concerning affairs of government and commerce. But this disclosure of the highly-seasoned amusements of some of the aristocracy, and especially of the heir to the throne, may prove to be the little that was wanting to organize public opinion in England in favor of more narrow restrictions of the royal power, and of large reductions in the royal revenue, even if it should not lead to serious changes in the very constitution of the governing powers of Great Britain. The "Nonconformist conscience" is so aroused that there is almost a revival of Puritanism under modern conditions. The immoralities of Parnell called forth a loud protest, which is now heard again with increased emphasis in view of the fact that the Prince of Wales is addicted to the vice of gambling, and depends on it, wherever he visits, as the chief source of his amusement. It is with a new application that the public is now saying *Le roi s'amuse*. Indignant resolutions are passed by religious bodies at their convocations, and a menacing tone is taken with regard to paying the debts of His Royal Highness from the public revenues. It is a pity that one in so high a station should so demean himself, and that so many of the nobility should dance to the tune he sets, but, at the same time, the disgust of the great mass of the people shows that the moral tone of England has never been healthier than it is to-day.

Not the least interesting aspect of the affair is the discrimination which is recognized as among immoralities. Cheating is worse than betting; one may play for light or heavy stakes, but he may not deceive those with whom he is playing. It may be wrong to gamble, but it is worse to cheat. Betting, if a vice, is one of the smaller vices. Deception is always a vice, and is one of the most flagrant. Modern immorality has its mortal and its venial sins. With perfect freedom, and without apology, ladies and gentlemen admit that they gamble, but are horrified at the discovery that one of their number is cheating. Such is the distinction commonly made in England, and probably anywhere else. The reason and the reasonableness of the distinction are apparent. Betting is bad, but undoubtedly cheating is worse. The English have cultivated the virtue of truthfulness to a remarkable degree. An Englishman's honor is synonymous with his word. He resents nothing so much as an imputation on his veracity. Detection in a falsehood is social

disgrace. Truthfulness assumes a community of life and interests in which every one has his rights, which would be lost if mutual trust were disturbed. One must, indeed, be an outlaw from society who has no right to know the truth. Falsehood is a violation of nature, of the very reality of things, representing them as other than they are; and is always, therefore, a lie against God as well as against men. Exceptions to truth-telling may, perhaps, be justified in some cases when the truth would be used to do injury to society, but even then one hesitates. Martineau concludes that —

“After all, there is something in this problem which refuses to be laid to rest; and in treating it, it is hardly possible to escape the uneasiness of a certain moral inconsequence. If we consult the casuist of common sense, he usually tells us that in theory Veracity can have no exceptions, but that in practice he is brought face to face with at least a few; and he cheerfully accepts a dispensation, when required, at the hands of Necessity. I confess rather to an inverse experience. The theoretic reasons for certain limits to the rule of veracity are convincing and unanswerable, and compel me to defend any one who acts in accordance with them. Yet, when I place myself in a like position, at one of the crises demanding a deliberate lie, an unutterable repugnance returns upon me, and makes the theory seem shameful. If brought to the test, I should probably act rather as I think than as I feel; without, however, being able to escape the stab of an instant compunction and the secret wound of a long humiliation.”

There is, after all, something noble in the scenes of the London courtroom, as they brought out homage to truth as based upon honor, and revealed the sacredness which an Englishman attaches to sincerest veracity.

Betting, it must be admitted, deals in another kind of commodity, and is reprehensible on somewhat different grounds. Money has not the value of veracity. If one loses it, he may be none the worse. There is no intrinsic immorality in an agreement among companions to pay each other certain sums, according to the issue of a game or a race. In the course of an evening or a season, losses and gains might be about equal. In principle it would be difficult to show that it is wrong for four English spinsters to play their rubber of whist for the stake of a sixpence. People who have no occupation but amusement do not reduce very much the little value remaining in their lives when they venture sums of money they can well afford to lose in order to spice their already stale pleasures. The wrong of gambling is in various ulterior consequences, which may become so bad as to make the practice almost criminal. It violates the economic law of exchange of values by making one's gain the precise measure of another's loss, and is thus a species of dishonesty. It discredits the slow and sure methods of industry, introducing an element of chance and risk which always proves disturbing to honest toil. It encourages the speculative temper in all kinds of business, and speculation cannot get on without deception. The speculator is always under temptation to make things appear other than they are.

Among poorer people, making bets and buying lottery tickets only increases poverty, while it causes discontent with legitimate work. And so modern ethics is entirely right in considering gambling, in its direct and indirect forms, among the worst elements in the corruption of morals; and economics is of the same opinion. When gambling is analyzed, it is found to rest upon deception. The subject is, therefore, receiving earnest attention in England on the part of all the churches. Discussions concerning the guilt of betting and gambling have been held during the last year at church congresses and on similar occasions. English love of outdoor sports and of horseflesh has had much to do with the bad practices which have spread so widely. In this country the evils of the lottery system are very great, and the moral sense of the people is already protesting. The Prince of Wales and his associates present a sorry figure in court, because they are seen not only to be occupied exclusively with their own amusement, but also to be resorting to modes of seasoning their pleasures which are forbidden by law, and which are known to be fruitful of evil and misery in the lower classes of society.

At the same time, those who disapprove their practices make the same discrimination they have made themselves, and would be shocked at disregard of truth and honor as they cannot be at playing for stakes. In the gradation of immoralities, then, there is some reason. It does not show a confused moral sense, nor a merely conventional standard which artificially classifies the virtues and the vices.

The development of morality is a process, ever going on, by which the realm of virtue is enlarged from regard for the direct obligations between man and man to the obligations which grow out of the complex relations of society, business, and advancing civilization. Such disclosures as have recently been made in England serve at least to mark the stages of progress in modern morality.

THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PROFESSOR BRIGGS.

AT the late meeting of the Presbyterian General Assembly, its Standing Committee on Theological Seminaries presented a report advising the Assembly to disapprove the appointment of Professor Charles A. Briggs to the Edward Robinson Chair of Biblical Theology in Union Theological Seminary. After considerable discussion, the report was adopted and the appointment disapproved by a vote of 440 yeas to 60 nays. The directors of the seminary met the following week and voted to disregard the action of the Assembly.

Professor Briggs will therefore continue to teach in the Union Seminary for the present, at least, if his health permits. Whether the General Assembly is able by legal rights or ecclesiastical influence to secure, if it so desire, his ultimate removal from that institution, and whether,

assuming it to have such power, the Assembly is likely to use it, are questions which we do not here consider.

A more interesting question suggested by the Assembly's action is that of the degree of importance it has as a doctrinal affirmation. It is such an affirmation. It is regarded as such by those who approve and those who disapprove of it. It was occasioned by Professor Briggs's inaugural and the impression which the opinions therein expressed had made upon a part of the Presbyterian Church. Of course the General Assembly did not undertake to correct the judgment of the Union directors, as regards the character or capacity of their professor-elect. This construction has not been put upon its action by any one, so far as we know; we are confident that the Assembly did not intend it to be so construed.

The report of its Committee on Theological Seminaries, which it adopted and affirmed by adoption, and which was its only affirmation about Professor Briggs, said, "On the 20th of January, 1891, Dr. Briggs delivered an inaugural address on 'The Authority of Holy Scripture,' which has been the subject of severe criticism, and which is the occasion of the recommendations which your Committee feel constrained to make to the Assembly."

The Assembly virtually said, therefore, in vetoing the appointment, that the sentiments expressed in Dr. Briggs's inaugural were so widely at variance with its standards of belief that a professor holding those views should not be allowed to teach in a Presbyterian seminary.

This, then, is the intended meaning of the veto, a doctrinal affirmation. It undertakes to express the mind of the Presbyterian Church as regards important doctrines. The question of its importance is the question of the degree to which it expresses that mind. If the Assembly's utterance were the expression of mature conviction, it might be presumed to be a fairly adequate expression of Presbyterian belief; and would stand as an impressive testimony of a great religious denomination, against the ideas Professor Briggs has put forth.

The question, then, of the importance of the utterance becomes the question of its character, of its having the seriousness and depth belonging to a really representative affirmation of the General Assembly, one which will stand as a landmark of American Presbyterianism.

The present time, in which the circumstances which led to this veto of the Assembly and the veto itself are in fresh recollection, is a time favorable to the discussion of this question; and we wish to make such contribution as we can to a proper answer to it, by comparing the Assembly's action with the obvious characteristics of action which would have seriously met the case in hand.

Let us recall the circumstances under which the Assembly acted. First, the career of Professor Briggs and his relation to the Union Seminary. Professor Briggs had already taught in Union for seventeen

years. He had shown there wide learning and unusual teaching power. He had great influence in the denomination and beyond its limits as a scholar and thinker. He was universally regarded as a pious and earnest man. The directors of Union, in appointing him to their new chair, expressed their hearty approval of his past services; moreover, his appointment was believed by them to be, because a transfer, not subject to the Assembly's veto.

Secondly, the nature of the ideas put forth in the inaugural. These were for the most part of a historical, not dogmatic character, the avowed results of exegetical and critical studies. Dr. Briggs professes and is admitted by all to be familiar with recent research into the Scriptures. He claims that modern evangelical scholarship has found certain things in the Bible which show that the statements about it made by some Presbyterians need correction, although not showing error in the Presbyterian estimate of its value. He claims that in the interests of truth the correction should be made, and that making it will greatly increase the influence of the Bible. True, other affirmations were made in the inaugural, dogmatic ones, but these were subordinate and incidental, so that a condemnation of the doctrine of the inaugural would be more than anything else a condemnation of this affirmation about the Bible.

Thirdly, the feeling roused by the inaugural. The address had caused much disturbance in the church. Sixty-five presbyteries sent memorials to the General Assembly, asking that it be taken into consideration by that body. Dr. Briggs had been put on trial for heresy before his own presbytery.

Fourthly, the indeterminate condition of the creed. The doctrinal standard of American Presbyterianism is undergoing revision. The amendments suggested by the Revision Committee are to be reconsidered by the presbyteries, and afterwards to come before the General Assembly for final approval.

Fifthly, the quiescence, up to the late meeting, of the General Assembly's veto power. No appointment of a theological seminary had been vetoed from the beginning of the compact between the Assembly and the seminaries, in 1870.

These circumstances evidently created a necessity that action of the Assembly so condemning Dr. Briggs's ideas as to express the Assembly's conviction should be taken deliberately, and under a clear understanding of his utterances and of their relation to the doctrines enunciated in the Westminster Confession. The Assembly, regarded as the great representative body and supreme judicial tribunal of the Presbyterian Church, has, we are sure, a profound respect for the character and learning of Professor Briggs. It respects the Union directors, both in their opinion of Dr. Briggs's services, and their belief that their action transferring him from one chair to another is not amenable to the Assembly's jurisdiction. It knows the seriousness and integrity of modern

Biblical scholarship, and is well aware that the concurring judgment of the great majority of modern Biblical scholars in such opinions about the phenomena of the Bible as Dr. Briggs expresses makes a weighty testimony in their favor. It knows that the existing prejudice against Professor Briggs created by a recent utterance is an important reason for acting in his case with scrupulous care for justice. It must feel the necessity of caution in condemning any Presbyterian's belief at a time when the creed is in an unsettled state, and when, therefore, no Presbyterian can know just what he is required to believe. It must feel that its use of a veto not as yet used, though possessed for twenty years, is an act of a startling kind, demanding well-considered reasons, — if done on doctrinal grounds, clear conception of the exact relation of the doctrine so rebuked to the creed. We are sure, therefore, that only careful, mature, well-reasoned action in this case, could really represent the General Assembly. Should it take action of a different and inferior character, we should refuse to regard this as really expressing its mind. The case would be as if some calm, wise man were to do a weak, petulant thing. We should refuse to regard it as standing for the man, and ascribe it to some unhappy impulse which had for a moment mastered his judgment.

How did the Assembly act in the case of Professor Briggs? Did it take pains to set accurately before itself the views enunciated in his inaugural, and to weigh carefully their relation to the correlated doctrines of the creed? No, it did not examine his doctrines. It accepted and adopted a report recommending that his appointment be vetoed, and giving no reason for the course recommended, save such as might be implied in the fact that Dr. Briggs had delivered an inaugural address which was "the subject of some criticism." It condemned — for its action was a condemnation — a faithful and pious teacher of the Bible, without taking the pains to see what his offense was.

Of course individual members of the Assembly had read the inaugural. It had been discussed in many of the presbyteries. But the Assembly as a body, the mightiest body of the Presbyterian Church, having the largest powers and the heaviest responsibilities, the supreme Presbyterian tribunal, was bound to have a knowledge of its own upon which to act in a case deciding upon the orthodoxy of a Presbyterian teacher. That knowledge it did not get. The Assembly did not even inquire what the inaugural taught, much less whether its teaching were contrary to its creed. It took the responsibility of declaring one of its foremost teachers, one who had just affirmed belief in the creed, doctrinally unfit to teach in a Presbyterian seminary, — for its action amounts to just this declaration, — without saying, or even asking, what doctrine he held. It declared that such Biblical scholarship as he represents cannot be tolerated in a Presbyterian seminary, without asking what the doctrinal bearing of this scholarship is. And it took this action when the unsettled state of its own creed created a special reason for

care in disciplinary action under that symbol. This thing was done by the Presbyterian Assembly, but it surely does not represent that body; it does not have the doctrinal significance which an affirmation serious enough to express the Assembly's conviction would have. The Assembly acted impulsively. It was evidently under a strong prejudice against Dr. Briggs's teaching, — so strong as to make it forget even the judicial proprieties of the case.

It does not belong to our discussion to point out the causes of the unjudicial temper of the Assembly, except, perhaps, such as were plainly at work in the late meeting securing the action. One of these we think it right to show, because seeing it helps one to distinguish between the deed of the Assembly and the character of that body. This is the advocacy of President Patton, "the adroit ecclesiastic," as Dr. Prentice calls him in the "Evangelist" of June 11. The speech delivered by Dr. Patton in defense of the report of the committee of which he was chairman contains skillful and specious arguments, which may well have concealed from many of the Assembly the real nature of the step which they were urged and perhaps disposed to take. Such an argument is the plea that members who did not approve of Professor Briggs's ideas were in duty bound to vote for the veto. "It is one thing to look on sorrowfully and express regret for a condition of things in regard to which you feel no responsibility, and in respect of which, therefore, you are not called upon to take action. It is another thing when that same condition of things comes before you and appears at the bar of your conscience in such a sense that for you neglect is to be *particeps criminis*. That is the point. Now we are in just that position. . . . We are here, the presbyteries have sent us here, and the report of Union Theological Seminary has brought this question right up to the bar of every man's conscience, and you cannot evade it, and you dare not avoid it. . . . For us not to express technical disapproval is to express technical approval."

This is very plausible. But a vote to confirm would not have been an expression of approval of Dr. Briggs, but of the opinion that under the circumstances it would be better for all parties for the Assembly not to veto.

One important circumstance was, as Dr. Patton admitted, the shortness of the time required for consideration. Why not defer action until the matter can be thoroughly considered? Because, says Dr. Patton, if we do not act now we shall very likely lose the veto in this case. Probably it lapses with this meeting. It is now or never. Very well, it might be replied by an honest opponent of Briggs, I will not act unjudicially lest by refusing to do so I lose the power of acting at all. I will refuse to veto in haste, for the act, if done at all, should be done calmly and deliberately. This would not be "technical approval." Besides, the power of expressing disapproval of Dr. Briggs's views would probably not be lost with the veto. For as Dr. Patton himself says in another part of his speech,

it is highly probable that his orthodoxy will come before the General Assembly in the course of appeal from the decision of his presbytery respecting his soundness in the faith.

The summons to choose between approval and disapproval seems to us, in view of these considerations, to be misleading. Not less so is the argument urged in behalf of the recommendation to veto without giving reasons. "Professor Briggs is on trial for heresy before his own presbytery, and to give doctrinal reasons for vetoing would prejudice his judges in that court,"—as if a condemnation without alleged reason would not influence their minds, and as if the General Assembly should condemn an accused man without fairly trying his case, in order that he might have a fair trial before his local presbytery.

But further on we find Dr. Patton saying that the fact of Dr. Briggs being arraigned by his presbytery is a reason for the veto. The Assembly, that is, should pronounce his doctrine heretical, because the local presbytery has undertaken to prove it to be such. These do not seem to us to be the arguments of a candid mind. To be sure, Dr. Patton urges that a professor may be so heretical that it is the duty of the General Assembly to veto his appointment to teach in a Presbyterian seminary, while not heretical enough to deserve discipline as a Presbyterian minister. But this is an assertion which needs proof. Does the Assembly insist on any other test of orthodoxy for professors than loyalty to Presbyterian standards? What less than this is required for ministers?

Dr. Patton, in the latter part of his speech, tried to show that certain affirmations of the inaugural were the utterances of an unorthodox mind. This was unfair, considering that he had not taken, and was asking the Assembly not to take, the responsibility of making a specific charge of heresy. Worse than this was his insinuation against Dr. Briggs's character. It was as follows:—

"I say we have done this in the interest of kindness to Dr. Briggs. I would be unwilling for this Assembly to pass a resolution in the very body of which there should be a stigma of a constitutional kind that would affirm that because of Dr. Briggs's idiosyncrasies he should not be a professor in the seminary. Why, a man's idiosyncrasies go with him through life, and I do not know but they go into the middle state, and I am unwilling to say that Dr. Briggs is not fit and should not be a professor in any seminary. No, I am not willing to say that he is unfit to be a professor in Union Seminary."

Here is a prominent and powerful man, who has brought before the Assembly, and is urging the Assembly to adopt, a report recommending that an honored teacher, who is absent, be removed from his post without assigned reasons, and he says, in substance, to the Assembly, it was in kindness to Dr. Briggs that I did not put anything into the report about his personality. So he tries to avail himself of such personal prejudice against Professor Briggs as may lie in the minds of any members of the Assembly, and to give those members excuse for yielding to such preju-

dice, at the same time avoiding for himself and them the responsibility of an accusation. And this man in this very speech loudly professes friendship for Professor Briggs. It seems impossible that he should carry into another meeting of the General Assembly so much moral influence as he may have exerted in this one.

Such arguments and suggestions as these, urged by a clever speaker and one holding a high place, could not but be effective with a body which came together fresh from heated controversy, many of its members in sympathy with the doctrinal views and ecclesiastical tendencies of the speaker. The Assembly voted, by a vast majority, to condemn, without asking what it was condemning, and why. In so voting it laid aside its judicial character, notwithstanding it was in the very act claiming judicial powers. For it laid claim to such powers in deciding upon the terms of the compact made in 1870 with Union Seminary. It also assumed them substantially if not formally in its veto. When the Assembly shall resume its true character, its calmer action will indirectly reflect upon, and we hope directly reverse, its late impulsive course.

But not so soon will the influence of the Presbyterian Church, in testifying to Christian truth, recover from the injury it has received at the hands of its great representative body and judicial tribunal.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

A GENERAL VIEW OF MISSIONS. SECOND SERIES.

X. INDIA.

INDIA, as a field of missionary activity, is almost the antipodes of its mighty northern neighbor. China, among great powers, is the most absolutely complete national unity in the world. There are doubtless wide physical, mental, and moral differences between the inhabitants of its different provinces. Especially, there is said to be, as might be supposed, a marked superiority of the northern over the southern Chinese. But all differences are as nothing compared with the absolute unity of the national consciousness. The Middle Kingdom, as it extended northward and southward, absorbing or reabsorbing into itself one after another of the principalities into which early China fell apart, carried with it so complete a sway (the more absolute because prevailing by its intrinsic congruity) of its ethical, literary, civil, social, ceremonial system, that, when it had finally expanded into China, there was seen a form of national life far too entirely mundane, indeed, to be ideally noble, but more completely digested than perhaps any other that has ever existed. There was almost complete unity of race, for the border tribes which have now and again conquered the realm were homogeneous, not heterogeneous, and assimilated themselves without a thought of oppugnancy. Nowhere, then, has any wide social system ever been seen in which every force was so fully correlated to every other, in which there has been so little civil waste. Of higher civilizations there have been many; but surely

China has a right to claim for itself, within its own range, the most absolutely complete civilization and national unity the world has ever seen, on any extended scale. Doubtless intimate acquaintance would reveal that even here the rude, unethicized forces of human nature spurt forth dangerously at various points of the great Confucian embankment. But relatively, at least, we do not appear to have been extravagant in praising the completeness of Chinese national unity.

India, on the other hand, is a mere "geographical expression," from the hoariest antiquity a chaos of conflicting races, religions, kingdoms, and dynasties, foreign and domestic. Until lately the thought of an Indian nationality can hardly be said to have existed, and the reality of it does not yet exist. It is true, the Mohammedan conquerors may have anticipated the assumption of the gaudy title by which an English Jew has endeavored to convert the reality of a national supremacy of England into the theory (which he hoped some day to actualize) of a personal supremacy of the English sovereign, reigning on the Ganges and the Kavery and Nerbudda by an independent prerogative, and may have given themselves some title equivalent to "Emperor of India." But this common subjection, after the failure of their first violent attempts of Moslem proselytism, left undisturbed the whole confusion of races, creeds, and laws, and neither extinguished the lesser nationalities nor engendered any broader one.

It is true that for these four or five thousand years our Aryan race has borne rule in India, and has gradually imbued it, from the Himalaya to its southern cape, with its own instincts and habitudes. But although its sway, being mainly spiritual, has become singularly pervasive, it has never approached to the unifying power of Confucianism, which interpreted and confirmed, though reducing them to a lower level, the instincts of a people that had been one and easily became one again. Aryanism, transmuted into Hinduism, shows, in language, in religion, in law, and in social use, reactions from the earlier races still making up the bulk of the Hindus which have deeply modified its own action upon them. And, even thus profoundly accommodated to aboriginal conditions, its perfect sway hardly exists outside of the Ganges valley. In the Punjab it left deposits which, in some very important respects, have maintained an earlier form of development; while to the south of the Vindhya, although it has advanced its religious supremacy, it has been obliged to leave the great Dravidian race untouched in its language, in its character, and even in some of those points of law and religious usage which in the North are a main support of Brahminical tyranny. Moreover, throughout India, of the two hundred and eighty millions of the people, at least sixty millions are either slightly Hinduized or not Hinduized at all, to which we are to add the fifty millions of Mohammedan invaders and converts, to whom, as to ourselves, Hinduism is an abomination. Moreover, within fully developed Hinduism itself, caste, allowing a free transmission of common traditions, makes common action difficult, while caste is crossed by sect in a way obscure to us, but surely not conducive to unity. And now, over and above all, the ruling race is introducing disintegrating influences of every kind at every point. Surely we may with good warrant call India the antipodes of China.

It can hardly be said that in India, at present, there is quite that spirit of active encouragement in the minds of Protestant missionaries which appeared in China at the Shanghai Conference. So heterogeneous

a country makes it harder to combine action or impressions. The number of Protestant Christians, it is true, is out of all proportion larger. But then Protestant missions themselves are a good deal older. Conversions are still proceeding rapidly in some parts of the Dravidian race of the south (especially the Telugus, where there have been five thousand baptisms in five months at the hands of the American Baptists), and among the Hill-tribes and "depressed castes" of the north, where the American Methodists are reaping a large harvest. But within Hinduism proper, conversions are just now measurably at a stay. This seems largely owing to the fact that, whereas there was once no alternative between the gross abominations of mere Hinduism and avowed Christianity, there are now (as remarked by the Free Church Deputation) various half-way houses, such as Brahmo Somaj, Prarthana Somaj, and especially Arya Somaj, this last being a repristination of Vedic religion, which, it is known, had not yet developed caste, suttee, child-marriage, compulsory widowhood, or sacerdotal supremacy, or, at most, had but some incipient traces of the first and the last. A man, therefore, who adheres to this, is free to use all the benefits of English rule, and is not obliged to any course of action which would offend even Christian morality. In doctrine the system seems to be distinctly Theistic. But while Brahmo Somaj has on the whole been decidedly cordial to Christianity, and seems at present to be more cordial than ever, and, as a natural sequel, to be heartily friendly to the English rule, Arya Somaj is bitterly hostile to the former, and none too well affected towards the latter. Of course this futile endeavor to turn the Ganges back to its founts, to revive forms of religion which were only possible in the early youth of Aryan India, implies a lower level of intelligence than is seen in the Brahmo Somaj. This inferior intelligence it must have been which, not long since, prompted to the perpetration of an absolutely comical trick. An Aryan catechism was published, and received with great applause, until at last some European eye, falling upon it, discovered it to be mainly a translation of the Westminster Shorter Catechism, omitting the references to Christ. But the hardy sect, it appears, though a little confused at the first detection, soon rallied, and now declares that Aryanism is merely reclaiming its own, the Assembly of Divines being accused as the real plagiarists, having, it seems, in some mysterious manner, derived their doctrine from the treasures of Aryan lore! But the whole movement is not so ridiculous as this episode, and is at present successful in interposing a barrier of no inconsiderable strength against the advance of the gospel within the limits of accredited Hinduism.

Meanwhile the traditional form of Hinduism is rousing itself to fresh energy of resistance. The quiet and rather indifferent courtesy which has prevailed for a good while towards the missions is giving way, at various points, to a rude hostility. Associations are formed for the express purpose of breaking up Christian street-preaching; tract societies are formed which pour out a flood of ribald indecency against the Saviour and his gospel, availing themselves indifferently of Bradlaugh, Ingersoll, and other abusive atheists of the West, and of the fouler resources of Hinduism itself. A more respectable means of opposition is the establishment of Hindu high schools. Zenana Missions, being regarded, not without reason, as a stroke at the very heart, begin to be opposed and curtailed at various points. And there have even been some reactionary movements which have carried away, in some districts, a considerable number of Christians.

These movements, so far as they prevail, are certainly, in their first effect, disheartening. In a deeper consideration, however, they are not without encouragement. They indicate the breaking up of a state of mind among the Hindus which has often made the missionaries feel as if they were pouring water into a sieve. The people would listen, appreciate, declare their acceptance of Christian teaching, and yet maintain, in quiet juxtaposition with it, the most absolutely inconsistent tenets and practices of their old religion. Hinduism is thoroughly pervaded with the doctrine of *Maya*, Illusion. Existence is, as Renan with Parisian politeness and indifference maintains it to be, an "everlasting dream," in which the most incongruous ideas and systems of ideas are free to move back and forth without any care of mutual adjustment. Why should not Christianity, then, be accepted as a peculiarly noble and satisfying vision among the rest, without any thought that this admission involves the obligation of surrendering anything on the ground of being incongruous with it? Who thinks of obligation as applying to a dream? And the more strangely incongruous it is, the greater its fascination. But the rising irritation seems to require us to suppose that a great many Hindus are beginning to feel that the gospel is very far from being a dream, that it is a living and wakeful force, against which they can only guard themselves by measures of wakeful activity. Or, to use another figure, employed by the non-Christian graduate of a Christian school: "The lion at last begins to feel that your darts sting and pierce." All the various endeavors of Græco-Roman paganism, even to Julian's attempt to imitate various institutions of the church, seem to be now finding their counterpart in India. This parallel, surely, does not appear to be a discouraging one.

The active and often disparaging and acrimonious criticism of missions which has lately awakened in such force, especially in England, has of course directed itself with peculiar energy upon India. Much of it, most indeed, has been proved to be overcharged. Much of it is ignorance, much is distorted, a good deal is even calumnious. But for all that, it is beyond dispute that the time has come for a thorough revision, and perhaps a thorough recast, of Protestant missionary methods, and certainly not least in India. Who can imagine that the semi-unconscious plans which have developed themselves in the first century of extended Protestant missions are to be the perpetual norm? Missions, during this first century, have had a great deal to do besides going on in their proper work. They have had to conquer slowly, and have hardly conquered yet, a recognition within the churches themselves of their full practical equality with home activity. They have had, with still more effort, to conquer the recognition which begins to be accorded to them by general society (in Germany with an almost ludicrous tumultuousness) as being a permanent, extending, and important force exerted by Christendom upon the world at large. They have yet to conquer for themselves such a place in the general intelligence as shall make it, for instance, impossible for a leading New York journal, with at least the pretense of simple faith, to ascribe the Christianizing of the Methodist Fijians to the Roman Catholics, and make it impossible for smart young Irishmen on the daily press to put into the mouth of an Hawaiian prince complaints against the Protestant missionaries of his country of having neglected the various points of social amelioration to every one of which they have given the most strenuous and successful attention. Missions in the world at

large, and in each great country, must be brought out of their haphazard state into a foresighted and farsighted correlation; and the one or two great denominations from which it seems impossible to secure anything like loyal comity, must at least be displayed, beyond the possibility of disguise, against the background of their really united brethren. It is too much, perhaps, to expect that in our day Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries will be brought to work within the limits of an ascertainable and not unbrotherly *modus vivendi*, such as that which the "Missionary Herald" has well pointed out as so admirably portrayed in its possibilities by Sir William Hunter. But even this is to be kept in mind, and, when the Papacy has been driven from Rome to London, may yet come to pass.

Within each denomination, the question how far the work is to be carried on by independent societies and how far by really representative bodies; how far by education and how far by direct evangelization; how far by European or American, and how far by native agents, and in what form of correlation between the two; how far, and in what sense, ascetic missions are compatible with Protestant principles; how far every fibre of genuine nationality may be preserved in the converts without admitting a single fibre of disguised paganism, — all these inquiries certainly ought before long to lead to a settlement on the basis of fundamental and permanent principle. The narrow unintelligence which would talk as if the gospel of God had never been brought to any still pagan country until Protestants came to it, must yield to a heartily appreciative study, not merely of apostolic and early, but of mediæval and modern missions, Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Nestorian. The exhaustive treatment by Dr. Faber, in the "Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift," of the long and embittered controversy between the Dominicans and the Jesuits in China, is full of instruction and admonition to us. It would not be strange, then, if, upon the multifariousness of India at least, a providential pause fell, until a broader outlook was secured. Our German brethren are beginning to do their part towards the Science of Missions, and here, too, if we do not originate, we may at least assimilate.

In India one very important step has been taken towards the readjustment of methods. This is the appointment, by the Free Church of Scotland, of two deputies, Professor Lindsay, and the Rev. Mr. Daly, authorized to examine the four Indian missions of that church in Bengal, in Madras, in Bombay, and in the central principality of Nagpur. It is known that most of the Scottish missionaries in India, with the great Alexander Duff at their head, went with the Free Church secession. The Established Church of Scotland has now an excellent mission at Darjeeling, and one at Kalimpong, but Scottish Presbyterianism in India is mainly of the Free Church. Duff, for devotedness, is worthy to be compared to Judson himself. To have heard him is the privilege of a lifetime. His authority in India has for Presbyterians been almost canonical. As a Scot and as a Presbyterian, he could not fail to emphasize the indispensable importance of intelligence, and the very great importance, in this land of subtle thinkers, of the higher education. Max Müller calls the Greeks and Hindus the two most gifted races of the world. The subtlest ideas of pantheistic philosophy, it is said, have sifted down into the common thought of the very bullock-drivers. "Impulse without direction," which we have heard described as the characteristic of a powerful denomination, is assuredly not the characteristic of Scottish Presbyterian-

ism. In the Scottish character the fiery fervor of the Celt and the unyielding energy of the Teuton are completely fused. And the two rarely escape from the control of strenuous thought and high intelligence. It was therefore to be assumed as of course that no revision of Scottish Missions would lead to a depression of the higher education. But the Free Church, accepting the conclusions of its deputation, has made the important decision that hereafter all increase of contributions shall be devoted to the work of direct evangelism until this is brought up fully abreast. Besides recognizing the fact that the Free Church work from the beginning has emphasized the future, and the importance of influencing the higher castes, somewhat at the expense of the present and of the "dim and common multitudes," the Church takes note that conditions have changed a good deal since the days of Duff. In his time the government system of high schools and colleges had not laid such a stress of competition upon the missionaries. The same men could therefore be at once educational and evangelistic workers. But this is quite impossible now. Even the quiet personal conferences with students, which once secured a good many conversions from the higher castes, are hard to maintain against the present pressure. It is still true that the converts of the high schools and colleges, though few, are men of mark, strong in character, firm in faith, and widely effective for Christ. But, owing to various reasons, it is perceived that they are becoming not only relatively but absolutely few. And, as has been pointed out by the Rev. Mr. Andrew of the Free Church Mission in the southern Presidency, high schools and colleges can never be the chief means of bringing the gospel even to the higher castes. The Free Church, therefore, with wise docility, obeys the providential admonition: "These things ought ye to do, and not to leave the other undone."

Of the four missions of the Free Church, the one in the Madras Presidency is easily the first, both on the side of education and evangelism. The leading Dravidian people, the Tamils, are an encouraging people to work amongst, capable and genial, and not so overpowered with self-consciousness as the Aryans of the North. The Christian College of Madras¹ is a great power for good in southern India. The fact that the two branches of the work coincide so happily, in that one of the four missions which is most eminent on the side of education, is a fortunate omen for the success of the new policy of the Free Church. The Poona branch of the Bombay Mission, having for some time back ceased to be an educational, is to be continued exclusively as an evangelistic work. In Calcutta and Bengal, the four or five high schools of the Free Church will be kept up, but it seems not improbable that the college will ultimately be fused with that of the Scottish establishment. And, now that the evangelistic work is to be brought up to its full coördinate dignity, it is to be hoped that a considerable proportion, at least, of the Scottish missionaries will be allowed time to learn the vernaculars of their dwelling-places. All the higher teaching being given in English, new men from Scotland are set to work at once, and have no time to learn the languages of the people. The missionaries remind the Home Committee that the American Board allows two years for new men to study the vernaculars, and advise them to imitate it, at least for a part of their Scotch agents.

The Free Church has also an entirely aboriginal and entirely evan-

¹ This is predominatingly, not exclusively Presbyterian.

gelistic mission in Santalia, which, however, seems to have been treated rather as a thing by the way. The church is reminded by these missionaries that too exclusive a devotion to the higher castes is of doubtful evangelical soundness, and that the reaction upon these from the lower classes, if thoroughly evangelized, is not likely to be less powerful for elevation than in the past it has been powerful for degradation. On the whole, the Free Church Deputation seems to have set the Scottish missions in the way of greater evangelical directness of aim, while distinctly maintaining the specific intellectual character, and disposition to seek the most difficult range of work, which is so agreeable to the Scottish genius. The readjustment will be without any of that slashing destructiveness, the fruit of a pure but rather narrow pietism, whose unfortunate working once made the very name of a Deputation a word of fear to many of our American missionaries in India.

The Deputation has considered another important question, and seems to have given a thoroughly sound solution of it. This is the question of Cheap Missions. It takes as the type of these the China Inland Mission. In this, each European agent is paid rather scantily. But as the decided majority of the missionaries are Europeans, the total outlay is large. On the other hand, in the Church of Scotland Mission at Darjeeling, the European missionaries are paid a good deal larger salaries, but each missionary is at the head of a body of twenty or thirty native evangelists. The work is therefore much more effective, and much less expensive. The Deputation accordingly does not recommend any great reduction of salaries, but a large increase of native evangelistic forces.

India is likely to serve in a peculiar measure the purpose of education in missionary intelligence at home. It affords a view of every sort of mission, from the simplest and rudest to the most refined and complicated. And a considerable current of visitors from home is beginning to pour in upon it, in the cooler season of each year, — eminent clergymen, men of letters, members of parliament, and princes of the blood. This may not improve the quality, but it will greatly increase the amount, of English knowledge of India, and there is fortunately in England a vast amount of digested knowledge to correct all crudities.

Dr. Pentecost's visit is generally acknowledged to have been a great benefit and blessing, especially in Calcutta, not only among the English, but among that great number of native gentlemen who know English perfectly. The Viceroy, the Marquis of Lansdowne, and Lady Lansdowne have taken particular pains, by personal attendance and otherwise, to mark their interest in his work. Since 1857 India has enjoyed various viceroys whose names are held in affectionate remembrance by the missionaries, particularly Lord Lawrence and the Marquis of Ripon, the former a Protestant, the latter a Roman Catholic, but both eminent Christian men, whose encouraging influence was felt by all who were laboring for the highest good of India.

The opium traffic, which was introduced to increase the revenues of the Indian government, appears to be recoiling upon it by a large increase of the opium habit in India itself, as well as in Australia. The Divine Nemesis cannot be evaded. But the first great victory has been gained in the House of Commons, and more practical victories are to follow. That Sir Lepel Griffin, who, honoring our nation with a distinction which is surely far beyond our merits, contemns missions and Americans alike, should now shriek out his horror of those who are endeavoring to reduce

the Eastern plague-spot, is altogether according to the fitness of things, although to inquire out the psychological process, by which he discovers their motive to be "selfish vanity," would be too much like essaying to break a butterfly on the wheel. The "Guardian's" dislike of the movement may perhaps be easily enough explained by its sense of religious obligation to oppose whatever Exeter Hall approves, as Hurrell Froude, in his High Church devotion, found it a means of grace in the West Indies to sneer at the negroes whom the Evangelicals befriended. But it does seem rather curious when a secretary of the Church Missionary Society itself apologizes for the traffic, and it is hardly what we should expect when the "Spectator" vigorously defends it, too. The "Christian Union" seems to be equally witty and wise in suggesting that, while suffering that others may not suffer is intelligible and commendable, sinning that others may not sin, as the "Spectator" appears to propose, decidedly breaks all bounds of Christian permissibility. "The Nonconformist conscience," however, within and without the limits of Nonconformity, will doubtless, as of old, go on conquering and to conquer. The late Mr. Brace held that at present the principal seat of Christian excellence in England is in the High Church party. But there seem to be some of its old sins from which it is yet to be purged.

While the Scottish Missions, if not absolutely yet relatively, have been somewhat mitigating their educational standards, the Roman Catholics, as attested by Sir William Hunter, whose statement is fully confirmed by other authorities, have been greatly raising theirs. Their high schools and colleges in India, especially those of the Jesuits, are becoming so numerous, so well appointed, and so well conducted, that the other Protestant missionaries besides the Scottish feel that they are hardly equipped for equal competition. It is highly creditable to the Catholics that they have so thoroughly made up their old delinquencies in this respect. But it will certainly not be greatly creditable to us if, as various missionaries express the apprehension, the higher intelligence of our own converts may, in a generation or two, if appropriate means are not used, pass over to the other side. These warnings are usually a little exaggerated, to make them more effective, but this one is certainly not to be disregarded. There is abundant room for both Christian parties to work in India, while surely each cannot be too well-equipped, above all ought to be amply equipped, for its own domestic needs. It is curious, but in this respect the other missions have done better than the Scotch, which have been arranged rather to work outward than to build up their own Christian communities, so that they find it difficult to obtain a sufficiency of Christian teachers for their own schools, — a grievous drawback to missionary efficiency.

It is known how fruitful a field of labor has been found at almost the extreme southern point of the great peninsula, in the district of Tinnevely, where the converts of the two great Anglican societies now amount to between one and two hundred thousand. The two bishops, Sargent and Caldwell, who have long superintended these two missions, are now both withdrawn, Sargent by death, from the work of the Church Missionary Society; Caldwell, by retirement, from that of the Propagation Society. Both were well known as devoted missionary laborers, and the latter is universally acknowledged to be one of the greatest missionary authorities in India. It is to be presumed that in his leisure he will put his remembrances and judgments of the work of God in India into definite shape.

The Syrian Church of the southwestern kingdom of Travancore, which has been settled there no one knows how many ages, some saying from the fourth century, has been disturbed by an important contest between two bishops, each claiming metropolitan rights over her. Mar Athanasius is decidedly friendly to the reforming influences which have lately been at work in the church; his competitor is for keeping everything as it has been from of old. The High Court of Travancore has finally rendered judgment in favor of the latter, the two Brahmin judges pronouncing for him, the one English judge for Athanasius. In our ignorance of the law, we are bound to presume the decision a just one, but as Protestants we should have been well pleased if it had turned the other way. We do not understand, however, that even the successful metropolitan is actively hostile to the Protestants (at least it is not so stated), but rather that he is somewhat stolidly conservative of old usages and superstitions. The church has been wont to open her pulpits freely to both the Episcopalian and the Congregational missionaries of Travancore. Having been for ten, perhaps for fifteen centuries, a feebly burning lamp in the densest darkness, she is glad to rest down on the fundamentals of the faith. And having, as Syrian, separated from the Catholic Church as early as the fifth century, she, like the Coptic Church of Egypt, keeps much of the consciousness of that time, when the hierarchical distinctions had long been fully established, but Christians had not yet forgotten that, as St. Augustine and St. Jerome both say, it is not divine necessity, but ecclesiastical practice, on which their validity depends. We have seen the statement that several of the most vigorous reformers of Hinduism, in a monotheistic and ethical direction, have been brought up on the confines of this church. If this statement is true (and it ought to be either confirmed or confuted), it would show that the Syrian Church, semi-torpid as she may have seemed, has nevertheless, by the very force of her belief, sent out vigorous pulsations into the heathen mass, which may perhaps be dimly discernible even now. It is to be presumed, also, that some of the supposed parallelisms to the gospels in Hinduism and Buddhism (vague at best) have been communicated from this Christianity of the western coast, especially as the Buddhist myths did not receive their present form until five or six hundred years after Christ. This ancient church ought to be still as much an object of interest and prayer to us as it was to Claudius Buchanan ninety years ago. The desolating policy of Portugal and Rome has sadly crushed and quenched it, *nec tamen consumebatur*.

Bombay is widely distinct in character from either Calcutta or Madras. Of course it shared with the whole western coast in the unsettling influences resulting from the impact of the Portuguese power four centuries ago. It has still a wonderfully stirring and varied population, and an inspiring situation on its island, several miles out from the mainland.

"Thy towers, Bombay, gleam bright, they say,
Across the dark blue sea,"

sings Reginald Heber, in the hope of soon meeting there his wife and children. A strongly differentiating influence is found here in the Parsees, that remnant of Zoroastrian Persians who fled hither long since from Moslem persecution, and whose energy of temperament, monotheistic belief, hatred of idolatry, high ethical code, comparative freedom from superstitious restrictions, respect for their women, who are well

educated, and wealth resulting from their devotion to commerce, render them helpful to progress, although the very nearness of their creed to ours has left them but little inclined to become Christians. On the other hand, for some unexplained cause, the British officials of the Bombay Presidency have been (and perhaps still are) peculiarly disposed to unbelief, and coldly averse to Christian effort. This perhaps is one reason why various philanthropic enterprises, among them those of our countrywoman Mrs. Brainerd-Ryder, though avowedly undertaken with a Christian intent and prosecuted with a Christian spirit, are in form neutral. One of the most important of these is a sort of technological school for women, the president of whose trustees is the eminent Brahmin, Chief Justice E. K. Telang, while on its advisory board there are associated the Lord Bishop of Bombay, Bishop Thoburn of our own Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Vicar-General of the Jesuits.

How singularly astray those are who speak of modern Hinduism as if it were a religion which could be treated with respect, like Parsism, like Islam on its theistic or Buddhism on its ethical side, is shown in the agitation caused by the recently enacted and timidly moderate bill raising the age of conjugal consent from ten to twelve. The abominations and atrocities of the marriage system of India are sickening to read and impossible to relate. Yet this bill, which competent authorities declare to be by no means what the actual physical temperament of the Indian population seems to admit, and indeed to require, awakened the most frantic opposition among the Hindus, culminating in a vast expiatory or deprecatory pilgrimage, attended by two or three hundred thousand suppliants, who interceded with piteous laments with the dreadful goddess Kali to avert this blow, which they declared would be mortal to their religion. Kali, the wife of Siva the Destroyer, the goddess whose tongue, thrust out till it touches her girdle, seems to be dripping with the blood of her enemies, and whose necklace of human skulls depends from her neck in long festoons, is the worthy object of such a devotion, the genuine Madonna of such a religion.

Those Americans who are so much disturbed because the Roman Catholics enjoy full political rights among us may (if it is in them) learn equity and common sense from the magnanimous courage with which the British government behaves towards the Mohammedans of India. These have a creed which does not, like Roman Catholicism, simply advance spiritual claims hard to reconcile with the independence of the civil power, but which really knows no distinction between the two. The extravagant pretensions of Italian canonists, most of which are confessed to be no certain part of the faith, express by analogy the very substance of Mohammedan belief. Islam allows no excuse to its adherents for rendering allegiance to an "infidel," except an absolute incapability of evading submission. And as India was for centuries a Moslem dominion, the succession of a Christian government to authority has caused the keenest disturbances of conscience, in the minds of the true believers, as to whether it was lawful to pay tribute to the British Cæsar or not. This has been a theme of anxious and protracted discussions, which have hardly been brought to a definitive issue even by reassuring decisions from Arabia. But England, which has not undertaken to check the fullest ventilation of the question, puts away from her, with equal wisdom and justice, all consideration of the question how far the speculative and abstract principles of Mohammedan religion agree or disagree with the

practical citizenship of her Moslem subjects. She knows that, with the great mass of men, healthy human interests, in the end and in the main, must and should determine the measure of their attachment to an actual government which shows that it has no desire to persecute their essential religion. Her policy is founded upon this large confidence, and the result does not put her to shame. Indeed, there are able Englishmen, thoroughly acquainted with the country, who urgently counsel her to throw the main weight of responsibility for its administration, so far as it rests on the natives of India, not upon the moral slackness of Brahminism, but upon the higher intelligence and more developed conscientiousness of Mohammedanism. England has no committees lying in wait, in Bombay or Calcutta, to devise invidious reasons for refusing honors to the dead, or to urge that the living shall be excluded from civil trusts for which they are found worthy until they shall consent to take oaths forswearing their spiritual allegiance to the Ottoman Caliph, or the tribe of Koreish. She only inquires whether they are in fact men that are rendering, and are likely to render, faithful service to the Empress of India. She respects every man's conscience, makes due concessions to his practical scruples, modifies the details of her policy according to the facts that she finds, and therefore is able to advance farther and farther, with ever-growing popular assent, the banners of a rational and essentially Christian rule. As the "Indian Witness," Bishop Thoburn's organ, says, it is indeed impossible to say that inward forces may not even yet burst forth and overwhelm all the formations of a better civilization. But there is good hope that this will not be, and the best guaranty that it shall not be is to be found in the calm wisdom and large equity of the English administration in India in its present form.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

(To be continued.)

NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

THE great event of the last few weeks has most undoubtedly been the announcement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in bringing in his annual Budget, that after 1st September next the government would give a grant to elementary schools in lieu of the school fees now payable, and so would initiate Free Education. By many this is taken as a sign of an approaching dissolution of Parliament: the government, it is said, will certainly appeal to the country before another Budget. But, as under our constitutional Septennial Act a government can decide on a general election at any time before the seven years of Parliament have run out, it is the usual practice for the government in power to suddenly choose a time suitable to themselves, and to give but little warning to friends or foes. So, now, it is the unexpected in this case that is most likely to occur.

As to Free Education itself, it is generally approved except by "those stern and unbending Tories," now only a small portion of the Conservative party, who retain the opinions which they held twenty years ago, and to whom anything that can be called on any pretext socialistic is an

unmitigated evil. Doubtless the proposal will be realized at an early date, even if not this year. But without the detailed proposals, by which the new grant is intended to be administered, it is impossible to say how the new order of things will act on our educational system. If only the fees in the lower standards (or classes) are freed, as is partially the case now in Scotland, the educationalists will be dissatisfied, for it will act as a discouragement to clever children to pass through the higher standards, which are only voluntary, if in these classes fees have to be paid. Again, if no popular control over the many practically private schools is granted with the new increased grants of public money, the Liberals will accept Free Education only to amend it as soon as they come into power. If popular control is made a rule instead of an exception in the elementary schools, it will irritate the country squires and clergy, who are the fastest supporters of the Conservative party, which is now in power. But in any case, there has arrived a time when the elementary educational system, which has worked for twenty years with some blots but considerable success, is acknowledged to require modification.

Another event, on which much has been said, has been the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the relations of Capital and Labor. Notice has been called in these "Notes" before to the increasing strength of "Labor Movements" in Great Britain. Parliament's attention has been constantly called to the matter, and the subject has become a frequent theme of eloquence upon political platforms. The government was obliged to do something, and has probably done the best possible thing in instituting a thorough inquiry of this nature. Labor representatives are not agreed amongst themselves as to whether legislative enactments, compulsory or permissive, for limiting the hours of labor, are needed, or whether trades unions and labor federations are really able by voluntary combination and united action to secure shorter hours and better wages. Cynics point to the fact that this recently appointed Labor Commission cannot report till after the next general election, and so seems an attempt to keep labor questions from the political battlefield for another few years. It is a commonplace, that Royal Commissions are appointed to hear evidence and frame reports, but not to expect their reports to be made the basis of practical action; and it is now remembered that six years ago the Conservative party appointed a Royal Commission on Education, which three years later reported against Free Education: yet very shortly after, the Conservative party promised to free the elementary schools, and is now just about to redeem its promise. It is far from impossible that there may be another such experience in connection with the Labor question.

The salient feature about the present condition of the Labor problem is that the unskilled laborers are being organized; the movement began with the dock laborers: it is spreading now to other occupations, and notably to the agricultural leaders. The labor organizers declare that in another four or five years the whole of the unskilled laborers of Britain will be as well united and organized as the skilled laborers now are. This is their aim, and if their object is attained, — especially among the agricultural laborers, who form the great reservoir of our labor market, on which capital relies to flood the field, when from one cause or another more cheap labor is wanted, — the outlook will be materially changed;

labor will be stronger to make its demands heard, even if no labor legislation has meanwhile been passed.

Another matter, at once political as well as social in its bearings, is coming to the front, namely, the administration of the poor law, and the provision made for the aged and incapable members of the laboring classes. Apart from the constitution of the Poor Law Boards, which are aristocratic and exclusive in composition, being subject to property qualifications and elected by multiple property votes, our poor law makes no distinction between the dissolute or disreputable and the deserving poor. Consequently, a very poor man feels it not to be to his advantage to save money or provide for old age, for in no case can he lay by much for himself, and he may well find in his old age that some other laborer, who has no means, can get relief from the poor-rates, while he, who has saved a pittance, after a thrifty life is no better off than he who has saved nothing. Then some poor-law guardians refuse almost all outdoor relief, that is, relief in money and food, and give only indoor relief, that is, accommodation in the hated workhouse: others refuse hardly any applicant for outdoor relief, on the ground that this is humane, and such a course is popular with many, though it undoubtedly tends to reduce the rate of wages to have, as is often the case in country districts, men who are sick, aged, or crippled working for less than two dollars (eight shillings) a week, while they eke out their earnings with outdoor relief. Pensions for the aged, and national insurance against sickness, old-age, and death, are now in the air: politicians, statisticians, and publicists are bringing these schemes to public notice, and, one may hope, into a practical form, such as mature public opinion can approve and adopt.

In the development of the life of the Free Churches during recent years, the popularizing and adaptation of the forms of public service have been prominent. The "service of song" is now as well understood as the "prayer meeting," and the office of praise is now felt to be as necessary as that of prayer. One well-known minister has at regular intervals services which are chiefly composed of singing, while he attempts to make the hymns more living by speaking shortly about the writers, the history, the literary or spiritual beauty of the hymns chosen. No work done by the Church of England is more catholic (in the truest sense) than the giving of oratorios and other music of a high class in the great cathedrals and churches. In St. Paul's Cathedral, in the city of London, Mendelssohn's oratorio of St. Paul is regularly given on St. Paul's Day, when more than ten thousand persons gather in the vast building to join in a most impressive service. Bach's Passion Music (St. Matthew) is performed similarly on the Tuesday before Easter. At Westminster Abbey, Bach's Christmas oratorio is performed every Christmas. Other great churches in London have similar services, at which good music is performed in fitting devotional manner. To some, of course, these services are mere performances: but are not the most eloquent sermons to many listeners often nothing more than rhetorical display?

"Happy Sunday afternoons" are another popular and homely development: a few musical solos or anthems, a hymn or two, and a short prayer, with a twenty minutes' address or lecture on some subject of the day, constitute a "brief, bright, and brotherly" hour of edification. Such services have special attractions for workingmen in many places.

The "Sunday Morning Adult School" is another agency which is now being most vigorously worked: at nine o'clock on Sunday mornings a class of men meets for two hours or so, and spends half the time in purely educational work, reading, writing, or the like: and then an hour is spent in discussing a Bible passage or in some other way, in which the whole class joins together. The social value of these classes, which are largely managed by the men themselves, is found to be very great. On the whole, these developments of the service and the class serve to show in how many ways the fact of Christians gathering together can be blessed.

Independents in England are now exercised about several matters. There is first and foremost the International Council, which is to meet in London in July, and which is most eagerly awaited. Then the funds at the disposal of the Church Aid Society, which distributes yearly grants to a large number of small country churches, have become so exhausted that the grants have been greatly reduced in many directions: this means a hard struggle for many a country congregation. A third matter of interest is the election of a Secretary to the Congregational Union of England and Wales in the place of the late Dr. Hannay: the choice has been postponed in order to satisfy a few who wished that no election should be made till the status and duties of the office had been thoroughly reconsidered. It appears likely, however, that the new secretary will enter on the same duties and stand entirely on the same footing as his predecessor.

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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

PHYSICAL REALISM. Being an analytical philosophy from the physical objects of science to the physical data of sense. By THOMAS CASE, M. A. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1888.

Professor Case's fundamental doctrine consists in the proposition that in sense-perception what we immediately perceive is not the external object, but our sensory nerves "sensibly affected." This doctrine he names Physical Realism, to distinguish it from Intuitive Realism, which holds that we immediately perceive and hold converse with the external object. When, for instance, we touch any solid object, as an orange, Intuitive Realism holds that through the sense of touch we immediately perceive it and know of its existence; whereas Professor Case's doctrine maintains that what we immediately perceive is the nerves of touch "sensibly affected," and the presence of the orange is only an inference from this perception. Intuitive Realism used to support its view by appealing to the testimony of consciousness, and with apparent reason: for we are not conscious of drawing such an inference as Professor Case's doctrine asserts, but believe that we immediately feel and perceive the external object itself.

If we take our example from vision instead of from touch, Intuitive Realism inclines at first glance to say that we perceive the orange as

directly by sight as by touch ; and if, as before, we consult the consciousness of the ordinary man, this is surely its testimony. The ordinary man believes that, as he walks along the street, he immediately perceives and knows the houses, the pavement, the horses and carriages, the men and women. But a little reflection suffices to convince the Intuitive Realist that this is not possible, and that the only thing we can immediately see is the light-ray as it impinges upon the retina. Intuitive Realism therefore seeks to parallelize the phenomena of vision with those of touch, and holds that, just as in touch we perceive objects in contact with the skin, so in vision we perceive the light-rays that impinge upon the retina. Intuitive Realism would like to claim the testimony of consciousness in favor of this view, but it cannot do so and remain true to the facts. For consciousness does not testify that in vision we perceive the light-rays that strike the retina, our unsophisticated consciousness knowing nothing of either light-rays or retina ; nor does it tell us, more vaguely, that what we see is the light that reaches the eye, for this conclusion, like the other, is the product of reflection ; but what consciousness testifies is this, that we immediately behold and know objects at a distance from the eye.

In short, a theory which aims to base all conclusions upon the testimony of consciousness leads to propositions which are scientifically absurd ; and Professor Case clearly sees that the proposition that we directly know objects at a distance from the eye is scientifically absurd. For the phrase, "the testimony of consciousness," covers two distinct and dissimilar classes of phenomena : (1) actual psychical facts, which to every psychological theory must be sacred and inviolable ; and (2) inferences from these facts in regard to their causes and implications, — inferences which may or may not be scientifically correct, but which are nevertheless inferences, not immediate knowledge, though they are often taken for the latter because they have the form of very confident beliefs. The belief that we immediately see external objects and beings belongs to this class ; it is an unconscious inference, made for the purpose of explaining the actual psychical facts of vision, but not to be confounded with those facts. And it is a belief which a scientific theory of vision must reject. If we could immediately see objects at a distance from the eye, it would be impossible to understand the rôle of the light-rays that pass from luminous objects to the eye, or the use of the physical apparatus of vision.

Just the same considerations apply to the case of touch : we must distinguish between the sensations of touch and the belief that by them we immediately know an external object. Doubtless we do know an external object, but we do not know it immediately ; all we know immediately is our sensations, and the existence of an external object is an inference from these.

Professor Case's theory deserves credit for ruling out of court, in at least one case, the Intuitive Realist's "appeal to consciousness," which was often only an appeal to unscientific prejudice. All reverence is due to psychical facts, but none to naive beliefs that have not stood the test of scientific criticism.

So much for Professor Case's view of what are *not* the objects of sense-perception. But what *are* its objects ? According to Professor Case, the sensory nerves "sensibly affected."

The phrase "sensibly affected" is, to say the least, an ambiguous and

unfortunate one. It may imply that the sensation in question is a property of the nerves; or it may mean that the nerves are affected in the peculiar manner which is the physiological accompaniment to a sensation; or that the nerves, or rather the nerve-terminations, are colored, warm, etc. The first meaning, that the sensation is a property of the nerves, that it is *in* the nerves, that the nerves *have* the sensation, commits the absurdity of predicating a psychical quality of a material thing. The second meaning, that the nerves are affected in the peculiar manner in virtue of which a sensation arises, — in a manner the details of which it would rest with the science of nervous physiology to determine, — this meaning cannot be intended by the phrase “sensibly affected,” as Professor Case uses it, partly because he does not seem to mean to assert that in sense-perception we make the immediate acquaintance of the processes that go on in the nerves, partly because he speaks in so many words of the nerve-ends as colored and warm. It is therefore in the third sense that he uses the phrase, and he means, for example, that when we see the color red, what we really see is the retinal terminations of the optic nerve so colored; and when we have sensations of warmth in our finger-tips, what we really feel is the nerve-ends warmed. If Professor Case carries out the analogy in the case of all the senses, he must also hold that when I hear a sound, my nerve-ends are sonorous; when I smell of a rose, my nerve-ends are fragrant; and when I taste sugar, my nerve-ends are sweet.

But perhaps Professor Case would draw a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and hold that only in the case of the former, that is, in the case of sight and touch, do we make the acquaintance of our nerve-terminations. His doctrine would then be that, when I feel a hard object, what I immediately perceive is my compressed tactile nerve-ends; and that, when I behold a colored object, what I really see is the colored image on the retina.

Now, this theory is just as irreconcilable with the facts of physiology as the theory that we immediately see objects at a distance is with the facts of physics. The fact that the image on the retina is upside down, and that there are two such images, one on each retina, proves that these images cannot be the immediate object of the mind in visual perception. This appears still more plainly from a series of experimental facts of the utmost importance to the theory of sense-perception, with which Professor Case does not seem to be familiar.

(1.) If a sensory nerve-trunk be severed at any point between periphery and brain, — say the nerve-trunk of the arm at the elbow, — all sensation in the forearm and hand is immediately abolished. Yet the nerve-terminations in the hand are uninjured, and so is every other part of the nerve except the point of section at the elbow. Stimulation of the *peripheral* cut-end, or of any part of the nerve between elbow and hand, no longer gives rise to sensation; stimulation of the *central* cut-end causes sensations of pain, which are localized in the hand. This shows that sense-organ and sensory nerve are powerless of themselves to cause sensation, except as they remain in unbroken structural connection with the brain.

(2.) Observations of persons who have lost limbs show that stimulation of the nerve-stumps remaining gives rise to sensations which may be distinctly localized in the lost limb; for instance, a man who has lost an arm can feel pain in the fingers. On Professor Case's theory we should

expect that the loss of a limb would forever abolish sensations referred to that limb. The fact that such sensations are nevertheless felt can only be explained on the theory that (*a*) the true immediate physical basis of sensation is the activity of the brain; (*b*) the sensory nerves are connected with sensation only indirectly, their business being to conduct nervous impulses from periphery to brain; and (*c*) the sense-organs are one degree further removed, their office being so to transform external stimuli that these may excite the nerves, in order that these in their turn may excite the brain. This view, which is held by all nervous physiologists, is confirmed by the facts that follow.

(3.) If a normal person receives a sharp rap on the elbow, at the point where the nerve that runs to the fingers approaches the surface, the excitation is not felt at the elbow, as it should be on Professor Case's theory, but is felt as a crawling of ants in the hand. What is essential to sensation is therefore that nervous impulses should be sent up the sensory nerves to the brain; and when such impulses are set going in a manner different from the normal, the sensations arise just the same.

(4.) If a clot of blood or other lesion in the lower centres of the brain encroaches upon the white matter in such a way as to destroy a portion of the nerve-fibres that connect the periphery with the cerebral cortex, the result may be *hemiplegia*, or a total loss of sensation and power to move upon one side of the body. Yet the nerves that lead to that side remain for a time intact, except at the point of lesion. Here, as before, sensation has been abolished by the interruption of the paths of conduction between periphery and brain.

(5.) A slight disorder of the cerebral circulation, such as is sometimes caused by overwork, may so stimulate the cerebral cortex as to evoke perceptions as vivid as life, yet which, not being produced in the normal manner through the sense-organs and the sensory nerves, correspond to no external reality. Such counterfeit perceptions, or *hallucinations*, show that the immediate basis of perception is the activity of the brain. Normally the brain is stimulated to this form of activity by impulses conducted along the sensory nerves; but if it be stimulated by some different agency, the perceptions arise just the same.

It will be evident that the doctrine that the direct object of the mind in perception is the terminations of the sensory nerves is irreconcilable with the facts of physiology. If one could say that any part of the nervous system is the object of perception, one must say it of the ganglion-cells in the cortex. But it cannot be said of any part. Consciousness lends no countenance to such a view; we have no knowledge in our perceptions of dealing with nerves or brain; the vast majority of mankind are scarcely aware that such things exist. If Professor Case's theory were correct, it would be possible to study the anatomy of the nervous system, or at all events the anatomy of the peripheral terminations of the sensory nerves, by the introspective method, — a method which has hitherto been considered the exclusive property of psychologists.

It is impossible to consider the nervous system or any part of it as the immediate object of knowledge in perception. We do not perceive the nerves or the brain, we perceive the external world. The only thing that Professor Case's theory can mean is that processes in the nerve-terminations are the *physical concomitant* to what we know psychically as our sensations; and, as shown above, physiology proves that this is

only indirectly the case. Not processes in the nerves, but processes in the cerebral cortex, are the physical phenomena to which sensation and perception are *directly* correlated. These processes must correspond in a way to the sensations and perceptions to which they are correlated; but not in such a way as to justify us in describing them as the objects of perception.

In short, all we can say is that, when an external object has caused certain oscillations of the luminiferous ether, and these oscillations have acted chemically upon the visual purple of the retina and so stimulated the retinal end-filaments of the optic nerve; when the impulses so generated have been propagated along the optic nerve to the brain; and when they have called forth there certain processes in that part of the cortex of the occipital lobe which is known as the visual centre, — then, and only then, does there arise in the mind the image of an external object. What the percipient then beholds is neither the object itself nor an exact representation of it; the image he beholds is only a symbol, and may be as unlike the object itself as a sentence in Greek is unlike its translation into English; yet it is a symbol that conveys knowledge, just as the translation does; that is, it reproduces those traits of the object which it is practically important for the percipient to know. Though the symbol gives him such information as he needs for practical purposes, it tells him nothing about the essential nature of the object, whether it is material or whether it is spiritual. In perception we have the certitude of a world beyond ourselves, though we do not behold it directly; but we learn nothing about its essential nature; we learn only the laws that govern its changes, which is all we need to know in order to live. What matter is, we know not, and perception does not tell us, for we perceive only the *simulacra* of things. But what mind is, we know from observation of ourselves, and mind is the only reality of which we have any immediate knowledge. Is it not, then, more reasonable to suppose that the reality which appears to us under the form of a material world is in its true essence psychical, than to attribute to it a different kind of reality from our own, a kind of reality of which we have no experience?

This is the view of Kant, — a view which a philosophy that wishes to last must move *through* and not *around*. Helmholtz, whose remarkable researches in physiological optics have made ophthalmology the most exact of all the medical disciplines, takes the doctrines of Kant as the basis of his investigations. It is a mistake to imagine that such an idealism leads to the atomism of Hume. However one may judge of other features of Kant's system, his doctrine that we do not directly know material realities, but only our own states of consciousness, must be recognized as a great and permanent achievement. It has not only won the assent of physiologists and psychiatrists as the only theory in accord with experimental and clinical facts, but may be said without injustice to have been held by every post-Kantian philosopher worthy the name, from Hegel and Herbart to Lotze, Fechner, and Wundt.

Charles A. Strong.

PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. By GEORGE HENRY LEWES. 8vo. 5 vols. Boston: Houghton, Osgood & Co.

Students of philosophy are not generally aware of this access to the most interesting and the most mature of Lewes's philosophic writings.

The publishers have done a good thing for the American philosophic public in publishing them, and we only regret that the History of Philosophy could not have been included in the series.

George Henry Lewes was a brilliant writer upon whatever he chose to speak, and although he hesitated for a long time in the choice of a career, fortune at last decided for philosophy. There were many marks of genius in his mind, and among them a characteristic which is not always associated with genius, and which is seldom exhibited by the school to which he belonged. This mark is fairness, or the earnest wish to be fair. Some may think he did not always succeed in this desire. But they will take the will for the deed and treat any real or imaginary delinquency with leniency. George Eliot said of him that she knew no man so great as he — that difference of opinion roused no egoistic irritation in him, and that he was ready to admit that another argument was the stronger the moment that his intellect recognized it. Next to Herbert Spencer he is the one writer of that school who has tried to mediate in the controversies of empiricism and apriorism. His "Problems of Life and Mind" is full of this spirit and can be read with profit by all students.

In regard to the doctrine, however, his honesty and good will cannot be taken as guarantees of its worth. It is true that he would admit a truth opposed to his own previous opinion as soon as his intellect recognized it. But the trouble was that his intellect so seldom recognized it. His mind was cut out for science and not for philosophy. Hence when he thought he was dealing with Kant and that school, he was discussing a pure figment of his own imagination. His statement of opinions opposed to his own can no more be trusted than that of partisans usually. Not because he was particularly prejudiced, but because his mind was not qualified to form a just conception of them. The great error of his method was that he tried to build up one system by destroying another. This method seldom succeeds in philosophy, because it usually begins with a misunderstanding of the system to be overthrown. The only proper method is to let argument with other systems alone, and to gather one's facts together and explain them. The writer in this way may repel all charges of conflict with other systems by maintaining that he is endeavoring neither to support nor to deny other philosophic doctrines. He will govern minds much more effectively by this process than by first conjuring up the feeling that one thing is to be first set aside and another adopted, as the way to proper knowledge. Lewes's doctrines, therefore, are wholly at variance with those which we should maintain, but they mark less of the *delendum est* spirit characteristic of his school than we meet in other representatives of it, although he has not attained to complete freedom from the method usually incident to such an animus.

The chief interest of his writings lay in two characteristics: first, in the charms and attractiveness of his style; and second, in a genius for selecting the prerogative or most significant facts in illustration of his views. These gave him a wider influence than many who were profounder thinkers. I shall never forget the suggestiveness possessed by the second volume in the third series, when I first read it several years ago. I could well understand how those who had not read anything else could be carried away with it and imagine that they had found a satisfactory philosophy. The facts and illustrations were chosen with

great power and judiciousness. But with all this, the conclusion drawn from them was too broad, and was not sufficiently confirmed by a large number of facts and principles. This is the main fault of all he wrote upon the subject. Still, as sources of interesting facts, suggestive observations, and original views, his works will always be valued by the student, whatever is thought of his doctrines.

J. H. Hyslop.

OUTLINES OF ETHICS. By JOHN DEWEY, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. 12mo, pp. 253. Ann Arbor, Michigan : Register Publishing Company. The Inland Press. 1891.

This volume is rather unique of its kind. It betrays very distinctly what the preface avows, namely, that it has taken shape in connection with class-room work. It is therefore neither a text-book nor a treatise on ethics. It is a sort of mixture of both, and insufficiently adapted to either of them. This is not necessarily a fault in the present stage of ethical speculation. But it is a source of dissatisfaction to those who expect one or the other. When a good text-book is wanted, on the one hand, the present volume will be a disappointment to that expectation. On the other, the disappointment will be equally great to those who are expecting anything like a systematic and complete treatment of the subject. But whatever may be thought of the plan, students will welcome the work as a rare summary of the main issues involved in ethical theory. It is perhaps a merit of it that whoever uses it as a text-book must know his subject and cannot parrot the matter after the ordinary *ex cathedra* method of teaching ethics. The selection of views to be discussed and of the representatives having special interest for the student of to-day is an admirable one. But the treatment of them requires to be fully supplemented by lectures in order to give a systematic knowledge of the subject. No doubt this is what Professor Dewey does in his classes. But it would be difficult for any other person to use the work as an "Outline," since it is less exhaustive than is desirable. Its defects in this respect, however, I have remarked elsewhere, while saying that a much better verdict could be pronounced upon its character in other respects. To this feature of the work I now turn.

The volume is divided into three parts. The first treats of Fundamental Ethical Notions, the second of The Ethical World, and the third of The Moral Life of the Individual. Under the first of these heads come the several theories of Ethics in regard to the Good. They are Hedonism, Utilitarianism, Evolutionary Utilitarianism, and Kantianism, with a statement of the author's own views, which are not dignified by any special name, but which are essentially Hegelian. Then follow the several theories of Obligation, and last the discussion of the freedom of the will. Admirable good sense is shown in the statement of the issues, and one will not find more clearness and succinctness in this respect. Nor would any except the utilitarian and evolutionist take exception to the strictures upon their theories. The criticism of Kantianism, however, while in many respects true, seems to the present writer to be laboring under a fundamental mistake of conception, a mistake committed by nearly all who criticise him. This is the assumption that Kant and his system are to be treated by the same method as that which avails to impeach the value of Mill's and Spencer's theories. Most critics either do

not know or forget that Kant's method is synthetic. Professor Dewey certainly knows it, but in handling the formulas of the utilitarian school he passes over to the criticism of Kant without recalling that he is going into completely new territory where the same form of argument will not avail. This is apparent in the following statement about "Formal Ethics," which he says "attempt to find the good not only in the will itself, but in the will irrespective of any end to be reached by the will. The typical instance of such theories is the Kantian," etc. Now it is very easy to point out statements in Kant apparently confirming such a judgment, but a true insight into Kant's system would prevent all such remarks. It is not true that he excludes the end from the consideration of moral law. No one has emphasized the need of an end more than Kant in the completion of his formula. It is reason or "man as an end in himself" that Kant makes the end, but only the formal end, of moral conduct, while he recognizes absolutely the material end of happiness or pleasure. Hence such statements as Professor Dewey's in defining the system are entirely misleading by leaving the impression at the outset that an end is wholly excluded from the principle of the system. This comes from considering only the incomplete form of Kant's principle. It is singular that nearly all critics direct their animadversions upon the first form of Kant's norm, which enjoins conduct which can be a law for all rational beings, and never take up the synthetically completed statement of it where an end is added to it. Mill saw it in no other light than in the abstract one of which Professor Dewey complains, and it is proper to say that Kant would have agreed with both of them. For he did not intend that it should be more than *formal*. It is no objection to Kant to say that his principle is only formal when he did not pretend that it was anything else, and much less is it relevant to consider the most elementary and incomplete form of it. Kant begins with one conception at a time, the simplest, and adds to this by his method, modifying it until it is perfected. His distinctions and arguments in the earlier stages of the discussion are merely tentative, and to serve a provisory end. A man familiar with the dialectics and synthesis of Hegel ought to be familiar with this. Indeed, it was just this very thing in Kant that made Hegel possible. It is true that we have to charge Kant with not making this so clear as Hegel. But nevertheless he emphasized his synthetic method to such an extent that, if the usual criticism were true, it would be impossible to find any legitimate connection between him and Hegel. Hegelianism is simply Kant's *matter* stripped of scholastic and Cartesian *form*.

This criticism of Professor Dewey is not made to defend Kant against all charges of defectiveness, but to remove a perpetual misunderstanding of his method and system. He was at fault in not making his method as clear as it should have been made. He was at fault in not using the stoic distinction between good, indifferent, and bad, or moral non-moral, and immoral action, when testing his formula. He was at fault in not developing more distinctly his doctrine of the connection between virtue and happiness, so as to rationalize pleasure, on the one hand, and to show that his consideration of it as a material *necessary* end was only tentative, on the other. But it is wide of the mark to charge his principle with being abstract, for this is only charging it with what it professed to be in its primary form, and ignores the whole synthetic method in which the system was conceived. The criticism, we

grant, is just enough against a certain conception of Kant, and we should entirely acquit an author who saw the matter in that light, and who was apprehending a misconception to which Kant is undoubtedly liable. But it is a mere fiction that such a conception is the correct or the complete one to be held of Kant.

Some of the criticisms of Kant's theory of obligation might also be the subject of remark. But they would lead us into too much discussion. Besides, most of the author's treatment of the subject is eminently judicious, and too many qualifications would have to be introduced into restrictions upon them.

Professor Dewey acknowledges his indebtedness to T. H. Green for the main principles of his own view. This is clearly true in the statement of his own ethical postulate on page 131, where self-realization in a community of persons and involving the equal self-realization of all others is enunciated as the formula of ethics. We have no objections to such a principle, but do not think it any better than a hundred others which might be framed. Indeed, we regard it simply as one of the many ways of stating the same truth, and would add that it is, to our way of thinking, identical with the completed form of Kant's formula.

There are some very strange statements about what morality is that deserve notice. The first is the following: "An 'ought' which does not root in and flower from the 'is,' which is not the fuller realization of the actual state of social relationships, is a mere pious wish that things should be better." Now we should ask how are we going to deduce the ideal from the actual unless the ideal has already been realized, and in that case there would be no use for ethics of any kind, Professor Dewey's, or any other. What actual state of social relationships ought to be more fully realized, the strifes, and quarrels, and thievery, and murder, and arson, and adultery of every-day life? Or should it be something else? Professor Dewey does not enable us to distinguish which of them is the truly moral. A similar objection can be made to his use of the term "moral," which is apparent in the opening of part second of his discussion. There he says that "the habit of conceiving moral action as a certain *kind* of action, instead of all action so far as it is action, leads us to conceive of morality as a highly desirable something which somehow ought to be brought into our lives, but which upon the whole is not." Now we should ask any man whether morality is not precisely what Professor Dewey here implies it is not. Would Professor Dewey say that all action is moral? If so it can be so only because of his failure to distinguish between the generic use of the term "moral" which includes the right, the indifferent, and the wrong, as subjects of ethical science, and the specific use of the same term as identical with the right. In the first sense all action whatever done by a conscious agent would be "moral." But Professor Dewey can hardly be ignorant of the very different use which both moralists and the laity give the conception. Besides, if "moral action" were not "a certain *kind* of action," what is the use of the term "moral" at all? Why has the human mind felt obliged instinctively to qualify action in this way?

These are crucial questions in an ethical theory, and we could wish that Professor Dewey had not laid himself open to criticism in regard to them. For there is too much value in his work to have it marred by defects of the kind we have indicated. There has been wide reading in the preparation of it, and the style is clear and inviting in most portions

of the work. In the main, also, the views expressed are stimulating and suggestive, and more than all are an indication of the earnest endeavor of the age to get at a basis for its conduct or an ideal that will adequately express its aspirations.

J. H. Hyslop.

Exposé de Théologie Systématique, par A. Gretillat, Professeur de Théologie à la Faculté Indépendante de Neuchâtel. Tome Quatrième. Dogmatique: II. Sotériologie; Eschatologie. Neuchâtel: Attinger Frères, Editeurs. 1890. 8vo, pp. 639. — The second part of the "Dogmatique" of Professor Gretillat treats in his intensely Biblical and thorough manner that portion of the subject extending from Hebrew prophecy, which, as "a unique and supernatural spectacle in the world," prepared the way for a Saviour, to those predictions of the Anointed himself which relate to the last acts of redemption in the consummation of the individual and of the universe. Christianity is the religion of salvation, or it is nothing. The author declines to see in the conciliation of two opposed principles, — one pagan, the other Jewish, — of Immanence and Transcendence; for this pretended conciliation had been already made in Jehovism the authentic history of Israel. Christ was a true substitute for the race, and wrought a divine satisfaction for sin, the ground of which satisfaction is not merely demonstrative and pedagogical, but ontological. Penal suffering was necessary, any arguments to the contrary drawn from parables like that of The Prodigal Son being arguments *e silentio*. In deducing the apostolic doctrine of satisfaction from the epistle, little allowance is made by Professor Gretillat for the Jewish antecedents and environment of the writers. They speak to him, at all points, with an illumination which is achromatic, plenary, and of universal application.

In determining whether the death of Christ was a fact of human consequence or of divine causality, it seems to us unnecessary to distinguish so sharply as does the author between these two spheres of action. We are unable to see why the conception of deliberate choice on the part of the Saviour himself may not reconcile both theories in a most natural way.¹

Two currents of eschatological teaching, the author admits, run through the New Testament; the one favorable to a near return of Christ, the other to its remoteness in time. The evangelization of the world, he thinks, is to be achieved before the day of the Parousia, and "midway between the chiliastic insanities and a transcendental idealism" are to be placed his views of the millennium.

In treating of the Resurrection of Jesus the writer fails, as we think, to consider duly that view in which it is regarded rather as the miraculous proof than as the normal process of the resurrection of his disciples. Luke xx. 38 seems to us certainly *not* a proof text for the dogma that "the human personality can be complete only in and through the association of the soul and the body," even if the dictum of Oetinger, *Die Leiblichkeit ist das Ende aller Wege Gottes*, be any more so. Both leave untouched the question, "With *what* body do they come?" If the necessary continuity between the present and the future body is to be maintained, as is asserted, only through "the accession of a celestial

¹ See Dr. Thomas Hill's article in this *Review* for February, 1891, on "The Proximate Causes of the Crucifixion."

substance to the buried germ which survives the dissolution of the former organism," it may puzzle some to explain the author's insistence on the phrase, "the resurrection of the body"! Is "*a new and celestial organism*" fairly entitled to be called *the* body? The question, we think, is worthy of more attention than it has yet received.

Between (a) effective universalism, (b) conditional immortality, and (c) eternal suffering, Professor Gretillat refuses definitively to choose, preferring eschatological agnosticism, in which class of thinkers he would include the disputed name of Nitzsch. "The God of the Bible and of history is not a sentimental being." "Is the soul essentially immortal? We answer, no! To argue, from the simplicity of its substance, its indestructibility, is to beg the point in controversy, whether a simple substance can or cannot be destroyed. . . . The Bible is ignorant of an eternal survival of the soul, even of the just, in a state of pure spirit."

The impression made upon the reviewer by this able and interesting volume is that the advance movement in theological discussion in different countries is very irregular. To speak only of a single contrast, traces of the controversy over canons of interpretation seldom appear in the volume before us, as they surely would had it emanated from an American mind; while it is equally evident that some tentative eschatological speculations, met with in our own theological literature, have become the settled science of the Faculty of Neuchâtel.

Le Problème de l'Immortalité, par E. Petavel-Olliff, Docteur en Théologie. Etude précédée d'une Lettre de Charles Secrétan, Professeur de Philosophie à l'Université de Lausanne. Vol. i. 8vo, pp. 441. Paris: Fischbacher. 1891. — The literature of Eschatology receives an important accession in the work whose first part lies before us, as does the theory of Conditional Immortality which it sets forth, in the adherence, now for the first time definitely announced, of Professor Secrétan. Of our author, it is enough to say that one might as reasonably ignore Cardinal Newman or Dr. Döllinger in the study of Papal Infallibility, or Pasteur and Koch while investigating bacteriology, as to neglect the writings of Dr. Petavel in the discussion of human immortality.

A general idea of the scope and value of the present volume may be had from the following words of review in the "*Bibliothèque Universelle*:" "It is not enough to say that his (Dr. Petavel's) work testifies to great erudition and a profound knowledge of the Bible and of theology; we must add that it is inspired throughout by a warm and living spirit, which engages and benefits the reader although he may not be convinced. We feel that the author has not written for the pleasure of writing, and because 'it is indecent nowadays not to have made a book.' He believes; therefore has he spoken. Animated by an energetic conviction strengthened with years, and which has been for him a source of light, of joy, and of power, M. Petavel has believed himself untrue to duty as a man and a Christian if he did not expound the truths to the investigation of which he has consecrated himself so long and so entirely, and which he believes to be founded upon Scriptural texts, the postulates of conscience and of reason, and the data of natural and philosophical science. It is not only with a special dogma that we are concerned in the book. When the second volume shall have appeared, if it fulfill the promises of the first, we shall have a theology, — and a theology forming a homogeneous, logical whole, worthy already, from this

standpoint, of consideration. And perhaps, after its perusal, many ministers will recognize that Dr. Petavel has only said, a little in advance, what they will then be ready to avow; and will be surprised to discover, in the testimonies invoked by the author, that they are in numerous company, and that if, until now, the ancient fortresses have stood against new evangelical schools, the moment may be not far distant when they will be obliged to capitulate; a thought well calculated to encourage those who would lead the way but dare not.

"As for Professor Charles Secrétan, he has dared. In a letter-preface, in which he recognizes Vinet as among the precursors of Conditionalism, he writes thus: 'I was a candidate predestined to your doctrine, since I have always seen in evil, not simply an insufficiency, a defect of being, as have the logicians to whom we owe the infernal metaphysic, but a bent of the will — that is to say, of the being itself — toward nothingness.'

"Anything like a review of the volume before us is forbidden by the space at our disposal. If Dr. Petavel errs, it is perhaps in the direction of an overscrupulous reliance upon Biblical texts, into which excess his exact scholarship, provoked by a worse abuse of the proof-text method on the part of some of his antagonists, may have betrayed him. On the philosophical side he is especially strong, and it is temperate praise to say that, right or wrong in his conclusions, he is the leading champion, in this generation, of the doctrine that they only can live forever who will live unto God. His doctrine of Facultative Immortality stands equally opposed to the spiritualism of the Platonic school and the crass extravagance of Prophetic-materialistic notions about the life of the world to come."

Les Droits et les Torts de La Papauté, par E. Petavel-Olliff. 8vo, pp. 74. Lausanne: F. Payot. 1890. — Dr. Petavel believes that in the parable recorded in Matthew xxiv. 45 *et seq.*, Jesus predicts some of the most considerable events in the history of his church, — the institution, the temporal and spiritual grandeur, and the decadence of the Papacy. "Like many other parables of Jesus Christ, this one is composed of seven verses, indicating seven phases of the history of the Papacy:" (v. 45) The establishment of a superintendent. (46) First return of the Master. (47) Promotion of the superintendent. (48) Demoralization of the superintendent. (49) Excess committed by the superintendent. (50) Second return of the Master. (51) Final punishment of the superintendent.

Those familiar with the rich exegesis of the writer (as seen in such articles as "The House of Gethsemane," translated for "The Expositor," March, 1891) need not be told how fascinating is this study from his pen. "From the practical point of view," writes the author, "the argument may furnish the ground of a profitable discussion between Catholics and Protestants." Exegetically, it is perhaps the most elaborate discussion of the text extant, and one whose conclusions have been pronounced legitimate by at least one of the foremost Protestant commentators.

Etudes Sociales, 12mo, pp. 338; *Les Droits de l'Humanité*, 12mo, pp. 350, par Charles Secrétan, Professeur à l'Université de Lausanne, etc. Lausanne: F. Payot. 1890. — Necessary Reforms, the Normal Working Day, Luxury, Relation of Political Economy to Morality, — such are the sub-topics treated in the first of these interesting volumes by the eminent Swiss philosopher, Professor Secrétan. Upon pastors particularly the author enjoins the study of these questions, without know-

ledge of which, he believes, they can exert but little influence upon this present world. "Happily we do not any more think of working out our salvation by doubtful disputation over the prophecies of the Book of Daniel, but, as in the days of Nehemiah, each must take hammer and trowel and build the walls of Jerusalem."

There is a social question: How shall the interests involved in production be harmonized? Our only aim should be liberty, but this liberty must be guaranteed *to all*. True reform will increase and fortify the liberty of the individual. Specific aims are just and worthy when they subserve (1) the most complete possible development of all the members of humanity, (2) the maximum of individual liberty compatible with the liberty of others, (3) the possession by each of the welfare and leisure necessary for the development of personal aptitudes. When disparity of condition places one class in permanent dependence upon another class; when inequality endangers liberty, — liberty must be abridged, but only in the interest of liberty.

It is unquestionably desirable that workingmen, the principal agents in production, enter some day into possession of the utensils and the capital necessary to their profitable employment, since only so can they receive the full value of their work. The great factor in the remedial efforts of society is, however, moral. Yet the author insists upon legal restraints, protecting minors from the necessity of labor, limiting that of women, securing weekly rest to all, and guaranteeing a normal working day. Professor Secrétan believes in an eight-hour day, and in international federation as the means of its realization. Like M. Simon, he speaks with expectancy of "The United States of Europe" as a Utopian calm likely to follow proximate political convulsions. Into his discussion of Luxury and the Relations of Political Economy to Morality, we must allow the reader to enter for himself.

"The Rights of Humanity," a companion volume to the "Social Studies," is more profoundly concerned with the basic principles of social reform as they inhere in personal rights. In treating of natural right it is the author's dominant idea that right is born of duty; but as the judge of duty is the individual conscience, the accomplishment of it is exigible by law only in the measure indispensable to the rights of others.

Dreams of equality are bad dreams. Collectivism is a bad dream. Inequality is life, uniformity is stagnation. "What heart and reason ask is, not that there be no more wealth, but that poverty be no longer insecurity, nakedness, and absolute dependence." The inequality which nature imposes, it is true, is a mobile inequality, but it is inequality. If the proletariat, however, is the correlative of landed property, the law is responsible for the proletariat. In older countries the nationalization of land is probably only a Utopia. Newer governments will do well to look, before it is too late, at the inevitable consequences of the individual appropriation of the soil. The right to assistance and the right to work do not exist. Mere need cannot confer a right. Heirship is not a favor of the state, but testamentary rights are involved in the right to liberty. That the father owes an equal love to his children does not concern the law. Here, as everywhere, law transcends its proper function when it aspires to sanction the precepts of morality.

If the doctrine of these books is not that of "The Fabian Essays," it is quite as far removed from the traditional social philosophy.

Professor Secrétan is a master. No one can be fully versed in the

moral and political questions of the hour without reading — and it is to be hoped that this may be made possible to all through a translation — the works of this redoubtable champion of liberty and its obligations.

Charles H. Oliphant.

METHUEN, MASS.

Christian Types of Heroism. A Study of the Heroic Spirit under Christianity. By *John Coleman Adams*, D. D. Boston: Universalist Publishing House. 1891. Pp. 208. — An admirable little book. Its intent is to refute Renan's silly and shallow remark, that a commonwealth of perfect beings would be very weak, and to refute the reproach that Christianity lays an enfeebling emphasis on the passive virtues. Dr. Adams points out how much of the passive virtues is necessarily included in all heroism, which is something far more comprehensive than mere dash; and, on the other hand, how widely removed Christian meekness is from weakness, being, indeed, precisely that quality of serene self-control which is inevitably involved in a warfare of ages, a warfare which cannot end until it changes the face of the world. As he says, a weak man cannot be meek. He can only be sheepish. The stations of the æonian warfare of the church he marks, respectively, by the martyrs and apologists, the hermits and monks, the prelates and knights, the reformers, the missionaries, the philanthropists and the statesmen, showing that each of these classes, in its time, condenses and expresses the highest forces of Christian virility and heroism. He vindicates the hermits manfully from the one-sided charge of cowardice, and says truly, Let there come another time when the social current runs irresistibly to evil, and there will come another time of seclusion and asceticism, and will be needed. He appreciates monasticism and its immortal services most broadly and justly. And of the Hildebrandine policy he says that, while the particular ideal was unrealizable (not to speak of its unendurable arrogance), it nevertheless engaged the noblest manhood of several Christian ages, and, with all its admixture of evil, wrought untold good. In treating of Luther he falls into the usual falsities and misrepresentations of Roman Catholic doctrine, without which a man cannot pass for a good Protestant in Boston, and errs entirely in treating Savonarola as being, like Wycliffe and Huss, a harbinger of the Reformation. Savonarola is not a harbinger of the Reformation, but of the Counter-reformation. His true representative is not Luther, but Pius V., like him in intensity of moral purity and in relentlessness of purpose to reinstate Catholic Christianity in the place of paganism (and also of heresy) in the chairs of the church. Had the incipient Reformation found a disciple of Savonarola, instead of a heathen, in the papacy, it would have been crushed past hope. Therefore the Dominicans, the Inquisitorial Order, have always honored their Girolamo as a saint and martyr. On the other hand, the author, in the breadth of his sympathies, does more than justice to the early Jesuits. The book is Christian through and through, extensively and intensively, completely up to the height of its endeavor, and all the more Christian because the author recognizes that perhaps prelates and all ecclesiastical forms of life may disappear before Christian statesmanship shall have accomplished its almost inexhaustible function.

The various quotations are excellent, but the author's own characterizations are finer.

The Professor's Letters. By *Theophilus Parsons*. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1891. Pp. iv, 215. — It is interesting to see the definite legal mind of a great jurist refreshing itself in the clouds of mysticism. Swedenborgianism, moreover, has this advantage for such a mind, that though as arbitrary and elusive as any father of the church in its allegorizings, it rests on a firm and definite system of philosophy and doctrine. The author plays fast and loose with the claims of his seer, professing to deny to him all character of inspiration, and yet regarding him with as profound, though certainly not as abject, a reverence as that which a Moslem entertains towards Mohammed. Swedenborg has practically taken the central place in Swedenborgianism, and Christ is a dark and mysterious background. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that Christ is turned into a book. The author informs his young correspondent that the Gospel and the Revelation are written by inspiration, but not the Epistles. They make up, however, for this curtailment by heaping up the inspiration of the elect remnant of the New Testament, in their threefold sense, with all the generous amplitude of an Origen, and with just as much foundation in objective principles of evidence. Their rejection of the Epistles from the Canon has a very practical reason. It throws out Paul, who is as much their Simon Magus as he is that of the Clementines. The Swedish baron, son of a bishop, lived in the time of dead Lutheran orthodoxy, and, identifying this with the genuine Luther, and Luther with Paul, he "threw out the child with the bath." The reader, however, will be happy to learn that, though Swedenborg was obliged to leave Paul, the original sinner, to his fate, he was so fortunate as to convert Luther to Swedenborgianism in the spiritual world.

Our Bibliolatry, and our disposition to put some one between us and the Redeemer, as his only authentic interpreter, may be perused by us, in magnified dimensions, in this heterodox system. And as heresy and orthodoxy together make up the church, this semi-theistic pantheism, or semi-pantheistic theism, offspring of profound powers of thought and a profound spiritual sense has been, and still is, one of the most powerful correctives of the juridical harshness of our Western Christianity, and a deepener of our sense of things unseen. This little book may not contribute very eminently towards this good work, but it will do its part. The author has not drunk as deeply, nor with as castigated a sense, from the founts of the Northern Seer as a Bushnell or a Mrs. Whitney, but he has taken no shallow draughts.

Elijah, the Man of God. By *Mark Guy Pearse*. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. 1891. Pp. 120. 50 cents. — Vivid and vigorous and spiritually minded. The author enters deeply into the age and man that he treats, and gives them living significance for to-day. The book carries the reader right along with it. Such a book makes the Bible alive, and so trains it upon our own age.

Honda the Samurai. A Story of Modern Japan. By *William Elliot Griffiths*, D. D., Pastor of the Shawmut Congregational Church, Boston, Mass., and author of "The Mikado's Empire," "Japanese Fairy World," "Matthew Calbraith Perry," etc. Boston and Chicago: Congregational Sunday-school and Publishing Society. Pp. 390. — This book, written from the inside, gives us the real Japan, better of course, than it could be given for us by a Japanese. The story, so far as there is one, is subordinate to the descriptions and narrations, but notwithstanding unifies them all into living interest, since we know that Rai

Goro, and Koba, and Dr. Sano, and Honda, and various others, are real men, whose thoughts and acts and fortunes were profoundly influenced by, and profoundly influential upon, the transmutation of mediæval into modern, feudal into unitary and imperial, military into industrial, Japan. It explains and illustrates the long usurpation by the General of the actual powers of the Emperor, in a manner which ought to make it impossible for any one, after reading it, to revert to the old phrases of "Civil and Spiritual Sovereign," with which we used to content ourselves. It gives us an inner sense of the mingled horror and amusement which the Japanese must have felt to hear that the "hairy barbarians" from America were dealing with the camp, in all form, as if it were the throne, and addressing a mere subject as "the Emperor." The book is so instinct with the scenery and the spirit of Japan that it makes vivid the reason why people look sad at leaving it. It pulsates also with the chivalric high-mindedness of the better class. As Dr. Griffis says: "The philosophy of life to an educated Japanese is as noble as was that of the Stoic. Show him his place in the line of duty, and he holds himself and his life but as dirt in comparison to his ambition to fulfill his obligation." At the same time we see that Buddhism and Shintoism could never develop a "pure Sir Galahad" or a "meek Sir Percivale," or even a sinful but remorseful Lancelot, much less an Elaine or an Enid. The depths of moral purity, the heights of heavenly hope, and the reverence for the eternal worth of personality, awaited the coming of the Son of man.

The story shows every shade and fluctuation of national feeling between our coming in 1854 and the granting of the Constitution in 1889. It teaches us how to understand and to sympathize with Japanese patriotism, while yet we see how even yet, and even in the most enlightened, its unreasoning intensity is too much of a mere natural instinct, and can never be thoroughly respected until it is far more thoroughly ethicized, and learns, with social modesty and meekness, to take its due place, neither more nor less, among the forces which are preparing the federation of man.

Of course every one who desires, at the simple cost of going through a pleasant book, to understand Japan so far as this is now a general obligation, will have no excuse for not reading "Honda the Samurai."

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

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POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY.

“The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry our race, as time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay. There is not a creed which is not shaken ; not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable ; not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has materialized itself in the fact, in the supposed fact ; it has attached its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it. But for poetry the idea is everything. . . . Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea, the idea is the fact. . . . More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry our science will appear incomplete ; and most of what now passes for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry.” — MATTHEW ARNOLD.

“NOT a creed unshaken,” “not a dogma unquestioned, every tradition threatening to dissolve,” — this is Matthew Arnold’s counterphrase to Carlyle’s “Our relations all an inquiry and a doubt.” In a world of disintegrated intelligence and a broken authority, Arnold sees men more and more turning to poetry for consolation, for stay, for interpretation. There is absence of any coherent social faith and order ; there is doubt whether any theory of life at once valuable and verifiable, true to intelligence and worthy to the emotion, is any longer possible, and yet there is also demand for authority and for instruction. We may say science is verifiable, but it lacks sympathy, consolation, humanity ; it does not afford instruction where instruction is most wanted, — in the ordering of life. What once afforded all this, says Mr. Arnold, has lost its hold as truth ; it no longer appeals verifiably to us. This is the difficulty of the situation : the true does not inspire, does not aid ; that which once gave stay and interpretation is no longer true. In poetry men find a wide interpretation of life,

noble ideas about life, and also a kind sympathy with all its colored moods, with all phases of its movement. Keen feeling, wide sympathy, noble ideas, serious emotion, are found there. What more do we want? What more natural than, in the difficulty of our times, men turning to poetry for guidance? We may well believe that poetry is more and more becoming our religion and our philosophy. Here, let us also add, there is no need to ask if this or that be scientifically true. "For poetry the idea is everything; all else is illusion. For poetry the idea is the fact."

We have the thought of Matthew Arnold before us. What shall we say of it? Shall we make bold to criticise the position? Spite of the clear insight of this great critic, shall we venture to say that his insight was essentially limited in range? that he saw but a small part of the forces really at work in modern thought?

We need not be detained by what our critic says regarding the existing disintegration of intellectual authority in matters of belief. Making allowance for overstatement, all will admit readily that there is enough of unrest, enough of doubt in modern thought, to make it worth while to raise this question, Where shall we find authority, the instruction which our natures demand? Shall we cease to find it in philosophy, or in science, and shall we find it in poetry?

I think none desire that poetry shall not be more and more the vehicle of serious thought and ennobling emotion, that it shall not more and more convey genuine and helpful interpretation of life. *Absit omen*. We have fallen too much on days of trivial subjects, ornate treatment, cheap sentiment, and artificial imagery not to sympathize with all that Mr. Arnold says about the high calling of poetry. We cannot too often return to the idea that its purpose is to deepen the sense of what is worthy, of what is permanent in life. The question only presses the more earnestly: How is poetry to interpret valuable meanings of life, how to animate to the execution of them; how is it to be kept from the evils that threaten it, from the frivolous, the sensual, the artificial? Can it do all this, if it is not backed and sustained by something which commends itself to the intelligence? Call this something what you will, theology, philosophy, or theory of life, how can poetry preserve its genuineness and its sustaining force, if it cut loose from all verifiable account of the universe? Who shall keep the keeper? I know of but one answer. Truth, and truth alone, can do this. And I confess I do not understand

how that can be true for the imagination, for the emotions, which is not also true for intelligence.

It is easy to disparage science, it is easy to laugh at philosophy, with its "reasoning about causation and finite and infinite being." Both are remote enough from our immediate spiritual and ethical interests. Face to face with the supreme question concerning the right ordering of life they seem ludicrously insufficient. But, after all, science means only knowledge, — philosophy, only love of wisdom, only the essay at reaching the meaning of this experience of ours. I cannot believe that the attempt to know truth, to grasp the meaning of experience, is remote from conduct, from the ideals and aspirations of life. In the words of Carlyle, I verify my own conviction: "Belief, indeed, is the beginning and first condition of all spiritual force whatsoever; only so far as imagination is *believed* can there be any use or even any enjoyment of it." The imagination rests upon belief; it is from belief that it gets its cue to stay, to interpret, its consolation. If there is belief in the high and serious values of the universe, with what glory shall not the imagination portray and inspire life, what consolations shall not issue from it! But let intelligence lose this belief in the meaning and worthiness of experience, and poetry is but the tricking out of illusions, the devising of artifices. I can well comprehend that poetry may deliver truth with a personal and a passionate force which is beyond the reach of theory painting in gray on gray. Indeed, it is the emotional kindling of reality which is the true province of poetry.

Astronomers tell us that meteors are cold rock, cold as the frozen emptiness of space, molten by contact with our earthly atmosphere, and thence glowing like the stars. Thus do I conceive of poetry. The graceless, rigid, dark facts of science, of philosophy, pass through the atmosphere of personality, of the hopes and fears of a human soul, and issue illumined and to illuminate. Without the basis of fact, of fact verifiable by science, our light is a will-o'-the-wisp, a wandering flame generated in the stagnant marshes of sentiment. In a word, there must be the possibility of science and philosophy to criticise, to verify. Poets are indeed seers and makers; but if what they make has matter, has weight, if what they see is more than shadow, the poets must reveal, they must round out to high completeness, the meaning of the life that is about them. Poets cannot be freed from the conditions which attach to the intelligence of man everywhere. The poet and the ploughman gaze at the same scene, only the

eyes of one are holden. If the life which the poet presents to us as throbbing, as pregnant, ever new from God, is other than the genuine revelation of the ordinary day-by-day life of man, it is but dainty foolery or clumsy masquerading. If life is, indeed, dull and blank and unappealing, poetry will be depressing, mechanical, merely decorative. If life is abundant, promising, endless, poetry will be spontaneous, buoyant, passionate; it will have enjoyment. If life carries meaning with it, fulfills purpose, makes exactions which are opportunities, poetry will be high-minded, a power to stay and to console.

Nor is this all. What life is found to be depends in large measure upon the prevailing theory of life, upon the interpretation of it which commends itself to the intelligence. Life is not a raw, unworked material to which the poet may directly apply himself. As it comes to the poet, life is already a universe of meanings, of interpretations, which indeed the poet may fill out, but not dispense with. For good or for ill, centuries of reflective thought have been interpreting life, and their interpretations remain the basis and furnish the instrument for all the poet may do; he may simply use the assimilated results of the labors of scientific men and philosophers. Let the philosophy of a time be materialistic, mechanical, and the poetry of that time is artificial and unworthy. If the poet succeeds in rising above the thought that has taken possession of contemporary life, it is because by instinct or by desire he falls back on the larger and freer ideas of an earlier day. If the ideas of a time breathe the solemn atmosphere of a divine order, if they find reality surcharged with meaning, we can imagine the poetry that results. It is the poetry of Homer, of Dante, of Shakespeare. If the philosophy of a time is agnostic, if it utters a scorn of life as it seems to be, that philosophy will also sound its note in the poetry of its day.

Thus are we brought again to our starting-point. If we are correct in our judgment that a poet must draw his sustenance from the intelligence of his time, the poetry of to-day must feel the touch of what we call our agnosticism, and the poets of to-day must be somewhat moved by this trait of contemporary life.

Are they thus moved? What is their attitude toward the agnosticism, the doubt, the pessimism, of the present day?

I wish now to speak in this relation of two poets who have recently passed from us. One of them is Mr. Arnold himself, poet as well as critic; the other is Mr. Robert Browning. How do these, both serious and high-minded poets, stand affected by the

popular philosophy? How do they affect us who go to them to learn of life?

Nothing in Arnold the poet strikes us more than the teaching of Arnold the critic. Translated from the impersonal narrative of prose into the warmth of poetry, it is the same lesson. Compare the passage standing as our text with this:—

“Wandering between two worlds, one dead
The other powerless to be born,
With nowhere yet to lay my head,
Like them, on earth I wait forlorn.”

Or with this:—

“The sea of faith
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth’s shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled :
But now I only hear
Its melancholy long withdrawing roar.”

Indeed, Arnold’s distinguishing sign among modern poets is the melancholy beauty with which he has voiced the sense of loss; his sad backward glance at the departure of old faiths and ideals; the brooding memories of joys whose spring has fallen away; the shapeless, hopeless hope for the dawn of a new joy, new faith.

I should say that the source of regret which expires from Arnold’s lines is his consciousness of a twofold isolation of man—his isolation from nature, his isolation from fellow-man. No longer, he seems to say, may man believe in his oneness with the dear nature about him: the sense of a common spirit binding them together has vanished; the sense of a common purpose outworking in both has fled. Nature, in ceasing to be divine, has ceased to be human. The faith that one idea, one fulfillment, unites in cherished bonds man to nature, is no more; in its stead, the consciousness of isolation. There is still, indeed, grateful companionship with nature, but below this companionship is the knowledge of an impassable gulf:—

“Thou hast been, shalt be, art alone :
Or, if not quite alone, yet they
Who touch thee are unmating things, —
Ocean and clouds, and night and day,
Lorn autumns and triumphant springs.”

The companionship is not at bottom real: it is only on man’s side; Nature lacks the element of purpose which alone could give joyful response to man’s needs. Man solaces and strengthens his spirit by recourse to Nature, but Nature goes her own way and man must return to his; strengthened and solaced, indeed,

but only that he may live self-poised like Nature, careless, unheeding of all beyond self. Companionship no longer is rooted in the heart of things ; it is no longer the outcome of a single life.

Man, repulsed from the intimacy of communion with Nature, may turn to man for fellowship ; but here, too, is found isolation : —

“ Like drift-wood spars which meet and pass
Upon the boundless ocean plain,
So on the sea of life, alas !
Man meets man, meets and parts again.”

No reader of Arnold can fail to notice how spontaneously he takes his most characteristic metaphor from the sea and the matters of the sea. The verses I am about to quote have the same inspiration and tell the same story. As the islands of the sea are separated by that sea which is common to them all, so men are separated by that very life in which all share. Between them is

“ The unplumbed, salt, estranging sea.”
“ Yes, on the sea of life enisled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
We mortal millions live alone.”

I am aware, however, of no passage of Arnold's which comes to us so laden with the gospel of the isolation of life as that poem which gives us his reading of history, “ Obermann once More.” The sad tone reaches its highest note in the description of the loss of Christian faith. From the land whence once came the words of humanity's life, —

“ Ah, from that silent, sacred land
Of sun and arid stone,
And crumbling wall and sultry sand,
Comes now *one* word alone !
From David's lips that word did roll,
'Tis true and living yet :
No man can save his brother's soul,
Nor pay his brother's debt.
Alone, self-poised, henceforward man
Must labor.”

Not from him who identified himself with the woe and the joy of all men's lives, but from David, sounds the final word of Palestine. The life of common brotherhood, struggle and destiny of Christianity has given way to the old isolated struggle of the individual.

“ No man can save his brother's soul
Nor pay his brother's debt.”

That is, I take it, the last word of Arnold's poetic message, his last interpretation of life. Perhaps I should rather say this is the keynote of it all. To say it is the last is to say his last message is one of weakness and despair. Contrary to this, the philosophy which Mr. Arnold leaves us is one of endeavor, of strenuous, almost buoyant, endeavor, in spite of the fact that this endeavor must spring from sadness. If man is isolated, in that isolation he may find himself, and, finding himself, living his own life, lose all his misery. Although man may not commune with Nature, he may yet follow and repeat her. If the works of Nature go on,

"Bounded by themselves, and unregardful
In what state God's other works may be,"

man should emulate this self-sufficient energy. Isolation is translated into self-dependence. Separation throws man farther into himself, deepens his consciousness of his own destiny and of his own law. The verses which close the poem called "*Youth of Man*," while far from the most poetical of his lines, sum up, I think, his interpretation of life: —

"Sink, O youth, in thy soul !
Yearn to the greatness of nature ;
Rally the good in the depths of thyself."

This is the outcome of the loneliness of life. Regret and melancholy are not the final fruit. Obey nature, go thy way, heeding nothing less than the concerns of men. As a consolation for thy loneliness, yearn to the greatness of nature. Is man helpless to save another's soul? Then all the more let him rally the good in the depths of himself!

How does this message stand related to the dictum of Arnold that poetry is to take the place of philosophy, of theology? How does it stand related to our dictum that the interpretation of life which poetry gives us must be parallel to the demonstrations of philosophy? I do not know how any one can apprehend the message uttered by Arnold and not feel its heart and substance to be that reflective and philosophic interpretation of life given by one school of the world's great moralists, — by the Stoics. As surely as Arnold's style, his deftness, his delicacy, his simplicity testify to the influence of Virgil, of Æschylus, of Homer, so surely do his ideas and their substance testify to Marcus Aurelius and to Epictetus and to Kant. I do not mean by this that Arnold has put the "*Meditations*" or the "*Critique of Practical Reason*" into

verse. I do not even imagine that Arnold had much acquaintance with Kant, or was attracted by such as he had. Speaking broadly, however, the ideas of the Stoics, of Kant, and of Matthew Arnold, grow out of the same soil. There is in all three the conception of the individual as shut off from real communion with nature and with fellow-man, and yet as bearing in himself a universal principle.

“ And thou, thou lonely heart,
Which never yet, without remorse,
Even for a moment didst depart
From thy remote and spherèd course
To haunt the place where passions dwell,
Back to thy solitude again.”

This is precisely in the sense of Epictetus, precisely in the vein of Kant. I would not, however, insist upon detailed likeness in special points. What is alike in all is the underlying spirit, the attitude towards life. The individual flung back from the world and from society upon himself, and within himself finding the secret of a new strength, the source of a new consolation,—this is the interpretation of life common to all. How can such an interpretation have use, have enjoyment, be a consolation, be a stay in poetry, and yet have no legitimacy in theory? What alembic does the poet possess that he may apply ideas to life with the assurance that in poetry the ideas are the fact, while the same ideas in the hands of the philosopher are unverifiable, discredited dogmas, shaken creeds, or failing traditions? I cannot rid myself of the conviction that the weight and the humanity of the message of the poet are proportionate to the weighty and human ideas which he develops; that these ideas must be capable of verification to the intelligence,—must be true in that system of knowledge which is science, in that discussion of the meaning of experience which is philosophy.

But what if Mr. Arnold's interpretation of life be partial? What if a completer account of experience, a deeper and more adventurous love of wisdom, should find community below all isolation? Would not the philosophy of life which revealed this limitation of Mr. Arnold's interpretation, reveal also the limitation of his poetry? This is the question that comes to me when I put Mr. Arnold's poetry, with all its nobility, beside the poetry of Robert Browning.

What a change from a serene yet cold air of one to the genial, glowing atmosphere of the other, which envelops and embraces

everything in this world of ours as if in fear that something might escape its loving touch. What a change from the pallid colors in which one paints life to the varied warmth of the other! What a change from the almost remote and academic sympathies of the one to the passionate human sympathies of the other! Where Arnold finds food for pensive regret, a rendering of triumphant hope is borne to us from Browning. When the world tells a story of softened melancholy to Arnold, Browning reads a tale of keen and delicious joy. If Arnold sings of calm, self-poised resignation and endeavor, the trumpet peal of an abounding life bursts from Browning. Arnold stands upon the sandy, barren shore of that vast ocean where is seen only "the turbid ebb and flow of human misery," whence comes only the melancholy sounds of a withdrawing faith. Browning takes his place on this homely, every-day earth of ours: —

"Do I stoop? I pluck a posey.
Do I stand and stare? All's blue."

Strenuous, abounding, triumphant optimism, — that is the note of Browning: —

"How good is man's life, the men living! how fit to employ
All the heart and the soul and the senses forever in joy!"

Buoyant faith, that is the attitude of Browning: —

"God's in his heaven!
All's right with the world!"

What is the source of this note of Browning, what the authority for his attitude? It is only when we go to his ideas, the ideas which he applies to life, by which he criticises and interprets life, that we get the secret of his superior passion, of his superior joy, of his superior sympathy. An adequate rendering of Browning's conception of the meaning of life does not come within the scope of this article. The most inadequate rendering cannot fail to note that Browning knows and tells of no isolation of man from nature, of man from man. No account, however brief, can fail to record the abundance, the intensity, the vibrating fullness, the impassioned sanity of his verse, basing themselves upon Browning's realization that the world was made for man, and that man was made for man: —

"This world's no blot for us,
No blank. It means intensely and means good."

This is the uniform utterance of Browning.

"Such a soul,
Such a body, and then such an earth,
For ensphering the whole ! "

"The earth's first stuff
Was neither more nor less, enough
To house man's soul, man's need fulfill."

"How the world is made for each of us !
All we perceive and know in it
Tends to some moment's product thus
When the soul declares itself."

In these verses we have the epitome of Browning's interpretation of life: the subordination of earth to man, to a common self. Just that which was conspicuously absent in Arnold is conspicuously present in Browning, — the sense of a common idea, a common purpose, in nature and in man. Thus it is man need not simply look to nature for encouragement in bearing the burden of the world, for strength to be like her, self-poised, self-dependent. Man may rejoice in her every pulse of life, having the conviction that in her life he, too, lives; knowing that her every event furthers some deed of his, knowing that her beauty is the response to some aspiration of his. Let one know, as Browning sings in "Rabbi Ben Ezra," that nature, that the earthly life, and all "this dance of plastic circumstance," are but the machinery to shape the soul, to form the spirit; are but the potter's wheel that moulds the clay to "heaven's consummate cup;" let him know that the meaning of life, the "uses of the cup," are

"The festal board, lamp's flash, and trumpet's peal,
The new wine's foaming flow,
The master's lips aglow ! " —

let him know all this, and he will understand why the song of Browning is one of joy and victory.

Add to this Browning's conception of the relation of man to man. Consider how he finds in the contacts of life, not isolation, but companionship, service, love, — the first and the last word.

To relate how he finds, in the minglings of life and life, the secret and the key to our experience, would be to summarize, one by one, his poems. Even a casual acquaintance with Browning suffices to show that love, as he conceives it, is no accident and no mere occurrence of the life-journey, but at once its path and its goal. Everything

"Of power and beauty in the world
The mightiness of love is curled
Inextricably round about.
Love lies within it and without."

We are led again to our old question. The greater vigor and sensuousness of Browning, his wider range, his more human touch, all spring from the ideas through which he sees and interprets life. But are the ideas true? Are they verifiable? Are they sporadic outbursts of a fancy which has no root in the nature of things, or are they the revelations of an imagination which is but another name for insight? If the ideas which give both substance and shape to Browning's poetry are only artificial make-ups of his individual fancy, what claim have they even for serious attention, to say nothing of power to stay by and to uphold? If these ideas are not ideas of soberness and of truth, as well as of fancy and passion, they are no more to us (the harsh word must be said) than freaks of a madman's brain.

If Mr. Arnold's message has weight and penetration with us, it is because that message conveys something of the reality of things. If there are messages, in comparison with which Mr. Arnold's seems pallid and academic, it is only because these other messages bring us word from a more abiding, a more human world than Mr. Arnold has known. The great power of poetry to stay and to console — a power which neither Arnold nor any other critic can exaggerate one whit — is just because of the truth, the rendering of the reality of affairs, which poetry gives us. The importance and the endurance of poetry, as of all art, are in its hold upon reality. We hear much, on this side and that, of realism. Well, we may let realism go, but we cannot let go reality. Here, too, we may turn to Robert Browning himself: —

"Truth, truth, that's the gold. And all the good
I find in fancy is, it serves to set
Gold's inmost glint free."

It is because, amid the conventionalities and make-believes of our ordinary life, poetry flashes home to us some of the gold which is at the very heart and core of our every-day existence, that poetry has its power to sustain us, its sympathy to enhearten us. Now science and philosophy, I repeat, however technical and remote in form and method, are the workings of the one selfsame spirit in its communing with this same world. There are, indeed, diversities of operation. And if the advantage in directness and universality of appeal, in wealth and passionateness of garb, is upon the side of poetry, let us remember that, after all, the advantage upon the side of method and standard are with the side of science and philosophy.

Indeed, this present separation of science and art, this division

of life into prose and poetry, is an unnatural divorce of the spirit. It exists and endures, not because of a glow to life which philosophy cannot catch, nor because of a verifiable truth which poetry cannot detect and convey. It exists because in the last few centuries the onward movement of life, of experience, has been so rapid, its diversification of regions and methods so wide, that it has outrun the slower step of reflective thought. Philosophy has not as yet caught the rhythmic swing of this onward movement, and written it down in a score of black and white which all may read. Or if in some degree philosophy has laid hold of the secret of this movement, it has not yet been able to tell it in straightforward, simple syllables to the common consciousness. In its own theory, this common consciousness tells by rote a doctrine of an earlier and outworn world. But this movement, which has so escaped the surer yet heavier tread of critical thought, has in manifold ways danced itself into the poetic measures of our century. The deeper and wider spiritual life which makes this movement has found an expression in Wordsworth and Shelley, in Browning and in Mr. Arnold himself, which has, as yet, been denied to it in English philosophy. That which seemed to Mr. Arnold a flight from philosophy into poetry was in reality but a flight from a hard and partial philosophy to a fuller and freer one. It is not because poetry is divorced from science that it gave Mr. Arnold's nature such satisfaction, but because his philosophic instinct was so deep and real that he revolted from the professional philosophy of the day as he found it in Great Britain, and sought refuge in the unnamed, unprofessed philosophy of the great poets of England and of all time.

Here, indeed, is just our problem. We must bridge this gap of poetry from science. We must heal this unnatural wound. We must, in the cold, reflective way of critical system, justify and organize the truth which poetry, with its quick, naïve contacts, has already felt and reported. The same movement of the spirit, bringing man and man, man and nature, into wider and closer unity, which has found expression by anticipation in poetry, must find expression by retrospection in philosophy. Thus will be hastened the day in which our sons and our daughters shall prophesy, our young men shall see visions, and our old men dream dreams.

John Dewey.

ALEXANDRE VINET, 1797-1847.¹

Einer der edelsten Charactere, von dem Ströme lebendigen Wassers ausgegangen Sind und noch ausgehen, ist Vinet ganz gewiss. — ARNOLD RUEGG.

I.

DURING the last year or two, the attention of the French and Swiss reading public has been called anew, by various publications and articles, to the claims of Vinet as a writer and a thinker. The appearance of a volume of his poems and of Moline's "*Étude sur A. Vinet*" would alone have raised more or less discussion about his works. But more or less extended criticisms by Brunetière, Faguet, de Pressencé, on these volumes and on Vinet's place in literature have largely added to the interest of this discussion. I have thought, therefore, that it might not be uninteresting to the readers of this "Review" to go over it with me. Vinet would have welcomed such a publication as the "*Andover Review*," and rejoiced in its influence and success, for it endeavors to promote what was exceedingly dear to him, — independence and honesty in Christian thought and expression, — and what was supremely important, in his opinion, — the coördinating of all Christian systems, methods, and efforts around the person of the Christ.

Of the purely theological work of Vinet, I am not competent to write. I feel certain, however, that the estimate put upon it by the author of the very inadequate biographical notice in the "*Encyclopædia Britannica*" is altogether erroneous. Vinet would be remembered still, and his influence would still be powerful, though he had not left us his various writings on French literature. He was not a system-builder either in philosophy or theology; not even a system-defender; but he had a wonderful power of penetrating to the core of things, and a fearless confidence in the expediency as well as in the rightfulness of uttering the truth, which won for him while he lived, and have retained for him to this day, a peculiar and prominent position among the suggestors and guides of thought and life in Protestant France and Switzerland.

¹ E. Rambert, *Alexandre Vinet*. 3d ed. Lausanne, 1876.

L. Molines, *Étude sur A. Vinet*. Paris, 1890.

E. de Pressensé, *A. Vinet d'après sa correspondance avec H. Lutteroth*. Paris, 1891.

P. Godet, *Histoire littéraire de la Suisse Française*. Paris, 1890.

J. F. Astié, *Esprit d'A. Vinet*. (English translation.) London, 1865.

A. Vinet, *Poésies — recueillies par ses amis*. Lausanne, 1890.

Seven years after Vinet's death a writer in the "North British Review" began an article on his life and writings in these words: "Vinet is the most illustrious ornament of modern French Protestantism." At that time Adolphe Monod, Guizot, the elder Coquerel, Merle d'Aubigné, Scherer, were living, and in the full maturity of their powers. Certainly, if the rank then assigned to Vinet was justly his, nothing has occurred since then to deprive him of it. Indeed, in an article that has appeared since I began to put together materials for this sketch, Gabriel Monod, writing for English readers ("Contemporary Review," December, 1890), says: "Alexandre Vinet is the leading figure of French Protestantism in the nineteenth century. Others may have had a more potent or dazzling eloquence, a purer style, a more precise or ample erudition; but nowhere among French-speaking Protestant authors do we find one who can be ranked as his equal in force, and wealth, and originality of thought. Not one among them has exerted such an influence over his contemporaries; not one among them has so perfectly represented the Protestant spirit in its best estate."

Vinet was born at Ouchy, near Lausanne, in 1797. His father, of Huguenot descent, had, from very humble beginnings, worked his way up to a responsible position under the cantonal government. He was a man of unblemished reputation, honest, industrious, intelligent, thoughtful, devout in a somewhat formal way, concealing under a severe, almost stern manner a large fund of tender affection. In short, a Swiss of the good old stock. He had set his hopes upon his son Henry, younger than Alexandre, who died while yet a lad. He was not blind, however, to the sterling and remarkable gifts of his elder boy, and directed and encouraged his studies with clear insight and broad sympathy. He gave him the best opportunities the canton then offered. The "Collège Cantonal" and the "Académie" of Lausanne were at that time far less completely equipped than they are now. Still, they counted some able and earnest instructors, and Vinet, in after life, was ever ready to acknowledge his indebtedness to them. The volume of Vinet's poems published last year in Lausanne proves conclusively that his student years, though laborious, were full of zest and gayety. Vinet was never an ascetic, never a puritan, in the narrower and restrictive sense of the term. His life, though one of severe toil, and much of the time of real poverty and of severe pain, was yet a rounded, symmetrical one.

The act that first brought him into public notice was the funeral

address that, in the name of his fellow-students, he delivered at the grave of a beloved instructor, Professor Durand. He did it spontaneously, to the surprise of all: with the students the surprise was full of pleasure; not so with the authorities, and the adventurous young orator barely escaped severe official censure.

Recommended by the faculty as the fittest of their students to assume the charge of instruction in French at the Basle Gymnasium, Vinet accepted gladly and gratefully the post offered him, and for twenty years he discharged its modest functions in such a manner that not the Gymnasium alone, but the whole city and canton, soon learned to respect him and to be proud of him. The "*Chrestomathie Française*" (3 vols. in 8vo), which he prepared for the use of his pupils, is still, all in all, the best compend of French literature for the use of schools. The selections are excellently made; the biographical sketches, though generally quite brief, give all the salient points and facts, and leave a clear, strong, accurate, abiding impression in the mind of the reader; the brief survey of French literature which introduces the third volume remains unequalled in the lucidity of its exposition, and the almost unassailable justness of its criticisms and estimates. Sainte-Beuve found scarcely anything to blame in its earliest form. In the later shape which Vinet, profiting by the suggestions of this and other critics, as well as by his own enlarged experience, gave the work, it may challenge comparison with any similar one in any literature.

In Basle, Vinet supplemented the somewhat narrow course of the Lausanne Academy by solid and extensive reading. Quite naturally, German literature, German philosophy, and German theology attracted and interested him. Greek, which he had learned very imperfectly, he now studied hard and to good purpose. In these pursuits he was helped and cheered by his wife, who throughout his life proved a loving and efficient helpmeet. On the whole, these years in Basle must be considered as the happiest in his experience. Unfortunately a severe accident, from which he never wholly recovered and which necessitated several painful operations, laid, in a constitution that had never been very vigorous, the seeds of a disease that was to carry him off in his fifty-first year.

It was some nine years after his removal to Basle, in 1826, that Vinet published his first important work, "*Mémoires en faveur de la liberté des cultes.*" A former French Minister of Justice, Count de Lambrecht, had left the sum of 2,000 francs

as a prize for the best work on "freedom of worship" that should be written within two years after his death. Vinet, as he himself tells us, "felt a call to undertake a contest to which he was urged by the most profound conviction of his mind and the most invincible sentiments of his heart." Twenty-nine manuscripts were sent in. The committee chosen to award the prize contained some of the most eminent Frenchmen of the day, among them Guizot, de Barante, de Rémusat, de Broglie, de Kératry, and Stapfer. Guizot as chairman reported that the unanimous choice of the judges had settled on the essay bearing the motto "*Là où est l'esprit du Seigneur, là est la liberté*" (2 Cor. iii. 17). It was Vinet's.

The conclusions reached by him in this "*Mémoire*" were the following: —

1. Members of a religious society should be, as to civil and political rights, on the same footing as other citizens.

2. The religious society governs itself in perfect independence.

3. The religious character of certain civil acts, such as marriage and baptism, is entirely distinct from their civil validity and character.

4. The government should cease to educate, pay, or oversee ministers.

5. Worship should be public, so that it may not become dangerous for social morality or for the state.

Though this essay was, on the whole, the most important of the works Vinet wrote during his stay in Basle, it was by no means the only one. We have already mentioned the "*Chrestomathie*." In the list appended to the last edition of Rambert's "*Life of Vinet*," we find that during those years he published no less than twenty-five pamphlets, besides some fifty articles, many of them of great importance, in various periodicals of Switzerland, France, and Germany. Most of this time he was teaching from twenty to thirty hours a week; he preached not infrequently; he was an active member of the Bible Society, and, as we have seen, he was hard at work on Greek and theology. In 1835 he was appointed Professor of French in the University, but continued his lessons in the gymnasium.

This incessant activity bore fruit not only in heightening the consideration he enjoyed in the city of his adoption, but in extending his reputation far beyond the boundaries of the Canton and of Switzerland itself. He was urged to apply for a position in the faculty of Montauban; invited to Paris, to Frankfort, to

Geneva, where he was offered a chair in the Theological School of the Evangelical Society. He refused all these offers and remained in Basle.

But he had ceased to be a local celebrity; his fame was becoming European. His articles in the excellent Paris Protestant publication, "*Le Semeur*," were attracting more and more attention. His criticisms on books by Sainte-Beuve, Souvestre, Béranger, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Hugo, so different in spirit and method from the ordinary work of the time, drew to him the attention and won the respect of many of the foremost writers of the day. Had we space at our command, we could fill pages with quotations to prove this. We can give only two. Souvestre writes to him: "I cannot tell you how much good your approbation has done me. I do not mean literary approbation. I did wish for that once; I still appreciate it now, but much less than the approbation you give my tendency, your moral encouragement. It is pleasant to meet from time to time a grave countenance approving you and a pure voice saying, 'It is well.'" Sainte-Beuve says of Vinet's criticism: "*Le but élevé final ne manque jamais, et l'on arrive à la dernière page regardant en haut.*"

In 1837 Vinet was called to Lausanne to fill the chair of Practical Theology vacated by Laresche. The call reached him in a state of profound discouragement. He was just passing through one of the crises, so frequent in his experience, in which the greatest temptation in his path seems to have been an exaggerated sense of his unworthiness. Vinet's modesty was extreme, his self-distrust excessive, and had it not been accompanied by the strongest sense of duty and by a deep and most genuine faith in the aid of the Holy Spirit, it would probably have led him to abandon the fields of activity in which even his immediate success was so pronounced.

He waited more than three months before giving his final answer. He was strongly attached to Basle. He writes to a friend: "There is not a stone in the pavements of the city that has not become dear to me. My heart breaks at the thought of leaving a spot in which I have *lived* so much, and in which I expected to die. And what shall I say of my children, who know only Basle?" Still he felt intensely the need of a change. After a sojourn in St. Gall, which his physicians had recommended to him, he returned to Basle, not much improved in health, and soon after decided to go to Lausanne.

His first weeks there were far from happy. Beautiful as were

the surroundings, they could not keep his mind and heart from longing for what he had left in the city on the Rhine. As usual he sought respite from sadness in hard work, and not in vain. He entered upon his work at the Academy the first of November, 1837. At the same time Sainte-Beuve was installed there as lecturer. He had come, on invitation, to the Canton de Vaud to work in quiet at his great "History of Port Royal," and was to lecture on the subject to the students of the Academy. He had previously, in the "*Revue des Deux Mondes*," published a careful and thoughtful article on Vinet. The relations between the two men were from the first very friendly, and they were maintained after Sainte-Beuve's return to Paris. It is not to be doubted that they were mutually profitable. The brilliant Frenchman found in the high-minded and pure-hearted Swiss a mentor and a judge, always charitable, as Sainte-Beuve himself says, but always sincere and intentionally just. We may say here that in his relations with other writers, many of them much better known than himself, Vinet is the one to "give the tone;" his is the directing mind, though all the time, it may be, he is insisting on his friend's superiority.

Of Vinet's work as Professor of Practical Theology it is somewhat difficult to give an adequate idea. The printed results of his courses are comparatively meagre, and in most cases are from imperfect notes taken by his hearers. The impression his teaching left on the minds and hearts of the students, and of others who had the good fortune to hear him, was profound, lasting, and in very many cases decisive. It is doubtful whether any other instructor of this century, with the possible exception of Arnold of Rugby, has had so great, so divine a gift of moulding character by implanting in the heart the conviction that the best life attainable is the only right life. In his case, lovable as was the man and wholly devoted as he was to the interests of his pupils, this power manifested itself and wrought almost exclusively through the spoken word. The state of his health prevented his doing much in the way of social intercourse with the students. But in his lessons he poured out the treasures of his intelligence and of his heart, and they fed on the rich bounty so liberally and lovingly bestowed.

The ten years that Vinet spent in Lausanne were of inestimable value to the church of God in Switzerland and in France, — nay, in the world at large. The writer of this article was born too late to be one of Vinet's hearers, but early in his student

years he met those who had been ; he has met many since, and he can without hesitancy declare that they all considered the privilege of having sat at his feet among the most precious in their lives.

But other and less agreeable cares occupied Vinet's mind and absorbed much of his time during the last half of his stay in Lausanne. He had, as we saw, early considered and settled for himself the question of the relations of the church to the state. Further reflection had but confirmed his views ; still he had never wished to become a separatist, preferring to work within the church, and on this vantage ground prepare the way for a better state of things. More than one of his friends wondered at this. Some of the leaders in the *Réveil* did more than wonder ; they criticised his course with considerable sharpness. Vinet did not at first quite understand the better spirit of the Revival movement. The excesses and absurdities that sometimes disfigured it hid from him in part its admirable features. The theology of its leaders seemed to him narrow, and in some degree to savor of obscurantism. On the other hand, their earnestness strongly appealed to him, and he denounced, not from principle only, but because with him resistance to all kinds of oppression was an instinct, the popular and legal persecutions of which they were the objects.

When, after the Revolution of 1845, the new Vaudois government ordered the pastors to read from their pulpits a long proclamation, the purport of which was largely political, many of them refused ; some even went so far as to forbid its being read at all in their churches. A struggle then began which, after various episodes, resulted in the resignation of over a hundred ministers and the founding of a Free Church in the canton. Vinet had already resigned his pastoral office in 1839, and his professorship of theology in 1845. He was at this time Professor of French Literature, but soon after these events, in 1846, was deprived of his post, on the ground that "he frequented religious gatherings outside of the National Church," a practice which by law debarred him from employment as a public teacher.

The government accepted the situation, and filled as fast and as well as it could the pastorates left empty. The writer remembers well, though he was still a child at the time, the coming of the new pastor, a former schoolmaster, to take charge of the large church of his native town. The division of views among the people was very marked, but an immense majority sided with the

government, not understanding how an employee, for such they held the pastor to be, should refuse to obey orders.

The *démissionnaires*, as the ministers who had resigned were called, continued to be the spiritual guides of such of their former hearers as chose to remain attached to them. They and their parishioners were for a while exposed to more or less brutal persecution at the hands of the populace. The government at first forbade all religious gatherings held elsewhere than in the National churches, but this attempt at legal persecution had its usual effect: it strengthened the faith of the dissenters, and bound them more closely together.

Measured by numbers, this contest was of far less magnitude than the corresponding one in Scotland, yet its consequences were and are perhaps no less important. The continental position of Switzerland, the close intellectual and religious relations between it and Germany and France, partly explain this, but the share Vinet took in the struggle, and the value of his contributions to the literature of it, had unquestionably much to do with this result.

The loss of his professorship was one of the penalties he had to pay for his activity in maintaining the cause of freedom of worship and the independence of the church. His chair was taken from him, but the students remained faithful to their beloved instructor, and he continued to lecture to them as long as his strength allowed him. It was but a short time. He died May 4, 1847. His last words were, "I can no longer think," to his wife, who was asking him a question, and "God have mercy on me!" which he repeated several times. His friends inscribed on the monument they erected over his grave a passage from Daniel xii. 3: "They that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever." His widow, remembering the modesty and humility that had been so marked traits of his character, caused these words to be added: "Your life is hid with Christ in God."

II.

Nearly half a century has elapsed since Vinet's death. Of how many theological writers and critics who have been in their graves so long can it be said that they still live? that they are still by our side, in our thoughts, guiding and moulding us every day? It is not too much to affirm that Vinet is one of the number. In the article already referred to, Mr. Monod says: "The most con-

vincing testimony to the value of his work is the slow but steady progress of his fame. . . . The most notable men of the younger generation — Messrs. Brunetière, Faguet, Desjardins, Chantavoine — speak of him as a master, and a master who teaches how to live as well as how to think. The exclusively Swiss or Protestant reputation he once enjoyed has grown into a reputation as wide as France. And it will not stop there; for the value of Vinet's works depends on no accident of form or charm of style. It rests rather on their profundity of thought and truth of feeling, and especially on the intimate union between the world and the man, between the teaching and the life."

This is well said, but more might be claimed. Vinet's reputation outside of France is not to be made; it is already made. In our own country many a pastor has drawn from his works some of his truest counsel and inspiration. The estimate Germany makes of him is evidenced by this fact among others: the article devoted to him in Herzog and Plitt's *Real-Encyc. f. Prot. Theol.*, by Arnold Rüeegg, fills nearly eighteen pages, and the term "great man" is more than once used in reference to the Swiss professor. Rüeegg naturally dwells mainly on Vinet's theological work, and we would refer to his article and to G. Monod's (*Contemporary Review*, November, 1890) all who wish to read a detailed account of Vinet's religious views and teachings. We have not the competence to treat of them. Yet even a layman may speak of the peculiar unction of Vinet's writings, — an unction as different as possible from the ordinary pathos of the rhetorical preacher. The impression his works at once and permanently produce is that he is endeavoring, not to establish or defend a theory, not to adapt a certain fact or state of mind to an accepted system of philosophy or theology, but to discover and proclaim the truth. One may not always agree with his opinions, but one must admire and love his spirit. He was not an extremist in anything, unless it be in his absolute faith in the triumph of righteousness. In the earlier period of his life, writing to a young friend who had questioned the rightfulness of reticence, he says: "*Vous êtes franc, je me pique de l'être aussi, mais nous n'entendons pas la franchise tout à fait de même. Vous la faites consister à dire tout ce que vous pensez; pour moi, je borne mon ambition à ne rien dire que je ne pense.*"

If we were called upon to describe in a few words the work of Vinet as preacher and theological professor, we should say: He laid an extreme but not excessive emphasis on the oneness of

faith and life. For him, to believe is to live, to live is to believe. He defended and upheld the freedom of the church, none the less earnestly and efficiently because he chose to remain a member of the establishment as long as his conscience permitted him. He lifted truth above dogma, the word of God above human speculations, the gospel above the catechism, not defiantly, but with a quiet, calm assurance that won his hearers without startling them. He made Christ the Saviour appear also the Friend, the Counselor, the Guide, the ever-present Helper, and this without in any degree lowering or belittling the divine and august character of Jesus. All this he did, and much besides; and it is altogether impossible for the church to which he originally belonged, or for that which he helped establish, to forget his example and his teaching. The world is distinctly and permanently the better for the life of this excellent man.

But for the writer of this very inadequate notice it is Vinet's work in literature that is most interesting and professionally most important. To the value of Vinet's work as a critic it were easy to give a mass of testimony from his contemporaries and his rivals, if we can apply this term to fellow-workers in the department of literature he had selected as his own. Sainte-Beuve, St. René-Taillandier, Souvestre, Chateaubriand, Hugo, have expressed their admiration of his talent, and most of them, also, their great obligations to him. And in our own day Mr. Brunetière, in an article published in the "*Revue des Deux Mondes*" (March 1, 1890), thus speaks of him: "When I recall my earliest impressions and scrutinize my conscience, I find no other historian of literature from whom I have learned more, not even Sainte-Beuve or Désiré Nisard; I am happy to have an opportunity of saying this. But, on the other hand, as for fifteen or twenty years I have ceased reading him, — indeed carefully abstain from reading him, *because I discovered that, if perchance I had an idea, Vinet always had had it before me*, — I fear I am not able to speak of him with as much precision as I would." Certainly the warmest friends of Vinet can wish for no stronger testimony to the value of his work than this, and the limitations that Mr. Brunetière makes later on — some of them we acknowledge quite well taken, others we think quite unjustifiable — do not seriously detract from the claims of Vinet to one of the highest places among the foremost French historians of literature.

In this field, which in France is hardly inferior to any other in importance, and in which such writers as Boileau, Voltaire, Diderot,

Laharpe, Madame de Staël, Villemain, Nisard, Sainte-Beuve, have labored, Vinet occupies a place distinctly his own. His work, though most of it was not given by him a final revision, will be read, I think, as long and as profitably as that of any of his contemporaries. He is preëminently the Christian critic. We do not mean by this that he considers literature exclusively as a vehicle for moral or religious instruction, or that he was at all narrow in his tastes or unduly severe in his judgments. He accepted, as all reasonable men must accept, the fact of modern civilization, with all its wonderful complexities and perplexities. But he read and criticised everything from the standpoint of its bearing upon life, — and with him life was Christian. He was largely liberal — sometimes even, his friends thought, too much so — in his appreciation of writers whom it is the custom severely to condemn and to remand among the harmful and dangerous. He saw, and tried to help others see, the good there is in them and the good that can be obtained from them. His gentle though searching analysis separated the chaff from the wheat, brought out their noble and unselfish ideas and ideals, and, whilst the final decision left no doubt as to the opinion of the critic concerning the low and base, it directed the attention of the reader mainly to the better qualities of the work.

In his lectures on the French literature in the eighteenth century, Vinet devotes one volume almost wholly to Voltaire and Rousseau. He concludes his study of Voltaire in the following words: “*Le sentiment qui demeure après tout ceci est un sentiment triste; il en faut exclure la haine et ne conserver que la pitié. Personne n’a mieux servi la cause du prince des ténèbres que Voltaire; mais si nous rentrons dans l’intérieur de son être, disons-le encore, Messieurs, nous n’y trouvons qu’un homme semblable à beaucoup d’autres hommes.*”¹

Of Rousseau he sums up thus: “*Rousseau fut donc l’écrivain le plus puissant de son école. En un point cependant cette puissance trouva ses limites. Il entreprit de donner une religion à la France; il prétendit substituer au déisme sec de Voltaire un déisme séduisant, rehaussé d’imagination et de sentiment; mais il n’aboutit qu’à prouver l’insuffisance du déisme pour la consolation*

¹ The feeling that abides after all this is one of sadness; let us exclude from it all hate and retain only pity. No one ever served better than Voltaire the cause of the Prince of Darkness; but if we penetrate within his inner being, we find there only a man like many other men.

et le soutien de l'humanité. Ou le monde deviendra chrétien, ou et deviendra quelque chose qu'il me répugne d'exprimer."¹

The masterpiece of Vinet's criticism is generally conceded to be his "Essays on Pascal." They were composed at different periods. The first given in the volume, entitled "Études sur Blaise Pascal," a volume brought out by Vinet's friends several years after his death, is only a fragment of a lesson given at Basle in 1833; the ninth, a brief sketch of Pascal's "Abrégé de la vie de Jésus Christ," was dictated by Vinet in 1847, when he was on his death-bed.

Vinet was unusually well qualified and prepared to understand Pascal. The two men had much in common. "Vinet," says de Pressensé, "has really been the Pascal of the Reformed Churches. This name belongs to him whether we consider the breadth of his religious conception, or dwell on the character of the writer, his absolute sincerity, the note of sadness (*le trait douloureux*) which characterizes all great Christians. Let us add that Vinet, like Pascal, whose most faithful interpreter he has been, was placed at the hard school of disease; that it was by subduing a body broken by an implacable illness that he accomplished his immense intellectual task. His thought, his soul, his very style, are constantly retempered in the burning crucible of pain. Only, Vinet is a son of the Reformation, and not a timorous disciple of Port Royal. His pinions have not the sweep of Pascal's, but his horizon is more vast, his spirit is more free. . . . Vinet is one of the greatest and truest liberals of our time, and religious freedom carried to its last consequences has no more convinced, no more potent defender than he. . . . These significant words were found in the note-book in which he jotted down his most secret thoughts: 'Love of glory is the dangerous neighbor of real love; the one loses all that the other gains.' Vinet loved truth, not glory. Hence his noble disdain for all that might have brought him into prominence."

True to his method of seeking the man in the written book, and in the man the Christian, if cause there be, Vinet has endeavored to penetrate into the real personality of Pascal. At the time his first essays were published, the improved texts of Pascal's

¹ Rousseau was the most powerful writer of his (own) school. Yet on one point this power found its limits. He undertook to give a religion to France; he tried to substitute for the barren deism of Voltaire a seductive deism, adorned by imagination and sentiment; but his efforts ended in proving anew the inability of deism to comfort and uphold humanity. Either the world will become Christian, or it will become something I am loth to express.

works, especially of the "Pensées," were not yet known. Whilst acknowledging that the friends of the great moralist, out of regard for the feelings of good men of their day and for his own reputation, had in all probability modified, by prunings and alterations, the exact form of Pascal's work, Vinet claimed that diligent and unprejudiced study of the text as published by them would lead to a sufficiently clear apprehension of the thought (*pensée*) of Pascal, of the drift of his argument, of his real position on the various matters he discusses.

The French eclectic philosopher, Cousin, had in 1843 published on the "Pensées" a book in which he maintained the view that Pascal was really a great skeptic, a Pyrrhonian. Vinet concedes that certain passages in the "Pensées" admit of such an interpretation, but maintains that they much more readily admit of a different one, more in keeping with the whole drift of Pascal's thinking, and therefore the more probable of the two. The argument of Vinet is remarkable for its moderation as well as for its strength, and leaves, it seems to us, no reasonable ground for Cousin's contention. Certainly the world at large accepts or retains Vinet's view. It was of these articles of Vinet's that Sainte-Beuve wrote: "Si l'on réunissait dans un petit volume les articles de M. Vinet sur Pascal, on aurait, selon moi; les conclusions les plus exactes auxquelles on puisse atteindre sur cette grande nature si controversée."

Some thirty years ago M. Astié published two volumes of extracts from Vinet's works under the title of "L'Esprit de Vinet." These have been translated into English, and appear as "Outlines of Theology," and "Outlines of Philosophy and Literature." We refer our readers to them, reminding them, at the same time, of the loss that the form, and not infrequently the spirit, the very life of a saying, often suffer by translation. For, although in Vinet the thinker is greater than the artist, yet the form is generally worthy of the matter, and often is exceedingly fine. On the whole, however, we agree with M. Brunetière, who refuses to place Vinet among the great masters of style. He lacked, it seems to us, the supreme sense of harmonious proportion that characterizes nearly all the great French prose-writers; his sentences are too full, often too subtle; the artist in them is subordinate to the *penseur*; the object he aims at is the adequate and just presentation of the truth, rather than the impressive and effective statement of it. But, after conceding all this, we are almost ready to join M. Astié when he says that Vinet was "the writer who

doubtless gave the world more original and true thoughts than any other man of his age."

We add a few extracts from Vinet's writings, choosing passages that throw special light on his opinions and his character.

Pour être convaincu, il faut avoir été vaincu.¹ (One of his favorite sayings.)

Le vrai bien de l'homme, le vrai mal de l'homme, sa destinée, c'est lui-même. Son âme est maîtresse de son sort ; heureux s'il était maître de son âme.²

J'ai écrit ceci sur mes tablettes : " Ne parle jamais de Dieu sans parler à Dieu. En des sujets religieux, la meilleure méditation c'est la prière. Avoir prié c'est avoir pensé." ³

Tout ce qui est vrai le Christianisme l'adopte ou plutôt le réclame.⁴

Je suis protestant, il est vrai, mais dans un sens si général, si peu historique, que je ne me sens étranger dans aucune enceinte, lorsque j'y retrouve cette foi en la charité divine, ce recours au mystère de l'incarnation et cette bonne volonté du repentir, qui sont la consolation, la couronne et l'humble triomphe de notre existence foudroyée.⁵ (Letter to Chateaubriand.)

Ceux qui sont protestants pour tout nier se font catholiques pour tout lier.⁶

On beaucoup trop conclu des succès de quelques écrivains sceptiques ou indifférents. Le doute est un état de l'âme, un fait humain et vrai, dont l'expression est intéressante à certaines conditions, et il a été

¹ To be convinced, one must have been conquered.

² The true weal of man, the true woe of man, his destiny, is himself. His soul is mistress of his fate ; happy if he were master of his soul.

³ I have written this on my tablets : " Never speak of God without having talked with God. On religious subjects the best meditation is prayer. He who has prayed has thought."

⁴ Christianity adopts, or rather claims, as her own everything that is true.

⁵ I am a Protestant, it is true, but in so general, in so unhistorical a sense, that I do not feel estranged in any circle if I find in it that faith in divine charity, that resort to the mystery of the Incarnation, and that willingness to repent, which are the consolation, the crown, and the humble triumph of our shattered existence.

⁶ Some that are Protestants to deny everything, turn Catholics in order to bind everything.

donné à certains génies indifférentistes de s'identifier avec le vrai par l'intelligence. *En thèse générale il faut partir de la vérité pour faire quelque durée.*¹

L'homme tout matière est méprisable; l'homme tout esprit est effrayant. Je veux l'homme maître de lui-même, afin qu'il soit mieux le serviteur de tous.²

Dans chacune des âmes qui la reçoivent, la vérité redevient nouvelle.³

L'Evangile serait bien moins parfait s'il était plus complet, bien moins éloquent s'il avait tout dit, bien moins puissant s'il était plus scientifique dans sa méthode et plus rigoureux dans son langage. Nous nous acharnons à le prendre sur le pied, d'un livre ou d'un traité; mais ce n'est pas un livre, ni un traité, ni un code. Qu'est-ce donc? C'est l'Evangile.⁴

1 Sous ton voile d'ignominie,
Sous ta couronne de douleur,
N'attends pas que je te renie,
Chef auguste de mon Sauveur.
Mon œil, sous le sanglant nuage
Qui me dérobe ta beauté,
A retrouvé de ton visage
L'ineffaçable majesté.

6 L'amour est la grandeur suprême,
L'amour est la gloire du ciel,
L'amour est le vrai diadème
Du très-Haut et d'Emmanuel.
Loïn de moi, vision grossière,
De grandeur et de dignité!

¹ Much too great stress has been laid upon the success of some skeptical writers. Doubt is a state of the soul, a true, human fact, the expression of which is interesting on certain conditions, and to certain unbelieving geniuses it has been given to identify themselves with the truth through their intelligence. *But, generally speaking, you must start from the truth to do durable work.*

² The man who is all matter is despicable; the man who is all intellect is frightful. I want man master of himself in order the better to serve all.

³ For each one of the souls that receive it, truth becomes young (new) again.

⁴ The gospel would be much less perfect if it were more complete, much less eloquent if it said everything, much less potent if it were more scientific in its method and more vigorous in its language. We insist upon understanding it as a book or a treatise; but it is not a book, or a treatise, or a code. What is it, then? It is the gospel.

Comme au ciel, il n'est sur la terre

Rien de grand que la charité.¹

(Two stanzas of "Jésus à Golgotha.")

Il n'y a que la littérature qui cultive.²

Parmi les auteurs réputés classiques, il n'en est pas un qui ne donne à penser, et qui n'apprenne à penser.³

L'arbre est vigoureux et beau, mais il est taillé.⁴ (On the French literature of the seventeenth century.)

La poésie est dans l'homme et c'est lui qui la donne aux choses.⁵

Il n'y a pas deux méthodes ; une méthode qui ne serait pas l'analyse est fausse et ne mène à rien. La synthèse n'est qu'un jeu de notions si elle n'est précédée de l'analyse.⁶

Le tort de l'esprit français, c'est de prendre l'esprit pour le talent, quelquefois même pour l'éloquence.⁷

¹ 1 Under thy veil of ignominy,
Under thy crown of sorrow,
Do not fear that I deny Thee,
August head of my Saviour.
My eye, under the bloody cloud
That hides thy beauty from me,
Can retrace of thy face
The ineffaceable majesty.

6 Love is the highest greatness,
Love is the glory of heaven,
Love is the true diadem
Of the Most High and of Emmanuel.
Away, coarse vision
Of grandeurs and of dignities !
As in heaven, so upon earth,
Nothing is great but charity.

² Letters alone give true culture.

³ Among the so-called classic authors, there is not one who does not suggest thought, not one who does not teach us to think.

⁴ The tree is vigorous and fine, but it is clipped.

⁵ Poetry is within man ; it is he that bestows it upon things.

⁶ There are not two methods ; a method that were not analytical must be false and lead to nothing. Synthesis is but a game of notions if it be not preceded by analysis.

⁷ The bent of the French mind is to mistake wit for talent, sometimes even for eloquence.

Toute étude où l'esprit reste inactif et ne rend pas à mesure qu'il reçoit, en un mot, qui ne produit pas, n'est pas plus une étude que voir n'est regarder. Notre siècle est malade de trop lire et de lire mal. *Lisez*, mais pensez ; et ne lisez pas si vous ne voulez pas penser en lisant, et penser après avoir lu.¹

Il faut, surtout quand on blâme, tâcher d'être vrai ; car, envers les morts comme envers les vivants, le premier des égards est la vérité ; et l'exagération n'est pas la vérité.²

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WHAT VALUE HAS GOETHE'S THOUGHT OF GOD FOR US ?³

A REVIEW of the two "Knickerbocker Nuggets" containing the first eleven books of Goethe's Autobiography compares the edition to one of the beautiful iridescent vials which Colonel di Cesnola dug up in Cyprus. "Nobody," concludes the reviewer, "can tell what the delicious Cyprian vases held, — poison or cosmetic, philter or filth. In the talking vial from which the silvery streams of Goethe's soul pour forth in self-confession, there is a similar doubt as to the ultimate contents." This doubt, with its long and lengthening chain of pros and cons, it is not the purpose of the present paper to try in any way to solve. To avoid misunderstanding, however, a few words may be necessary before we take up our main theme. Genius can never hallow vice, rabid and shallow enthusiasts to the contrary notwithstanding. Genius as well as mediocrity must come to judg-

¹ Every study in which the mind remains inactive, and does not give out in measure as it receives, in short any study which does not *produce*, is no more study than seeing is observing. Our age is sick of reading too much and reading badly. Read, but think ; do not read if you do not wish to think as you read and after you have read.

² One should, especially when blaming, endeavor to be true ; for, toward the dead as toward the living, the first of duties is truth, and exaggeration is not truth.

³ Oosterzee's *Goethe's Stellung zum Christenthum*.

Goethe's *Wahrheit und Dichtung*.

Lewes's *Life of Goethe*.

Dünzter's *Life of Goethe*. (Translated by T. W. Lyster.)

Taylor's *Goethe's Faust*.

Eckermann, *Gespräche mit Goethe*.

ment, and in both cases the definition of a sinner is the same. The Scylla and Charybdis theory, which claims the justification of genius in swallowing up whatever of ordinary humanity may serve to feed its hungry maw, belongs to a heathen and a defunct mythology. It is beyond belief that the enlightenment of the present can ever return to it, whatever signs of atavism may occasionally appear. On the other hand, is it not the part of narrowness to refuse to listen to great and noble utterances from a man whose character we believe to be darkened by serious blemishes? The lasting power is with the man whose word is vitalized by his life. Such a word was that of the great Nazarene. It was not spoken before Him. It has not been spoken since. Failing the absolute test, we speak of trend of character, and this must always measure the *force* of any teaching. The *truth* of a teaching is not always to be so measured, as ordinary observation compels us to admit. The divine breath passes through the passive organ-pipe into music, as well as through the voluntary co-operating human voice. Even a Byron can hymn the infinity and omnipotence of Ocean so that the world must stop to hear. Even the unwilling lips of a Balaam must utter blessings for curses, and must tell perforce of the vision of the Almighty which he beheld though it was not nigh him.

Goethe confesses that he finds both heaven and hell within, but he does not regard himself as peculiar in this respect. The main difficulty has been that the particular murkiness of which Goethe has been suspected lies in that part of hell which we regard — and rightly regard — as farthest from heaven. But I submit that, whatever may have been the degree of darkness in him, it cannot justify us in denying or overlooking whatever light there was in him also. His enemies themselves, at any rate those who know anything about the subject, do not deny his strict business integrity, his almost painful conscientiousness in the discharge of his smallest and most irksome duties, his genial generosity, his passionate desire to know the truth as it is.

So much by way of introduction.

I have tried to indicate my purpose in this paper by its title. The effort will be made, not so much to offer a complete compendium of Goethe's religious views (a comparatively unimportant matter) as to bring out a few points in which he can give us personal help and inspiration. This will cause us to pass by, as rapidly as may be, what Goethe did not see, and will lead us to ask rather what he did see. His insights, not his oversights, are to us

the important thing concerning him. At the same time, the first step toward understanding what we may expect from Goethe is a clearly cut idea as to what we may not expect from him. It is for the sake of this positive result that we shall consider the more negative and least valuable aspect of Goethe's religious belief, which I take to be his attitude toward historical Christianity.

During Goethe's youth and early manhood, two tendencies are distinctly traceable in his religious thinking. Through the influence of his mother and Fräulein von Klettenberg, — the latter of whom he had in mind when writing the "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul" in "Wilhelm Meister," — the boy was brought under Christian influences to which the young soul responded. The deep impression made upon his childish mind he describes in "Faust," where Easter songs, celebrating the risen Christ, bring back to the man, grown old in unbelief and despair, the days of boyhood, when the tones of the church-bells rang out full of meaning, when prayer was ecstasy, and, in the Sabbath stillness, heavenly love poured caressingly down upon him. At nineteen or thereabouts, he describes himself as loving and valuing the Bible, for almost to it alone does he owe his moral culture. At twenty-one (1770) he writes to his friend Trapp that prayer is profitable, and that "a single uplifting of the heart in the name of Him we call Lord, until we call Him *Our* Lord," will load us with countless benefits. To Fräulein von Klettenberg, in the same year, he writes that he has attended the Christian communion to commemorate the sufferings and death of the Lord.

But with this pietistic and orthodox phase which dominates Goethe's early development, another tendency shows itself. The boy of twelve, prepared for confirmation by a "good old infirm clergyman," found his religious aspirations "paralyzed" by the dry formalism of his teacher. At thirteen, when he began to learn Hebrew, he was full of doubts and questionings about the Old Testament, but could get nothing out of his instructor save now and then a shaking laugh and the exclamation, "The mad fellow! the mad boy!"¹ At sixteen, when at the University of Leipzig, he withheld himself for a time from all church connections. It is not, therefore, surprising to find at twenty-three that this undercurrent has come to the surface. "He goes," writes Kestner, "neither to church nor to the Lord's Supper, and rarely prays; for, he says, 'I am not hypocrite enough for that.' . . . He reveres the Christian religion, but not in the form in which

¹ *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, Viertes Buch.

our theologians present it." From this time till he takes his Italian journey in 1786, fourteen years later, his indifference to Christianity increases, and his opposition becomes more pronounced. In 1776 his enthusiastic friendship for Lavater begins to cool, and he refuses to be impaled on either horn of the dilemma — "Christian or Atheist" — which Lavater, with ill-advised persistence, held out to him. In 1779 Goethe suggests to Lavater that it would be well to leave their particular religions unmolested each to the other. A thousand books, old and new, he finds as beautiful as the Bible. Christ has become an unhistorical ideal of divine humanity, which is realized, not in one individual, but more or less in every man. "I am no anti-Christ, no un-Christian, yet I am decidedly not a Christian," he writes. The next period in Goethe's life is distinguished by what he himself calls a "truly Julian hatred" towards Christianity. It was with this feeling that he returned from Rome, and the time is characterized by expressions that are malignant in the aversion they express. In 1792 this extreme animosity has, however, begun to abate. An assured Christianity he has come to consider the summit of humanity, but is not yet able to adapt Jacobi's Christianity to himself, and still prefers his own heathenism. In 1808 he writes to Jacobi in regard to the Christian dramatist Werner: "It is altogether surprising to me, an old heathen, to see the cross planted on my own ground, and to hear the blood and wounds of Christ poetically preached without its being offensive to me. We owe this to the higher standpoint to which philosophy has raised us. We have learned to value the ideal, even though it may show itself in the most marvelous forms." During the last twenty-seven years of his life (1805-1832), Goethe continued to remain outside of any church communion. He claims to be a Protestant in the sense that he protests against any particular religion in order to develop himself religiously; and his success in this respect is signalized by the fact that "Faust," especially in the last part, is claimed by Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Pantheists alike.

Nevertheless, he seems to have advanced beyond the position that Christianity is the "noblest of illusions." "I consider," he says to Eckermann, "all four of the Evangelists as genuine, for there is in them the reflection of a majesty which proceeds from the person of Christ, and is of so divine a sort as to emanate only from the Divine. If any one asks me whether it pertains to me to show Him adoring veneration, I reply: Certainly; as to the divine

manifestation of the highest morality. If I am asked whether it is my nature to venerate the sun, I again say: Certainly; for he is likewise a manifestation of the highest Being."¹ But there is no evidence that Goethe ever regarded Christ as divine in any unique sense. To the poet all humanity continued to be divine, and although, as we have seen, he finally came to consider Christ as representing the highest possible moral development of the race, the difference between Him and other men was only one of degree. However interesting and important the expressions in the latter part of Goethe's life may be as showing the development and growing catholicity of the man, they are comparatively unimportant to us. And this remains true even though we add that, in the final scene of "Faust," the necessity not only of self-salvation, but of the "freely bestowed grace of God," is acknowledged. In these days of Christo-centric thinking, it would be like substituting a firefly lamp for the steady brilliancy of the electric arc, to turn back to the fitful and reluctant concessions of Goethe for enlightenment as to the nature and office of the Divine Redeemer.

Has he nothing, then, to offer us? Was he, indeed, a man

"holding no form of creed,

But contemplating all?"

Goethe was no atheist. The boy, erecting a sacrificial pile in his room to the God of Nature, the Creator and Preserver of Heaven and Earth, and lighting a fragrant flame on its summit through a burning-glass by the first rays of the rising sun,² was father of the man to whom the snow-mantled summit of the terrible Brocken becomes a temple of sweetest praise. It is impossible to deny the spirit of reverent adoration that characterizes his thinking. But while we recognize an erected altar in the teachings of Goethe, it is another and a more difficult question as to what is the inscription upon it. Was his worship Nature-worship? If this means that Goethe's God was nothing more than the cosmos of matter and motion, we find a decisive answer to the question in his abhorrence of French materialism. Of the "Système de la Nature" and its effect upon him as a young man, he writes: "We did not understand how such a book could be dangerous; it appeared to us so gray, so Cimmerian, so death-like. . . . All was to be of necessity, and therefore there was no God. But could there not be a God of necessity also? we asked."³ "He who speaks of

¹ *Gespräche mit Goethe*, iii. den 11, März, 1832.

² *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, Erstes Buch.

³ *Ibid.*, Elfte Buch.

Nature must presuppose Spirit," so reads one of the *Sprüche*. "I believed," he said to Eckermann, "in God and Nature;"¹ though it is to be noted that he thought of Nature as so instinct with Deity that he used the terms God and Nature synonymously. By "Father of love" — an expression that occurs in the "Harzreise im Winter" — he explains that he means the being who is the *fons et origo* of all other love in the universe.² "I ask not," again he says to Eckermann, "whether the highest being has reason and understanding. I feel that it is understanding itself and reason itself."³ Nature, he held with Spinoza, works after eternal, necessary, divine laws, which God himself cannot alter. It is for the poet's intuition to pierce through the perishable and discordant appearance of things to these, their essential forms. So doing, the universe will be revealed as one vast harmony. It is this thought that inspires the archangel's song of praise. For myself, I should feel under life-long obligation to Goethe, if I had read nothing he had written save this introduction to the "Prologue in Heaven." It is the same thought that causes Faust to exclaim: —

"How each the Whole its substance gives!
Each in the other works and lives.
Like heavenly forces rising and descending,
Their golden urns reciprocally lending
With wings that winnow blessing
From Heaven through Earth I see them pressing,
Filling the all with harmony unceasing."

I dwell on this because it is one of the main enthusiasms of Goethe's religious belief, and also because I regard it as largely explaining his lack of enthusiasm in relation to the Christian faith. "A voice from heaven," he says, "would not convince me that water burns and fire quenches, that a maid brings to birth, and a daughter rises from the dead. Rather I hold it as a blasphemy against the great God and his revelation in Nature." "Faith's dearest child is Miracle," cries Faust, and finds, for himself, that belief is lacking. To regard miracles as violations of inviolable law is to-day an inexcusable anachronism. But Goethe belonged to the eighteenth rather than to the nineteenth century, and holding, at least through the early part of his life, that the revelations in Scripture and Nature were hopelessly opposed, he

¹ *Gespräche mit Goethe*, iii. den 4, Januar, 1824.

² "Unter Vater der Liebe das Wesen gemeint, welchem alle übrigen die wechselseitige Neigung zu danken."

³ *Gespräche mit Goethe*, ii. den Februar, 1831.

accepted the text which he could read, and the truth of which appealed to his inmost soul. The universe, to Goethe, is the expression of the Eternal Reason; more than this, it is the expression of the Eternal Love. "If certain phenomena of nature," he says, "looked at from a moral standpoint, force us to assume the existence of a primitive Evil, so, on the other hand, many phenomena force us to assume a primitive Good." Goethe's study of Mephistopheles has saved him from the theological inanity of imputing sin to God as its creator. What, then, is the relation between the evil and the good? Evil is described in "Faust" as the power that always "wills the bad and always works the good;" as striving with furious but impotent energy of destruction against the infinite germinating activity of beneficence that hourly fills earth and sea and sky with myriad forms of life. Recall, also, the passage where he says: "I worship Him who has filled the world with such a productive energy that, if only the millionth part became embodied in living existences, the globe would so swarm with them that War, Pestilence, Flood, and Fire would be powerless to diminish them. That is my God!"¹

In the second part of "Faust," Goethe voices his own belief in the words of Pater Profundus: as by a mighty impulse from within, the tree reaches ever upward, so almighty love, ever striving upward, creates and cherishes all. The raging storm sends beneficent waters to the valley, the flaming thunderbolt cleaves the poison-laden atmosphere. All are messengers of love, and proclaim the power, eternally creating, that enfolds us. "The divine energy is everywhere diffused, and the eternal love is everywhere active."²

Such is his conclusion.

For those of us who have seen the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, this glad gospel is beyond the peradventure of a doubt. But how many, turning from that sure word of prophecy, can read with Goethe the same message in the confused hieroglyphics of Nature? If we had no other revelation, how many of us could go beyond, how many of us could go so far as Tennyson in his striving to "faintly trust the larger hope"? In Goethe we find a man who does not "faintly trust," but claims to *see*. "'I believe in God,' is a beautiful and praiseworthy phrase; but to recognize God in all his manifestations, — that is true holiness on earth." "Everything," he writes to Char-

¹ *Gespräche mit Goethe*, ii. den 20, Februar, 1831.

² *Ibid.*, ii. den 29, Mai, 1831.

lotte von Stein in 1786, "forces its meaning on me. I no longer think a subject over; everything, everything comes to meet me, and the vast kingdom simplifies itself in my soul. . . . If I could only communicate to any one the prospect and the joy! but it is not possible." In the same connection he says that the plant world takes hold of him with passion; it rages within him. Many a time, in "Faust," he longs to know the secret germs of life, the hidden fountain of being.¹ Ever ready, as he expresses it in a letter to Lavater, to acknowledge that into no human head "can go the stupendous All," he yet speaks with Nature (I quote from "Faust") "as one spirit speaks with another," and is permitted to "look into her deep breast as into the bosom of a friend." So looking, a sudden rapture, a life-glow that is holy, and strong as youth, thrills his being; the better soul awakes within him; the love of Man returns, the love of God is revived. "And this," he says in one of his letters, "is no dream, no fantasy; it is the growing aware of the essential Form with which Nature but keeps playing ever as it were, and, playing thus, brings forth the manifold life." If we regard Goethe as lacking in esteem and reverence for the Biblical revelation, has he nothing to teach us in esteem and reverence for the revelation in nature? Nor does he depend entirely on poetic intuition. Capable of "toiling terribly," he held that "belief is not the beginning but the end of all knowledge" (*Sprüche*). His scientific studies he looked upon as the necessary complement of his art studies: "A work of art should be handled scientifically, a work of nature artistically,"² — such was his doctrine. He speaks of the Hellenic mind as the healthy mind, "when the hardly curable schism" between thought and feeling had "not yet taken place in the sound nature of man."³ The well-known creed in "Faust," which is usually regarded as a mere expression of the "Gefühlsphilosophie," becomes of typical and permanent value as "Goethe's creed" only when it is read in the light of these other passages. Even in the creed we are told that to *head and heart* throngs the visible, invisible Force, — a statement which of itself precludes a too literal interpretation of *Gefühl ist alles*. With "great

¹ "Dass ich erkenne, was die Welt
In Innersten, zusammenhält,
Shau' alle Wirkenskraft und Samen,
Und thu' nicht mehr in Worten Kramen!"

² *Campaign in France*, October, 1792. Cf. Professor Edward Caird, art. "Goethe and Philosophy," *Contemporary Review*, vol. 1.

³ *Essay on Winckelmann*.

thoughts and a pure heart" truth was to be apprehended, according to Goethe, and, so striving to apprehend, life itself (*und kostet et mein leben*) is not too great a price to pay that he may win an insight into the mystery we call nature. And with a force of conviction that bursts like a trumpet-peal above this scientific, doubting, pessimistic age of ours, his words ring out: —

"Dass die welt, wie sie auch kreise,
Liebevoll und dankbei sei." ¹

Why should those to whom the Bible is still a closed book be forever turning the pages of a Schopenhauer and a Von Hartmann? Such testimony as this is, at least, equally free from orthodox prejudice. No modern can be uninfluenced by the potency of centuries of Christianity. But consciously and pre-eminently, Goethe read from the book of Nature, — the only book in which he found weighty matter on every page. Such exuberant and unerring penetration as his, where most men falter or err, fulfills in its measure Emerson's pregnant paraphrase of Scripture: —

"One accent of the Holy Ghost
The heedless world hath never lost."

Eternal activity, eternal reason, eternal love, Goethe found revealed in the universe. Did he find a personal God there? that is, a being with whom he could hold personal communion? What reason and love can mean apart from personality, it would be hard to say. And in view of his express declaration to Jacobi, in 1813, that among the many modes in which he conceived of Deity, "a God for his personality as a moral human being is provided for also," the query cannot be answered in the negative. At the same time, it seems to me indubitable that his teaching on this point is shadowy, vague, unsatisfactory. He believed, as he said to Eckermann, that man is so interpenetrated with the divine that he can apprehend parts of the Highest;² and yet, instead of regarding personality as the greatest possible perfection that can be discerned by humanity in the Deity, he was haunted by the ghostly idea, at present grown to such large proportions (*crescit eundo*), that to ascribe personality to the Deity is to limit and dwarf our conception of Him. "Our Father" is a beautiful and helpful prayer. In God's name let him pray it who will." But his own attitude is better expressed by Faust: —

¹ *West-östlicher Divan, Buch des Paradieses, Huri.*

² *Gespräche mit Goethe, ii. den Februar, 1831.*

“ I have no name to give it ;
The name is sound and smoke,
Obscuring Heaven's clear glow.”

Possibly for this reason, and undoubtedly because he shared the vices as well as the virtues of the Hellenic mode of thinking, we find in Goethe no such profound sense of sin as is to be found in Shakespeare. If the harp of the Bard of Avon gives forth fresh strains under the hand of the German poet, as Bayard Taylor gracefully phrases it, this one of its thousand strings is with Goethe mute, or but faintly sounded. The remorse of Faust after the ruin of Margaret is, with the exception of a few scanty lines, left to be inferred, and the heinousness of the act owes its development to Goethe's commentators rather than to Goethe himself. If the sunlit heights of human hope and possible salvation are revealed to Goethe as they are not to Shakespeare, it is, partly at least, because Goethe occupies a vantage-ground that is given by a certain superficiality which Shakespeare's deeper penetration into the abyss of human sin and sin's despair make impossible to him.

Without elaborating this point any further, we are forced to hasten on to the last phase of Goethe's religious creed which we shall consider. It is also the phase which to me is the most interesting and helpful. The main contest that Goethe had with the religious creed of his time is expressed in his poem, “Gott und Welt.” “What would a God be,” he asks, “who merely propelled the universe from without, and let the All revolve in a circle about his finger?” A Deity afar off in the heavens, who has created the universe, endowed it with independent forces, and then withdrawn from it, merely interposing now and then by way of miracle, was a conception abhorrent to Goethe's soul. And with this feeling the thinking of our day is, to a degree, in sympathy. It is claimed that we are learning to combine the Latin view of the transcendence of God with the Greek view of his immanence. If God is God, and man is man, and sin is sin, then the Deity must be infinitely greater and other than the creation. Such was God to Goethe. In 1813, after a conversation with Rochlitz, the latter said: “Let us not omit to give God the honor, and acknowledge his moral government in the world.” They had been walking up and down as they talked. At this Goethe suddenly stopped and said, solemnly: “Acknowledge it! who can help acknowledging it! But I, for my part, in silence.” “In silence? why in silence?” asks Rochlitz. Goethe replied: “Who can express it,

save for himself? For others, who? And when one knows that one cannot utter it, it is not permissible." "Who dares to express Him? and who to profess, 'I believe in Him'?" Who, feeling, dares to say, 'I believe Him not'?" There is in these words from the famous "creed" an echo of the old Hebrew prophets, and the old Hebrew reverence that forbade to name the name of Jehovah. For us, who in living and in teaching have the name of God so often on our lips, such utterances are not without their warning and their revelation. How perfectly Goethe conceived of the transcendence of Deity, with its accompanying truths of the divine and human personality and of human sinfulness, we have no space to inquire beyond what has already been said. That he conceived of it profoundly, the quotations given here, together with many other expressions, are a proof. At the same time, the chief strength and value of his thinking is not here. It is to be found rather in his conception of the indwelling God. Professor Allen, speaking of the recovery in the nineteenth century of the idea of the immanence of God, says: "It is no trifling or unimportant circumstance that the first, the clearest, the most emphatic expressions of this conception, occur not in theology but in literature.¹ And prominently, among others, he mentions Goethe. An indwelling Deity!—in this idea lay the serene calm and enlightenment that Spinoza had for Goethe.

How many of us have gone any farther than to think of the world as dependent on the sustaining will of God? How many of us feel that it is necessary to go any farther? Yet the question presses for an answer: In what sense is the world dependent on God? As the spirit to the body, so is God to the world! Thus said the Stoics. But what independent life has the body apart from the spirit? This is pantheism. It does not leave room for any personality beside the divine. Consistently or inconsistently, as it may be, Goethe held no such idea. He says distinctly to Eckermann that he believes in the existence of the individual.² This notion he carried out so far in his advocacy of self-development and self-culture that, in spite of the boundless disinterestedness which he claimed to be his highest desire, he has even been misunderstood as advocating a bald egotism. What, then, is Goethe's conception of indwelling Deity? When Eckermann wondered at the devotion of a hedge-sparrow to her captured

¹ "Theological Renaissance of the Nineteenth Century," *Princeton Review*, November, 1882, p. 279.

² *Gespräche mit Goethe*, ii. den 3, März, 1830.

young, braving danger and imprisonment in order to feed them, Goethe smiled and said: "If you believed in God you would not wonder. Did not God inspire the bird with this all-powerful love for its young, and did not similar impulses pervade all animate nature, the world could not continue in existence. But even so" (I repeat the quotation) "is the divine energy everywhere diffused, and the eternal love is everywhere active." God, from whom every motherhood on earth is named, — is the idea so startling that it cannot be accepted? Have we not hints of it in the old words, "In Him we live and move and have our being"? And, again, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not"? And yet again: "As one whom his mother comforteth, so will I comfort you"? In connection with the incident of the hedge-sparrow, Goethe quotes a passage from "Gott und Welt," thus giving an invaluable key to the interpretation of a poem which is regarded as showing his "speculative tendencies in a concentrated form." This is the passage: "It beseems Him to move the world from within, to cherish nature in himself, himself in nature, so that what lives and moves and is in Him may ever feel his spirit and his power." Eternal love, the sustenance of spirits (*der Geister Nahrung*), is celebrated in the second part of "Faust." But it is in the first part that the idea reaches its highest expression in a figure bold, strong, beautiful, the meaning of which dwindles and coarsens in translation. When Faust exclaims, "What a spectacle! but, alas, only a spectacle! how can I grasp thee, Nature illimitable?" he continues: —

"Euch, Brüste, wo? Ihr Quellen alles Lebens,
An denen Himmel und Erde hängt,
Dahin die welke Brust sich drängt —
Ihr quellt, ihr tränkt, und schmacht' ich so vergebens?"

(Ye breasts, where are ye? Ye fountain sources of all life, on which hang heaven and earth, to which the withered breast is pressed, ye flow, ye nourish, and do I thus yearn in vain?)

The motherhood of God! This is no pantheism. As the air to the lungs, as the mother's milk to the babe, so is the life of the Divine Spirit to the lives of our spirits. In point of theory, accurate; in its relation to life, broadening, deepening, illuminating, — such I find this conception. We have yet much to learn as to the "independent God-dependence" of Christianity. Again and again the veil of the temple must be rent in twain that we may

find ourselves permitted, with hesitating, reverent step, to enter the holy of holies.

“The All-enfolder, the All-upholder, holds and upholds He not thee, me, himself?”—how often in the study of Goethe have these words passed through my mind, freighted with an increasing wealth of meaning!

Not long ago I saw a curious and interesting sight. It was the stump of a great chestnut-tree which formerly stood in front of my home, the peculiarity of the stump being that a number of stones, some of them of considerable size, were embedded in it. Probably the starting, fibrous roots came in contact with the stones, and grew around them, in some cases so as almost to inclose them. In other cases, the roots, instead of hugging the stones, were led by the process of growth away from them, so that, when the stump was unearthed, the stones, though they were unearthed with it, were not a part of the tree, but fell away as soon as the earth was removed. As Goethe the immature changed to Goethe the completed man, the roots of his thinking spread, so that although, in the attempt to analyze his religious philosophy, many a stone may seem to have been unearthed, we may gladly acknowledge that the process of growth more than once prevented the flinty matter from becoming an integral part of the whole. Nevertheless, the most charitable interpretation cannot deny that, at the heart of his best and greatest thinking, are still embedded stones more than one. Of whom, indeed, cannot this be said? As I recall the chestnut-tree, lofty, blossom-crowned, reaching down white fingers through the fragrant moonlight, as though to impart its sky-gained treasures to less aspiring souls, I am still blessed with its abounding life and inspiration; and it is this, rather than the lifeless masses that the tree inclosed, which will always, in my mind, stand for the tree. So ends, as I read it, the lesson of Goethe's teaching.

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A NEGLECTED LIMITATION OF CRITICISM.

IN the concluding paragraph of his little book, "A Layman's Study of the English Bible," Professor Bowen makes this suggestive comment on certain prevalent tendencies of thought: "I know it is said by those who deprecate any such regard for the consequences of our opinions, that we have only to follow out loyally our own doubts or convictions, be they what they may, since the interests of truth are paramount. But they misconstrue their own adage. We hold as firmly as they do that the truth can do no harm; and it is just because the acceptance of their doctrine does and will do immeasurable harm . . . that we are firmly convinced their doctrine is not the truth." Involved in the comment is a principle which is general in its application. It is often assumed that, in the search for truth, investigation moves forward from starting-points clearly established, along lines so plainly marked that the certainty of results reached is assured beyond question by the course followed. It is well to be reminded that the order is not always so exact, and the point reached cannot, on this ground, be so confidently asserted. The navigator cannot always determine his position, even approximately, by chart and compass and chronometer and log, however perfect his instruments, or however careful his use of them. Sailing through still water, their guidance may be nearly accurate; but under changed conditions, where the water itself is in motion, they are less reliable. Their testimony must be supplemented and corrected by other observations. So, in the quest of new truth, changed conditions affect the methods employed and the degree of accuracy reached.

There is, at least, reason for questioning whether Biblical criticism does not too often neglect the presence of conditions in its work which open the way to errors, in even its precise and methodical examinations. There is reason for believing that methods which would lead to perfectly reliable results under certain conditions are sometimes treated as though they were equally infallible when the conditions are materially different. Those who have given themselves to critical study are apt to treat with considerable impatience any reluctance to accept their conclusions which does not justify itself through the use of their methods. To question those conclusions because of consequences they are supposed to involve is regarded as a mark of narrowness and prejudice. Many critics, even in sympathy with the evangelical faith,

complain, in a tone approaching bitterness, at the protests raised against some of their conclusions. Such protests, they say, are a hamper upon free investigation. The Bible must not be treated as a privileged book. If it be true, it has nothing to fear from the most searching investigation. If errors are mingled with the truth, they should be exposed. No one who loves truth should object to tests applied for such a purpose.

Claims like these fail to take due account of the varying conditions in which the work is to be done. Methods are modified, and must be modified, by the material given them to work upon. The perfect working of exact methods implies and requires full data. The analysis of the chemist cannot detect the presence of certain poisons in the stomach, after decomposition has set in; nor can the expert in the use of the microscope distinguish human blood corpuscles from those of animals, in bloodstains long exposed to the air. Tests which would be decisive where full material is furnished lose their decisiveness where only partial data are offered. Processes of investigation which within certain limits conduct to certainty, beyond those limits, though still valuable, fail of certainty.

This limitation is not wholly ignored by those who aggressively champion critical methods, but it is often neglected. Critical questions are discussed with no suggestion of modifications which this condition requires. It comes as an inference from this assumption of certainty that we are told to judge the difficulties in the Bible just as we judge those in any other book. But what invariable procedure is adopted with other books? An error in the writings of one author is interpreted as an error of ignorance; in another it is explained as an oversight. A misstatement in one is attributed to faulty sources of information, which in another is set down as willful misrepresentation. Men's writings are judged in the same way as their words and acts. An injury received is deemed unintentional or deliberate, not from anything in the act itself, but because of the person who did it. Such inferences seem to be made by reasoning in a circle. The error, on the face of it, betokens ignorance; but a belief in the very knowledge which seems to be wanting is used to interpret the statement itself. The injury naturally implies a malicious purpose; but a belief in the friendliness which seems disproved by the act is used to interpret the act, and to show it was not what it seemed to be. Such judgments are well-founded, though they seem to fly in the face of the facts. They are based on presumptive evidence:

they determine the true character of the act itself by considering what the author was likely to do.

Now, in the field covered by criticism, the major part of its vexed questions, and all of the most important, are of this sort. Their immediate concern is with the conduct and the testimony of the characters who figure on the pages of Scripture. In the very nature of the case, the conduct is only partially represented, and the testimony is fragmentary. The facts to which we are so persistently pointed are, in any view of the case, only a part of the facts, and that part is not an epitome of the whole, it is a fragment. In dealing with the questions which such a record calls up, rules of examination must be used indeed, but those rules are the laws of evidence. They differ in important respects from the rules of strictly scientific investigation, where all the facts, or all the essential facts, are accessible. Presumptions have no place in establishing scientific certainty; but where only probability or moral certainty is possible, they are a part, and may be the most important part, of the proof.

It will be helpful to notice certain well-known rules of legal procedure, for which the laws of evidence have been most fully developed.

It is to be noted that these rules recognize the impossibility, in certain cases, of reaching a judicial decision upon the conduct in question. Legal verdicts, in one class of cases, are avowedly confessions of ignorance. Doubt, instead of knowledge, determines them, and the laws of evidence decide where the benefit of the doubt shall be bestowed. The verdict, not guilty, means only, not proven guilty, in a multitude of cases. It does not mean that the accused is innocent, or even probably innocent; it means only that the evidence is deficient. The limit, however, beyond which this critical examination dares not decide upon conduct, is by no means the limit where individual judgment must be suspended. Considerations too subtle to be classified, and requiring qualities for their apprehension not possessed by all men alike, furnish the grounds upon which private judgments must be formed, and conduct toward the accused regulated.

Again, these laws of evidence do not require the same degree of certainty for different kinds of cases. A difference in this respect is explicitly recognized by legal authorities between civil and criminal cases. Considerations of expediency affect the decisions. It would work intolerable confusion to suspend judgment in every case where moral certainty is unattainable. Society

could not afford it. The litigants themselves could not afford it. The distinction explicitly recognized by authorities between civil and criminal cases is carried still further in practice. It is easier to convict of theft than of manslaughter and murder. The consequences of the decision affect indirectly the decision itself; they determine the extent of the investigation, and the degree of certainty demanded.

The character, also, of the parties involved is taken into consideration in determining a case. In the absence of indisputable proof of what the accused did, evidence is admitted which shows only what he was likely to do. In the impossibility of knowing whether the witnesses have spoken the exact truth about the facts in question, considerations showing whether they were likely to tell the truth have weight. This presumptive evidence has very great influence before a court and under legal rules. But rules, at best, only partially embody the principles on which they rest. In the usage of intelligent, upright individuals, the principle has fuller expression. When a grave charge of guilt is preferred against one whose life has been above reproach, those who have known him intimately resist the charge, unless proof is absolutely conclusive. Though they know nothing whatever about the alleged act, except what is contained in evidence supporting the charge, they strenuously assert their friend's innocence. Such an attitude is not necessarily a mark of partiality. It means, or may mean, that the presumption from the character of the accused is evidence against the accusation stronger than the positive evidence urged in support of it. That is the ground on which the friend opposes the detective: he has evidence, valid evidence, which the detective has not. The proof is partial on both sides; either may be mistaken; the danger is perhaps greater in the use of the presumption; but the use of it is not only permitted, — it is demanded. All that is best in the mutual confidence existing in society depends upon its use, and those who are loudest in declaring that they judge fellow-men as they see them, are those who are justifying their own cynical judgments by that boast.

These laws of evidence and rules of procedure apply to criticism as well. Biblical criticism, we are reminded, is a branch of historical criticism. Its methods have been used, and results universally accepted have been gained, in other fields of ancient history; now they must be applied to the Bible. Scripture must be tested precisely as other ancient records are tested, and when the same tests have been employed on the one as on the other, the

results must be loyally accepted. To withhold assent is disloyalty to the truth.

The claim is plausible, but it ignores a consideration which has a rightful place in every examination of this sort. Where absolute certainty is not reached, the approximation to it, accepted as satisfactory in one case, is not so accepted where graver issues are at stake. In the practical application of the most exact of the sciences even, such distinctions obtain. In computations where only integral numbers are involved, and results absolutely correct are possible, the procedure is the same for all cases. But this is wholly changed when values cannot be exactly expressed. When circulating decimals are involved, the number of places to which the decimal is carried varies with the importance of the results depending on the calculation. The process is affected by the consequences involved. So it is in historical criticism. The general acquiescence in the critics' verdict upon Grecian or Roman history does not necessarily signify a belief that the exact facts have been ascertained on all the points examined. It may mean only that the approximation is near enough to satisfy the interests involved. Those interests are relatively unimportant. But for the same reason that a degree of certainty accepted as sufficient in a civil case is not deemed sufficient in a capital offense, the results reached by tests which have been accepted in ancient secular history do not compel assent in the Bible. A more searching and more protracted examination may be demanded, and, upon some of the questions involved, not prejudice, but reason, may decide that the evidence already offered is not sufficient to warrant a critical verdict, and may hold the case open until further evidence is produced.

A more important element in the critical examination of Scripture is the presumption in favor of its truthfulness. The character of the writings and of the writers, as it is indicated through their work; the effects produced by those writings; and the confirmation of portions of their contents in the present experience of a multitude of witnesses to their value, — afford a presumption of truthfulness. That presumption must be taken as an element of the evidence determining the decision. It is admitted that evidence of this sort is often found to be misleading. It rests back frequently on grounds which are themselves only probabilities, and which, strongly probable as they seem when knowledge is partial, are found to be false when full knowledge is gained. For that reason, an aversion to this use of presumption is produced.

"Give us facts," men say, "and we will judge by them." But under this demand lies a confusion of cases which are different. The facts which might conduct to certainty are wanting, and can by no possibility be all recovered. The certainty which excludes all question would be very desirable if it could be gained, but it cannot. Presumptions must be used, and are used by every one who forms any conclusion whatever upon the questions involved. The alternative is simply between recognizing and ignoring them. In the one case, they may be made measurably just; in the other, they are well-nigh certain to be unreasonable.

The avowed use of such presumption in favor of the truthfulness of Scripture writers is not a decision in advance upon the question at issue. Often it is so represented. It is characterized as an assumption or a presupposition, and the attitude toward inquiry which it necessitates is branded as dogmatic or philosophical prepossession. Those who hold it are exhorted to lay aside their prejudice and consider simply the facts. The charge has probably a measure of justice. Prejudice undoubtedly exists, though no party has a monopoly of it. To those who recognize the necessity of presumptive evidence and insist upon its use, a convenient place is afforded for smuggling in their prejudices along with it; but the presumption itself is not prejudice. It is not a decision, but only a part of the evidence. To give it place is to introduce a new witness; it does not pack the jury.

Not a few, who see and own the necessity of using the character of the writings in determining the critical questions which arise, bring it to bear upon them at the wrong point. Thus one able critic says of the examination of the history of Israel: "At the end, the crucial test of all critical processes is that they allow us to do justice to all there is in the religion of Israel." But the content of Israel's religion is one of the matters in question in any critical examination of the history. An inference from Israel's religion to some point of Israel's history is legitimate during the examination, but it cannot be used as a test after the examination is concluded. To assume such a relation would be like withholding an important witness during a trial at court and testing the decision by his testimony given afterward. Others use the same considerations to shape postulates from which the inquiry is to start. But the necessity for such postulates disappears if the presumption is given the place which rightfully belongs to it. That is neither at the beginning nor at the end of the examination. It is an element to be used in the examination itself.

The objection will be suggested that such a comparison between the method of examining historical narratives and that used in judging current events is misleading. Time is a grand revealer. Truth which is obscured by passion and prejudice in current affairs reveals at least its outlines with certainty as events recede into the past. But the claim cannot be maintained. The same difficulties from partial knowledge are encountered in history as in every-day experience. In a review of Beyschlag's "Life of Christ," Professor Weiss says: "We must take care, it should be said at the outset, not to overestimate the value of this [scientific] work. One disposed to make his trust in Jesus, as the eternal Son of God and the world's Redeemer, dependent on the solution of a scientific problem, and so to base his faith on scientific conclusions, will soon find that he is leaning on a broken reed. For our knowledge is fragmentary, and must ever remain so." It is high critical authority which utters this warning. The only possible way in which criticism of the Gospels could become a ground for Christian trust to rest upon would be by furnishing proof of the truth of the record, at least in its essential parts. But this, we are told, it cannot do because that record is fragmentary. Fragmentary records may be either true or false. Not because of their character, but because they are fragmentary, criticism cannot decide with certainty upon them. The service which criticism has to render to faith is not by any means to prove the truth of Scripture; it has only the humbler task to show that the objections urged do not disprove it.

Among those who insist most unconditionally upon the absolute authority of scientific criticism in judging Scripture, a considerable number relieve their conclusions of any possibly serious consequences, in asserting that faith rests on a different ground. Faith is founded on experience, it is claimed. Thus Professor Weiss, in the article above referred to, says: "Our faith rests upon the apostolic preaching, and upon our personal experience of the redeeming, sanctifying, and joy-giving power of this message of salvation." In his "Life of Christ," he says of the claim of the apostolic preaching to bring a message from God: "In the last analysis, however, there is no proof forthcoming for the justification of this claim other than their special experience of the truth of their proclamation, the renewal and strengthening of the religio-ethical life gained on the ground of that, along with peace of soul, and assurance of future blessedness." Others assert, still more explicitly, that faith rests upon experience, and

cannot be touched by historical criticism. Such claims seem to relieve portions of Scripture from a responsibility which has been widely believed to rest upon them. These claims, whether well founded or not, are simple and consistent so long as they are content with their independent basis. But the attempt is made to use the faith, thus established, to vouch for the historic revelation in its essential truth. Thus, in another place, Professor Weiss says: "Every essentially erroneous view of the earthly life of Jesus would be incompatible with a true knowledge of the salvation which is in Christ; and in this sense the inspiration of the writers of the Gospels gives security for the real trustworthiness of their delineation of the life of Jesus." But, it may be asked, what facts of the record are certified by this knowledge of salvation? Is it claimed that the account of the resurrection, at least in its main features, is thereby substantiated? That fact is deemed essential to the maintenance of the Christian claim by many. Among that number, apparently, is the Apostle Paul, who declares: "If Christ hath not been raised, then is our preaching vain, . . . yea, and we are found false witnesses of God." But the only contribution which Christian experience can offer to the truth of that account is to furnish a presumption in its favor. To say, as some seem ready to say, "We know that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, because we have felt in our hearts the presence and working of the living Christ," is to use an argument with a missing link. In kind, it is like that which, in some localities, confirms the tradition of finding the true cross by showing a piece of its wood. The fact and the conclusion fail to connect. This account of the resurrection stands, if it stands at all, upon the testimony of the witnesses. Before that testimony can be accepted to vouch for this particular fact, its general trustworthiness must be established. Unless the *integrity* of the witnesses remains unimpaired by criticism, and it is possible to show that the admitted defects in their testimony are not such as to compromise their character for truthfulness; unless, too, their *ability* as witnesses, in certain distinguishable portions of their testimony, stands unshaken by conceded mistakes in other portions, it is idle to speak of them as trustworthy. Their trustworthiness may, indeed, fail to establish all of the incidents which they relate; it may not guarantee minute accuracy in all the details of statements which are reliable: but unless, out of the account, it is possible to show that certain particulars are not vitiated by imperfections affecting other parts, and unless it is possible to state

approximately certain limits within which confidence may be placed, it is a waste of words to speak of the trustworthiness of the narrative. The theologian may conceivably be essentially right in his conclusion, while none of the steps by which he seemed to reach that conclusion will bear examination; but the witness has no such freedom of movement. If he gives a true impression, he must be reliable in certain ascertainable particulars. If the picture presented through his statement is in any true sense a likeness, while some features are confessedly distorted, other features, and those prominent ones, must be faithfully represented. Furthermore, the trustworthiness of a witness is not established by independent proof of the truth of many things which he declares. The witness whom we believe as far as another and a reliable witness has given the same testimony, we do not believe at all. Until confidence in the statements has led up to confidence in the witness, and we believe his testimony because he himself vouches for it, he is not accepted as trustworthy. Until integrity and ability both are established, — the purpose to tell the truth, and the means of knowing what the truth is, — authority is wanting.

When, then, it is attempted to establish the trustworthiness of the Scriptures independently through the witness of the Spirit, either in the individual or the church, the attempt must fail. Such witness yields only a presumption of trustworthiness. It is impossible to reach a decision by considering simply the evidence, or a part of the evidence, on one side. The counter-evidence must be considered and met. Inspiration, in the sense of the term accepted by criticism, can at most vouch only for the integrity of the writers. The whole question is still open until the other qualification of trustworthy testimony can be vindicated. That can be done only as the difficulties which critical inquiry has found are met and overcome.

The claim that faith rests upon experience, and is independent of the results of Biblical criticism, inevitably affects those results. This it does in part by its tendency to cut short the examination of vexed questions. The degree of certainty which men are satisfied with, and the pains they are ready to take to reach it, depends in large part on the consequences involved. As these diminish in importance, effort grows less.

But a more important effect is in the change thus introduced into the evidence itself. If faith rests upon experience, and is independent of testimony, then the presumption in favor of that

testimony is lessened. If the Evangelists felt that they were writing down merely interesting memoirs of their Lord, instead of words and deeds on which their faith rested, the presumption of accuracy is diminished. If these records were received as such memoirs in the early church, the presumption of their thorough testing by means of information then accessible, but no longer possessed, is lessened. So, too, under this claim, the presumption of truth in the main features of the record of the life of Jesus, through the results which have followed where the Bible has gone, is considerably diminished. These considerations do not bear upon the truth of the claim itself; they are to be noted because they show why the claim and the arguments used in support of it have been so strenuously opposed.

To call attention to these conditions in the problems of criticism, which are believed to deserve a degree of consideration not now given, is not to charge a fatal weakness upon critical conclusions. Criticism's appeal to facts and its patient, exhaustive study of them have taught belief lessons which are wholesome, though often painful. If it has itself too largely lost sight of the rights of presumptive evidence, it has pointed out the danger and the evils of letting the presumption become mere assumption. It has won valuable and enduring results. None can doubt that a large work still lies before it. That work, however, it will wisely do only as the limits of its province are kept clearly in view.

Arthur Smith.

SOUTH FREEPORT, ME.

SLAVERY AS IT APPEARED TO A NORTHERN MAN IN 1844.

ON the 1st of May, 1844, I landed at Savannah, having sailed thither from Boston in a first-class freighting ship, the ownership of which was divided equally between a friend and parishioner of mine in Portsmouth, N. H., and Mr. C. of Savannah. Mr. C. took me at once to his house, where I saw for several days the sunny side of slavery, and basked in its sunshine, served more sedulously than I could have imagined prior to experience, having my shutters closed for me after I went to bed, and opening my eyes in the morning on a stalwart negro awaiting my orders. Mr. C. was a bachelor, a rich merchant, president of the Georgia

State Bank, and elder of a Presbyterian church. His house, in one aspect, was the centre of the kind of hospitality which we republicans, in our ignorance, call princely, but which has a freedom, breadth, and generosity very much more than princely; and in another aspect it was a magnificent negro boarding-house. The census of his black family I did not take; but they looked a host as I caught sight of them in passing the basement windows. Their number, and that of the friends whom they fed, might be estimated from one fact. A large ham of the richest quality and flavor appeared, with soup, fish, roast, and game, on the dinner-table every day; a few slices from it, perhaps, at the other meals. Mr. C. told me that three hundred and sixty-five such hams were boiled in his kitchen every year, and of course, when he had no guests, the negroes must have had almost the whole of the daily ham at their own disposal, and ham is to the negro what ambrosia was at the table of the gods. Mr. C.'s table was served with the utmost elegance, and with a profusion of good things. He gave, on my account, a dinner party, — as handsome an entertainment of the kind as I ever saw. He told me that he knew no more than I did what was to be on the table. He owned a steward and majordomo, who must have been of kindred genius with Smith, whom many of my readers knew and some of them must have employed, who on one occasion offered to furnish a Harvard Commencement dinner gratuitously if the college would give him the degree, which would not have been unmerited or unearned, of Master of Arts. Mr. C. told me that he never gave specific directions for his table, and that, when he was to have company at dinner, he simply told Scipio how many guests he was going to have, and whom, and Scipio adapted the dinner to the number and quality of the guests. Mr. C. prized this man so highly that he once sent him to Saratoga for his health. But, in eulogizing him, he added a trait which we at the North should hardly regard as characteristic of a faithful servant. Said he: "I give Scipio every month a certain sum for my table, and if, before the month is out, he tells me that he has spent it all, I give him more. I have no doubt that he keeps for himself a part of what I give him; for I have found that he has property of his own for which I can account in no other way."

Now this trait was, as I ascertained, recognized generally by slaveholders. The slaves, however faithful in other respects, would steal when they could; and, in looking into the records of slavery and oppression from the earliest ages till now, I have

learned that, in all time, stealing has been and is the uniform habit of enslaved and oppressed races. Those who know that they are deprived of what is rightfully theirs feel authorized to assess damages by some arithmetic of their own, and to levy them whenever and wherever they can.

Here was slavery at its very best, and there were probably hundreds of families where it existed in like fashion; and if the negroes were to be regarded as working cattle, they could not have been better off. They were well lodged and fed, and could have been worked no harder than was necessary for exercise and digestion.

But there had taken place at Savannah, several years before my visit, a transaction which showed, in its worst aspects, the proslavery infatuation of the people. A man whom I will not name, from one of our good New England towns which I will not name, was an auctioneer, and held a slave auction every Saturday. He had belonged at the North to a Unitarian society, and essayed to establish one in Savannah. He was, I will not say respectable, but respected, and was in perfectly good standing. I was told that, had he been professionally a slave-trader, he would not have been respectable; but as slave-selling was a mere incident in his profession, and was not on his own account, but on that of his clients, his standing was not injuriously affected. For this society of his, it was deemed expedient in Boston to send a minister who would be acceptable at the South. The choice fell on Rev. Mr. Motte, afterward of the South Congregational Church in this city, a native of South Carolina, a man of elegant culture, with the manners of a Southern gentleman, — a type now extinct as the dodo, really very charming, such a blending of dignity and grace as can hardly be formed except where one is conscious of an absolutely superior position as regards a permanently lower order of beings, and bears that consciousness meekly. He was not an abolitionist, and had then no alliance or sympathy with the anti-slavery party at the North. But having inherited a family of slaves, he had emancipated them, because he was unwilling to burden his conscience with so fearful a responsibility as the ownership of fellow-men. He was sent to the Savannah society as a man specially fitted for its service. But his act of emancipation was there regarded as an unpardonable sin. He was repudiated indignantly by the members of the society, and was treated with so much insolence, not without peril of personal violence, that he was compelled to retreat in hot haste.

From Savannah I went to Macon, where I spent a Sunday and attended a Presbyterian church. There were many negroes in the gallery, the women arrayed in the gayest colors and a profusion of cheap finery. There were black communicants, who were, of course, served at separate tables. The minister prayed very fervently that the servants, as he called them, not having access at first hand to the Bible, might diligently inquire of their masters as to its contents, and govern themselves accordingly. The terms of the prayer were evidently chosen for the receptivity of the human audience rather than for the ear of Heaven, and led me to suppose that the minister was more solicitous to define his own position than to implore a benediction on his colored brethren. I at once suspected that he was a Northern man. I found on inquiry that he had recently come from western Massachusetts.

I spent a fortnight at New Orleans. There I visited a large slave-market, where I could obtain a comprehensive view of some of the worst, the most hideous and soul-sickening, aspects of slavery. A large proportion of those on sale were manifestly intensely anxious as to their fate. Supposing that my friends and I were there on business, several of them asked us to purchase them, probably thinking that we did not look as if we would be hard masters. I confess that I never in my life felt so flattered as to my personal appearance as I was by the earnestness with which, on the score of my good looks, two or three of those poor creatures begged that they might become my property. There were in the market all shades of color, — some who had less of black blood than would have made them octoroons, — several young women who would have passed for white, and who were held at a very high price.

Rev. Mr. Clapp, for many years the only Protestant clergyman who dared to stay in the city during the yellow-fever seasons, owned his sexton, though with that exception he had never owned any human being. He told me that he saw this poor, broken-down old man in the market, in great distress for fear of being sold where he would be overworked and maltreated, and so strong an appeal was made to his compassion that he paid the paltry price, and utilized the man for the light work about his church.

I was in New Orleans while Dr. Palfrey was looking after his human property, and no one who was not on the spot can estimate the energy and perseverance with which he prosecuted his claim. He was a man who would have defied all the powers of earth and hell in pursuit of what he deemed right, and who never failed to

have Heaven on his side. A man less strenuous in his purpose would have succumbed. He, as one of three brothers, inherited his share of a family of slaves. His brothers proposed to let him have his entire heritage in money, and to keep the slaves. When he declined this, the attempt was made to interpose legal obstacles in the way of emancipation, and the case was even brought before the legislature; but he fought his ground inch by inch, and he told me that he had resolved not to leave the spot alive till he could bring his quota of black property with him to the North. He prevailed. He was suffered to choose his share of the property, and he chose those whom he supposed to have the lowest market value, and to be therefore most likely to suffer wrong as slaves; so that he had more than a third part, more than forty in number, all of whom he brought to the North, and cared for till they were in positions in which they could earn their own living. To all his friends it seemed a nobly philanthropic transaction; he regarded it simply as a painful duty laid upon him by the Divine Providence, and inevitably incumbent on him.

During this tour I saw nothing of plantation slavery. In hotels and good families, there could have been very little of overwork; for it took twice as many blacks as it would white people for every kind of work or service. I had opportunities of making inquiries in every direction, from persons who knew whereof they affirmed, and whose testimony I had ample reason to believe. The conclusion which I reached was, that on principle, in habit, and even on grounds of self-interest, the greater part of the slave-owners were humane in the treatment of their slaves, — kind, indulgent, not over-exacting, and sincerely interested in the physical well-being of their dependents. But I had ample and reiterated testimony of the existence of three classes of slaves, together making a large aggregate, who were liable, without protection, to undue exaction, hardship, and cruelty. There were, first, the slaves under the sole management of hired overseers, who everywhere had a bad name; secondly, the slaves of immigrants from the North, who were often of the sort of men that might leave their country for their country's good, who, when not otherwise bad, were greedy of gain, and who, even with kind intentions, almost always required of their slaves more and harder work than the negroes, really less strong than white men, were able to do; and, thirdly, the slaves of poor owners who had but one or two negroes, that were almost always overworked, underfed, and badly

treated. These were cases which, as to anything short of atrocious crime, neither law, nor public opinion, nor influence from without, could reach. With these exceptions, which, however, included a pretty large percentage of the black population, I believe that, so far as physical comfort was concerned, the slaves were better off and less the objects of compassion than the poor of our Northern States; and I think it by no means improbable that there is at this moment a larger amount of want, wrong-suffering, and misery among the colored population of the Southern States than existed among them fifty years ago. But I believe in a better future, and an ultimate condition of equal opportunity and privilege with the whites, for the colored race in the absence of slavery, while under the ban of slavery the race had no future brighter or better than its present.

But I brought away from the South the strong impression that the white population had the worst of slavery, and that emancipation was much more desirable for them than for the negroes. Let me, then, give a sketch of what I saw of the effect of slavery upon the white people.

One of the most striking features of the slave population was the very large proportion of it that indicated a mixture of races. This fact, which it is enough to name, tells its own sad story of depravity.

To a Northern man nothing was more fully manifest than the shiftlessness of the Southerners. The slave States, both Eastern and Western, had been settled, on an average, about as early as the Eastern and Western free States, respectively; but there seemed a century's difference between the condition of the North and that of the South, as to all that constitutes advanced civilization. Savannah was dependent on the North for all kinds of fine mechanical work, whether of manufacture or repair. I at that time wore a diamond ring, in which the stone fell from its setting. The resetting was an affair of few minutes and small cost, as I found at Cincinnati; but I carried the ring to every jeweler in Savannah, and they all offered to send it to New York. It was finer work than they knew how to do. I learned, too, that even nice furniture was sent to New York when it needed repairs. In point of fact, the classes of men which at the North furnished skillful artisans deemed handiwork beneath them.

The case was the same as to the kinds of men that ought to have been leaders in public improvements, in the establishment of lines of communication, and in the development of the resources

of the country, other than simply agricultural, which, in many quarters where they were the richest, remained unexplored and unimagined. Such men regarded it as beneath their dignity to be anything but planters and politicians. The consequence was that, of such improvements as had in the lapse of time been made in the free States, there was in the slave States an absolute dearth, or, at best, beginnings so awkward and ill-contrived as to seem a burlesque of what they were meant to be. On the Atlantic seaboard and far into the interior there were then at the North well-constructed and well-equipped lines of railroad, and the Alleghanies were already crossed by rail on a series of inclined planes, which took not only passengers, but loaded canal-boats without breaking bulk, over the steepest heights that steam-power anywhere in the world had begun to climb. The contrast in this respect between the two sections of the country may, on the Southern side, be illustrated from the notes of my journey from Savannah to New Orleans.

The railroad from Savannah to Macon, two hundred miles in length, was traversed in twelve hours. On the way there was not a single village, and there were but few houses in sight. There was not a single station-house or railroad building of any kind. About once in ten miles the train stopped for wood and water, the pumping apparatus being of the rudest description. By the pump was a little pile of pine wood, the sticks charred at each end, showing that fire had been employed to facilitate or supersede the labor of chopping. At these stopping-places there was generally a small drinking-shop, at which the mails were opened and changed, and in which passengers probably sheltered themselves in bad weather when waiting for a train. At one of these places was a shanty in which we breakfasted. We dined under a new house that stood on piles. The earth was our dining-room floor. The dinner would have been decent but for the sand that was sifted through the cracks in the floor above, with every footfall.

From Macon to Griffin, sixty miles, I went by rail in six hours. The rail was a series of flat strips of iron fastened by spikes to a wooden rail, and, of course, liable to spring into what were called snakes' heads. The myth was (and, had there been enterprise enough to import Japanese runners, it need not have been a myth), that a man ran in advance of the train to nail down the snakes' heads. The tank that fed the boiler leaked so badly that we had to take in water every five miles. This defect had the compensating advantage of so thoroughly watering the track as to pre-

vent any annoyance from dust. The passenger cars could have been derived from no anterior type, but must have been evolved from the brain of some native architect. When I entered the car I found myself in a long, rudely built, unglazed wagon, with a huge spittoon in the centre, with ample standing-room, and, as I at first supposed, with no seats. But I at length ascertained that there ran round the entire periphery of the car a shelf, little more than a hand's breadth in width, covered with blue baize, and that my fellow-passengers were making believe that it was a seat. I followed their example; but standing would have been much more comfortable.

Griffin was a city of twenty or thirty houses and shops. I stopped an hour or two at a very primitive tavern called the "City Hall." In Griffin I examined for the first time a church of a style of which I afterward saw many in Georgia and Alabama, indeed, everywhere except in the large towns. It looked like a barn *minus* the hayloft. It had no glazed windows. The apertures for air and light were commanded by wooden shutters that opened from the inside.

From Griffin to Chehaw, Alabama, I had a stage-coach journey of one hundred and fifteen miles, accomplished in twenty hours, through a sparsely settled country, passing a house, generally a log house, perhaps every half mile. These houses, oftener than not, were destitute of glazed windows, with wooden shutters to exclude the rain, which, when closed, must have excluded light also, unless there were straggling day-beams that found their way through the unplastered chinks between the logs. These houses made my night journey very picturesque. Candles were little used; oil still less; but pine knots were burned freely, and a house illuminated by them, as they shone with intense brilliancy through doors and windows, and numberless apertures in the rough log walls, with similar lights in surrounding negro cabins, had the effect of magnificent fireworks got up for show. But how the United States mail lived through such a fiery dispensation was to me incomprehensible. The mailbag was opened every four or five miles, in front of the door of one of these houses, the postmaster examining it with a blazing torch in one hand, a torch, too, that scattered sparks that might easily have turned the entire correspondence into ashes.

At Chehaw we took rail for Montgomery, a distance of forty miles, accomplished in four hours and a half. Here I encountered what I found to be a characteristic of Southern travel. Two

o'clock was the nominal hour for starting, and the passengers were all on hand then, ready for starting, but the engineer had overslept himself in an after-dinner nap, so that we did not start till three. I subsequently had ample experience of the ignoring of the time element, especially by steamboats. It was not even expected that they would start at the advertised time. Thus for my voyage up the Mississippi, I went on board my steamer in the evening, thirty-six hours after the time advertised for starting, and slept that night on board, alongside of the pier.

From Montgomery, after waiting two days for a boat reported as due on my arrival, I took passage on the Alabama River to Mobile, the passage occupying three entire days, the boat being tied up for the two intervening nights to a tree, on account of sandbanks, through which there had not been enterprise enough even to procure an appropriation from Congress — never difficult in behalf of a Southern river — to cut a safe channel.

From Mobile I went by steamer to the eastern shore of Lake Pontchartrain, thence by a railroad of five miles to New Orleans, the road having been built through a noisome and loathsome swamp, laden with miasmatic capacity sufficient to poison the air for miles around, which only a slave-ridden community could have left uncleared, uncleansed, and undrained at the very back door of a rich and great commercial city.

In New Orleans, which was then at the height of its prosperity, it was perfectly evident that the large business interests were principally in the hands of Northern men. They had also taken into their hands the cause of popular education. An excellent public school system had been established. A Massachusetts man was the superintendent of schools, and the school board consisted almost wholly of Northern men, one of my college classmates having borne a specially active part in the service. At a later time I found that St. Louis had been indebted to immigrants from New England for the organization, management, and endowment of educational institutions of every grade.

The portions of New Orleans occupied by the remaining Spanish and French population, which was confined chiefly to one section of the city, showed tokens only of thriftlessness and decay, — of poverty staved off and impending rather than already felt in its keenness. They retained the habits of indolence engendered by hereditary slaveholding, without partaking in the renovating influences of Northern immigration and enterprise. I suppose that it was in accordance with a Spanish predilection rather than

as the direct result of slavery, yet still in harmony with the non-progressive character of a slaveholding population, that on a Sunday morning, on a church door, there appeared a huge placard, advertising for the afternoon a bullfight at Algiers, on the opposite side of the river.

In my voyage up the Ohio on that same journey I had an object-lesson forced upon my sight which would have furnished the best possible text for an antislavery lecture. On the Kentucky side of the river the clearings were rare, straggling, and ill-looking, with mere shanties for dwellings, and the villages small, mean, and poor. On the Ohio side we were constantly passing neat, well-fenced, well-cultivated farms, with comfortable dwelling-houses, and the villages had a prosperous air; while Cincinnati, in her fiftieth year, was already a great city, and as not then defaced by coal-smoke, more beautiful than it is now; and Covington, opposite to it on the Kentucky side, though about its coeval, seemed a century behind it.

The mention of Kentucky reminds me of another object-lesson that came to me several years later, on a journey to the Mammoth Cave, a large part of the way by stage-coach. I saw numerous droves of swine on their way from remote birthplaces to Louisville for a market. It was the custom to start them lean from their native homes and to fatten them on the way. There were, all along the road, fields of Indian corn and of other grain, which were destined to be harvested by traveling pigs. A drove was turned into a field, stayed there till it had consumed the grain, stalks and all, and was then driven a few miles farther to another field secured in advance for its special service. This relieved the farmer of the trouble of reaping; but it indicated for the proprietors of the swine a lazy, dawdling way of life, such as could by no possibility have become prevalent or seemed tolerable in a working white population. Probably the establishment of railroad lines has made this method obsolete; but at any rate emancipation would have put an end to it.

On my way home from the South and West in 1844, I made my first visit to Washington, now second in beauty to no city in the world. It was then a mere quagmire, with public buildings, respectable houses, and shanties, dotted down, as it seemed, promiscuously, though really on broad streets, now magnificently broad, that had been surveyed and laid out, but were for the most part without sidewalk or pavement, and with no token of enterprise or of prospective improvement. It had then been the seat

of government for forty-four years. Had a like district for the national government been ceded by Pennsylvania, New York, or any other non-slaveholding State, in less than a quarter of a century there would have sprung up a city of which the nation might have been proud; and it is certain that since the abolition of slavery Washington has made in every five years a greater advancement in everything that indicates good taste, prosperity, and enterprise than in any twenty years of its previous existence.

John Tyler was then President. I called on him, and I cannot forget that in my brief half-hour I heard from him what I am sure that I should not have heard from a Northern gentleman of his standing. His manners were both courteous and kind, and he did not swear to me or at me; but there was present a flippant young man, the editor of an ephemeral Boston newspaper, whom he must have instinctively perceived to be of a profane turn of mind, and in talking with him he transcended the outside limits of reverent speech. The President is expected, indeed, socially, to become all things to all men; but the line should be drawn somewhere, and we might not unreasonably demand that it should be so drawn as to exclude oath and imprecation. I think that a Northern President, if not of blameless life, would have known enough to keep his lips clean in his own reception-room in mixed society; but swearing at slaves, I suppose, seemed natural, and this miserable habit would have been of spontaneous growth in the relation between owner and bondman.

I have told my story of slavery. Give me leave to tell in a very few words what I saw of its close; for I was in at the death. In January and February of 1864, immediately after the emancipation of the slaves, I spent six weeks at St. Louis, and saw abundant tokens, not only of joy, but of good promise, among the colored people. A great number of negroes all over the city were learning to read. At a barber's shop which I frequented, the journeymen and apprentices, in their intervals of leisure, were some of them teachers, some of them learners, and primers and spelling-books were lying about. I heard accounts of similar doings all over the city; for there the colored people, I think, had not by law, certainly they had not in fact, been forbidden to read, so that teachers of their own race were not wanting. As I was officiating at a church which had morning and evening services, on Sunday afternoons I went the round of the colored churches and Sunday-schools, and in every one of them the hymn, —

“My country, 'tis of thee,
Sweet land of liberty,”

was sung with the most fervent glow of fresh emotion, so that good Dr. Smith, had he listened, would have felt more glorified than at any moment when, in going round the world, he heard his hymn sung in every climate and land. In all these services there was mention made in sermon, address, and prayer of the new gift of freedom, with overflowing gratitude, and with a profound sense of obligation no less than of privilege. There seemed, also, to pervade the community a friendly feeling toward the emancipated blacks, — a feeling which, I cannot but believe, would have been universal, growing, and predominant, had it not been for the lamentable error of giving the negroes the right of suffrage, and thus endowing them with a power, in several of the States a controlling power, which it was impossible that the then existing generation could use intelligently, and which really made them the passive tools of unprincipled and unscrupulous demagogues.

While I was at St. Louis I saw a man who was probably the last fugitive slave arrested as such. He was a man who had suffered greatly from a series of oppressive masters, and had cast himself on the charity of Rev. Dr. Eliot, who employed him as a servant, taking care to obtain a license for so doing from the provost-marshal. One day Dr. Eliot and his wife, returning from a drive, learned that this man had been seized, and with no little wanton violence carried off in an express wagon. One of the domestics remembered the number of the wagon. The Doctor virtually registered a vow before heaven that he would not sleep till that negro should be again under his roof. He learned from the driver of the wagon that the man had been lodged in the city jail. He obtained from the provost-marshal an order for the negro's immediate release, and took the man home. But this was not enough. Though the gospel which he preached forbade him to avenge himself, he did not regard the prohibition as applicable to any cause of righteousness and humanity. He therefore obtained of the provost-marshal a warrant for the arrest of the kidnapper, the man's late master, and had him routed from his bed at the Planter's Hotel, to spend the rest of the night in the cell which the negro had vacated. As may well be supposed, the negro became, body, mind, heart, and soul, by his own free gift, Dr. Eliot's property. He served as the Doctor's sexton, became a communicant in his church, married respectably, maintained himself comfortably till he succumbed to the infirmities of age, and was tenderly cared for in his last days by him to whom he owed his own self as to all that had made his life worth living.

THE INDWELLING CHRIST.

By one of those developing and revealing processes which betray the hand of God, the underlying principle of what has been known as New Theology is emerging. It is the immanence of Christ. It is this which underlies the recent broader and deeper conceptions of the universality of Christianity, the significance of the Incarnation, the extent of the Atonement, Continued Probation, Infant Salvation, — in a word, whatever is properly contained in the term “New Theology.”

It is not necessary to show how this fundamental truth has given birth to, and incorporated itself in, all these enlargements of Christian doctrine. Now that it has emerged, it is plain enough to detect its presence and workings. I think all who have been in sympathy with the spirit and motive of this movement in theology must feel a grateful satisfaction that the truth which has been the leaven of it all proves to be of such profound and inexhaustive significance, and withal not new but old, for the New Testament is replete with it.

Starting from one of these New Testament expressions of the truth, it will be my attempt to offer a very direct application of it to the question of individual relationship to Christ. In the Epistle to the Colossians Paul speaks of the word or revelation of God, of which he is a minister, as a *mystery* kept secret through all preceding ages and generations, but now made known. This mystery is, Christ in you the hope of glory. I think I do not misinterpret the import of his words if I state it thus: Christ has always been in men, but with this difference: before the era of his incarnation, He was in them as a mystery; with the incarnation, this mystery became a manifestation. It is true there are passages in the writings of the Apostle which seem to annul this interpretation. But I think the antagonism is apparent, not real. If he teaches that men are “by nature children of wrath,” he also teaches that they “do by nature the things contained in the law.” This teaching, in another and less inspiring form, has been generally accepted.

All Christian teachers recognize that there is a something divine in man, that this something was there before the coming of Christ, that it is there to-day. Most of them choose to call it a divine principle, giving birth to unselfish deeds and noble thoughts, — a “spark” of the Divine Nature. The truth is dawning upon us

that instead of a divine principle this is a Divine Person, and that that Person is Christ. It has always puzzled theologians to account for the deeds of virtue and honor which light up the pagan world. What is their source, and what their explanation? Some have so far outraged truth as to call them *splendida vitia*, — beautiful but deceptive flowers growing out of a corrupt soil, entirely destitute of worth or holiness, because not springing from a regenerate principle within. Others have estimated them over-highly, and held them up to show to what heights the purely human can attain. The one explanation is as far from the truth as the other. Was God absent from the human heart before the Christian revelation? Was there ever a noble deed or a noble idea that was not God-inspired? No! A divine mystery underlay all that was noble, true, and beautiful in Greek and Roman, as well as Hebrew. That mystery was “Christ in them the hope of glory.” He was the justice of Aristides, the wisdom of Plato, the heroism of Leonidas. If not, what was the source of that justice, heroism, wisdom? Surely it was not purely human. And if the divine was interblended, was it not the presence of the yet unveiled Christ, the Immanuel, the eternal Son, the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world, — then a mystery, now a manifestation? I know no other explanation of the prologue of John’s Gospel — speaking as it does of the world being made through Him, of his coming to his *own*, of his being the Light that lighteth every man coming into the world — than that He who was among men before, as a spiritual illumination, now came among them in the flesh, the “mystery” becoming a “manifestation.” Those who were “of the truth,” who had confessed the spiritual Christ within them, recognized the entire correspondence of this faint image in their hearts with the moral lineaments of Jesus, and joyfully hailed Him as Lord. I know of no other key than this to the Gospel of St. John, as I know of no other to the Epistles of St. Paul.

But this view, it will be said, belittles the historic nature of Christianity. I think not. Because Christ was present as a “mystery” before He was present as a “manifestation,” is there any reason why the manifestation should be undervalued? No! The manifestation explains the mystery. It is better than the mystery. Indeed, the mystery adds significance and power to the manifestation. The central fact of Christianity, Christ has come in the flesh, would have no meaning if there were no Christ to come in the flesh.

(1.) God's revelation to Israel was a revelation through Christ, albeit through Christ as a mystery. Even in the wilderness "they drank of that spiritual Rock that followed them; and that Rock was Christ." The patriarchs entered the kingdom of God through the "narrow door," although over it they could not discern the words, "I am the way."

(2.) If Christ was in the world before He came in the flesh, then surely He is present among men and *in* men now, and in all men of whatever race or religion. Let us not shun the full extent of the truth. Yes, Christ is in the heathen heart. Dim, indeed, is his image; faint, indeed, is the whisper of his voice. But He is there. How else can we explain the recognition which the gospel meets as it falls from the lips of the missionary? — "Ah, yes, that is *my* Saviour that you have told me of. I know it!" Is not this the mystery coming forth to claim the manifestation?

(3.) But apply this truth to the men and women about us. Suppose the pulpit, instead of haranguing men upon their alienation from Christ, denying the unregenerate all contact with Him, should address them on this wise: "Friends, Christ is *in* you. Yes, unbeliever, I include you also. I will even address you directly and say, Christ is in you. Do you doubt me? If I had said, 'There is some *good* in you,' would you have doubted me? No; you would have replied: 'It is true; bad as I am, there is somewhere in my heart a principle of goodness. I know it. If I had not violated it, I should not be what I am.' Will you question it — dare you question it — if I say that that good is Christ? Well, I do say it. That goodness within you is not yours, it does not belong to you. And yet it is entwined in your very consciousness. What is it? 'Christ in you the hope of glory.' Are you saved by it, then? No. Christ is in you and yet you are not saved! Why? Because it makes a heaven-wide difference whether He is there as Ruler or Remonstrator; whether He is there as an accepted Light, the Guide of life, or as one breaking fitfully through the darkness; whether this Light is overcoming the darkness, or the darkness the Light; whether Christ the mystery, being received, leads to Christ the manifestation confessed."

What impression must it make upon a man, who has been taught to believe that he is "out of Christ," to realize that, nevertheless, Christ is in him, a sacred indwelling presence; that he has it in his power to violate and banish Him, or reverence and

accept Him! Only by asserting this organic relation of every man to Christ can we convince men of their obligations to Jesus. Only by attributing every outflow of moral goodness to its source in Christ can we give Him his true power and influence in the human heart. It is time we had done with accounting for the sweet and gracious lives, or the brave and unselfish deeds, of some of the men and women who are not Christians, as the exalted products of human attainment. If they can be as gentle, as pure, and as true without Christ as we are with Him, then is our faith vain. But it is *not* without Christ. Is there any radiant human perfection in any life? — it is Christ-begotten. There is a word which ought to be said to every one not a Christian, who feels that nevertheless there are in him the germs of righteousness and love which are redeeming his life. It is this: "Do you imagine, vain mortal, that the goodness within you is your own? that it is your 'better self'? It is a selfish delusion. All righteousness is of God. You have no 'better self' apart from Him."

It is this presence of Christ which we see in each other's lives, this pure radiance which illumines the good, and even gleams fitfully at times from those not yet wholly evil, that gives to human life all its worth and beauty.

"And every virtue we possess,
And every virtue won,
And every thought of holiness,
Is His and His alone."

Nor does this lessen responsibility or do away with endeavor. For whether this shall be a dying hope, a retreating Presence or a growing one, becoming a foretaste and earnest of the glory which shall be revealed and of a perfect union, depends absolutely upon will and conduct. And with our attitude toward the indwelling Christ is intimately involved our attitude toward the historic Christ. The two blend and are lost in one another. It is the same Christ who constitutes the inward mystery and the historic manifestation. If we are of the Truth we shall hear his voice.

There is one other conclusion which seems to me to ensue upon any large application of the doctrine of the immanence of Christ. It must affect our idea of conscience. Theology has unwisely left the entire consideration of conscience to philosophy, and adopted too readily its determinations. And what is the general idea of conscience thus obtained? That of an impersonal automaton mechanically pronouncing upon questions of right and wrong. And if the more devout minds have ventured to call it

the voice of God, it has been as a voice dis severed from all immediate contact with the Speaker, — words of warning spoken into the soul at its creation as into a phonograph, to become audible as occasion requires. An immanent Christ requires the personality of conscience. I use conscience, in distinction from the moral judgment, as that which detects the (undefined) presence of good, and impels toward it. The Holy Spirit is a Person; and unless we would commit the error of allotting to the nature of man what is in reality God in man, we must, it seems to me, reach the conclusion that conscience is also the Spirit of Holiness manifesting itself, not in its inspired supernatural activity, but in the necessarily restricted sphere of the natural man. What becomes of conscience in the perfect spiritual man? The Holy Spirit is his conscience. What is the every-day, so to speak, activity of the Holy Spirit in the unregenerate? Is it not the warnings and pleadings of conscience? And is the influence of the Holy Spirit ever separate from the presence of Christ? Not that I would seek to identify conscience with the indwelling Christ, but to attribute the monitions of conscience to Him, thus giving them a personal character. For the indwelling Christ is more than conscience. He is that mystery of Righteousness in the human heart who manifests himself in all the motions of goodness and godliness.

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EDITORIAL.

THE POSITIVE SIDE OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

It is inevitable, in the reëxamination of any subject and the change of view which such reëxamination usually involves, that emphasis should be laid at first upon the negative or destructive side. False and narrow views must be exposed and corrected, before the truth can be seen in its clearer light and its larger outlines. Biblical criticism meets this necessity. The rigid and mechanical theories of the origin and the office of Scripture, to which Protestantism was driven in its conflict with Roman Catholicism, stand directly in the path of historical and critical study, and must be removed before progress can be made. This destructive work, however, necessary as it may be, must cause pain and anxiety, not only to those who learn of its conclusions, but also to those who proclaim them. No serious man can evade the question, — If you admit that there are defects in the Bible, will you not destroy its power to shape the faith and mould the characters of men? The process of criticism has now gone far enough to make it possible to suggest, at least, an answer to this question.

It is not too much to claim that criticism has not yet touched directly any questions which relate immediately to the spiritual life. Such questions as the existence and personality of God, the immortality of the soul, man's need of redemption and God's purpose to redeem him, the presence of God's Spirit in the world, his control over human history and his indwelling in human hearts, do not come within the range of Biblical criticism, except incidentally and inferentially. When one says, — Unless we hold to a certain theory of inspiration and of the nature of Scripture, we must surrender our religious hopes, he draws an inference which is without foundation. The most that can fairly be said of the most extreme views which are seriously entertained concerning the Scriptures is that they diminish the force of one line of evidence for these doctrines. This is manifest from the fact that not a few have held these views and yet have retained their faith in the essentials of Biblical religion.

But it may be confidently affirmed, further, that the views which are now gaining ground among open-minded and serious critics are tending to confirm the conviction that the Scriptures are the vehicle of a divine enlightenment and revelation. This is, in part, the direct result of the negative work which has been done. The views of God and of man to which recent studies in philosophy and science and history have led make it extremely difficult to believe that God has ever held a strictly pedagogical relation with men, — that by a direct and infallible communication, He has taught science or history or metaphysics. A doctrine of the origin of the Bible which affirms or implies this meets with very serious difficulties. Now modern Biblical criticism thinks that it has

found abundant evidence in the Scriptures themselves, and in the history of their composition and compilation, that this theory is not well-founded, but that Biblical writers learned facts as other writers learn them, and reported them with the same liabilities to partial and inexact information. Faith gains, thus, a certain relief ; it is exalted and spiritualized. The attention is turned from small things to great things, — from the letter to the spirit.

And when the attention is thus turned from the smaller and more formal features of the Bible to those which are larger and more spiritual, the critical and historical study of the Scriptures aids in the appreciation of these really significant and vital characteristics. There are certain things in Scripture which are not found anywhere else, — at least not found so clearly apprehended, and so fully and confidently affirmed. These are so familiar that it is necessary only to note some of them by way of illustration.

There is in the minds of Biblical writers a sense of the presence of God, — a confidence in a divine enlightenment and leading, such as is rarely if ever found in any other literature. Even those writings which are most closely related with Scripture, seldom, if ever, contain this characteristic. In general, a pretty plain line of distinction runs between Biblical writings and other Jewish and Christian writings. The prophets and apostles certainly believed that they were taught of God, and spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. It must be admitted, indeed, that this does not characterize all Biblical writings, and that it is more prominent in the Old Testament than in the New Testament ; but it is a phenomenon of Scripture which demands attention and explanation. Moreover, it involves a mental condition which, when it appears elsewhere, is almost always associated with extravagance and fanaticism. A peculiarity of Scripture is that this confidence in divine communications is associated with great sobriety and humility. The combination of intense feeling and good sense is rare. Especially is this true in the realm of religious feeling and action. Most men who dream dreams and see visions are vain and rash and impractical. But this is not the case with the prophets and apostles of Biblical history. They were humble and wise. They were statesmen, good counselors, able administrators. They never fell into that fanatical conception of religion which makes it a purely transcendental experience and obscures the common duties of life. They recognize, also, the limitations of those revelations which they hold are vouchsafed them. Their awakened fancy does not run riot. They do not speculate or ruminate. They simply speak the word which, as they think, has been given them, and leave it to do its appointed work. This remarkable combination of enthusiasm and confidence with wisdom and moderation has always commanded respect for the Scriptures, and suggests a divine control of its writers. And the more critical study of the Bible, and the more careful comparison of its contents with other literature,

deepens this respect, and reënforces the conviction that it did not originate as other literature originates. Other wise men have been timid, doubtful of their conclusions. Other confident men have been rash, imperious, impracticable. This goodly company of men, living in different ages under diverse forms of social, intellectual, and religious development, spoke with a wisdom to which other men did not attain, and with this unique confidence that their wise words came from the fountain of eternal wisdom and truth.

This argument is even more convincing when we examine in detail the fundamental ideas of Scripture. How did men in these early ages come to apprehend the doctrine of the unity and the perfection of God? Granted that this doctrine was a growth which did not appear fully developed in the Hebrew mind in the earliest history, and that the philosophers and prophets of other nations sometimes caught glimpses of it too, the fact still remains that in Biblical history this great thought gained control over men's minds, and shaped all the ideas of life and duty which the Scriptures contain. To affirm that other people apprehended the same doctrine with more or less clearness does not diminish the evidence that divine instruction was given the Hebrew people and their prophets, for the proof that the great truths of the Bible were taught by God does not depend upon proving that He was the God of the Jews only, — still, historical and critical studies are impressing men with a deeper sense of the singular majesty and beauty and moral and spiritual inspiration there is in the Biblical idea of God, the Almighty Creator and Ruler of the worlds, holy and just, and at the same time the friend of men, their Shepherd, their Father, their Redeemer.

Much the same may be said of the Biblical idea of man, — of his origin and his destiny, of his sinful state and need of redemption. The most difficult problem set before man is to know himself. Even Socrates failed in his effort to solve it. The problem of sin and redemption has hardly been apprehended, never mastered, by any writers but those of the Bible and others who have laid hold upon their thoughts. Nothing has ever been added to the teachings of Scripture upon these themes. Yet while other men have not discovered these truths, they have recognized them as just and reasonable when they have been taught them. Doubtless this is what Coleridge means when he says that the Bible finds him. It interprets to man his own condition and need.

So of the Biblical conception of the outcome of human life and history. The Bible's view of the world is sober and comprehensive. It recognizes the evils which beset human society and the dangers which threaten human history; but, at the same time, it is a book of hope and not of despair. It is, in almost all its parts, a prophetic book, — not so much in predicting specific things, as in its confidence — even in the darkest times — that God rules, that righteousness is mightier than sin and light more potent than darkness. The history of the world goes far

towards confirming this outlook and proving that these men, who always believed in the power of righteousness and truth, were right, and that they had, therefore, a deeper insight into the power and purposes of God than other men have gained.

But this evidence, that we have in the Bible a record of God's approach to men, concentrates about the story of the life of Jesus Christ, the report of his teachings and of the impression which his life and teachings made upon those who were associated with Him. Nor does this evidence depend upon the literal accuracy of the records, or the infallibility of the writers. Tradition may not have preserved his exact words, the memory of his disciples may have failed sometimes, his life may have been interpreted and idealized, and the doctrinal inferences drawn by the apostles may need to be tested in the light of reason and calm reflection; but this much is plain, that Jesus Christ made such an impression upon men that He gave them such a revelation of truth and such an inspiration of life as no other man has ever given. The wisdom of the ages is in the words attributed to Him; the hope of the world is in the doctrine which He taught and in the life which He lived and which He sacrificed. This is the conclusion of the most stringent criticism quite as much as it is of the simplest faith.

Criticism, then, simply brings into clearer recognition these marvelous features of Scripture and concentrates attention upon them. It proves that men with human limitations and infirmities and ignorance, living at periods in the world's history which were comparatively dark, were conscious of seeing a great light, and that that light, when tested by all modern appliances, proves to be genuine and wonderful, — the best and clearest light the world has ever seen. It shows that the important thing about Scripture is the Scripture itself, and not the times and circumstances of its composition, and that the great doctrines of Scripture are so great and so wonderful that they are quite independent of any minor inaccuracies which may be combined with the writers' apprehension or statement of them.

THE PAPAL ENCYCLICAL ON LABOR.

IN previous letters on civil and political questions Leo XIII. had touched upon the economic situation. He now addresses himself directly and elaborately to the labor question, "in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement." The style of the epistle is generally clear, though the movement labors under the ecclesiastical reasoning with which the subject is burdened. It is easier for a modern to accept the conclusions of the argument than the reasoning upon which they rest. There is an air of remoteness about some parts of the discussion in singular contrast with the practicality which distinguishes the aim and general purpose of the

epistle. The worldliness of the theme does not preclude the reminder that God "has given us this world as a place of exile."

The Encyclical opens, after the salutation, with the following view of the present condition of labor: —

"All agree, and there can be no question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor. The ancient workmen's guilds were destroyed in the last century, and no other organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws have repudiated the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that workingmen have been given over, isolated and defenseless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition. The evil has been increased by rapacious usury, which, although more than once¹ condemned by the church, is, nevertheless, under a different form but with the same guilt, still practiced by grasping and avaricious men. And to this must be added the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself."

After this statement the Encyclical passes at once to a vigorous attack upon socialism as a proposed remedy, in connection with which the inviolability of private property is as vigorously maintained; then enters upon a somewhat detailed direction as to the proper mutual conduct of the rich and poor under the inevitable inequalities of social condition; then discusses with great care the function of the state in the way of relief; and closes with a plea for coöperation between employers and workmen, and for the formation of workmen's associations for protection and development, after the manner of the ancient guilds.

Whatever agreement there may be, according to the statement quoted above, about the necessity of a speedy remedy for the want and wretchedness of the very poor, few will accept the reason so prominently suggested in the decline of workmen's guilds. The fact that these went to pieces before modern industrialism showed their utter insufficiency to meet the new situation. Had they remained, they could not have protected their members from the "callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition." The tremendous material forces which the last century brought into play set at naught all existing methods of social protection. Could we conceive of their discovery and application independently of the great religious and political revolutions which preceded, which are doubtless referred to in the sentence, "Public institutions and the laws have repudiated the ancient religion," — could we conceive of modern material progress under the régime of the church of the Middle Age, we could only think of the church as powerless to control its order or modify its conditions. The startling phenomena of industrialism are apparent to all, but it requires the greatest philosophical

insight to determine their course or to estimate their force. This insight we think is lacking in the Encyclical at the start. The appreciation of the present misery is evident, and the sympathetic attitude toward the poor is honorably declared, but the measure of the present economic problem is lost through a narrow historic approach.

And in like manner the concentration of production, which is referred to as giving the few such power over the many, is in no clear way related to the development of that intense individualism which has been the characteristic of modern industrial life. On the contrary, the epistle goes on to reason about individual natural rights, as if individualism when stimulated and developed would not show its results first in "unrestrained competition" and then in the concentration of wealth in the hands of a very few.

The authority of the Encyclical lies in its unqualified assertion of the doctrine of private property; its wisdom lies in its concessions respecting the present economic and social function of the state.

The argument for the fullest possession of private property, especially in the land, deals chiefly in abstractions, and therefore has the old dogmatic ring. The priority of the individual and of the family, with the consequent authority of the head of the family, to the state, is given as the ground of natural above acquired rights. We think that many would reach the conclusion of the right of private property by some other mode of reasoning. And that many others still, while rejecting communism, would allow a far greater assumption of power by the state in respect to things for which there is a common demand. Certainly the legislation of Germany and of England for the last ten years, while anti-communistic, has been and still is decidedly socialistic. State ownership and state control are making large infringements upon "individual rights."

And really the Encyclical concedes the principle of a more socialistic use of the state in the powers which it concedes to the state in relieving the present distress. The dogmatic authority of the papacy holds good while the subject is kept in the abstract; when it comes into the concrete the Pope reasons like any other man of modern times. The state should be expected to give to the workmen their Sabbaths, to shorten their hours of labor, to protect women and children against excessive toil, and to secure a fair wage for the work rendered. All this is precisely what the State is doing. And the Encyclical, as it advocates one measure after another in the line of state interference, reads like any one of the better socialistic journals of Great Britain. If it may be laid down as a general principle "that the workman ought to have leisure and rest in proportion to the wear and tear of his strength," and that the state ought to secure the application of this principle, why may it not go further and help the workman to make the right use of his leisure and rest?

Why not public libraries, and public parks, and public baths, and the various "improvements" which the modern state is called upon to furnish in the interest of the workman?

One can but read the Encyclical on Labor with interest and satisfaction. Its influence will be felt toward the freedom and elevation of the working classes. Its tone is seldom condemnatory, and it makes little account of past grievances. Something must be allowed to the perspective in which the Church of Rome sees all modern issues. It is much that in practical matters "His Holiness," as a recent journalist remarks, "has ranged himself unmistakably on the side of the new Political Economy."

BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

THE HISTORICAL MOVEMENT TRACEABLE IN ISAIAH XL.-LXVI.

"THE deported Jews had been in Babylon little more than a generation," says Stade, "when the premonitory signs of those mighty revolutions in the relations of the peoples and states of Asia began to show themselves, revolutions which should make possible the return and the reestablishment of a humble state."¹ During the troubled period which followed the downfall of Syria, about 600 B. C., Teispes, a Persian, conquered the country of Elam and laid there the foundations of a powerful monarchy. This monarchy reached its real greatness in Cyrus, who had been looked upon as a Persian king in the strict sense, until the discovery of his own record of the conquest of Babylon, and of one or two other inscriptions, has shown that his kingdom was ancient Elam. Cyrus conquered Persia and Media, and they became his base of operations in his wars of conquest into the heart of Asia Minor.

This is the movement which was destined to exercise so great an influence upon the fortunes of the Jewish exiles in Babylon. They were utterly unconscious of its significance, which unconsciousness is the less surprising, however, inasmuch as the Greek states of Europe, as Ståle has pointed out,² failed to realize that Cyrus was paving the way for the great invasion of Europe which, but for the unique valor displayed at Salamis and Plataea, might have changed the history of Europe.

It is easy for us to see how inevitably Babylon must have been from the first the ultimate goal of Cyrus's conquests, however careful he may have been to keep his intentions in the dark. One whose military genius was so great, who had such a true conception of the right way to hold together a vast empire, could not pass by the greatest kingdom of the time.

The most wonderful of all the prophecies of the Bible is closely connected with the career of this remarkable general. The second part of Isaiah was only half understood, so long as it seemed to be purely a religious treatise without any historical relations. More and more clearly the historical basis is coming into view, with the result of giving us the larger and fuller meaning of those wonderful chapters. There is now a

¹ *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, ii. 68.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 69.

general agreement among Biblical scholars as to the historical circumstances with which this series of prophecies is connected ; even those few who still maintain the Isaianic authorship agree that the prophecies are based upon the fall of Babylon, the prophet living, as Delitzsch said formerly when he believed that Isaiah was the author, "a pneumatic life among the exiles." Placing these prophecies in their right historical setting has been very helpful in a right understanding of them. But as yet nothing has been done toward assigning the various prophecies which make up the book to the particular event with which they were connected. It is true that until quite recently our knowledge of the history of Cyrus and Babylon was so slight, and, as it will appear, so erroneous, that there was comparatively little data to work upon. The cuneiform inscriptions, however, are illuminating this history so powerfully that we may hope for future research with more definite results. As yet Biblical critics have scarcely gone further than to say that the series of prophecies have their historical basis in the fall of Babylon.

It would be quite unusual to have so elaborate a series of prophecies based on a single historical event. It has long been my belief that the different addresses which make up this fine collection were delivered at intervals as the course of history gradually unfolded itself toward the actual restoration of captive Israel. With our present knowledge, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign every address to the particular appropriate historical event which called it out, but I deem it quite easy to show the general correspondence between the movement of events and the prophet's words. The prophecy is a unit so far as treating of one great period in the history of the nation is concerned ; but there are as many leading parts as there were great events which gave the prophet occasion to preach.

No sympathetic Bible student can for one moment question the high spiritual tone of this prophecy, which Cheyne appropriately calls the "Gospel before the Gospel."¹ This book more than any other is rich in Messianic thought. A large part of these prophecies had a very inadequate fulfillment in Jewish history, and could only have their perfect fulfillment in Messianic days past and to come. The spiritual and Messianic element gains rather than loses from a right understanding of the historical setting. The forty years' wandering in the wilderness is certainly as valuable for spiritual guidance as "Pilgrim's Progress." No part of prophecy applies any less to Christ, if it had its first more or less imperfect application to some one in the prophet's own time. In a single paper it is impossible to touch every part of this great book. We take a single line, — the historical setting of the various parts, — and can treat this only inadequately. These statements are tentative largely, aiming to be suggestive rather than dogmatic.

Chapter xl. is the first, chronologically, of the series of discourses. What was the historical situation when it was delivered ? Driver says : "The precise moment at which the prophecy opens cannot be determined ; but it must, in any case, have been prior to 538, and, as xli. 25 implies a date subsequent to the union of the Medes with the Persians in 549, it will be limited to the interval between these years, during which Cyrus was pursuing his career of conquest in the north and northwest of Asia."² Matthew Arnold, whose fine literary and critical insight made him a

¹ *Prophecies of Isaiah*, Am. ed., i. 243.

² *Isaiah : his Life and Times*, p. 137.

sympathetic student of this prophet, says simply : " In the year 541 B. C. [Cyrus] turned upon Babylon. Against their enslaver and oppressor, the Jewish exiles in Babylon saw uplifted the irresistible sword of God's instrument. Assyria had fallen, Babylon was falling ; and in this supreme hour is heard the voice of God's prophets." ¹ Stade says, — though partly erroneously, as I hope to show, — " The discourses which may with certainty be ascribed to the deutero-Isaiah belong collectively to the time which expired between the downfall of Croesus and Cyrus's attack upon the latter, in that time of the struggle of the Persians against the Greek States of Asia Minor." ² This would make the whole series fall before 547, a date which is clearly too early.

The Hebrew prophet was distinctly a man of his times. He understood clearly the movements of his day, and interpreted them for his duller brethren. God sometimes raised him to a Pisgah to take a view of the near future, and he was therefore always the first to see the consequences of a new political movement while it was yet in the bud. Amos, from the south of Judah, saw the danger hovering over Israel from beyond the river Euphrates, when the infatuated Israelites were exulting in their great power. Isaiah sees the dire consequences of Hezekiah's league with Merodach-Baladan, when Hezekiah himself could only see the hope of greater glory. By analogy, therefore, we should expect the great prophet of the exile to declare the impending restoration as soon as the course of events clearly foreshadowed it, but before it was obvious to the slow perception of the mass of the people. *A priori*, therefore, we should expect that the first of these prophecies was delivered some time before Cyrus marched against Babylon, probably not long after 549. So Driver says : " The prophet's eye marks him [Cyrus] in the distance as the coming deliverer of his nation ; he stimulates the flagging courage of his people by pointing to his successes, and declaring that he is God's appointed agent." ³ The other indications are scanty, but they point to the same conclusion. At the time the opening prophecy was delivered, the mass of the Jewish people did not realize the significance of Cyrus's movements. The prophet (chap. xl.), after declaring in a wonderfully graphic way that the restoration of Israel was near, argues that there is nothing so strange in his good tidings, inasmuch as Jehovah's power is so great, his counsel so wise, and his knowledge so profound. But Israel was thoroughly discouraged, not seeing any prospect of release, because in the land of exile, they seemed to be out of Jehovah's reach. The prophet thus rebukes and encourages : " Why sayest thou, O Jacob, and speakest, O Israel ? My way is hidden from Jehovah, and my cause has passed away from my God " (xl. 27).

The prophet speaks thus of Jehovah's power over men : " He who bringeth men of might to nothing, who maketh the judges of the earth as chaos ; yea, they were never planted," etc. (xl. 23 *seq.*). The most natural interpretation of this passage is to refer it to the quick overthrow of the various states of Asia Minor by Cyrus, who, in the mind of the prophet, was Jehovah's instrument.

In chapter xli. the reference to the effect of Cyrus's sweeping victories is very marked. Remembering again Cyrus's relations to Jehovah, we shall easily understand the challenge : " Come silently unto me, O

¹ *Isaiah*, xl.-lxvi., p. 36.

² *Geschichte*, ii. p. 72.

³ *Isaiah : his Life and Times*, p. 137.

countries; and let the peoples gather fresh force: let them approach, then let them speak. Who hath stirred up from the sunrising the man whom Righteousness calleth to follow him; and giveth up before him peoples, and maketh him trample upon kings? He pursueth them, passeth on in safety: the road with his feet he doth not tread" (verses 1-3). This picture seems clearly to point to a rapid career of conquest still going on, one kingdom after another falling before the invader. Then the prophet depicts the terror spread by these conquests: "The countries have seen it and are afraid: the ends of the earth shudder: they draw near and come: every one helpeth his neighbor, and saith to his fellow, 'Be strong'" (verses 5, 6).

In marked contrast to this is the effect to be produced on Israel. They were not to fear like those nations who trusted in gods made by the carpenter and smith, for Jehovah would aid them and support them in time of danger (verses 8-20).

These considerations point to the conclusion I suggested. They are not sufficient to make a mathematical demonstration that these words are to be assigned to a particular year, though they make it probable that the prophet declared the tidings of release some considerable time before the fulfillment.

Let us now turn to another question vitally connected with our argument. More than any other writer of the Bible this prophet dwells upon the omnipotence and omniscience of God. Israel would do well to rest his faith on the Creator and Upholder of the Universe. But another test of Jehovah's power was offered, namely, his foreknowledge. Again and again the prophet appeals to the fulfillment of prophecies uttered by Jehovah as evidence of Jehovah's superiority to the heathen gods. The "former things" were declared, before they came to pass, to show that Jehovah brought them to pass. What are these "*former things*"? The first use of the term is in chapter xli. 22, in the challenge to the idol gods: "Let them bring forth, and show us what shall happen: let them show the former things, what they be, that we may consider them, and know the latter end of them." This means, says Cheyne, "predict, if ye can, the things which are to take place before certain other events."¹ The force of the challenge would then be: "Tell us something that is going to happen soon, and if it come to pass, we shall have some faith in your predictions for more remote times." Like Elijah's sarcasm, the challenge tells plainly the powerlessness and ignorance of the idols. In contrast with this is Jehovah's accurate predictive power. "I the first said to Zion, Behold, behold it; and I gave to Jerusalem one that bringeth good tidings" (xli. 27). This test is evidently based on the standard of true prophecy given in Deuteronomy xviii.: "If thou say in thine heart, How shall we know the word which Jehovah hath not spoken? if the prophet speaketh in the name of Jehovah, and the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which Jehovah hath not spoken, but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously: thou shalt not be afraid of it."

It seems clear that the prophecy of Jehovah quoted above refers to the return from exile made possible by the conquests of Cyrus. Is it possible that even between the first prophecy (chap. xl.) and the second (chap. xli.) there was so great an interval that the prophet could already appeal to the beginning of the fulfillment? This is certainly not a necessary conclusion. Analogous to the challenge to the idols, we might sup-

¹ *Prophecies of Isaiah, in loc.*

pose Jehovah to say : " Here is a clear prediction of mine. I did not borrow it from any one, but was the first to utter it. It will soon be seen whether it is true or false, and then my knowledge of the future will be known."

Again, in chapter xlii. 9, we read : " Behold, the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare : before they spring forth I tell you of them." By the " former things " Delitzsch here understands the coming of Cyrus, and the downfall of nations connected with his coming. The " new things," he says, are the coming of Jehovah's servant, the restoration of Israel, and the conversion of the heathen. This is certainly very plausible, and, if it is true, we must suppose that a short time had intervened between these prophecies. In chapter xl. there is no definite mention of Cyrus ; but we must not build too much upon such an omission, inasmuch as the writing of a prophecy probably followed its oral delivery, and specific references might be omitted in the written abstract.

Passing over several of the references to predictions, we take up the one in chapter xlviii. : " The former things long ago I announced. Because I knew that thou wast hard, and an iron band thy neck, and thy forehead brass, therefore I announced it to thee long since, before it came to pass I showed it thee : lest thou shouldst say, Mine idol hath wrought them. Thou hast heard it, see it all complete. I declare to thee new things from this time. Before to-day thou heardest them not, lest thou shouldst say, Behold, I knew them " (verses 3-7).

At first sight it might seem as if the " long ago " in this passage would refer to the predictions of the fall of Babylon made by the earlier prophets. But the expression is qualified " before it came to pass," so that it only means relatively " long since," that is, before the people found it out naturally. As I shall hope to show later, this chapter was probably written just after the capture of Babylon, and the " long ago " could be ten years ago, and still refer to the first glad tidings : " Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people, saith your God " (xl. 1).

Chapters xliii. and xlv. bring us apparently to a somewhat more advanced stage of the history. The hopes of the return are held out definitely and positively from a nearer point of view. Jehovah will give other nations — Egypt and Ethiopia — as a ransom for Israel (xliii. 3). We know that Cyrus had been planning a campaign against Egypt, and it is now generally agreed that one of the motives which prompted his restoration of the Jews was to make a wall against Egypt. In view of this fact, the prophet's reference to Egypt is particularly interesting. Yet it is a prophetic, not a historical reference. The campaign against Egypt was never carried out. It is possible, however, that the prophet's words were based on Cyrus's design.

The prophet declares plainly that God's hand is in all these historical movements, that no one else has had any part in bringing them about. Carrying out the purpose of the satire on the idol gods (xlv. 9-20), the prophet passes on to Jehovah's supreme greatness, his superior power over all other gods, so called. " I am Jehovah, that maketh all things ; that stretcheth forth the heavens alone ; that frustrateth the tokens of the liars, and maketh diviners mad ; that turneth wise men backward, and maketh their knowledge foolish ; that confirmeth the word of his servant, and performeth the counsel of his messengers " (xlv. 24-26).

Have we not here a contest between true prophecy and false, between

Jehovah on the one hand and the idol gods on the other? The astrologers and wizards who flocked about every ancient Oriental court had their say about the prospects of Babylon. Like Ahab's prophets in Micaiah's time, they declared that their king was safe from Cyrus. There were many Jews, never very devout Jehovah-worshippers, who were so weaned from their national religion as to be quite as ready to accept the oracles from the heathen as the message from Jehovah. Their counsel was in direct opposition to that of our prophet, as this passage shows. Both could not be true. Events had progressed to the point that the Babylonians were concerned about their safety. It was a time no longer when a far-sighted prophet was required to see the final aim of Cyrus's campaigns. The people of Babylon had become as negligent of their religious rites as other people do; but in the face of the great danger, there was that renewed activity in the idol market which gave the Hebrew prophet a basis for his keen satire. According to the oracles, these rapidly multiplied gods were to avert the great calamity. But the Jewish preacher declared that the falsity of all such hopes, the delusiveness of all such claims, would soon appear.

With the more immediate prospect of relief, the prophet carries further his picture of the restoration. He thinks of the present dreary condition of the ruined city, lonely and solitary, then of her happy future: "She shall be inhabited; and the cities of Judah, they shall be built; the temple, its foundation shall be laid" (xliv. 28).

With the enthusiastic preaching of the evangelical prophet, and the progress of the conqueror's armies, many of the Jews came to believe in the early downfall of Babylon. In chapter xlv. Jehovah said more definitely than before that Cyrus was his instrument, his anointed one, the executor of his will, and that Jehovah was so aiding him in his career as to make success certain. Moreover, he declared that his motive in directing the conqueror's movements against Babylon was the return of the chosen race, whose punishment had been sufficient. But Israel was not satisfied with Jehovah's plans, so the prophet rebukes sharply the presumption of the faithless people: "Woe unto him that striveth with his maker; a potsherd among potsherds of the earth: shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands? Woe unto him that saith unto a father, What begettest thou? or to a woman, With what travailest thou?" (xlv. 9, 10).

Israel's criticism of providential arrangements cannot mean, as Cheyne supposes, the long delay of Cyrus's movement; but, as Ewald said, the objection was, that the deliverer was not an Israelite. There is no appropriateness in the figures if they are referred to the tardiness of Providence; they are very striking if referred to the seemingly unsuitable instrument whom God ordained. We can better understand the feeling of the Jews in view of the latest discoveries about Cyrus, which show that he was a tolerant polytheist, not an enthusiastic monotheist, as was formerly held.

This passage shows that the time of doubting Babylon's early fall was past. The doom of the city was clear, but the people were slow to see, in a heathen, Jehovah's anointed, a Messiah. May not the scene of this chapter be something like the following? The prophet, addressing an assembly of the exiles, declares that Cyrus will conquer Babylon, and that he will do it as Jehovah's anointed. Some one in his audience objects to that term. He can see clearly enough now that the King of Elam

and of Persia will soon be King of Babylon, too; but he cannot be God's Messiah: Jehovah could not place any heathen polytheist in such a position as that. In answer to this, the prophet utters the rebuke I have quoted above.

The climax is near. The weak Nabonidos, as we now know from the monuments, brings gods from all parts of the kingdom to Babylon. Other shrines are robbed to save the capital. Caravans of weary animals come into the city loaded down with images. But it is no use; the chief gods are meeting the fate of the Philistine Dagon before the ark of Jehovah: "Bel boweth down, Nebo stoopeth; their idols are upon the beasts, and upon the cattle; the things that ye carried about are made a load, a burden to the weary beast. They stoop, they bow down together; they could not deliver the burden, but themselves go into captivity" (xlvi. 1, 2). The nearness of Babylon's doom is indicated a little further on: "I bring near my righteousness, it shall not be far off, and my salvation shall not tarry" (verse 13).

Chapter xlvii. is the last predictive utterance of the destruction of the city. When those words were spoken, we may well believe that the fall was imminent. But we must turn aside for a moment to read the true record of Babylon's fall. The familiar story of Herodotus that Cyrus entered the city through the river bed, the equally familiar one of the carnage in which Belshazzar was slain, are inconsistent with the recent discoveries from the monuments. It appears from Cyrus's records that he had done some sharp fighting with the Babylonians in Accad, in the north. In the seventeenth year of Nabonidos, Cyrus marched against the Babylonian army from the southeast. Here I quote the inscription, from Sayce's translation: "In the month Tammuz (June) Cyrus gave battle to the army of Accad in the town of Rutum. The men of Accad broke into revolt. On the fourteenth day (of the month) the garrison of Sippara was taken without fighting. Nabonidos flies. On the sixteenth day, Gobryas, the governor of Gutium, and the army of Cyrus, entered Babylon without fighting. On the third day of Marchesvan (October) Cyrus entered Babylon. He grants peace to the city, to the whole of Babylon, Cyrus proclaims peace." The statement here made, that Babylon opened her gates to the conquerors after her army had been defeated in the field, is reiterated again and again. It is scarcely credible that Cyrus should omit from his record such a clever piece of generalship as the diverting of the waters from their channel, if it had really occurred at this time. As Sayce suggests, it is probably misplaced from a later siege under Darius.

I have stated this point fully, that we may guard against picturing any dramatic catastrophe in the fall of the great city. The conquest was assured before the army came before its massive walls. It may be with reference to the preliminary battles in the field that the prophet utters the stirring song over the downfall of the city: "Come down, and sit in the dust, O virgin daughter of Babylon: sit on the ground without a throne, O daughter of the Chaldeans" (xlvi.). Chapter xlviii. is, says Cheyne, a résumé of the ideas stated in the preceding discourses. It seems to me much more likely that it is a retrospect after the conquerors had entered the city. The prophet's utterance is something like the vulgar phrase, "I told you so." He points to the complete fulfillment of all that had been predicted. He declares again, and for the last time, that Jehovah had been the real cause of Cyrus's success, and closes with

that appeal which the fall of the city alone could make possible: "Go ye forth of Babylon, flee ye from the Chaldeans: utter it even to the end of the earth, say ye, Jehovah hath redeemed his servant Jacob" (xlviii.).

This is an appropriate ending to the first book, or series of prophecies, giving at the end a suggestion of the theme of what follows. In this place Rückert's division certainly is correct. With the opening of chapter xlix. the scene changes, — new conditions present themselves. We have now heard the last of Cyrus and his conquests. Babylon's struggles are things of the past. This change opens new hopes and new dangers to Israel. The time has now come for action. The day of bondage is past. What use shall the released captives make of the liberty which is now given? To these problems the prophet addresses himself.

This second book is, as Ewald says,¹ of not much later date. It seems to follow pretty closely the closing words of the preceding section. The change in tone is due not so much to the lapse of time as to the new conditions brought about by the change in government. The same great Bible scholar suggests that Cyrus, at least at the beginning, did not fulfill the great expectations raised by Israel's prophet.² The permission to return was not issued as promptly as might have been expected. From his own account, we know that it was four months after the capture of the city before Cyrus made his appearance in Babylon. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that God's prophet should turn to Israel and try to arouse them to the task now lying before them.

The prophet declares his mission, — it is to Gentiles as well as Jews. The signal will be given by Jehovah, and the dispersed Jews will throng the roads to Zion from every corner of the world. In the mean time Zion herself, not perceiving the movement, sits and laments: "Jehovah hath forsaken me, and the Lord hath forgotten me." Then the streams of exiles begin to pour in. In the Captivity the blessing of numbers pronounced upon the patriarchs had been fulfilling itself. Zion, the mother of the people, thinks it impossible that all these people who are thronging the roads, which in the prophet's mind converge towards Jerusalem, are her children. "Then shalt thou [Zion] say in thine heart, Who hath begotten me these? and who hath brought up these?" (verse 21).

The prophet has passed ahead of events here in his vivid pictures of encouragement for Israel. He comes back to stern reality. The people object that there is as yet no sign of a decree permitting the exiles to return. The prophet answers by a vigorous and striking assertion of Jehovah's close relations with Israel. What has Cyrus to do with my people? Can he keep them here? Did I ever separate Israel from myself permanently, by a writing of divorcement, or a bill of sale? The return does not depend upon Cyrus, it depends upon Jehovah; Cyrus cannot withhold the decree of release, which is ordered by Jehovah (l. 1).

After all, the people were not very anxious to leave Babylon when the opportunity came. Whether chapters li. and lii. were spoken after Cyrus's decree (Ezra i.), or before, is not easy to determine, but it is evident that it reflects the circumstances connected with it. Jerusalem

¹ *Prophecies*, iv. 254.

² *Ibid.*, p. 292.

was in ruins, the walls were heaps of rubbish; the Temple had been burned, the palaces and most of the houses were masses of *débris*. The scattered population was half heathen. The land was a wilderness, the fields long neglected. In the country of their exile these keen business-men were engaged in various industries, many of which were very profitable. They were established in homes with their families. The liberal policy of the new government, the established order, the hope of prosperity, made such strong inducements to remain in Babylon, that we need not be surprised to learn from the later history that only a small part of the Jews accepted Cyrus's offer. These chapters are designed to awaken the patriotism of the people by pointing out the glory of the restored Zion.

Chapter liii., which words would fail me to characterize adequately, does not reveal any historical progress; but whether written by our prophet, or, as Ewald supposes, an earlier piece quoted here, it fits into the historical position most appropriately. St. Paul, in 1st Corinthians, rebukes the people for their sins, and then, saying, "but lo, I show you a more excellent way," writes the sublime discourse on charity. Is it not with some such spirit that his Old Testament predecessor appeals to an erring people, pointing out first the certainty of the restoration, and then making a climax by picturing in impassioned strains the suffering by which this return to Zion is made possible? Does not such an interpretation give us the surest basis for our belief that this chapter has its perfect fulfillment only in the Lamb of God whose sufferings make possible our entrance into the heavenly Zion?

We must pass on rapidly now to a point of interest in chapter lvi. This chapter certainly reads as if the decree had been issued and preparations were being made for the journey Zionward. The prophet encourages proselytes to go back with the Jews, assuring them that they should not be separated from God's people. Many Hebrew slaves in the Chaldean court had become eunuchs. The prophet, rising above the Deuteronomic law, assures them that they shall have a place in Jehovah's house. The attention to minute details tells us that the course of events has been moving, not only in the prophet's mind, but in actual history.

Rückert's division, making a book end with chapter lvii., seems to me without good reason. The most marked change begins with chapter lx. A large part of chapters lvii.-lix. Ewald supposes to be only quoted by this prophet, some of it being much earlier. It is quite apart from my purpose to go into a discussion of that point. I will pass on to the third section of the book beginning with chapter lx.

There again we find a clear advance in the thought. As Driver says: "After chapter lix. his thought not only leaves behind it the fall of Babylon, but ceases to revert with the same frequency as before to the release and return of the Jews: the vision of Zion restored absorbs more constantly his attention; he paints its glories in colors of surpassing brilliancy."¹ Details of the work of restoring the city are taken up. Strangers will aid the Jews in building up their walls. Wood shall be brought from Lebanon, as in Solomon's day, to use for the rebuilding of the sanctuary. "They shall build the old wastes, they shall raise up the former desolations, and they shall repair the waste cities, and desolations of many generations" (lxi. 4).

Chapter lxii. sounds as if it might have been a song to the returning

¹ *Isaiah: his Life and Times*, p. 159.

exiles: "I have set watchmen upon thy walls, O Jerusalem: they shall never hold their peace day nor night." "Go through, go through the gates. Behold, Jehovah hath proclaimed unto the end of the earth, Say ye to the daughter of Zion, Behold, thy salvation cometh" (verses 6, 10, 11).

Ewald says, "lxiii. 7-lxvi. is a later and very dissimilar addition, written after history had further developed itself, and after opinions upon the former work had been already widely given."¹ Whether this passage is by another hand or not, it cannot be doubted that it reveals later conditions, though not necessarily extending beyond this prophet's lifetime.

The scene changes to Jerusalem. Is it possible that the great prophet, whose name has not come down to us, is really buried in the list of returning exiles preserved in the Book of Ezra? At any rate, his point of view is the Holy City. He represents the people in a reverie when the sight of their desolate and ruined city bursts upon them. Their confession of the sins which were the cause of all this ruin is most touching. The people feel the enormous task that awaits them; they realize the hostility of the peoples about them. They pray longingly for such another divine intervention as that which overwhelmed the Egyptians in the sea. "Oh that thou wouldst rend the heavens, that thou wouldst come down" (lxiv. 1). "Our holy and our beautiful house, where our fathers praised thee, is burned with fire; and all our pleasant things are laid waste. Wilt thou refrain thyself for these things, O Jehovah? Wilt thou hold thy peace, and afflict us very sore?" (verses 11, 12).

It is most interesting to speculate whether chapter lxv. may not have a reference to well-known history. The Samaritans came to Jerusalem and offered to aid in rebuilding the Temple, making the offer, as I think, from sincere motives (Ezra iv. 12). Their offer was peremptorily refused by Zerubbabel and Joshua. In the following passage can the prophet be rebuking the Jewish narrowness, as St. Paul rebuked St. Peter's? "I am inquired of by them that asked not for me; I am found of them that sought me not; I said, Behold me, behold me, unto a nation that was not called by my name. I have spread out my hands all the day unto a rebellious people, which walketh in a way that is not good, after their own thoughts, which say, Stand by thyself, come not near to me, for I am holier than thou" (lxv. 1-5).

There follows a severe scourging of those Jews who refused to join their brethren, and the sure promise that the reoccupation of Judah was not temporary, but to continue permanently in prosperity and peace (verses 19-25).

In chapter lvi. 1-4, the people are rebuked for failing to complete the Temple, probably because they stopped with the erection of an altar; they are denounced for the unholy sacrifices which they offer. Does not this spring from the trying scenes in Jerusalem in the early days of the return?

But there was much disappointment at the insignificance of the restored state. The history of Ezra's and Nehemiah's times confirms the lament of the people that great expectations had brought forth such scanty realizations. The prophet, who always recognized the needs of the people and ministered to them, preaches patience. "Shall a land be born in one day? Shall a nation be brought forth at once? Shall I bring to the

¹ *Prophets*, iv. 255.

birth, and not cause to bring forth?" (lxvi. 8, 9). The prophet then gives fresh encouragement to the disheartened people, and ends his book by rising to a beautiful Messianic strain, in which he declares that the Israelites now scattered over the whole world shall again come to Zion, borne by the very ones who have so long been their oppressors.

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SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

I.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.¹

PART III. PAUPERISM.

TOPIC IV. THE MODERN STATE AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE POOR.

THE transfer of the greater functions of charity from the church to some other agency had become necessary at about the date of the development of the modern state.

The charitable institutions and orders of the church were growing more and more corrupt through the vast accumulation of wealth, and the method of the church was becoming more and more demoralizing in its general effect upon society.

Reformation might have been possible, but the reformation which actually came divided the church into various sects, and hopelessly destroyed that unity which was necessary to efficiency and economy of charitable administration.

The state meanwhile had become so far Christianized that it was able to assume with measurable fitness the new and more delicate function of charity, though the transition from church to state was not effected without some violence and much distress.

(For a clear understanding of this period of transition, special study must be made of the decline of the monastic orders, and also of the poor laws of the modern states, especially of England.)

The question at once arises, which should be fairly met, Why Pauperism is a greater problem under the modern or Christianized state, than under the ancient civilization.

One answer is that Christianity, acting through the state, has undertaken to do for the "unfit," that is, the unable, what primitive society and to a degree the pagan civilizations had allowed nature to do with them. Nature, if unaided, acts rigidly upon the principle of the survival of the fittest. Christianity comes in to protect, nourish, and even perpetuate the weak and unable. To such degree has this care been extended that the charge has been made, "that we have reason to suspect that the unfit are becoming specialized into a new parasitic variety of the human species, possessing different habits and different instincts to those which influence the rest of mankind."

¹ For statement of the different parts of the course, and their relation to each other, see *Andover Review*, January, 1889, or February, 1891.

A second answer is that Christianity, in breaking up the forms of organized greed and cruelty, like slavery, set free a vast amount of "unfit" material. "There is a close association between the growth of freedom and the growth of pauperism. It is scarcely too much to say that the latter is the price we pay for the former." Toynbee's "Industrial Revolution," p. 96.

A third and partial answer is that Christianity has gradually diverted human energy from the arts of war to the arts of peace, and in so doing has introduced new sources of pauperism. Industrialism is not all a gain. It creates a social residuum as well as a surplus of wealth. It enriches society faster than it can develop and maintain proper channels of distribution. Hence the spectacle of an industrial proletariat shading down into pauperism.

1. THE RELATIVE PLACE OF THE FUNCTION OF CHARITY IN THE MODERN STATE.

Statistics are less accessible and less reliable at this point of administration than at any other. Methods of classification vary so much under different governments that few comparative statements can be made. The statistics of the British government are the most complete in respect to charitable administration.

There are in Great Britain a little over a million of paupers, maintained at an annual cost of \$40,000,000. The annual charge for the army is \$90,000,000, for the navy \$60,000,000, for the department of law and justice \$30,000,000, for education \$30,000,000.

The reports of the United States census are as yet entirely incomplete in the registration of paupers. Recourse must be had to state reports, or to the reports of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections. A few state reports may be quoted to illustrate the amount of charitable administration in the United States.

Michigan: maintains about 45,000 paupers, outdoor and indoor, at an annual cost of \$650,000; in addition to the maintenance of 2,500 insane at a cost of \$500,000.

Ohio: paupers, outdoor and indoor, 54,000; cost, \$1,100,000; insane, 6,000; cost \$800,000.

New York: the whole cost for the dependent and defective classes (this includes criminals) exceeds \$12,000,000.

Massachusetts: paupers, outdoor and indoor, 62,000; cost, \$2,000,000; insane, 6,800; cost, \$900,000.

In Germany the charitable function of the state is associated with the system of industrial insurance, of which a careful study should be made in contrast with the poor laws of England. "Bismarck and State Socialism," Dawson, pp. 109-127.

2. THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITY.

The original theory rested upon the doctrine of the natural right of all in the land. The theory has been abandoned, but it underlies the poor-law system of England.

"It is an admitted maxim of social policy that the first charge on land must always be the maintenance of the people reared upon it. This is the principle of the English poor law. Society exists for the preservation of property, but subject to the condition that the abundance of the few shall only be enjoyed by first making provision for the necessities of the many." — Nicholls, *Hist. of English Poor Law*, Introd., p. 2.

Another theory, to which only an incidental value attaches, is that of the self-defense of society. Babbage states it as follows : —

“Whenever, for the purposes of government, we arrive in any state of society at a class so miserable as to be in want of the common necessities of life, a new principle comes into action. The usual restraints, which are sufficient for the well-fed, are often useless in checking the demands of hungry stomachs. Hence . . . it may be expedient, in a merely economical point of view, to supply gratuitously the wants of even able-bodied persons, if it can be done without creating crowds of additional applicants.”

The true theory upon which the state has begun to act, in distinction from that of natural rights in the soil or of the self-defense of society, is the theory of the social conscience : —

“Every society, upon arriving at a certain stage of civilization, finds it positively necessary for its own sake—that is to say, for the satisfaction of its own humanity, and for the due performance of the purposes for which societies exist—to provide that no person, no matter what has been his life, or what may be the consequences, shall perish for want of the bare necessities of existence.” — Fowle, “The Poor Law,” p. 10.

3. THE SUBJECTS OF THE CHARITY OF THE STATE.

Who ought to be supported at the public charge? The question relates to the number and character of those supported, and to the manner of their support. And the answer concerns the poor, who are yet able to pay taxes, as well as the very poor who are helped.

The following principle of administration was adopted by the Commission on the Amendment of the Poor Law of England (1839) : —

“The fundamental principle with respect to the legal relief of the poor is that the condition of the pauper ought to be, on the whole, less eligible than that of the independent laborer. The equity and expediency of this principle are equally obvious. Unless the condition of the pauper is, on the whole, less eligible than that of the independent laborer, the law destroys the strongest motives to good conduct, steady industry, providence, and frugality among the laboring classes, and induces persons of idleness to throw themselves upon the poor-rates for support. But if the independent laborer sees that a recourse to the poor-rates will, while it protects him against destitution, place him in a less eligible position than that to which he can attain by his own industry, he is left to the undisturbed influence of all those motives which prompt mankind to exertion, forethought, and self-denial. On the other hand, the pauper has no just ground of complaint, if at the same time that his physical wants are amply provided for, his condition should be less eligible than that of the poorest class of those who contribute to his support.”

To the same end is the following extract from an address by Mrs. Lowell before the Conference of Charities and Corrections (1890) : —

“Public relief is money paid by the bulk of the community (every community is, of course, composed mainly of those who are working hard to obtain a livelihood) to certain members of the community, not, however, paid voluntarily or spontaneously by those interested in the individuals receiving it, but paid by public officers from money raised by taxation. The only justification for the expenditure of public money (money raised by taxation) is that it is necessary for the public good. That certain persons need certain things is no reason for supplying them with those things from the public funds. Before this can be rightly done, it is necessary to prove that it is good for the community at large that it should be done.

“It is always necessary, also, in considering the expenditure of public funds, to give up the notion that these funds come from an indefinitely large central source of supply which can be drawn upon constantly without affecting any one.

There is no such central source of supply. Every dollar raised by taxation comes out of the pocket of some individual, usually a poor individual, and makes him so much the poorer; and therefore the question is between the man who earned the dollar by hard work, and needs it to buy himself and his family a day's food, and the man who, however worthy and suffering, did not earn it, but wants it to be given him to buy himself and his family a day's food. If the man who earned it wishes to divide it with the other man, it is usually a desirable thing that he should do so, and at any rate it is more or less his own business; but that the law, by the hand of a public officer, should take it from him and hand it over to the other man, seems to be an act of tyranny and injustice, which, if carried far enough, and repeated often enough, leads to a condition of things where there is not sufficient produced for everybody, and therefore all suffer, — the men who earn the dollars as well as those who do not earn them.

"It is good for the community that no one should be allowed to starve; therefore, it is a legitimate thing that the public money should be used to prevent such a possibility, and this justifies the giving of public relief in extreme cases of distress, when starvation is imminent. Where, however, shall be found the proof that starvation is imminent? Only by putting such conditions upon the giving of public relief that, presumably, persons not in danger of starvation will not consent to receive it. The less that is given the better for every one, the giver and the receiver; and therefore the conditions must be hard, though never degrading. On the contrary, they must be elevating, and this is by no means incompatible with severity."

In the application of these principles to state aid, the subject of indoor (or institutional) or outdoor aid becomes a matter of much difference of opinion. On the one hand, it is urged that the institutional test is the only clear test of poverty; on the other hand, it is urged that one chief end of charity should be to preserve the self-respect of the recipient. The present tendency is away from outdoor relief in order to systematize charity, and reduce it to the greatest practicable economy; and yet outdoor relief is practiced in all states, and is strongly advocated by some administrators as a necessary and proper mode of relief.

See Professor Fawcett on "Pauperism, Causes and Remedies," General Booth's "In Darkest England," and also discussions in recent annual reports of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections.

The classes in society, with respect to which there is no question as to the full duty of the state, are: —

(1.) The insane, of which class there is a marked increase in all countries. The report of the State Board of Massachusetts for 1889 gives an increase of sixty per cent., compared with the report for 1879, while the population of the State had increased but twenty-five per cent.

(2.) The incurably sick, the feeble in body or mind, and the aged.

(3.) Orphans, and the children of destitute or depraved parents.

The children of the state constitute a proper subject of special study, including the parental and the protective relation of the state toward them, child labor, and the school life of the child.

The authorities to be consulted are chiefly the poor laws, factory laws, and school laws of the different States, and of the governments of Great Britain, France, and Germany.

4. THE AGENCIES OF THE STATE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITY.

These are of two kinds: —

(1.) Administrative, including the state or county or town boards, and all under the direct appointment of the state, as the superintendents of institutions.

(2.) Advisory, or in some cases supervisory boards. These are virtually commissions, with more or less power, and are to be found in fifteen States of the Union. These commissions usually have the right of inspection and examination of all public, and in some cases of private, institutions, the right to call for reports, and the right to advise new and special legislation.

To these agencies under the direct control of the State should be added those which may be classed as auxiliaries, like the Board of Associated Charities in the various cities. See Gurteen's "Handbook of Charity."

The study of the working machinery of any more advanced State, like Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, or Michigan, is advised; and also familiarity with the administration of local institutions,—insane asylums, almshouses, reformatories, and homes or cottages for children.

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

II.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

THIS is often called the Industrial Age. It might, with equal propriety, be called the Age of Cities.

According to Bulletin No. 52, of the Census of 1890, the proportion of our total population dwelling in cities of 8,000 or more inhabitants was, 3.35 per cent. in 1790; 3.97 in 1800; 4.93 in 1810; 4.93 in 1820; 6.72 in 1830; 8.52 in 1840; 12.49 in 1850; 16.13 in 1860; 20.93 in 1870; 22.57 in 1880; 29.12 in 1890! This is an increase from one thirtieth to nearly one third of the population, and represents a total of 18,235,670 in 1890 as against 131,472 in 1790. It will be noticed that the increase has been mostly during the last half century. During the fifty years preceding 1840 the urban percentage had risen only to 8.52, or but a little more than doubled, while in 1890 the percentage of 1840 had more than trebled.

But this does not tell the whole story. In the North Atlantic Division the urban percentage is 51.58, or more than half; in the North Central Division it is 25.90; in the Western Division it is 29.74; in the South Central 10.45, and in the South Atlantic Division 16.04.

Even in the great agricultural section of the country the urban population is vastly more important than at the beginning of the century, and the most congested divisions are those which contain five sixths of the entire population, that is, the North Atlantic and North Central divisions. The growth of the urban population has been out of all proportion to the growth of the total population. During the last decade, in the North Atlantic Division, the urban population increased 43.53 per cent., while the total increased but 19.95 per cent., and about the same proportion obtains in the North Central Division. In the South Central and South Atlantic divisions the urban population increased 58.88 per cent., while the total increased but 20.07. In the case of single States the proportion of urban population is even more striking. In Massachusetts it is 69.90; Rhode Island, 78.89; Connecticut, 50.58; New York, 59.50; Pennsylvania, 40.93; Illinois, 38.77.

A very similar state of things prevails in Europe. Brückner, in "Mayer's Statistisches Archiv," in an exhaustive article upon the "Evolution of the City Population in the German Empire," works upon the basis

of the German census of 1885 (that of December 1, 1890, not yet being accessible). He reminds us that in 1801 London, now upwards of five, had not reached her first million (864,000), while Berlin, now toward two, had but 173,440; and that while the total population of Germany wanted considerable of doubling between 1816-1885, the great cities increased more than fourfold. Here, too, as in the United States, the increase has been greatest in recent years; the increase from 1861-1885, as compared with that for 1816-1861, being as five to three.

Defining "great cities" as those of more than 100,000 inhabitants, it appears that they have increased 100 per cent. in the twenty-four years between 1861-1885, while the total population of the Empire increased but twenty per cent., which means, of course, that, if the cities were excluded, no gain of the country population would appear, probably a loss. These same great cities formed with their suburbs but 8.56 per cent. of the population in 1867, as against 12.74 per cent. in 1885. Again, while the population of the Empire increased annually in the five years before 1885 seven tenths of one per cent., that of the great cities increased two and seven tenths per cent., or three times as fast. Districts of less than 2,000 exhibit a small annual loss. Of the total increase within the Empire from 1867 to 1885, twenty-five per cent. was absorbed by cities of over 100,000; twenty-one per cent. by cities between 20,000 and 100,000; twenty-five per cent. by cities between 5,000 and 20,000; fourteen per cent. by cities between 2,000 and 5,000; and the remaining thirteen per cent. belonged to country districts, although the latter in 1867 contained sixty-five per cent. of the total population. Expressed differently, the country districts gained thirteen where they should have gained sixty. Their birth rate being higher than the urban birth rate, they lost to the city forty-seven out of every hundred. The German census of December 1, 1890, shows an even greater growth of city population.

The figures for England, taken from the "Statesman's Year Book," show a similar state of things. In England fifty-six per cent. of the population live in towns of over 10,000 inhabitants, and their rate of growth in the ten years preceding 1881 — the last figures available — was nineteen per cent., while the rural population increased only seven per cent. London, with its suburbs, increased twenty-two per cent. In Scotland forty-three per cent. of the population lived in cities of over 10,000. The urban increase for the same decade was seventeen per cent., while the rural population *decreased* about four per cent. The English census, just completed, is said to evidence the same depopulation of the country districts.

According to Rauchberg,¹ the urban population of France in 1886, upon a minimum of 2,000 inhabitants, comprised thirty-six per cent. of the population, as against twenty-four in 1846; leaving to the rural districts sixty-four, as against seventy-six in 1846. Here, as in Germany, the attractive power of the city seems to be in direct ratio to its size. In the twenty-five years from 1861 to 1886, cities with a population between 10,000 and 15,000 increased thirty-three per cent. The proportion rises gradually to fifty-one per cent. in cities between 50,000 and 100,000. There seems to be a law of social as well as of material gravitation.

It seems hardly necessary to state that this modern growth of cities is not an *internal* growth, that is, not at all owing to a surplus of births

¹ *Archiv für Sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, Zweite Jahrgang, Zweites Heft.

over deaths. It is mainly external, by accretions, immigration from rural districts. This fact is easily accepted and indisputable, but let us dwell upon it. In the five years from 1880 to 1885 the annual surplus of births over deaths in Germany was about one per cent., while the annual increase of city populations was nearly two and a half times as great. Again, according to the census of 1875 there were in Berlin 231,135 persons who had moved into the city during the three years preceding. In 1885, out of every 1,000 inhabitants in Berlin, 576 were born outside the city; in Hanover the proportion was 612; in Frankfort-on-the-Main, 651; in Leipsic, 644. The best showing was made by Aix-la-Chapelle, namely 383. In short, from one third to two thirds of the population came from outside the city. Out of every 1,000 persons in Paris in 1885, 647 were born elsewhere. Professor A. B. Hart of Harvard University states¹ that of the 362,000 inhabitants of Boston in 1885, only 135,000 were born in the city itself. In Washington one third of the whites, resident, were born outside the city. If one will follow the census bulletins of 1890, dealing with population by counties, the same gain of the cities at the expense of the rural districts is everywhere noticeable. To quote from "The Nation:" "From Schoodie Lake on the eastern borders of Maine to Decatur, Ala., is about 1,300 miles as the crow flies. It would be possible in going from one of these points to another to travel nine miles in every ten through counties, the population of each of which, outside the bounds of their cities, has decreased in the interval between the tenth and eleventh censuses." The general rule is that purely agricultural counties have lost population, and counties with the largest towns have gained most. In Maine, Franklin has lost 1,127; Hancock, 817; Oxford, 2,041; Waldo, 4,704; Knox, 1,390; Lincoln, 2,825. In Connecticut the gains vary from two per cent. in Litchfield to thirty-three in New Haven and Fairfield counties. In Vermont eight out of the fourteen counties have lost, and the State has gained but four tenths of one per cent.

We conclude, then, that the astonishing development of the city population in modern times is largely at the expense of the rural districts. The birth rate in the country is high, the death rate is low, and the surplus population seeks the cities. Let us see, now, whether we can determine how much of the growth of a city results from an excess of births over deaths within the city. Within the city the birth rate and death rate vary together. According to Brückner's tables of German cities, a purely manufacturing city, Chemnitz, had, in 1885, the highest birth rate, forty-five per thousand; Berlin had thirty-eight; Frankfort, the richest city in Germany, had the lowest, twenty-nine per thousand. The death rate, too, was highest in Chemnitz, thirty-three per thousand, and lowest in Frankfort, nineteen per thousand. Oldendorff² supports the inference that the birth rate and death rate are both highest among the poor. He states that in Erfurt, among the working classes, thirty per cent. of the children die within the first year, among the middle classes only seventeen per cent., and among the upper classes only nine per cent. Further, the infant mortality is much larger in cities than in the rural districts, and varies with the city population. In Saxony the infant mortality was forty per cent. among the urban population against thirty-three among the rural population. In Prussia the ratio was twenty-five

¹ *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, January, 1890.

² *Archiv. für s. G. und S.*, B. i., H. i.

to twenty-one. In the German Empire the mortality among infants during the first year is twenty-eight per cent. in the great cities, twenty-four in cities of medium size, and twenty-two in the rural districts.

It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the immigrants from the country are usually in the early prime of life, and that marriages and births are much more frequent among any given number of immigrants than among the same number of natives of the city, many of whom would be children and aged persons. Immigrants from the country contribute much more than their own numbers to the growth of the city population. So much more that it may be accepted as a general law, that any city population, if left to itself, would die out within four generations. This, and not the growth of cities from the outside, seems to me the most startling phenomenon of city life. This is the theme of a recent brilliant German work of George Hansen.¹ Though statistics are unfortunately imperfect, or non-existent, they support his contention that a great city is a bottomless whirlpool upon whose surface objects may play, for a moment, but into whose depths they must ultimately be drawn and disappear. Hansen relates that a friend inquired of him one day in Munich, "Have you ever seen a person born in Munich? I have already made inquiries, and no one has seen such a one; I do not think there are any." In fact, in 1880 thirty-seven per cent. of the inhabitants of Munich were born there, but about twenty-five per cent. were children under five years of age, leaving only twelve persons in every hundred over five years of age who were natives of Munich! Hansen builds upon very complete Bavarian statistics of 1871 and 1880, which fortunately cover the relation of urban to rural populations. These showed that only sixty-one per cent. of the inhabitants of Bavarian cities were born in them. A special census of the city of Leipzig in 1875 disclosed the fact that, from the age of fifteen upward, the immigrants surpassed the native born, which is probably to be accepted as a general law, though the external growth of Leipzig has been extraordinary. In 1875 only 363 out of every thousand were born in the city. The following table tells its own story:—

Age.	Percentage of Total.	
	Born in Leipzig.	Elsewhere.
0-5	24.36	2.19
5-10	15.48	3.62
10-15	12.24	4.92
15-20	10.75	14.24
20-25	8.10	19.20
25-30	6.10	13.71
30-35	4.90	9.76

Expressed differently: from birth to ninety years the relative percentage of those born in Leipzig sinks gradually from eighty-six per cent. to seven per cent., while the percentage of those born elsewhere rises from thirteen to ninety-two per cent. As seventy-six per cent. of those over fourteen years of age were not Leipzig born, if all possible deductions be made for transients of all kinds, it is safe to say that the population of Leipzig consisted half of natives and half of immigrants. As the latter is a constantly running stream, it follows, to quote Hansen, "that the native city population is entirely displaced every two generations through the immigration from without." With this conclusion the Bavarian statistics are in complete accord. In Munich, during the five years

¹ *Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen*, München, 1889.

following 1870, the births were 37,549, the deaths 37,320, while the population actually increased 23,331, of course entirely at the expense of the open country. Remembering the fact already noted, that the immigrants contribute most to the marriage rate and birth rate, and least to the death rate, it is safe to say that the city of Munich, if left to itself, would have lost population rapidly: as has been said of mediæval Frankfort: "Without the continuous stream of foreign settlers, its very existence would have been impossible." Goethe, in his "Conversations," says: "Our country people secure us from total decay and destruction. The rural population may be regarded as a magazine from which the forces of declining mankind are always recruited and refreshed. But just go into our great towns and you will feel a great difference." Charles Booth, "Labor and Life in East London," vol. i. p. 502, says: "The London-born workman feels that it is not the immigrant but the native, who goes to the wall." Again, page 533, after characterizing dock labor as a "sort of a buffer between ordinary productive industry and the poorhouse," Mr. Booth says: "Such labor is chiefly recruited from the ranks of Londoners, for seventy in every hundred were born in London against fifty-two for the whole adult male population of East London and Hackney, or forty-six for the whole of London. The vast majority of the dock laborers from outside are practically Londoners, having lived for over ten years in London." Again, in speaking of a somewhat similar class, the stevedores, he says: "There are about 8,600 stevedores proper engaged in the port of London, . . . and of these about seventy-five per cent. are estimated to be Londoners by birth. . . . In the main, casual dock labor is a London employment, and countrymen only filter into it in small numbers after many years of residence in the metropolis." Mr. Booth shows further that the proportion of countrymen in any trade increases in proportion to the skill and strength required. "There is no doubt of the inferiority of London labor, as indeed that of any capital city."

In his second volume Mr. Booth shows even more clearly that the "submerged tenth" in London is practically London born. Hansen, dividing the population into three classes, — the agricultural, the middle class, the town laborers, — concludes that "only the first class, the agricultural, possesses permanent vitality; from its overflow the city population is formed, displaced, and renewed." "Of the town population a small fraction, of both middle and laboring classes, returns to the agricultural condition, the greater fraction dies out, the remainder, in its progress toward decay, forms the class of unskilled labor and the proletariat." Hansen obtains an effective proof of this law by a study of the religious composition — between Catholic and Protestant — of the German cities and rural districts, showing that the equilibrium point in the proportion of Catholics to Protestants within a city is reached when such proportion exactly coincides with the proportion in the rural districts from which it draws its inhabitants.

Now, I am far from saying that this general law, that a city is an inland lake fed by constant streams, but without an outlet, is without exceptions or without modifications in different cities, and particularly in new countries, but I have no question that it is a general law. Quatrefages says "M. Boudin could not find a pure-blooded Parisian whose ancestry could be traced for more than three generations."

Here is not the place to dwell at length upon the causes of the inordinate growth of cities in modern times. They are briefly: —

(1.) The establishment of great manufacturing industries that make it advantageous both for the manufacturer and the men to be in large towns.

(2.) The development of the railroad and transportation system, which makes it necessary for industries to have the best shipping and distributing facilities, that is, to be at railroad centres.

(3.) The quickening of general intelligence, and the unfolding of a complex civilization which can only be enjoyed in the whirl of town life.

(4.) The neglect of rural population by economists and governments, placing upon them undue burdens, and practically excluding them from government.

(5.) An equal neglect on the part of social reformers and the churches to do anything to quicken and make interesting rural life.

(6.) The fact that in our enormous material development the great prizes are only to be won at great centres, to which one hundred go, though only one can succeed. Men are by nature gamblers.

D. Collin Wells.

BOWDOIN COLLEGE.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

DIE HEILIGE SCHRIFT DES ALTEN TESTAMENTES. In Verbindung mit Professor Baethgen in Greifswald, Professor Guthe in Leipzig, Professor Kamphausen in Bonn, Professor Kittel in Breslau, Lic. Marti in Basel, Professor Rothstein in Halle, Professor Ruetschi in Bern, Professor Ryssel in Zürich, Professor Siegfried in Jena, Professor Socin in Leipzig, übersetzt und herausgegeben von E. KAUTZSCH, Professor der Theologie in Halle. Parts I.—III., pp. 1–240 (Gen. i.—Josh. xv.). Freiburg i. B.: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1890–1891. Subscription price, 9 Mrk.

This is the beginning of a new translation of the Old Testament by a company of German scholars whose names give good promise for the thoroughness of the work. The principles which they have laid down for themselves are substantially the same which have guided Weizsäcker in his admirable version of the New Testament, and Kautzsch and Socin in their "Genesis." As these principles have been sufficiently exposed in notices of the volumes just named,¹ it is not necessary to give an extended account of them here. Professor Kautzsch and his associates aim to interpret the Old Testament in the light of modern scholarship, in a version which shall do for our day what Luther did with such unexampled success for his own, — make the prophets talk German. The basis of the translation is, of course, the Massoretic text; but although sufficiently conservative in this particular, the translators do not feel bound to follow it against better readings preserved, for example, in the Septuagint; nor to pretend to understand it where it is wholly unintelligible. All departures from the Hebrew text are indicated in the translation by an unobtrusive sign, and will be recorded in an appendix. The place of unintelligible words is filled by . . . ; the sense suggested by the context is pointed out in footnotes. In the Pentateuch and Historical Books, the components which are discovered by the critical analysis are desig-

¹ *Andover Review*, vol. x. pp. 651–653; 653, 654.

nated by signatures in the margin. In this department of criticism, also, a wise reserve is apparent in the use of these signs. No attempt is made to represent the minuter and more controverted features of the analysis, especially in the separation of *E* from *J*, and of the different strata of *P*. In the historical books and prophets, dates will be given in the margin, as far as they can be fixed with any confidence. The results of Assyrian research, which has put the chronology of the eighth and seventh centuries on a solid basis, will, of course, be fully recognized.

Such a translation must serve in many ways a useful purpose. It exhibits better than can be done in any other way the actual state of the interpretation of the Old Testament, and becomes thus a landmark of progress. Comparison with the version of De Wette, the last real revision of which was made about fifty years ago, enables us to estimate what has been achieved in the half century; while at the same time it shows us how much remains to be done for the understanding of the Old Testament. To the Old Testament student and the minister, it will be a very useful addition to his exegetical apparatus; to the student of history it will supply the urgent need of a version which represents the present state of learning in criticism and interpretation. There must be many American scholars to whom such a translation will be welcome.

A somewhat careful examination of the parts which have thus far appeared confirms the high opinion of the work which we were ready to form from the prospectus. The scholars who have been engaged upon it have attained in a high degree the objects at which they aimed. The interpretation is sober and cautious, rather than novel and ingenious, fairly representing the consensus of scholars where such an agreement exists, and following the more prudent opinion in cases of doubt. In matters of criticism the same sobriety is observable. The German is clear and readable. The book is well printed, and published at a price which puts it within the reach of everybody. We wish for it the widest circulation, not only in Germany but in the lands of the English tongue. And we hope that the good example may stir up some of our own scholars to do a like work for us. For, whatever may be the ultimate fate of the Revised Version, it cannot fill the place of such a translation as this.

George F. Moore.

DIE GENESIS, mit äusserer Unterscheidung der Quellenschriften, übersetzt von E. KAUTZSCH, Professor zu Halle a. S., und A. SOCIN, Professor zu Leipzig. Zweite vielfach verbesserte Auflage. Freiburg i. B. 1891. Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

The first edition of this work was noticed in the "Andover Review" for December, 1888 (vol. x. 653 f.). It is a spirited and faithful translation of Genesis into modern German, in which the different elements of which the book is composed are distinguished by different kinds of type, thus presenting at a glance the results of the critical analysis. That it met and satisfied a real need is sufficiently attested by the fact that a second edition was necessary in little more than two years after its first appearance. As the stereotype evil does not afflict German scholarship as it does that of England and America, the authors had thus the opportunity and occasion to revise their work in the light of the criticisms which came to them from all quarters, and of their own second judg-

ment. Evidence of the thoroughness of this revision are visible on almost every page, especially in the translation. A number of the bolder renderings have given place to less striking expressions, or to the more generally accepted interpretation. If the new edition has thus a somewhat less pronounced individuality than its predecessor, it is doubtless better suited to serve as a basis for academic lectures. In the analysis the changes are less noticeable, though they are by no means lacking. In regard to some of them, opinions will differ as to whether the first or the second thought was the better; but on the whole the improvement is to be recognized. I take pleasure in calling attention again to the work, and in commending it to all who are interested in Old Testament studies.

George F. Moore.

THE BOOK OF SUN-DIALS. Collected by Mrs. ALFRED GATTY. Edited by H. K. F. EDEN and ELEANOR LLOYD. 3d edition. London: George Bell & Sons. 1890.

To the modern reader Mrs. Gatty is perhaps best known through her gifted daughter, Juliana Horatia Ewing, whose exquisite charm and grace have moved us all. But many of the generation now in the midway of life, upon hearing whose daughter she was whose tales so touched and delighted them, welcomed her with the joy of recognition, and the pleasure of finding the charm of the mother added to by the graces of the daughter. Many of such readers carry pleasant memories of the "Parables from Nature," or "Proverbs Illustrated," the first of which was republished in this country by D. Appleton & Co. in 1861.

From the present edition of 1890 it does not appear when Mrs. Gatty's volume on sun-dials was originally published. Her daughter, Miss H. K. F. Gatty, now Mrs. Eden, writes the preface to the second edition in 1888, which is reproduced without apparent additions. Mrs. Gatty's interest in the subject began in her early childhood, we are told, from the stone dial over the porch entrance of her father's church near Richmond, Yorkshire. Her father, the Rev. A. J. Scott, D. D., was "the friend and chaplain of Lord Nelson, who died in his arms at Trafalgar." From 1816 to 1840 he was Vicar of Catterick, and it was from her early love for the dial of Catterick Church, with its motto of "Fugit Hora, ora," that the delightful book before us grew.

The introduction is an admirable essay upon ancient methods of measuring time, from the dial of Ahaz and the Egyptian pillars to the better known examples of the Middle Age. England is rich in sun-dials; they were the ornaments of a nobleman's seat, and the useful centre of the market-place. In 1631 the Company of Clockmakers was incorporated, and given jurisdiction over dials as well as clocks and watches. They were directed to "search for and break up all bad and deceitful works."

But, interesting as the introduction is, the curious reader will hasten to the body of the work, where, with the addenda, nearly nine hundred dials are described and their mottoes given. The flight of time has always been a fruitful theme to poet and moralist; "Fugit hora sic est vita" is the burden of many a motto.

"As these hours doth pass away,
So doth the life of men decay."

This simplest conception of the relation of time and life seems to expand with the idea of improving the hours.

"I am a shade ; a shadow, too, art thou.

I mark the time ; say, Gossip, dost thou see ? "

"Lose no time," a large dial of a Lancashire church admonishes.

"Swift runs y^e time

This diall face doth show

Ye houres are fewe

That ye shall pass belowe "

is to be found in Yorkshire. This shire seems particularly rich in quaint and suggestive inscriptions, or else has been particularly well searched by Mrs. Gatty, whose early home it was.

Some of the French mottoes are ingenious and clever, while most of them seem to have a baldness of statement which takes from them the charm of the English archaic simplicity. "*Cette Montre par son ombre montre que comme l'ombre passent nos jours*" is one of the best.

Turning from "*Mox Nox*" and other distinctly mortuary verse, we come to the more cheerful dial inscriptions. "*Si sol deficit, nemo me respicit,*" is the plain statement in the cloisters of Chambery, which is lifted into poetry as the idea advances. "I mark none but sunny hours," an old English dial declares.

"Let others tell of storms and showers,
I'll only count your sunny hours."

"The hours, unless the hours be bright,
It is not mine to mark :
I am the prophet of the light,
Dumb when the Sun is dark."

Many members of this family of bright hours are scattered through the collection.

The warning flight of time has been fully treated by dialists ; the sun, too, has had full justice done it, but the truthfulness of the dial has been little celebrated. There are two or three dials, one of 1680 and one of 1722, with a motto from Virgil, *Georg. I. 463*, "*Solem quis dicere falsum audeat ?*" and an Italian one,—

"The maker may err,
The iron may err,
I never err,"

but this idea has not been much used in inscriptions. No English collection would be complete without the curious puns they delight in.

"We must die all "

has quite a following, including "We shall — 1693" and

"Time tide
Doth waist
Therefore
Make haste
We shall — " (*scil. DIAL, i. e. die-all*),

which is to be found in Newcastle. Among the "Notes on Remarkable Dials," and the Introduction to the Addenda, much curious and interesting information is to be found in regard to early Norman or even Saxon dials, as well as those of later date. The famous Seven Dials stone,

which it seems were really only six, is carefully described. Very interesting, also, are the dials belonging to famous people — Sir Walter Scott's "Watch weel," and Miss Harriet Martineau's, with "Come, light, visit me!" a motto of her own which had Wordsworth's approval. Many sun-dials have been recently erected in England, apparently. Within two years since the second edition of this book was published, the editors say they have added sixty mottoes to the collection. Many of them owe their existence to the interest created by the book. Some of the new inscriptions are excellent, while others, as Lady Burdett Coutts's in St. Pancras Gardens, are too literary in form. The same objection applies in a lesser degree to Whittier's charming motto for Dr. Henry J. Bowditch's dial: —

"With warning hand I mark Time's rapid flight
From life's glad morning to its solemn night:
Yet, through the dear God's love, I also show
There 's light above me by the shade below."

This is the only American dial given, and perhaps until recently was the only one to be mentioned. A fine dial has lately been set in the old stone wall which marked the northern boundary of the grounds of Santa Barbara Mission in California. The highway passes the church now, and runs through a break in the wall, so that the dial is in plain sight of all the passers-by. It is a single stone, thirty inches square, of a fine gray color, with the dialing and numerals deeply cut and gilded. In the angle which the diverging lines above the iron gnomon make is the motto,

"Lux Dei vitæ viam monstrat;
Sed umbra horam atque fidem docet."

It is a pretty sight to see the picturesque native Californians stopping to read the Latin, in their softened Spanish accent, with evident comprehension.

The book closes with a valuable treatise on the construction of dials, by W. Richardson, which gives it a practical as well as a literary value. We cannot have old dials, but surely many a town and village can boast of a mathematical student who would delight in constructing one. And in our hurried American life the shadow should teach its old lessons, not only of redeeming the time, but of steadfastness and peace.

The book which opens so pleasant a field of study is handsomely printed, with good woodcuts as illustrations, and furnished with a full index. The mottoes are arranged in alphabetical order, the only possible way of classification, perhaps, where the sense is so various. Altogether, it should receive a hearty welcome upon this side of the Atlantic as well as in the mother country.

Caroline Hazard.

PEACE DALE, R. I.

A Concise Cyclopædia of Religious Knowledge. Biblical, Biographical, Theological, Historical, and Practical. Edited by *Elias Benjamin Sanford*, M. A. New York: Charles Webster & Company. 1890. Pp. 985. — This large, handsomely bound, and clearly printed book (although not on paper of the finest quality) seems to be a fairly accurate statement of most religious matters of present general interest. It

would be better if the editor had recast it more thoroughly in his own mind, and studied to bring out more distinctly the characteristics and salient points, and also if, in some matters, he had taken more account of the latest discussions and results. For instance, he still puts down Buddhists as one third of mankind, neglecting Dr. Legge's exposition of the cause of this error, the correction of which reduces them a good deal below one tenth. After all the clatter of the last few years over Indulgences, perhaps the author thought it judicious to leave out the subject altogether. But in his few lines on Tetzels he perpetuates the stupid popular misapprehensions of the real causes of offense given by this venal and impudent friar. He borrows a good deal (avowedly) from Cassell, as well as from Benham and various others, but in borrowing his articles about Americans should not have been so careless as to make Dr. Edward Robinson a professor in *Andover* during his last twenty-five years, — an inexcusable error.

The book shows a temperate and impartial spirit throughout. The article on the Church of England, for instance, allows the author unimpeded opportunity for his endeavors to detach her from her Roman filiation through a grotesquely impossible establishment of Trophimus as Bishop of Arles, who is even found likely to have given his apostolic father, returning from Spain, a flying excursion over to Britain, to communicate self-subsistence to a Church of Britain which has about as close identity with the English Church as our Union with the Iroquois Confederacy. The same author's fierce assault upon Calvinism shows of how little worth such people's boast of comprehensiveness is to be accounted. As Goldwin Smith says, Calvinists and Puritans were "liegemen of the truth," and therefore odious to all sacerdotal magicians. For though this would be a calumnious designation of the Anglo-Catholic party, it is not a calumnious designation of some of its extremists. On the other hand, the article on the Jesuits is so colorless that it gives no true idea of this not unfrequently beneficent and steadily malignant society, from either a friendly or a hostile point of view. In the article on Japan (a very good one) the author takes no account of the ill-warranted charges against the Jesuits of having plotted to subvert the national independence. He does no better justice to Port Royal than to her enemies.

The brief article on Hades, in a few lines, is absolutely perfect, and delicately discriminating. We note a few errors of detail that have caught our eye, some of them derived from more celebrated encyclopædias. Cardinals are not exclusively eligible to the papacy, though no other than a cardinal has been chosen for five hundred years. The Archbishop of Baltimore is not a primate, though largely so treated, and popularly so styled. When not a cardinal, he must sit, in a general council, with common archbishops. Bishop Alonzo Potter figures as Alonzo Porter. The few lines on Anglicans are not erroneous because simply unintelligible. St. Peter's is called a cathedral, which it is not, St. John Lateran being the cathedral of Rome. It is, as Stanley says, essentially "a gigantic private chapel" of the popes. Yet even Catholics often call it, loosely, a cathedral. Roman Catholics do not draw "a hard-and-fast," but an exceedingly elusive line between doctrine and discipline. Savonarola was not burnt, but strangled and his body burnt. The author should have mentioned that in 1569 his memory was solemnly rehabilitated by Rome. The statement that the Dominicans and Franciscans, even after their definite constitution, were originally laymen, appears

irreconcilable with the declaration of Wetzer and Welte, that Innocent III. deprived all monastic brethren out of holy orders of choir privileges. Canons and minor canons, in the Roman communion, need not be farther on in holy orders than subdeacons, if, indeed, minor canons need be beyond minor orders. But to require of a popular cyclopædia, in articles respecting this vast system, the astonishing accuracy of Professor F. H. Foster in the *Christian Literature Dictionary*, would be unreasonable. For all practical purposes, this work of Mr. Sanford is all that is needed by those who are likely to use it. Its account of Protestant, especially American, churches and societies, is full and authoritative. Individual names are admitted and excluded not quite as we should have dealt with them, which is as much as to say that the editor has followed his own point of view, and not ours. To quote Napoleon Bonaparte, with variation, there are a great many saints and only a limited number of pages to divide among them.

American Religious Leaders. Charles Grandison Finney. By G. Frederick Wright, D. D., LL. D., Professor in Oberlin Theological Seminary, Ohio. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1891. Pp. vi, 329. — A very effective presentation of the life of this great man of God, and, from the point of view of a disciple, of his theology. In our own judgment, the latter is presented at a length out of proportion to its actual abiding value in the whole circle of Christian truth. Powerful as it is, and in some of its aspects majestic, it is still provincial. Nay, as a particular phase of New England theology, it is the provinciality of a provinciality. We may be wrong in esteeming it hardly capable of catholic enlargement, but so it now seems to us. Mr. Finney himself was not wholly unconscious of this. We remember once hearing a remarkable sermon of his, from his Oberlin pulpit, in which he declared that all the forms of the New School theology, as contrasted with the Old, had a great, an indispensable critical value, but were by no means worth as much constructively. He rated the spiritual life of the New School churches as being then, in 1846, decidedly lower than that of the Old School, and ascribed it to their having attributed too much of a positive value to that whose value was mainly negative. Though, in his formal theology, he was, as to our natural state, little above the level of Pelagianism, we have heard him, when preaching from his heart and not from his note-book, not only acknowledge the fact of Original Sin, but call it, though hesitatingly, and recommended his hearers to call it, by its true name. And though he soon reverted to a comfortable persuasion of the sufficiency of his system, yet his endeavors to secure a pronounced Princetonian for his successor in the pulpit seem to show a recognition that the days of its specific importance were past. And, indeed, the full and admiring exposition of it by his biographer cannot save this scholastic framework of doctrine — necessarily scholastic, as being meant to meet scholasticism — from wearing rather a belated look in the world. Nevertheless, it accomplished its providential end of breaking down the barriers that had kept tens of thousands of strong minds and characters out of the kingdom of God. And to hear him, year after year, lay down the obligations under which the glorious character of the Creator laid his creatures to Him, would leave the hearer forever inexcusable for giving way to any of the plausibilities of unbelief. And though the more gracious aspects were kept too much in the shade, yet, as Dr. Campbell said, when he did preach the gospel, it was like the windings of the river of the water of life.

President Finney's coadjustment of justification and sanctification by no means secured such a stable equilibrium as the biographer infers. He never established himself firmly enough in the right line of doctrinal succession from the reformers. Holding, rather with the practical instinct of a revivalist than from any Biblical or rational necessity, to the absolute immutableness of the state entered upon at death, he exaggerated this so far as to deny — what to admit is something which even now horrifies a whole General Assembly — that purification from imperfections in the way of rational discipline is possible to the children of God after death, while he would not believe with the Westminster divines, and with a great part of modern Roman Catholicism, in any sudden or magical purification at death. The consequence was, that much of his preaching left the impression that eternity, for every believer, hung on his being, in the last second, in a state of sinless perfection. He was helped to this by his doctrine of the simplicity of moral action, so pungently and perfectly described by Dr. Henry B. Smith as "the complete triumph of system over consciousness." The consequence was, that a great deal of Oberlin piety had nothing like the restfulness of evangelical confidence, but was uneasy and agonizingly introspective. Mr. Finney used to seek an imperfect corrective in works breathing a profound but not over-healthy pietism, like the "Life of Madame Guyon." But after the withdrawal of the rich and deep but morbid and sentimental religion of President Mahan, and the coming in of various independent influences, this tone of things appears to have gradually changed for the better. However reactionary Oberlin may be, — and in our judgment she is lamentably so in some vital questions of the present, — there seems no reason for believing that her strong and practical Christian life contains now any discernible traces of this unprotestant element. We do not exactly see, by the way, what basis Mr. Finney's theology gives the biographer for interjecting a sneer, characteristic of his own particular school, at "the so-called Christian consciousness," — a sneer worthy of a Cardinal Caraffa, — but perhaps, if we examined it with sufficient care, we should discover it. President Finney, apart from the great truths wrought out in his own experience, took up the traditional opinions, and defended them with the usual Rabbinical arguments, good, bad, and indifferent. But, not being a Rabbi, but a prophet, he soon hurried over such things.

When Mr. Finney's mental energy began to decline, his lack of regular training became increasingly evident. Most of the sermons of his last years were lamentably "slack-twisted." But very few of other men's best efforts equaled, intellectually and spiritually, this detritus of age.

President Finney was too much like John Knox not to have a good deal of the spiritual tyrant in him. Although he loved, and after a fashion honored, John Morgan, who, above all his colleagues, breathed the spirit of historical theology and Christian scholarship, yet he ever and anon would snub him after the good old fashion of Luther and Melancthon. This afforded huge glee to little souls, but great grief to the judicious. But there are few men so great as this Christian Elijah whose character can be portrayed with fewer abatements. We have no claim to comprehensive acquaintance with American ministers, but we know of no one who, taking intellect, character, and spiritual power together, appears to us his equal, except his mighty superior, Jonathan Edwards, towards whom he was pervaded with so profound and filial a reverence:

Charles C. Starbuck.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By JOHN FISKE. In Two Volumes. Boston and New York : Houghton, Mifflin, and Company. Vol. I. Pp. xxi, 344. Vol. II. Pp. xii, 305. \$4.00 a set.

The gradual genesis of Mr. Fiske's works on the Revolutionary period is given at full in the preface. The "Critical Period of American History" is the third volume of this work, the narrative being continuous. Mr. Fiske hopes some day to give a manageable history of the United States, from 1492 to 1865. Meanwhile he has rightly judged that he might as well publish fragments as let them lie by him in manuscript.

Mr. Fiske does not know how to explain the general interest exhibited in a plain narrative of events already familiar. Some reasons, however, may be alleged. The narrative, while perfectly plain, and not seeking after startling effects or mysterious explanations, is so penetrated with a genuine sense of the genetic connections of things, that it takes on a teleological luminousness which cannot fail to be fascinating. The book is neither a presentation of events without causes, nor of causes without events, but of events that are causes and causes that become wide-reaching results. Then the author's individual judgment of men and facts is so thoroughly independent that he is not afraid to sympathize heartily with the *communis sensus* of the nation, and to write as "kindly man among his kind," which cannot fail to please us of the commonalty, so that we find it even agreeable to have our particular misapprehensions rectified, and our judgments rendered more enlightened and charitable. Moreover, the underlying enthusiasm takes the place of rhetorical elaboration, and is felt all the more for the matter-of-fact style of the narrative. Then the characterizations of men are superb, and the past is always related in the sense of the present and the future. It is not strange, therefore, if we of the people are greatly taken with Mr. Fiske's histories, as even we are able to spell out their merits.

Mr. Fiske portrays vividly the perpetual disputes of the eighteenth century between the colonies and the home government, engendering the fixed opinion in official circles at home that the Americans were queer, turbulent, and factious, whereas they were simply English freemen thrown locally out of the possibility of using the Parliament, and therefore obliged to find their political organs nearer by. It was not an intrinsic hatred of their liberties, but an inveterately conventional apprehension of the rights of the subject as hardly capable of transfer abroad, a way of thinking incapable of recognizing new forms of old nobility, which made the Lords of Trade eager for a colonial union which should depress the legislatures and exalt the crown. Franklin was equally eager for the union, but for a very different end. "The vast sweep of his intelligence," his wider intercourse with men, and his dual character as a native of Massachusetts and a citizen of Pennsylvania, made him the first Federalist. It shows how deep he went, that his project of 1754 contemplated that immediate federal control over the individual citizen, for federal ends, which could not be made endurable to our localism until impending disintegration forced us into it in 1789.

The author remarks that it shows the superior political advancement of the colonies at that time, kept alert as they were by danger, and having so many truly representative organs of their public life, that the only motive weighing much in England against the proposal to tax them was the fear that they might not like to part with their money. The

dignified protest of Massachusetts against taxation of the unrepresented was derided as "the raving of a parcel of wild enthusiasts." The non-representative character of the unreformed House of Commons made it mainly the organ of the aristocracy, and this had come under a singular subservience to the king. George did not devise the vexatious measures, but, having adopted them, he made them his own, so that the Revolution was a revolt against him personally, in quite as full a sense in fact as the Declaration of Independence expresses it in form. Mr. Fiske thinks that Americans, in their good-nature, have exaggerated his stupidity, and not laid due stress on the intensity of his vindictiveness and the depth of his insincerity. The nobility of Chatham made him frantic, and so he proceeded to do everything that Chatham abhorred. He even threw away Cuba and the Philippines because Pitt had acquired them, and turned Prussia into an enemy because Pitt had made her a friend. It was left for his grand-daughter, by her resolute refusal to make war on Germany in the interest of Denmark, to undo this last mischief, and to prepare the way for the unification of Teutonic and Protestant Europe, which has been emphasized by the solemn entry of her daughter's son into her capital.

Mr. Fiske, highly appreciating Mr. Lecky's dignity and candor, shows, by the quiet presentation of some of the intimate thoughts of our leaders, how far these, as well as the people, were from a ready acceptance of the necessity of separation. Occasional flashes of earlier prevision would be quite consistent with such an habitual feeling. The author is not sure but that, even after Saratoga, Chatham, had he lived, might have secured a dual unity of the Empire, virtual independence without so long an alienation. As it is, the triple unity of America, England, and Germany is a hope of the future, though not without anticipations in the present.

The Boston Tea-party is shown in a light which even enhances the popular enthusiasm over it. It was not until even the majestic legality of Samuel Adams had exhausted itself in the effort to find a quiet way out, that the one remaining way of force was resorted to, just so far as supreme necessity required, and no farther. And, says the author, it shows the mildness of New England civilization, that the careless shooting of half a dozen citizens evoked a horror that could find no other name for it than Massacre, while yet it could not be stirred to condemn the offending soldiers, who at least supposed themselves to be obeying orders. Concord and Lexington and Bunker Hill are described with as much vividness as Macaulay could give, and in a very much purer taste.

The author explains the misapprehended myth of the Mecklenburg declaration of independence, which for a while actually presented Jefferson as a plagiarist. The Mecklenburgers simply declared that royal authority should be treated as *de facto* suspended for the time being.

The frank loyalty with which Maryland entered into the union, though the proprietary government was deeply rooted in the affections of her people, and the stalwart excellence of the Maryland troops, are both noted.

The First and Second Blow at the Centre introduce the history of the war. The descriptions of the battles must be good, because even so dismally untactical a head as that of the present writer can see into them. They are helped by fourteen military maps.

The incompetency and mischievous meddlesomeness into which the

Continental Congress soon sank, after the grandeur of its first efforts, and after the draining out of its great men to other uses, is fully presented, as well as its wretched bad faith towards Burgoyne's army. It could not continue worthy of respect, with such a mere shadow of authority. God gave us a King of Men, and therefore we were held together. The infinite mischief wrought by local and ecclesiastical jealousies of the different colonies, within and without the army, is also made plain.

The blame of the substitution of that pompous nonentity, Gates, for Schuyler, is shown to rest more heavily on New England than we had been aware. Schuyler's "family was one of the most distinguished in New York, and an inherited zeal for the public service thrilled in every drop of his blood. No more upright or disinterested man could be found in America, and for bravery and generosity he was like the paladin of some mediæval romance. In spite of these fine qualities he was bitterly hated by the New England men, who formed a considerable portion of his army." He was a New Yorker and of Dutch descent, and upheld the right of New York to the "Hampshire Grants," and that was enough. Nevertheless, he could not be prevented from setting the trap for Burgoyne which Arnold sprung. General Gates, however, did something. During the crisis of the decisive battle he engaged in a hot wrangle with a sick British officer over the merits of the Revolution, which, drily observes the author, appears to have been his contribution to the crowning victory. It is curious that the two native Englishmen that rose to high rank on our side, Gates and Lee, both turned out mischievous, intriguing incompetencies.

The author interweaves into the romance all the processes which depraved the brave and generous but unprincipled character of Benedict Arnold into his final treason, with a fullness and delicacy that are quite Shakespearean. His verdict on him is compassionate, as he shows good reasons why it should be, but it is essentially confirmatory of the infamy that must forever weigh upon his name.

Mr. Fiske's development of Washington's strategy is above our competency of criticism, but he shows how little he deserves to be known merely as "the American Fabius," how thoroughly competent he was, after long waiting, to deliver the most masterly and crushing blows. Cornwallis told Washington that, wonderful as was the skill with which he had suddenly hurled an army four hundred miles, from the Hudson to the James, with such precision and such deadly effect, his achievements in New Jersey could not be surpassed even by that. Washington's caution was simply his self-control over the audacity of his courage.

After the fall of Burgoyne "it was generally believed, both in England and on the continent of Europe, that the loss of the American colonies would entail the ruin of the British Empire. Only a few wise political economists, 'literary men,' like Adam Smith and Josiah Tucker, were far-seeing enough to escape this prodigious fallacy; even Chatham was misled by it. It was not understood that English America and English Britain were bound together by commercial and social ties so strong that no question of political union or severance could permanently affect them. It was not foreseen that within a century the dealings of Great Britain with the independent United States would far exceed her dealings with the rest of the world. On the contrary, it was believed that, if political independence were conceded to the Americans, the whole

stream of transatlantic commerce would somehow be diverted to other parts of Europe; that the British naval power would forthwith decay; and that England would sink from her imperial position into such a mere insular nation as that over which Henry VIII. had ruled. So greatly did men overrate political conditions; so far were they from appreciating those economic conditions which are so much more deep-seated and essential."

The great importance of the Armed Neutrality, and the permanent advance made in it towards humanizing war on the sea, is shown at full. The author justly remarks that this great act ought to outweigh a good many of the crimes of Catherine II.

Of the results of Yorktown the author says: "The advent of Lord Rockingham's ministry meant not merely the independence of the United States; it meant the downfall of the only serious danger with which English liberty has been threatened since the expulsion of the Stuarts. The personal government which George III. had sought to establish, with its wholesale corruption, its shameless violations of public law, and its attacks upon freedom of speech and of the press, became irredeemably discredited, and tottered to its fall; while the great England of William III., of Walpole, of Chatham, of the younger Pitt, of Peel, and of Gladstone was set free to pursue its noble career. Such was the priceless boon which the younger nation, by its sturdy insistence upon the principles of political justice, conferred upon the elder. The decisive battle of freedom in England as well as in America, and in that vast colonial world for which Chatham had prophesied the dominion of the future, had now been fought and won. And foremost in accomplishing this glorious work had been the lofty genius of Washington, and the steadfast valor of the men who had suffered with him at Valley Forge, and whom he had led to victory at Yorktown."

The character of Chatham, on pages 17-22 of vol. ii., deserves to be known as one of the noblest passages of English literature. We cannot ask that it be transcribed into the reading-books of such pale neutralities as our public schools are coming to be. But it ought to be learnt by heart by every pupil of our private and Protestant schools, that they may be taught to give thanks to God for the man through whose grandeur of conception and of execution He has secured the lead in all the world, and for the free development of all the world, to the men of the Teutonic race and of the Protestant religion.

The portrait of Washington prefixed to the first volume, and believed to be now engraved for the first time, adds greatly to its interest. It is less conventionalized, more human, than the ordinary likenesses. The publishers call attention to the style of binding as peculiarly flexible and firm.

Charles C. Starbuck.

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CRITICISM VERSUS ECCLESIASTICISM.

I. CRITICISM.

It is obvious to any person who has studied the conditions of theological thought to-day, that there are two tendencies or modes of thought which are affecting in very different ways the most active and sensitive spirits of this generation. We have come to the parting of the ways. The old happy compromises with all their genialities and inconsistencies can no longer find a place in the flood of light which the last half century of historical and critical investigation has applied to the solution of the great historical and theological problems. Amid all the confusions of thought and various currents of influence which converge upon this life of ours, two distinct and mutually exclusive movements are manifest. Each is complete in itself, and between these two ways of regarding religious truth the future will be divided far more than along the lines of our existing religious differences. The opponents of each consider it a novelty; but viewed historically, one tendency may be regarded as the continuation and expansion of principles long since laid down, and the other a revival, under the stress of peculiar social and spiritual circumstances, of a mode of regarding man and religion long since rejected by the sturdiest and most robust intelligence of the world.

They represent certain spiritual attitudes and beliefs which express themselves in these very different forms. That either of them can be called a novelty, in any strict sense of the word, is impossible. They can be considered pretentious inventions only by him who knows nothing of the past, or whose philosophy of

history has not space in it for all the phenomena of life. In current phrase they are described as Criticism and Ecclesiasticism, and the language is ample and definite enough.

All modern theological thought has relations and affinities with these two dominant factors, for it is their peculiarity and their power that they are representative. They are the clear, definite, and unflinching statements of what the logic of history demands, and have swept away all the compromises and half-measures by which men have attempted to keep the peace with reason and tradition, or the formula of conservatism and the demands of modern life. In our own country the growth and spread of these movements has been so recent that their real significance has not been fully appreciated. Now, however, it is apparent to all that the old order has passed away; all things are tending to new directions. Old parties and schools are disappearing. The lines of a new conflict are clearly shaping themselves. New standards are flung to the breeze, new weapons flash in the sunlight, and new battlecries are heard floating across the field. Let us study these conditions in their historic development.

That which is called Modern Criticism, and which has caused so much debate and strife, is hardly, in any sense of the word, modern, except as we regard it as preëminently one of the great forces of modern thought. In reality it has relations with the whole history of Protestantism, and that great intellectual movement of which the Reformation forms a part.

The classic revival of the fifteenth century, commonly called the revival of learning, found the old church sunk in wealth, bigotry, and ignorance. Scholasticism had broken down and exploded in thin air, and the slowly awakening mind of Europe was filled with profound disgust and contempt for the scholarship and the methods of study which the schools and universities then represented.

In Italy the revolt was so passionate that religion itself was scorned, and a revival of paganism in thought and in learning began, which shows how ill-prepared the church was to deal with the new intellectual energies which had begun to display themselves. At first, and in Italy, this burst of zeal for knowledge confined itself almost entirely to the pagan world of antiquity; classical writers and classical studies, rather than Christian, absorbed all the attention of the scholars. Lorenzo Valla was the only Italian humanist who paid the slightest attention to any historical or theological subject connected with the Christian church.

But when the waves of the great classical revival spread beyond the Alps and reached Germany, it there inspired none of that pagan sentiment which filled the hearts of the Italian scholars with that old heathen longing.

The more sober, stalwart German mind responded most eagerly to the new call, but it was filled with a seriousness and religious earnestness which made men apply the new learning to the highest uses.

The German humanists were Christians, and threw themselves into the struggle with the church which the Italians disdainfully abandoned. The new classical studies destroyed the old scholastic habits of thought and methods of study. A new way began to open up before the minds of men, and pointed to a change which was destined to form an epoch in the history of the human mind. A new ideal of knowledge and truth began to appear, and instinctively the men in whose breasts the new life was stirring arrayed themselves against the old institutions and the old methods of thought. Germany was the heart of the struggle, and here, in fact, we see the meaning of the new movement best.

The universities were on the side of the old church, and rejected humanism, and it was only after a long and bitter struggle against the authority and prestige of centuries that it gained an entrance into them. Agricola, Æcolampadius, and Reuchlin lectured at Heidelberg, but were not members of the university. Melanchthon exerted himself in vain to gain a degree, but was rejected because he was known to be an enemy of scholasticism, and Erasmus himself had no friends in the university world for the same reason.¹ But the classical students of Europe won the cultivated part of society for science and for spiritual freedom, and prepared the way for the reception of the new religious life that was struggling for expression.²

In this new atmosphere the old ecclesiastical thought grew pale and sickly, and gradually vanished into its appointed place.

It is very difficult to realize the actual state of things in the fifteenth and early part of the sixteenth centuries. There was absolutely no knowledge of classical or Christian antiquity. Real scholarship and learning had been forgotten for more than a thousand years. Latin was the authorized language of the church, and yet what it had become in the hands of the monks we learn from Hutten and the famous "*Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*."

¹ Karl Schmidt, *Geschichte der Pädagogik*, Zweiter Band, S. 377.

² *Ibid.*, S. 492.

Hebrew was forgotten, and, worse, it was looked upon with fear and dread, and Greek was in but little better favor. In fact, as one of the scholars scornfully asserted, "The monks said every good grammarian was an heretic."¹

Such was the state of knowledge, not in Germany only, but in Europe, when the new movement began.

Germany asserted her preëminence in the higher fields of study then as always. Reuchlin and Erasmus, whom Hutten calls "Duos Germaniæ Oculos," placed her at the head of the new learning. There was only one scholar in Europe who could claim equality with them, and he, too, was north of the Alps.

In Reuchlin, Erasmus, and Budæus, the three great languages of antiquity found worthy representatives, and men began again to see the meaning of learning, which had been so totally forgotten. The gigantic figure of Luther towers so far above his contemporaries that but scant justice has been done to many of them.

In the history of modern scholarship no name is quite as important or conspicuous as that of Erasmus. The English scholar who knew more of the history of learning than any Englishman of this generation has said of Erasmus that "he was the first man of letters who had appeared in Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire."² And a more recent critic claims that since his day there has been no such literary reputation as his; "before the sickly scholar of Basil all Europe bowed."³

High praise to be awarded to any man; and when we add to this the fact that he is the first Biblical and historical critic who has appeared in modern times, we see something of the dimensions of the man.

His edition of the Greek Testament is the first; and although the critical powers displayed are not what now would be expected of an editor, yet the fact of its preparation shows that he perceived the true methods of Biblical study. In his edition of the Fathers, which was also the first, there is an instinctive recognition of the fact that history must be studied in its sources and with a scientific and critical spirit. It is almost appalling to look back to the achievements of the scholars of the sixteenth century. They had to break their way through the densest ignorance, and almost create the material for study.

¹ Rev. Charles Beard, *Lectures on the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century in its Relation to Modern Thought and Knowledge*, p. 55.

² Mark Pattison in *Encyc. Brit.*, vol. viii. p. 517.

³ Beard, p. 65.

There was not an edition of any classical writer in existence, before the middle or last of the fifteenth century, which could be of any service except to the few. Reuchlin in Hebrew, Budæus in Greek, and Erasmus in Latin broke the way to the modern field of philological studies. These early scholars were great travelers and men of the world, and their wandering life and wide experience gave a breadth and strength to their work which is often wanting in the later ones.

The striking thing in a study of the lives of all the early scholars, whether French, German, or English, is the unanimity with which they unite in repudiating the merely traditional and ecclesiastical methods of the church for the more accurate and scientific habits generated by the new fields of knowledge opened up to them. The moral and intellectual sense of Europe was outraged by the attitude and temper of the church, and the great humanists set about a reformation by widening the field of light, and setting truth before the eye of the world; but the change which they so hopefully expected could not be wrought by these means. Revolution, and not reformation, was the cry that sprang from the lips of the plain and ignorant, who simply felt their needs and found the answer in the truths presented by the religious reformers and not the scholars. What the history of Europe would have been had the religious revolution of the sixteenth century not taken place, it is idle to speculate about; but it is very evident that theological strifes, and the bitter animosities aroused by the religious struggles between the old church and the new, checked the growth of knowledge and stunted the intellectual development of Europe more than most writers on the period are willing to recognize. Luther was great enough to see the value of the new learning for the Protestant party, and the painful disputes and bitter hostilities which displayed themselves throughout Germany filled his heart with sadness. Melancthon laments boldly the neglect of learning for controversy, and the abandonment of the classics for the unprofitable pursuit of theological debate.

It was not in Germany alone that the new religion threw the older learning into the shade, but all over Europe. When Erasmus visited England, where the new king had just come to the throne, Sir Thomas More was the pride of every Englishman, and there were men at both universities who were capable of appreciating the first scholar of Europe.

Within ten years after the death of that same king, and during

the reign of his daughter, it is said there were only two ecclesiastics at Oxford who could preach, and learning was at its lowest ebb in England.¹

Although the religious revolution checked the new learning, it did not destroy it. As the leadership in the world of letters had passed in the last quarter of the fifteenth century from Italy to Germany, so after the death of Erasmus it passed from Germany to France, and Turnebus and Dorat continued the fame of Budæus, and prepared the way for the greater fame of Scaliger and Casaubon.

Joseph Justus Scaliger, in some respects the most powerful mind of the sixteenth century, struck out for himself new and original methods and lines of thought, which were so far in advance of anything which his own age had accomplished that his intellectual temper and grasp of the problems seem more like those of a scholar of the nineteenth than of the sixteenth century. Erasmus was a great scholar; Scaliger was a great critic. More than that, he laid the foundation of all the scientific and historical investigations which have taken place since his day, for he first made philology the basis of historical studies, and from him it spread east and west through Germany and England.² Moreover, Scaliger resolutely refused to recognize, in critical studies, the existence of any artificial or conventional distinctions. Biblical and classical studies were related to each other as parts of a whole, and not separated by any arbitrary divisions.³

It is the application of these ideas and principles of investigation which constitutes his great distinction in the history of criticism. But great as his fame was, — and he was by universal consent the first scholar of Europe, — his life was darkened by the great change which was now rapidly taking place. The counter-reformation had set in. The exulting church advanced to a reconquest of her old territory. Germany was filled with dissensions, England with controversies and plots, and France with blood. After St. Bartholomew's Day every French Protestant knew what he might expect at any hour, and when Scaliger went to Leyden the supremacy in scholarship passed from France to Holland, as it had passed from Germany to France. One man alone was left, after the death of Scaliger, who might establish France's claim to her old position, and he, too, was driven by the ferocity of religious bigotry to seek refuge in a foreign land.

¹ Schmidt, *Geschichte de Pädagogik*, 3. Band, S. 182.

² Bernays, *Joseph Justus Scaliger*, S. 62.

³ *Ibid.*, S. 37.

The reactionary party had its way. The great school of German scholars had already disappeared. Even before the sword of the Thirty Years' War had shed the blood of her best and bravest, the youth of Germany had become spiritually dead.¹ The biographer of Casaubon tells us that on his face, as on that of every French Huguenot, there was that mournful shadow which is on the faces of men who are fighting for a lost cause.

The Jesuits had won, and in the little University of Leyden alone, fed by the memory of Scaliger's great fame, the lamp of critical learning was kept burning when the rest of Europe was given up to other and lower things.

With the triumph of the Catholic party through Latin Europe and the death of Isaac Casaubon, a great chapter in the history of learning was closed. Leyden, it is true, has always been faithful to her traditions, but the later scholars, even of that distinguished university, had a touch of pedantry about them, and the learned men of England and Germany gave themselves up almost exclusively to the theological controversy, a not too profitable pursuit upon the lines upon which it is generally carried on. The counter-reformation had inflicted injuries upon Protestantism which cannot be estimated. The fierce struggle for existence had robbed the reformed churches of that wide intellectual freedom and generous mental attitude which earlier characterized them.

In the sixteenth century, all the learned men had been Protestants, or sympathized with that party. In the seventeenth century there was a great change. No really great man abandoned the ranks of Protestantism, but all were tempted, and some wavered. Lipsius went over; Casaubon remained a Protestant, but not a Huguenot; and Grotius looked with the longing eyes of a statesman towards the old church. On the continent, with the exception of Leyden, there is little to inspire hope. In England the learning is theological, polemic, and devoid of inspiration. In the very beginning of the humanistic movement, one Italian alone had seen the value of a correct text of the Scriptures, and in the next century the subject was taken up by the most distinguished ecclesiastic of Spain, and also by Erasmus. The edition of the New Testament edited by the latter was published at Basle in 1516, a year before the beginning of the Reformation. This subject of the text of the Scriptures, especially of the New Testament, was continually before the minds of Protestant scholars, and in the seventeenth century was pursued with eagerness

¹ Bernays, *Joseph Justus Scaliger*, S. 65.

and industry by some of the ablest English scholars. In the history of criticism, this is the only branch of labor which in England plays any important part in the progress of the science until we reach the name of Richard Bentley. In his own country he had no predecessor; and in genius and learning, if we except Joseph Scaliger, he had none, or almost none, on the continent. His German biographer says of him: "He was not simply a great critic among a number of others, but with his name begins a new era in the science. He broke with tradition and opened a new road. He marks the boundary line of a new epoch."¹ His labors never represented the full power of his genius, and there were none of his own countrymen who were capable of recognizing the great significance and value of his method. On the continent, however, his greatness was appreciated and his influence most profoundly felt; but even there the full effect of the new principles which had been applied by him with such astonishing results was not seen until the labors of Wolf and Niebuhr showed that the German scholars were the spiritual children of the great Englishman. A distinguished German writer is quoted as saying that "historical philology was the discovery of Bentley."² This is the key to his position, and what made him the immediate founder of the whole modern critical school of the nineteenth century. His dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris, published in 1699, showed how far criticism had advanced, and what it could accomplish in the hands of a genius. It is the first brilliant and overwhelming exhibition of a method which is now universally adopted by all modern critics, and denounced by their opponents as a German invention.

In this remarkable book Bentley shows how much can be learned of the age of a work, the character of the author, and the purpose of its composition, by a study of the evidence contained in the work itself. In his hands criticism became a science which worked independently of tradition or prejudice, and led to results which could be tested by the severest rules of evidence. He projected an edition of the New Testament, and gives hints as to the methods which he would adopt in preparing the text. The work was never executed, and it is useless to conjecture as to its probable effects upon Biblical science; but it is a striking testimony to his grasp of the problem that, nearly one hundred and fifty years after, Tischendorf adopted the method which Bentley

¹ Jacob Maehly, *Richard Bentley; eine Biographie*, S. 5.

² *Ibid.*, S. 8.

had outlined. As he had no predecessors worthy of the name, so he had in his own country no successors, and English scholarship has never since reached his level. It was on the continent that the effect of his labors was to be most profoundly felt, and, in the new period which was approaching, the influence of his teaching was to have the most brilliant and striking illustrations. By the middle of the eighteenth century it was manifest that a change in the intellectual atmosphere was approaching. A generation was growing up which had larger needs than the established schools of learning seemed able to supply. Leyden was still, as in the seventeenth century, devoted to scholarship, and Heyne had made the University of Göttingen famous; but the influence of a new school of writers was making itself felt in wider circles, and the flash of genius was attracting the eyes of the youth which had been so profoundly stirred by the political convulsions of Europe.

A splendid burst of genius, of which Lessing and Herder were the forerunners and Goethe the central figure, filled Germany with new life and activity. New ways into that far distant past were opened, and into them burst bands, not of pedants or antiquarians, but of eager, ambitious thinkers, whose brains were quickened by the throbbing pulse of that fierce fever which plunged Europe into chaos and France into madness.

Amid all this mental activity, certain broad, solid lines and regular scientific methods of investigation began to emerge. The great speculative and philosophical movement inspired by Kant, which has changed the theology and philosophy of this century so thoroughly, was moving along its appointed paths, and only indirectly and by contact influenced or affected the growth of the critical movement. As we look back and see the order of development, and the relations that unfolded themselves, we see that that order was logical and these relations necessary. Classical learning had sunk relatively very low. It was necessary that it should attain scientific precision before the highest achievements of the critical spirit could be realized.

Around two names centre all the interest in the new science, which was now to be given such form and currency as to become the property and instrument of every careful student. Wolf and Niebuhr are the two men whose activity made an epoch in the study of the literature and history of the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome. To such men as these, history was not the dead annals of a vanished race, but a page in that story of life of which the present forms part. The thought of the unity and

continuity of history also gave to the past a brilliancy and depth it had not possessed before, filling it with a living sympathy and interest.

Such a student was inspired to the most intense activity of investigation, which gave unity to his own life by joining the remote subject of his study with the passions and thoughts of his own existence. The past was not a grave, nor its history a musty roll, but the story of a rich organic life, full of overwhelming beauty and undying interest, and the spirit of the Old World wove anew its everlasting charm about the souls of men. In all the classical investigations which belong to the new school there is manifest, amidst much mental excitement and violent exaggeration, the clear perception that history was being studied in a new way, and that its examination was conducted by new methods. The new school of critics had blood in their veins, and the past which they were investigating grew clear and bright and living in the light of that busy, tumultuous present in which they played such important parts. The field was gradually widened, and all antiquity was claimed for a new investigation. The story of a new world unrolled itself, and the old literature became a living spring from which men drew new inspiration and hope.

One literature alone of the past seemed surrounded by a traditional reverence and fear which forbade the hand of the critic. The Hebrew history had a halo about it which had for ages blinded men to their own ignorance, and the great confusion which existed in all their conceptions of its composition and character. Efforts had been made to examine the Hebrew Scriptures in a scientific and unprejudiced manner; but for a variety of reasons which cannot be enumerated here, the results had been extremely unsatisfactory from a historical point of view.

The growing sense of freedom, the increase in resources and material, as well as the awakening of mental activity in philological and historical fields, which marked the latter half of the last century, turned men's thoughts again towards what was then supposed to be the oldest literature extant. The great problem of Old Testament criticism, the Pentateuch, had the keynote to its solution sounded as early as 1753 by Jean Astruc,¹ a Frenchman; but Old Testament science received its greatest impulse from the labors of De Wette, whose "*Beiträge zur Einleitung*" (1806-7) showed that the sacred literature was to be treated by the same methods and with the same critical spirit that char-

¹ Bleek's *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 5. Auflage, S. 607.

acterized the best classical work of the day. To follow the course of Old Testament criticism from De Wette to Wellhausen would lead through many long and weary controversies, and over many well-fought battlefields, and would require a volume in itself. Sufficient to note here that the difficulties which stood in the way of a clear understanding of Jewish history were partly a result of the condition of the documents, and partly a result of the method of treatment, which oftentimes was conducted without a clear recognition of the character of the books, or a satisfactory knowledge of their composition and age. The growing interest in Oriental studies was pouring a constantly increasing stream of light upon the Old Testament, and furnished much valuable material for a better method of interpretation.

The task of grasping the entire history in all its complexity and variety in one whole, and presenting the life of a people complete, distinct, and harmonious in all its parts, is, even in the best state of historical science, and with the richest and best-digested supply of material, a gigantic one. Hebrew history, moreover, presented special difficulties on account of the traditions which had gathered around its literature, and the absence of that atmosphere in which the freest mental activity takes place, and, besides, the literature itself is comparatively small. Yet the desire expressed by Dr. Arnold, "What Wolf and Niebuhr have done for Greece and Rome seems sadly wanted for Judea," was to be gratified in a work even more solid and brilliant than those of the distinguished classical scholars named. Heinrich G. A. Ewald had for many years furnished many valuable contributions to Oriental and Biblical study, but it was not until his "History of Israel" was placed before the world that the depth and range of his knowledge and the grasp and power of his genius were fully realized. Many criticisms have been offered, many errors have been discovered, many additions have been made to our knowledge in points of detail, but, like Gibbon's great work, the "History of Israel" stands without a rival in the field which it covers; and the massive foundations and walls, which have been so fiercely attacked, still stand to testify that only a great intellect and a profound genius could have constructed them. In a certain sense Ewald represents the high-water mark of constructive genius in Old Testament history. The wide interest in Oriental studies, particularly in Hebrew, which has been aroused among Christian scholars, is largely a result of his astonishing industry and enthusiasm. The critical-historical point of view in the study of

Hebrew literature has been so clearly and firmly established that only bigotry or ignorance now dare to utter any protest or cavil.

While so much was being done for the Old Testament history and literature, it would be impossible for the general intellectual activity to confine itself to that portion only of the sacred literature of Christianity. Naturally, then, the peculiarly Christian portion of the book, the Canon of the New Testament, was investigated with even greater zeal and earnestness. The pens which contributed so much to a more intelligent understanding of the Hebrew literature also opened the way to a clearer and more exact knowledge of the Greek. De Wette's work in New Testament criticism, though not so important or significant as that done on the Old Testament, was yet of great value, and he was followed by a number of writers in swift succession. The best known of these, Bretschneider, Gieseler, and the great Schleiermacher, before the year 1820, made their contribution towards the solution of the problem of the origin of the Gospels.

Among all the great names in theological literature, of which Germany has furnished so many during this century, one occupies the place of supreme interest in the field of historical criticism. It is a name of ill-omen to orthodox ears, and yet no single writer has done so much to place the science of historical criticism and church history upon a solid basis as he. Ferdinand Christian Baur has been well described by a recent writer "as one of the most eminent representatives of the intellectual nobility of Germany,"¹ the founder of the Tübingen school, and the most striking and conspicuous figure in the great critical movement. His writings cover the whole field of Christian history, and almost every topic in theology, and every subject, was presented in a clear and forcible style, not the common gift of German theologians, and sustained by the widest learning and profoundest research. He was a scholar who combined with the most subtle and penetrating genius a thorough and exhaustive knowledge of the whole field of investigation, and a masterly grasp of the material.

The criticism of the canon, which had been perhaps the most important subject on which the intellectual activity of the new school of critics was engaged, was by him widened until it embraced the whole field of the early church. The scientific principles upon which all historical investigations were being based were by him applied to the history of the Christian church, and especially to that period generally known as the apostolic age.

¹ F. Lichtenberger, *History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 379

Yet he never forgot that the canon is the real starting-point for any actual progress in the knowledge which we may hope to gain of the Christian church. Consequently some of his most exhaustive and subtle labor was expended upon the questions raised by criticism of the canon. "It is impossible," he says, "to come to any satisfactory conclusion about the historic origin of Christianity, unless one has attained some satisfactory view of the writings which are the only documents belonging to the origin of Christianity."¹

He regards the New Testament not only as the key to the historic development of the church, but as the basis whence we must start to gain a clear knowledge of the growth and development of Christian speculation. "Without an accurate knowledge of the theology of the New Testament, one cannot follow the course of the history of Dogma,"² he says. He also devoted himself with untiring zeal to a reconstruction of the primitive church based upon his acute investigation of the canon, in connection with whatever hints and suggestions he might find scattered throughout the literature of the first and second century. To him belongs the great honor of having first discovered that the key to the history of the apostolic age is Saint Paul. It was here that some of his most brilliant work was done, and all subsequent treatment of Paul and Paulinism has been conditioned by the labors of Baur.

The literature of the first and second century, aside from the canonical writings, being far more scanty than that of later periods, a wide field for speculation and conjecture was opened up, which needed to be exercised in the most judicious and frugal manner. This restraint Baur did not always exercise, and the tone of an advocate rather than of a critic is perceptible in some of the most difficult investigations. The philosophical ideas of Hegel make themselves manifest in his conception of the principles of historic development. Those general principles of historical criticism which were coming into popular use, Baur applied, not to the canon only, but to the whole history of the church. All the literature which belongs to the history is brought under the hammer and tested with the same rigid scientific precision. The Epistles of Ignatius or the Epistles of St. Paul are examined with the same freedom, for no arbitrary line of de-

¹ F. C. Baur, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Kanonischen Evangelien*, Vorrede, S. V.

² *Vorlesungen über die Christliche Dogmengeschichte*, I. B. I. Abt. S. 19.

marcation is drawn where science shall stop and assertion begin. The bias in favor of a peculiar theory of history which he had formed manifests itself through all the wealth of learning and the subtlety of debate. He rejected the old conceptions of the development of the church, and proceeded to construct a new view of its growth, basing it upon the methods of investigation which he believed had never been applied in this field. The result was some of the most original and striking essays in church history that have ever appeared. His theory was advocated with a power and sustained by a mass of learning and an originality of thought greater than any other writer of his time possessed.

The effect upon German and Continental scholars was tremendous. It seemed as if a revolution in theology was at hand. The year 1835 was the critical one in the history of modern German theology. In that year Strauss's "*Leben Jesu*" appeared, and raised a storm whose waves were felt throughout the whole Christian world. Two years previous to the publication of Strauss's "*Leben Jesu*" appeared in England the first of the famous "*Tracts for the Times*." This fact has a significance which it is well to bear in mind. The close relation in point of time indicates how wide and deep the revolt was against the established religious ideas of the age. The difference in character between them shows, on the other hand, what a wide chasm there was between the mental activities of the two people. One is engaged with the body and form of the religious life, the other with the very foundation and essence of the Christian faith. One is historical, the other essential.

The great body of literature which was called forth by the Tracts had little in it of permanent value, and the mass of it has long since become obsolete; but the theological literature that owes its origin to Strauss's fierce attack contains some of the most valuable theological writings of the present century, and will influence the whole future of Christian theology in a very positive manner. The interest in the Tractarian controversy is, to a large degree, local; that of the great battle in Germany belongs to Christian thought everywhere.

The importance of the movements, therefore, to the deeper life of the church is by no means of equal value. It will not be necessary to follow the parallel or contrast further, but a close study of the facts will show the great significance of the fourth decade of this century for the Christian church, and reveal upon how much wider and higher a plane the theological mind of Ger-

many has moved in this century than that of England. It was subsequent to this that Baur's chief activity lay. The brilliancy and enthusiasm of the great teacher crowded Tübingen with students, and filled the theological world of Europe with strife. For twenty-five years, or until his death, he was engaged in presenting his labors in every department of history.

At first the new school swept all before it. The orthodox theologians were unprepared for such an attack, and in their attempts to repel it they discovered how useless and futile many of their old weapons were. Year after year the battle raged, gradually extending over a wider field, and year by year it seemed more destructive, and the opposition more weak and helpless. After a time the more conservative scholars began to gain the advantage, and slowly the tide turned, until the once triumphant school was checked, and some of their most important positions overthrown. Investigations quite as careful, and just as free and bold, yet less prejudiced, furnished material for a most effective reply. There is a Tübingen school still, but it is but the echo of the past, and it does not follow into the extremes to which Baur went. It has learned timidity. Wounds make men careful, and teach them to fight with caution. One of the most striking features in a review of this great movement is the change and shifting which has taken place in the views of theological opponents, and the means which are used to defend them. Many of the positions which the Tübingen school held are now occupied, at least in part, by their opponents. The weapons now used in controversy have been forged in the workshop of the critical school. The orthodox party speaks with a new voice, and the language is utterly different from that used half a century ago.

Critical methods are adopted by the leading writers of every university that has any claim to eminence. Germany has won the intellectual supremacy of the world, and the power which she wields is all in the interest of scientific methods.

The radical change in the attitude of the great mass of European scholars within the last half century has many causes, no doubt, yet the most active agency in the revolution of theological thought has been the great advance of scientific and critical methods. In a study of this movement Baur is the most striking figure, yet we should clearly discern what he did do, and what he did not and could not do.

The deepest problem of all, the one about which the thought of this age is moving with ever-increasing earnestness, was left

untouched by him. A recent critic has well stated it. "What was the Christianity of Jesus, and in what relation does it stand on the one hand with Petrinism, and on the other with Paulinism? Such was the great fundamental question which Baur's criticism has passed over in silence."¹

Neander, Dorner, Rothe, Ritschl, Zahn, Weiss, Pfeiderer, Har-nack, and hosts of others, both past and present, who have earned for themselves a name and a place in the various fields of his-torical investigation, have all adopted, with more or less rigidity, the methods which first became known to the world at large in their most offensive form in the school of Baur.

It is not to be supposed that a method which has in reality only been generally adopted for a half century or less, and has as yet reached only an incomplete development or application, should not bear marks of crudity and lack of logical proportion.

The scholars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had to work their way through many extravagances and exaggerations, and among the great difficulties which they had to encounter not the least was that offered by the nature of the human mind.

A man's thoughts arrange themselves around some theory or conception of life which has been handed down to him by tra-dition, or which has been the result of his own observation or ex-perience, and this in turn becomes the test, not only of the past, but the present and the future. This central idea becomes the dominant force and weight in his judgment of all events, and every subject which is presented to him for consideration. The actual growth of knowledge takes place slowly and by a process of accumulation, as the waters of numberless springs buried in the hillsides find their way, year after year, into some quiet basin in the hills. Sun and wind drink from the crystal surface, the trees and shrubs on its grassy shores suck through a million roots its living waters. At last the time comes when the fountains can no more find a home in the green and silent valley. The quiet lake rises beyond its borders and, seeking its far-off home in the sea, sweeps away all in its path, leaving but a wreck of many things behind. Men see that a flood has passed through the land, but do not know what it means. New points of view rise before them, but they cannot take them, and cling tenaciously and mourn-fully to the past. So it was in the second and third centuries, when many a serious Roman and thoughtful Greek refused the

¹ F. Lichtenberger, *History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 389.

new creed, and turned passionate and longing eyes to the fading past, denouncing it in fierce scorn as an "Exitiabilis Superstitio." So it was also in the sixteenth century, so it is perhaps not to a less degree in our own age. But the most despondent can console themselves, however, with the words of the far-wandering Ulysses : —

"Though much is taken, much abides."

The testimony of history is that neither age nor novelty, in themselves, are a test of truth, and that truth itself is not fixed, permanent, and absolute, but relative, expansive, and growing. Wise men feel the difficulty of reading the future, and leave the revelation to Him to whom the days and years of man's life are but as shadows.

The new movement, which has attracted so much attention and roused so many fears, must not be regarded as something temporary or local, or restricted to any one department of theological study. In its largest proportions, it includes the whole field of theology. As has been well said : "It must not be supposed that German theology is some obscure and national product, the concern exclusively of the country which gave it birth. . . . Though generated in Germany, it belongs to Christendom. It is the theological movement of the age."¹ It has on its critical side been called "the new" or "the higher" criticism, but in no real sense of the word is it new. That is to say, there is nothing novel about it, or original, as being the discovery or invention of a class of fantastic or eccentric writers unfamiliar with the subjects they treat of. It is a part of the noblest traditions of Protestantism, and is a legitimate and scientific development of its principles. But the question may very properly be raised, "If it is a manifestation of the Protestant spirit, why has it never found expression before?" It did find utterance, and that the most marked and emphatic. All the greatest scholars who have been filled with the genuine scientific spirit have been Protestants, and could have been nothing else. Scaliger, Casaubon, Bentley, were pre-eminently Protestant in their whole intellectual constitution. The reason this spirit did not embody itself before in a universal movement is one that belongs to the very nature of the case. The critical spirit could not find effective expression until proper material was furnished. Texts needed to be revised, editions of ancient authors carefully prepared, old documents analyzed, the

¹ *Essays by the late Mark Pattison*, vol. ii. p. 216.

ruins and inscriptions of antiquity thoroughly studied, and all the various marks and tokens of civilization fully recognized and appraised at their real value, and a true method of study marked out.

European scholars labored with more or less success for more than three centuries before the soil was prepared from which the critical movement of the nineteenth century sprang, and any one who has glanced over the vast field knows that we are still only on the first day of the harvest. Enough has been done, and well done, for us to see what criticism really means, and what it is capable of accomplishing. It is first and chiefly a criticism of documents, but a criticism of the documents in the light of their origin. The literature of the past is submitted to a rigid and scientific examination. Hearsay testimony, second-hand quotations, garbled extracts, are all assigned to their proper places. The author must go upon the witness-stand and submit to a strict cross-examination. As far as possible he must tell his own story, and not other men's thoughts about him. All the long intervening centuries, with their strange, huge growths of tradition, prejudice, and misconception, must be swept aside, and we must listen to this voice, be it of Greek or Roman, as the voice of a living man, telling the story of a life far removed from ours in all its customs, ambitions, dreams, and aspirations. This man looked into a different sky and thought different thoughts from ours. He was moved by different impulses and stirred by different purposes, and out of that old imperial world, buried so far in the past, he has something of infinite worth to teach us if we will but let him speak his own language, and not the language of our modern nineteenth century. And this brings before us a second point of supreme importance for the intelligent understanding of the past, and that is the study of the civilization of the particular period from which our literature or ideas sprang. To use the words of a great scholar, whose loss is most painfully felt by all students of church history, "the study of the growth and modifications of the early forms of Christianity must begin with the study of their environment."¹ The observance of this simple canon is worth more than cartloads of erudition, for it must be evident to every one thoughtfully considering the point that in different countries there must have been different forces moulding the thought and shaping the character as the social type and

¹ *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usage upon the Christian Church*, by Edwin Hatch, D. D., p. 25.

culture varied. In the study of any organism there is, as a final result of patient investigation, not only the knowledge of the powers and functions of this organism, but also that of the causes and influences which lay outside of it, and affect it in a thousand subtle ways. It is the scientific student alone who has a clear conception of the vast extent and the endless forms under which the surroundings or environment of any life influence and modify it. If in turn this environment can be submitted to a careful examination, new suggestions and new truths begin to emerge, and it becomes possible to estimate just how much of that peculiar life is what we may call original, and how much of its special forms and relations are the result of external forces operating upon it. So in the study of any institutions which have been part of the history of man, in the examination of any organizations which have largely influenced the growth and development of human life, we discover that one source of their power has been in their ability to absorb all that is most powerful in the life around them, and reflect the best and highest influences of the civilization in which they live, without losing their individual energy and character.

"The survival of the fittest" is not a mere phrase, but a truth that has its evidence written as well in history as in science.

That institution is most potent which is most elastic and susceptible to all the most vigorous influences around it, and in its growth we see the effect of the soil in which it is planted, and the presence of all the vital forces in its surroundings. The environment of any organism does not generate the life of that organism, but it does modify it most profoundly and seriously. In the history of any powerful institution we expect to see preserved the various periods through which it has passed lying as in a geological formation which preserves in the iron grasp of its various strata the life of far distant ages. Church historians tell us of the influence of the church upon the history of Europe, but the influence of Europe on the history of the church is a truth fully as important and necessary for a clear understanding of the real history of the church. It should not be expected that Christianity, or the Christian church alone, should be exempted from the great historic law of which we have been speaking. On close examination it is manifest that it is not. The Christian church of any age, along with its special Christian elements, bears the decided stamp of the particular age in which we study it. This is admitted without hesitation of one of the most pic-

turesque and striking periods of Christian history, that of the Middle Ages. It is readily granted that what we call the Mediæval Church could only have existed in an age in which feudal ideas and feudal forms of life were dominant. The most imposing feature of mediæval history is the Latin Church of the thirteenth century. It may be described as the Christian church plus the Middle Ages. What is true of this church is true of the church of every age. The thought and life of the time is marked upon it and enters into it. The constant struggle going on within the bosom of the church is to keep alive its perpetual power of adaptation, without at the same time sacrificing its personal identity and special life, and when the two forces exist in harmonious relations we have a vigorous and powerful organism.

These general truths are admitted in a general way, but when they are applied to the history of the early church they excite unfeigned dislike and opposition. Yet when we study that vast civilization that rested secure and peaceful under the wings of the eagle, we see powerful currents of thought, deep and venerable national instincts, long religious traditions gray with age and sacred by the worship of generations, vast and complicated systems of philosophy whose influence was felt in the lives of the most ignorant, and subtle and mysterious tendencies too vague to submit to a strict definition, yet which characterize every age and determine the mood of their generation in a very marked degree. When we see these things, and they all lie there clear and distinct in the wonderful daylight of that past, we cannot escape the conviction that an organization which was destined to have influence upon the world in which it lived, and the generation with which it came in contact, must be affected in the course of its development, both of life and thought, by that complex life which represents the vital forces of every period, and which we call its civilization. The more deeply the life of the empire is studied, the more clearly is perceived how closely the life of the church is related to it, and how deeply influenced by it.

Every wave that sweeps through that great ocean raises a sympathetic movement in the Christian church. As a summary of the total relations of the Christian church and the Roman imperial civilization in which it lived, and at the same time as the full expression of the historic law of environment, no words state it better than those of the German historian: "The development of the Christian church in the Roman-Grecian world was not at the same time a development of this world through the church, and,

farther, through Christianity at large. Nothing remains as a result of this process save the existing church. '*The world which built it had in it built itself bankrupt.*'"¹

So, also, the most strict and rigid philological principles are applied in the interpretation of the past Christian ages. No distinctions are recognized which do not declare themselves. The meaning of the Scriptures is ascertained by the same methods by which the meaning of Homer or Thucydides, of Tacitus or Livy, is ascertained. Theological prejudice and ecclesiastical tradition have nothing to do with strict scientific criticism. The Bible and the Fathers have one meaning, and one meaning only, and it is the purpose of criticism to discover what that meaning is, without reference to any other claims but those of truth.

The acute saying of Scaliger, "*Non aliunde dissidia in religione pendent quam ab ignoracione Grammaticae,*"² is receiving daily verification.

Among all the diversities which exist among critical commentators to-day, there is little or no divergence upon the most important points, and there is a growing approximation upon most of the points of controversy.

At the basis of the whole movement, and also as an outgrowth of its development, becomes manifest a profound philosophical principle whose validity is increasingly recognized, and which is entirely in harmony with all modern teaching and the movement of the modern mind. It is that the law of the development of history is the same, and the universal experiences of mankind come under the same general principles. The dualistic method which claims for one branch of history, or one field of research, methods which do not apply or hold good in other fields, is denied any philosophical basis or validity. If history is a science, there is only one science of history, not two or many. Historical truth is one, and the methods of its investigation are the same in every field which can claim anything like a scientific investigation. As documents which belong to the literature of the religion of Greece and Rome, of Egypt and India, are examined according to certain well-known principles of evidence, so must the Hebrew and Christian literature submit to the same principles of examination, else we can have no guaranty that the results attained rest upon any legitimate basis, or make any legitimate claims upon our recognition.

¹ R. Rothe, *Vorlesungen über Kirchengeschichte*, Zweiter Theil, S. 8.

² Jacob Bernays, *Joseph Justus Scaliger*, S. 19.

One chief reason why there is such profound dissatisfaction in the minds of a large number of intelligent persons is because they do not feel that the religious literature of Christendom has been treated by methods which are regarded as of universal validity in every other field of human knowledge.

The aim of criticism is to do just this work, and rest the claims and evidences of Christian history upon a basis of accuracy as scientific and substantial as any other history. It is well to bear in mind what the true purpose and object of New Testament criticism has been. It is frequently spoken of, by those who know nothing of it, as "destructive criticism," but it may be laid down as a positive fact, beyond question or doubt, that anything purely destructive ends by destroying itself. Bare and naked negation has no life in it. Positive forces alone continue, and New Testament criticism has displayed an activity and energy that manifests a solid and durable purpose. Its aim has been no more destructive than that of the archæologist who removes the shabby dwellings that are built upon some buried city in order that he may lay bare to the light of day that hidden past, and let it tell the story of those long-forgotten days in the shattered arches and broken walls, the ruined altars and empty markets, the unknown graves and silent streets. What the critics have sought to discover in Scripture was not the religion of the third century, or the tenth, or the thirteenth, but the religion of Jesus, and have striven to stand face to face with the Son of man as He actually walked and talked in sunny Galilee so long ago. It has been a passionate, devout, and spiritual purpose that has led them on through all their many labors, seeking to discover the actual meaning of the Bible, and to find that sacred face without any stain of time upon its great perfection.

Never, in the whole long history of the church, has so much solid thinking and writing been done about Jesus Christ, as in Germany in these last ninety years. This means something, — something infinitely more than those who have launched so much thin vituperation against German criticism have the faintest or dimmest conception of.

Unquestionably, numerous blunders have been made, but no more so than in the beginnings of the scientific study of any other department of human knowledge. It is the results which have been attained and those which seem to be involved which, in reality, have caused far more perturbation than the commencement of the application of scientific methods to this field.

Let us take a hasty glance at some of the chief results which have been reached. In the first place, the position and character of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament have been much changed. The uses and applications which can be made of them have been more strictly defined as a result of a clearer knowledge of their nature. Each book belongs to a certain period of human history ; it was produced under certain social and religious conditions ; it had a special aim and purpose lying behind its origin, all of which can be more or less clearly ascertained by patient study of its contents.

These books are literature, and show the literary character which belongs to all products of the human pen. They are historical, poetical, or prophetic, as the case may be, and as a consequence the very designation furnishes a key to their interpretation, and establishes in our minds an expectation of what can there be found, and how it is to be received and appropriated. A law of value and proportion at once appears, and a real pertinency and application is demanded in all appeals to them, and the integrity of a man's judgment is not confused and embarrassed by random and haphazard applications. The Bible thus becomes a rich and beautiful picture of the past, with far perspectives stretching into the remote distance, here and there dim recesses where the soul's desire or the soul's agony is poured out in unearthly and mysterious beauty, and over and through it all is the atmosphere of a divine purpose and a divine presence which fills the student with the sure conviction that that purpose and that presence are not absent in his own experience, and in the life which he and thousands of others are struggling to understand to-day.

Whatever may be said for or against the critical school, it cannot be denied that the Bible is the key to its position, the basis from which it starts, and that the Bible is a more living book to-day than it has been since the eager, hungry souls of men clung to it and studied it in the stormy days of the sixteenth century.

Another contribution of the critical method has been the establishment of a new science or department of theological study, namely, Biblical Theology. The name, as a separate branch of theological science, to many even to whom the ordinary branches of this science are perfectly familiar, is almost unknown. It represents, however, a real thing, and it has its origin in that careful and microscopic examination to which the different portions of Scripture were subjected. All theological systems have claimed to be Biblical, and so long as they appealed to the Scrip-

tures their claim was acknowledged, or at least not disputed, except by their opponents. The assumption was that a definite system of doctrine lay embedded in the Scripture, that its origin and purpose were doctrinal, and that all the parts stood in harmonious and scientific relation to each other. The moment the various books were investigated, it became apparent that different points of view existed, and that the spirit of each book was affected, not by logical theories, but by spiritual experience and personal conviction.

The subject can only be referred to here, but it is one of the positive results of the critical movement which has proved of the greatest and most permanent value, and is destined to exert wide and most beneficial influences on the future study of theology. Little is known of it in this country, comparatively speaking, and all that is known has been drawn from the Germans.

In the wide and well-known field of dogmatics, the influence of the critical movement has been most pronounced and effective.

It is true that the deepest influence exercised directly upon the field of theology in this century sprang from Schleiermacher, and to the power of his great genius, more than to that of any other man, is due the vast changes in theological thought which mark this century as the turning-point from the past to a new and wonderful future, whose outlines are but dimly unfolding themselves. He delivered theology from its barren scholasticism and ineffective logic, and grounded it upon the experience of the living spirit having its basis in man's consciousness of God. Yet, notwithstanding the labors of Schleiermacher, the purely critical movement was destined, from the results attained in the field of exegesis and of history, to revolutionize theology. And there is no inherent reason why theology should not advance beyond the doctrinal platforms of the sixteenth century, or at least, grasping anew the great principle of the Reformation, develop the spiritual life from the basis of men's added experience and knowledge.

The sixteenth century, starting from the basis of the new free life, of the soul in God, presented and emphasized just those truths which the age needed, and in just such relations and proportions as the times called for and the necessities of the spiritual life of the age suggested and permitted. Great and fundamental truths were misunderstood, misused, and even abused, and some of the deepest importance to our own age were either comparatively neglected or played a subordinate part.

It is no disparagement of the great men of the sixteenth cen-

ture to say they could not span the whole heaven of truth, or formulate systems of thought and modes of conceiving God's relations to the race which would be suitable for men of a different age and with different needs. Each generation must do its own thinking, and realize for itself the relations that exist between it and God, and stand firm by the conviction that, as He was guiding and directing the men of the past, so He is still guiding the race in its search for light and peace.

Beneath the tenacity with which men cling to the strict letter of the logical definitions of the past often lies an incipient unbelief and a latent atheism which needs to be fully exposed before a man can attain the solid ground of personal faith. In ages of calm and tranquillity men think they can live on formulas, but in ages of change and revolution their life must find its source and centre in God, or they become blind obstructionists of the divine purpose.

The aim of theology is to bring man into living communion with God, or at least express the conscious results of this fellowship. To bring before the mind the real nature of the task, and trace the means adopted for its fulfillment in the past, has been the work of historical theology, and historical theology is a child of the critical movement. It has been not destructive merely or chiefly. It is reconstructive. It aims to set forth the value and worth of theology, and it began with the beginning. Across the pages of the Bible were written many cherished systems, many devout theories; theology after theology, crossing and recrossing, covered all its lines. Passages were so buried under a mass of interpretations of an arbitrary character that none knew what the true meaning was. The critics began to erase these various writings, and to try to discover what was originally written on this sacred palimpsest. Steadily and patiently they pursued their task, and now we know more of the theology of the apostles than has been known in centuries. The various systems, in their long succession from the Alexandrians of the third century to the Tractarians of the nineteenth, pass before the eye of the critic, and make whatever contribution they have, valuable or otherwise, towards the great problem of man's life, and the thoughts and feelings that unite him with God.

In the field of church history proper, the critic has been busy as in no other department of theological science except exegesis, and in the field of church history we are able to see more clearly the value of scientific principles, and the great results achieved by

their application. From what has been already said on another page, it will be only necessary to draw attention to the fact that now it is a science. Mere learning and knowledge of facts are no more the sole qualifications of an historian than a knowledge of the current phenomena of nature constitutes a physicist. Behind all phenomena lie principles, and only when these principles are known, arranged, and applied can we say we have a science of the subject. There is such a science of church history to-day, and it is the noblest fruit of the critical movement of the nineteenth century. To quote from a recent writer on the subject: "We may hear, if we will, the solemn tramp of the science of history marching slowly, but marching always to conquest. . . . In front of it, as in front of the physical sciences, is chaos; behind it is order."¹

The critical movement stands in historic relations to the sixteenth century. It is the offspring of the German Protestant spirit.

Germany is Protestant, has been so for more than three hundred years, and will remain so. The critical spirit represents the higher intellectual attitude of Protestantism. Our Christian sympathies should not blind us to facts, or lead our judgment into foolish paths. Nothing can stand against the demands of the Christian intelligence and the Christian reason. They who look for a reconciliation of Romanism and Protestantism, of Ecclesiasticism and Criticism, are dreaming idle dreams, having no knowledge of the principles upon which these opposing parties stand, and the eternal antagonism that exists between them.

As the Reformation in the sixteenth century in the end carried the Teutonic nations with it, so will the critical movement of the nineteenth century carry the higher intellectual life of Protestantism with it, because it is moving in the path of right reason and of science.

Stewart Means.

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

¹ Edwin Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*, pp. 23, 24.

THE CHALLENGE OF LIFE.

“And all as we’ve got to do is to trusten, Master Marner, — to do the right thing as fur as we know, and to trusten. For if us as knows so little can see a bit o’ good and rights, we may be sure as there’s a good and a rights bigger nor what we can know, — I feel it i’ my own inside as it must be so.” — *Silas Marner*.

TOURISTS who have visited Brussels will recall the Musée Wiertz, and the impressions made upon them by the paintings of that eccentric genius. His mind, bitterly cynical to a morbid degree, wrought in the region of the grotesquely horrible, and would seem to have dwelt almost entirely upon war and wickedness and woe. Like exaggeration and one-sidedness characterize the views of life prevalent in the pessimist philosophy. This somewhat pretentious school of the prophets has its Elijah in the gloomy Schopenhauer. It has also its Elisha, milder, more conciliatory, and more immediately successful, who none the less wears the elder’s mantle, having fallen heir to his spirit. Just half a century after the publication of the great work of Schopenhauer appeared his successor, the ex-artillery officer, Eduard von Hartmann, who at the age of twenty-two began, and four years after, in 1868, published, “*The Philosophy of the Unconscious*,” a work which, in striking contrast with the fortunes of its predecessor, very shortly ran through many editions.

Hartmann’s is to-day perhaps the most popular philosophy in Germany. He claims to be something more than a mere disciple of Schopenhauer, whose system he has indeed, in important particulars, modified. He repudiates the subjective idealism wherein Schopenhauer followed Kant. In the eighth chapter of his *Second Book* he clearly argues for the position which Kantians are wont to ridicule, but which would seem not without support from common sense, namely, that Space and Time are *both* objective forms of existence and subjective forms of thought. Schopenhauer’s ultimate principle was Will alone. Hartmann with Will unites the Idea in his absolute world-principle, the Unconscious. Design he finds everywhere, and is pronounced regarding teleology, introducing an ingenious mathematical demonstration of the certainty of purpose in the arrangements of nature. Instinct he finds to be “purposive action without consciousness of the purpose.” He argues against the Cartesian theory of instinct, which made it purely mechanical. With Hartmann, instinct is conscious

willing of the means to an unconsciously willed end. There is in it an element of sure presentiment and clairvoyance. It need not reflect, does not vacillate or doubt, and never errs. These assertions of a mysterious infallibility we cannot fully accept, if we are to defer to authorities like Wallace. This eminent naturalist recognizes imitation, memory, observation, and reasoning, as often entering into instinct; instances evidence of its fallibility in the nest-building and the migration of birds; and further adduces, as a reason for the perfection to be observed in instinct, the extreme severity of the selection during its development, so destructive to the unfortunate. When, however, Hartmann proceeds to trace instinct in the human mind, he would seem to be in harmony with the latest and soundest conclusions, namely, that there is between intelligence and instinct no absolute opposition, but that they pass into each other by insensible gradations, and that the reason of man has its shadows, types, and rudiments in other animals.

The manifestations of his mysterious Unconscious Hartmann traces through the phenomena of bodily life, and then further through sexual love, feeling, character, and morality, the artistic faculty, language, thought, mysticism, human history, under each of these several heads giving what is often a brilliant treatise. He makes much of the instinctive and the spontaneous, much of unconscious cerebration, much of the intuitive and the mystical. Throughout he refuses to see in evolution merely a mechanical process, and is spiritualistic in his recognition of a principle to which the mechanism is a means. His philosophy is anti-materialistic in its general aim. Conscious mental activity, as we shall see, he hands over to materialism; but the Unconscious, in his system, is thoroughly transcendental. Having explained force as will, matter he regards as a conglomerate of flats of the Unconscious. The world is only a sum of the activities of this Omnipotent and Omniscient Power, ever renewing its functions in a continuous creation. Indeed, he sometimes approaches so closely to Theism that, in his sixth edition, he felt it worth while to insert a chapter on the Unconscious and the God of Theism. Here he goes so far as to designate his world-power of infallible intelligence as at once unconscious and super-conscious. His whole system bears largely in this direction, and, with its further development, his language becomes very nearly theistic, as he descants upon the supreme wisdom of the Creator, World-orderer, or World-governor. The approach, however, is from the side of

a pantheism, out of which he does not emerge. Divine personality he denies, and, of course, with it, all human personality. The self, that says I, is a mere result of activities of the Unconscious One which is All. It is only a passing phenomenon, like the rainbow in the cloud.

Where, now, in this philosophy of the Unconscious Super-conscious, is the place of consciousness itself? It has an important part to play in Hartmann's world-drama. Throughout the earlier unfolding of the vast plot, in the action of the Unconscious, will and intellect work together in an inseparable unity. At last there is an interruption, and an intrusion upon the scene. In the brain, organized matter suddenly breaks in upon the peace of the Unconscious. The reaction thrusts upon it an idea which it did not will, and the startling by this idea from without is consciousness. We will not pause to consider the difficulties of this conception. Let us observe it finds that, in consciousness, thus something may be presented without being willed. The hitherto inseparable unity between intellect and will is severed, and in consciousness lies the possibility of the emancipation of the intellect from the will. Through it may be wrought what Hartmann calls redemption and salvation. Redemption and salvation from what?

The question brings us to Hartmann's pessimism. We must glance at the apex of the pyramid he claims to have built up by inductive knowledge. Schopenhauer had made conscious intellect merely a parasite of will, which was his only principle. Hartmann, noticing that the great works of Schopenhauer and Hegel appeared in the same year, 1818, and recalling the latter's observation that, where several philosophers synchronously appear, they will represent different aspects of a single whole, combines in a higher synthesis, in his Unconscious, Schopenhauer's a-logical Will and Hegel's logical Idea. Our space does not suffice for a full discussion of his somewhat fantastic metaphysics. As regards the will-factor in this world-principle, he follows Schopenhauer, in finding pure volition to be an eternal pining, absolute pain and unblestness. With this unhappy factor is joined the Idea. One cannot help thinking of Dante's lines which tell how the ruler of hell

"Giunse quel mal voler, che pur mal chiede,
Con l' intelletto."¹

¹ "He joined that evil will, which seeks but evil,
To intellect."

In the Unconscious are joined Will and Idea in a nuptial union, whereof the creation is issue. The Idea, femininely passive, is, as purely ideal being, in a state of blessed innocence. Seized and dragged down by the active and insatiable Will, it yields up that maiden innocence. Thus from the embrace of these two super-existent principles, the volitional and the ideal, is engendered the creation, owing to its father *that* it is, and to its mother *what* and *how* it is. The Idea, seeking release from this miserable connection with the incessant striving of volition, at length deludes the blindly eager Will into constructing a brain. Hence arises consciousness, and therewith the possibility of dividing the will against itself in the individual, and, by divorce of the wretched union with will, emancipating the intellect. It is thus the very mission of consciousness, born in pain, to see through the irrationality of existence. As strongly as any optimist, Hartmann takes issue with Schopenhauer's position that the world is the worst possible. Its maternal derivation from the ideal would guarantee that, of all possible worlds, the existing one is the best. So far Leibnitz was right. But Hartmann goes on to ask, Is the existing world worse than none at all? This further question is settled by reference to the paternal derivation of the world. What and how it is was determined by Supreme Reason. But *that* it is at all is owing to the other parental factor, the irrational will. Its existence is therefore irrational, and, notwithstanding the supreme wisdom to be observed in it, it is worse than no world at all.

This *a priori* proof Hartmann follows by an *a posteriori* argument, wherein he proceeds to strike a balance between pleasures and pains, as if he had a table of weights and measures for that subtle process, and finds that the pain outweighs the happiness. He is careful to dissent from Schopenhauer's assertion of the negative character of pleasure. But a consideration of nervous fatigue, increasing the pain of pain and diminishing the pleasure of pleasure, comes to pretty much the same thing, and the conclusion is reached that pain is direct and pleasure chiefly indirect, and that the latter does not by a good deal balance the former. Happiness is a mere delusion. Hartmann ambitiously makes three stages of the illusion. The first stage is the dream of happiness attainable by the individual in his earthly life. Without much system, except as determined by prejudged conviction, a survey is taken of health, youth, freedom and a competence, appetite, compassion, friendship, domestic felicity, and other things

that may be supposed to make life happy ; and everywhere is exposed the folly and inevitable misery of such supposition. Thus men are driven to the second stage, where happiness is conceived as attainable by the individual in a transcendent life after death. This hope Hartmann, rejecting immortality, asserts to be thoroughly illusive. This stage, is the link between the first and third stages. Secular aims palpably gain in extent and interest, and there is an advance to the third stage, where happiness is sought not beyond, but within, the world-process itself, and relegated to the future of this world. But this hope, like its predecessors, is doomed to disappointment. Progress brings no more happiness. With the progressive development of humanity rather increases the misery, and also the consciousness of misery. His three stages of the illusion he finds typified in the child's living for the present moment ; the youth's dreams of transcendent ideals ; the man's ambition for glory, for gain, and practical science, giving place to the weariness of old age. He finds them exemplified in ages of history, the ancient world, Judaic, Greek, Roman, with various visions of terrestrial felicity, then Christianity with its faith in immortality, and now modern times with their secular hope in this world's development. The result is an ever enhanced consciousness of the unspeakable wretchedness of existence.

Nevertheless, through those three stages of the illusion there is a continuous progress toward the goal of the vast evolution. What is that goal ? The proximate end, we have seen, is consciousness. But what is the ultimate end, to which consciousness is a means ? Hartmann answers, Happiness. This, however, he has found to be a mere illusion, impossible of realization. The very purpose of consciousness is to recognize the misery of existence, and to achieve redemption from its unblestness. And the ultimate end of the world-process is thus to realize the greatest attainable happiness, namely, a state of painlessness. How ? Schopenhauer's method, through ceasing to will and personal annihilation, is repudiated as selfishly individual. Hartmann conceives of a redemption of the whole world, and not through such passive quietism, but through active coöperation with the world's development. In all seriousness he thus conjectures of a possible end of all things hereafter. Humanity, having come to comprise the outweighing quantity of the active spirit and will in the world, shall at last, by this philosophy educated up to the recognition of the misery of all existence, through a simultaneous common resolve, " cause the whole Cosmos to disappear, at a stroke, by with-

drawal of the volition, which alone gives it existence," and thus, by unanimous or majority vote, "hurl back the total actual volition into nothingness, by which the process of the world ceases, and ceases, indeed, without any residuum whatever whereby the process might be continued." ¹ O most lame and impotent conclusion! The philosophy of despair, that makes its goal the annihilation of all existence, would seem to dig its own grave and write its epitaph.

It is perhaps too early to assign to Hartmann his true place in philosophy. He is still in his prime, vigorous and prolific. He will probably modify certain of his positions. Indeed, he has, in later publications, himself exposed some of his unscientific methods. There remains, however, his main drift, which there is no mistaking. Difficult as it may sometimes seem to take his philosophy seriously, nevertheless most serious problems it has certainly propounded. Its palpable fallacies we are not concerned here to discuss, nor its continuation by other writers in variously mitigated or exaggerated forms. Like the evil genie that escaped from the fisherman's jar and, extending along the seashore, formed a great mist, so the mist of pessimism has gotten out of the confines of philosophy, and cannot be permanently conjured back again. It is in the air to-day, and is making its way into the daily life and speech of men. To a larger extent than many are aware of, it infects the literature, overshadows the art, and weaves its spell in the music, of our time. Whatever may be said of the causes, or of the future outcome, of pessimism, its mission would seem to be to compel attention to a matter of supreme importance, the worth of existence. It is a question concerning life, as it is delineated, for example, by Balzac, that Barye for the human species. The comedy of human life, on this wide and universal theatre, seeming one moment terrific tragedy, and the next despicable farce, what is its meaning and import? Is it worth playing out by these foredone, heart-weary players? Is it better to be or not to be? — that's the question, and it has to be answered. We may criticise the details of a pessimistic philosophy. Meanwhile, it is audaciously challenging existence itself. That challenge must not be allowed to pass unheeded. Boldly the gauntlet has been thrown down. How shall the challenge be met?

The increasing pessimism of our time cannot be repulsed by an extreme optimism, that shuts its eyes to the deeper and darker facts of life. That was forever exposed by Voltaire in "*Candide*."

¹ *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, Book C, chapter xiv.

Of the two extremes, pessimism is the less flippant, more earnest, and more faithful to fact. An easy-going, shallow optimism must almost inevitably produce a reaction.

Consider now the moderate meliorism advocated by Mr. James Sully.¹ This able author makes Will, not, as do the pessimists, the father, but rather the foe, of life's misery. He dwells upon the possibility of increasing happiness through volition, resisting evil and dominating circumstances; and argues for a wise control of the conditions of experience to such a degree as to extract from life's possibilities a moderate, if not a goodly, heap of treasure. But on this low ground of mere calculation the assault upon the value of life itself cannot be successfully repulsed. For thus the question becomes to a large extent merely one of temperament in connection with circumstance: the sanguine, the superficial, the favored, on one side, on the other the more earnest, the melancholy, the unfortunate. Nor can that assault be repulsed on the ground of increased material comfort. Improvement in the means of living does not bring content with life itself. Suppose all hard conditions eliminated, we should still be left to face Hartmann's question: "What then to do with this life; with what substance of inner worth is it to be filled?"

Nor, against despair of life, will avail a trust in mere political or socialistic expedients. It must be recognized that social and political conditions should be included in an account of the present prevalence of pessimism, for example, in unhappy Russia, with its anarchistic vagaries, its semi-religious fanaticism of despair, and the wholesale suicide, not only of political prisoners, but also of peasants in their village homes. Far be it from us to deprecate efficacious reforms. But while such may mitigate certain of the ills of men, they can never eradicate those deepest and darkest facts that confront and appall humanity, — for example, sin and death. And, as Hartmann further says, "every approach to the ideal of the best life attainable on earth must make the question as to the absolute value of this life only an ever more burning one." Suppose all political and social evils remedied, and still would be left the great causes of suffering, in the very conditions of life, the inevitable limitations of man's lot. "The web of our life is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together." The threads that cannot be pulled out from that darker woof woven across the warp, what shall we do with them? Before these insoluble fac-

¹ *Pessimism*, London, 1877.

tors, in the mysterious problem of trouble, how shall the mind be satisfied, the moral sense content, the inner spirit braced?

This moral result cannot, I venture to assert, be successfully accomplished by any utilitarian views of life or hedonistic morality. Any system of ethics which makes pleasure supreme is morally inadequate to the requirements. The difficulty here is that such a system is ethics with the ethical left out. It deals, as it were, with the outer shell only, or the material mechanism, of morals. Without entering upon a consideration in detail, it is perhaps enough to observe that hedonism got a fatal wound in Mill's distinction of one pleasure from another in quality. If the pleasure of the drunkard in degrading himself, or of the libertine in degrading others, be lower than the pleasure of the artist in achieving beauty, or of the philanthropist in relieving misery, what is the standard of measure by which you reckon lower and higher? Each is pleasure. If the higher pleasure is preferable to the lower pleasure, then something else than pleasure constitutes the difference and the preferableness. The scale by which to compare pleasures cannot be furnished by pleasure itself. There is, then, something beyond pleasure by which we determine the worth of pleasures, and pleasure is not ultimate and supreme.

As against pessimism, the unavailability of hedonism is manifest from the following considerations. It is essentially self-interested, and so tends ultimately to depression, by the very curse of selfishness. The life must be dull and joyless, if in the shadow of self exaggerated till it hides each genial ray. It is a poor sort of pleasure that is gotten by thinking primarily about the pleasure. The pleasure-seeker is bound to be disappointed and restless. Real happiness is found only when not sought, is coy, and must be won by indirect approach, else eluding pursuit. Direct assault invites disastrous defeat. Further, even if the happiness sought were gained, therein the man would not find full satisfaction. Howsoever it got there, there is a spirit in man. There is a hunger in him which cannot be thus appeased. Take the voluptuary. The more he lives for pleasure, the hotter and more restless will be the fever of desire, and he the more tormented in its flame. Because he is a man, it is impossible that he should be satisfied with any multiplication of pleasures:—

“He made a feast, drank fierce and fast,
And crown'd his head with flowers, —
No easier nor no quicker pass'd
The impracticable hours.”

That shade of dissatisfaction is to be detected over all Epicurean views of life. Even the genial Horace has his melancholy undertone wherein he sings life's evanescence : —

“ Dum loquimur, fugerit invida
Ætas : carpe diem quam minimum credula postero ” —

or the weariness of unprofitable days : —

“ Sic mihi tarda fluunt ingrataque tempora.”

In Hebrew literature, Ecclesiastes shows the oscillation from pleasure-seeking to pessimism. On the other hand, the Persian astronomer-poet, Omar Khayyám, passes from pessimism to sensual indulgence ; and, however mystical, and even satirical, may be regarded by critics the praise of pleasure in his sad yet voluptuous verse, he never seems to have emerged from that passionate pessimism of a pleasure-loving soul. Byron, again, whose ethical poverty is in proportion to his lyric wealth, never quite shakes off the influence of the miasma that had early infected his nature ; and with his passion for pleasure goes his forlorn despondency, as with the fever the chill. A like transition is to be elsewhere frequently observed. Says Amiel, writing of the blasphemy of pessimism : “ And yet it is all logical ; it is the philosophy of happiness carried to its farthest point. Epicurism must end in despair.” The gratification of ambition, also, often reveals to a man the vanity of the pursuit, and the misery gnawing at his heart. It is the general confession of earthly greatness. Pope Adrian V., in Purgatory, speaks like the veriest pessimist of his elevation to that most exalted position : —

“ Così scopersi la vita bugiarda.
Vidi che lí non si quetava il core.”¹

If man is made to be happy, why is he not happy ? That is a question easy to ask, but harder to answer, because of the condition that is assumed. Both hedonism and pessimism assume happiness as the sole good, the only desirable end and aim of existence. This assumption makes the transition from one to the other very easy. By a natural reaction, hedonism leads to pessimism. It is only turning up the reverse of the same medal. Hartmann declares the only thing to which could be assigned absolute value to be happiness, elsewhere asserting that morality and justice are valid only as means to happiness. From this

¹ Then I discovered life to be a lie.

I saw that there the heart was not at rest,

Purgatory, xix. 108, 109.

hedonistic point of view the pessimistic outlook is most natural. If happiness be the standard, then, generally, life is a failure. Even pessimists, however, cannot divest themselves of the suspicion of another standard of value. An English writer, who avows himself to be of the pessimistic camp, says that, granting the possibility of a really happy life, the first question with the pessimist is: "Has such a happy life really a higher value than pleasureless but also painless non-existence?"¹ It is an implicit admission of the inadequacy of happiness as the standard of value.

Take pleasure of a nobler sort than we have glanced at. Suppose that law of transference, whereby we might ethically pass from egoistic to universalistic hedonism, and make the end of life to be the happiness of all; not then should we be secure from the suspicion of the vanity of it all, the question whether the game were worth the candle. There is impressive testimony upon this point in the fifth chapter of Mill's "Autobiography," where he records his painful awakening from that dream of universal happiness. The whole passage is noteworthy, but too familiar to be here quoted at length. Therein he says: "The whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. . . . I seemed to have nothing left to live for." Again he says: "I felt that the flaw in my life must be a flaw in life itself." He is, in spite of his theory that happiness is the end, nevertheless driven "to treat, not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of life."

Hedonism, again, is powerless, in the presence of that mystery upon which the attention of pessimism is concentrated, namely, pain. Says the English pessimist already quoted: "To the eye of cool reason the world seems as good as possible because it is a real logical process; in the eudæmonistic point of view, it is worse than no world because the path whereon the *logos* strides from victory to victory is a path of suffering to the creature."² Surely, then, cool reason must suspect that point of view. Rationally considered, the world shows a progress. As evidently that progress disregards pain, save to use it as means. Therefore the purpose in the progress must be something else than pleasure or pain, something to which pleasure and pain are only means. There is in pain a certain mysterious import. The uses which it evidently serves are secondary and limited. They do not suffice for complete explanation. Is pain a kind of police, to warn in danger, and to ward off disturbance, to preserve order, and coerce to observance

¹ *Mind*, vol. iv. p. 52.

² *Ibid.*, vol. iv. p. 88.

of laws? But it is found playing the part of a foe to peace, of a fierce mob seizing possession, to paralyze, waste, and destroy. Is it the minister of justice, to execute penalties for violation of law? But it oftener involves the innocent with, or instead of, the guilty. There are instances which baffle explanation on the ground of benefit, of punishment, or even of discipline. Pain is a mystery which, in the power of a strange fascination, sternly beckons us on to its solution in something beyond.

For that ulterior something, the principle which alone, I believe, is adequate to explain pain, namely, sacrifice, for this, also, hedonism has no legitimate place. Its altruism is of a mild type that does not imprudently waste itself, nor suicidally throw itself away in absolute self-devotion. What, however, were the world, how much less worthy, how much less glorious, if all its toil and sweat of unselfish struggle, all its unrewarded patience, all its pain of sacrifice, all its blood of brave battle, all its forlorn hopes of heroism, all its fire of martyrdom, had never been! And such things allure the human heart to-day. Opportunities for such things it instinctively feels to be the supreme and culminating moments of existence. It is not the thought of happiness that elicits the highest notes, or stirs the deepest chords, in human nature. Self-devotion may glorify life and bless it, as no "enlightened self-interest" ever could. Who but one who had found that blessedness of sacrifice, could write of life as James Hinton wrote? "Will my friends try after I am dead,—for I cannot do it myself, I cannot say it as I mean and wish to tell the world,—how beautiful and rich, and absolutely good, full of joy and gladness beyond all that the heart can wish or imagination paint, I feel that the world is, this human life. I know it by my own, which is no exception, but only life made smaller, that it may be seen. . . . 'This is what all human life is, all like this little bit of yours; *be glad.*' . . . So much does this life surpass what we thought of it, so overwhelmed and merged and lost and sunk in gladness."¹ Hinton made sacrifice the key to the hardest problems of existence. Surely, in losing himself, he had found the blest secret of life.

Mr. Sully, in his work already alluded to, argues from the hedonistic standpoint, and he finds himself obliged to concede that the establishment of pessimism would without doubt tend to the rejection of hedonism.² But, I would ask, is not pessimism any way the *reductio ad absurdum* of hedonism? Surely it shows what the

¹ *Life and Letters*, p. 294.

² Chapter vi.

ethics of feeling at last must come to, in such a world as this. Pessimistic thought threatens the foundations of hedonism. On the other hand, hedonism offers a very feeble and inadequate defense against the appalling array of dark facts which cannot be denied, and sombre conclusions therefrom to be drawn on utilitarian principles. Notwithstanding those dark facts, men will continue to esteem life to be precious. But it will be, I venture to say, upon a severely ethical basis of value. Even Mr. Sully hints at a possible rejection of his standpoint, in favor of another basis, as, for example, the supreme value of moral development.

It is not upon the low ground of any happiness, howsoever or whensoever, now or hereafter, that life is to be vindicated against pessimistic questioning and despair. Our stand must be taken upon the lofty position of a moral life, to which all else is subordinated, embracing moral ends to which both pain and pleasure are means. When duty is placed upon her throne, the realm of life is secure. When virtue for its own sake is recognized in its due precedence, as end of life, then, despite all failure otherwise, the end remains unmoved, and life is vindicated. Of this moral order a prime element is the fact of personality. Behind all doing of duties is the being, endowed with life, and therefore capable of growth, endowed with conscious life, and therefore capable of effort, toward perfection, toward the realization, that is, of the possibilities felt within and pressing for fulfillment. Thus are given that aim and purpose for humanity, the very suspicion of the absence of which casts a shade of melancholy upon every nobler spirit. Such perfection is conceded by Mr. Spencer to be an end of evolution.¹ This perfection of human nature means not solely moral nobility, but, as implying the realization of all the possibilities of humanity, it is broad enough to have a legitimate place for science and art, and all those large and impersonal interests, without which life is necessarily narrow, and therefore dull and joyless.

In the moral order it is further involved that, of that ideal perfection, there is an eternal realization. There is a forever realized best, in the conviction whereof men may aspire and strive after the better. A divine perfection is at once the supreme reality, and also the unfailing spring and infinite inspiration of human effort. He who revealed the Father of spirits, and showed men their possible dignity as children of God, could issue to them that sublime injunction to completeness of character, "Be ye

¹ *Data of Ethics*, sec. 62.

therefore perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect." His voice our spirit may know in the quiet yet imperative claims of right, and recognize its own high lineage as child of God. Thus the divinity of duty invests life with permanent relations of dignity and nobility; somewhat as the valley of Chamonix is glorified by the immediate presence of the monarch of mountains. As, from the very precincts of the plain and prosaic village, the mountain uplifts those piles of ice and snow, and that stupendous outline, as of the great white throne itself; so, amidst this wonted routine and these prosaic surroundings, might be recognized the towering grandeur of the sublime fact of duty, an ever-present and eternal fact, a felt manifestation of the divine presence, giving a dignity and glory of consecration to the ordinary course of the daily life lived in its awful shadow.

The challenge which pessimism brings against life demands the answer of faith in the God of our life, a God of right and duty. Without God is truly to be without hope in the world. Pessimism is only the dire discovery of the hopelessness of a godless world. To be alienated from that divine life must mean misery. Hence many discords of daily life, and the age-long *Miserere* with its notes of anguish, and doubt, and fear. There is, even when inarticulate, yet proceeding from the deeps of human nature, a longing somehow to be redeemed from evil, made at one with the source of goodness, and so brought again into the harmony which means union of human and divine. One only has ever claimed to be able to redeem the world from this discord of evil, make man at one with God, and thus restore the harmonious blessedness of life in Him. In his gospel is thus the key to "the riddle of the painful earth." Burdened with earth's pain and woe, the thoughtful heart may easily fall into a dull despair, that sees nothing beyond

"the arbitrator of despairs,
Just death, kind umpire of men's miseries."

But, having the revelation of God, the heart may go on, putting perhaps more than dying Mortimer's meaning into that next line, —

"With sweet enlargement doth dismiss me hence."

Yes! In this moral order, as Kant demonstrated, are involved God and immortality. These transcendent truths the gospel proclaims anew in fuller revelation. A secure refuge from the misery of pessimism is afforded only by faith in a higher realm of truth and righteousness and love, an eternal order transcending

248 *Apollonius of Rhodes and the Argonautica.* [September, the limitations and shocks of time, while consecrating and blessing the course of this world. In that eternal order this temporal life has issue, as the river in the sea; and, as the river's current is affected by the mysterious tide that sets up from ocean, so this temporal life may be influenced by the eternal order whereunto it is tributary, and feel, making far up its narrow, fretted channel, the mighty tide of a full, unmeasured, and resistless joy, from the great deep of the righteousness and love of God.

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APOLLONIUS OF RHODES AND THE ARGO-NAUTICA.¹

IN the revival of Greek poetry at Alexandria in the third century before Christ, when literary art was brought to as high an excellence as it can ever attain without the inspiration of an earlier and more unconscious genius, the learned poets of the court of the Ptolemies returned to those forms of composition in which Hellenism had embodied its first words of song, — forms which, by centuries of familiarity, had become dear, almost sacred, to the hearts of the Greeks; and in the epic and the elegy we see the perfection of Alexandrianism. The period has a profound interest, not only to the student of the human mind in its more conscious workings, but also to the critic of literary art; for much of the poetry of this epoch, artificial and uninspired as it often is, deserves attentive study; and we especially of the present day, with whom laborious investigation of subtle points and carefully wrought niceties of expression too often take the place of originality, breadth, and force, may learn something from a period marked by similar characteristics. The learning, appreciation, and spirit of a Frenchman, Auguste Couat, have lighted up the subject, and under his guidance the study of the principal poets of Alexandrianism is no uninteresting occupation. Five centuries after Christ the poet Nonnus uttered the “swan-song of Greek literature;”

¹ *The Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius. Translated into English Prose from the Text of R. Merkel, by Edward P. Coleridge, B. A. London: George Bell and Sons. 1889.

La Poésie Alexandrine sous les Trois Premiers Ptolémées, par Auguste Couat. Paris, 1882.

the tendencies which led to the decline and extinction of that wonderful development of the Greek artistic spirit are visible in the Alexandrian poets, and Nonnus was but the last link in a chain which began with Homer.

The story of the Argonauts, as told by Apollonius, has only recently become accessible to modern English readers. Mr. William Morris has, indeed, made use of the legend in his "Life and Death of Jason;" but he has treated it with considerable freedom, and mingled the classic and romantic elements, the Homeric and the Spencerian style, in his own happy manner.¹ Mr. Coleridge's translation of the "Argonautica," which has lately appeared, though occasionally inexact, gives, on the whole, a good rendering in not unpleasing English; and in this form the poem may well claim the attention of the general reader.

Born about 235 B. C., probably in Alexandria itself, at that time the centre of literature and art, — the "eye of Greece," or of all that remained of the Grecian spirit, — Apollonius was surrounded from the first by those influences which cultivate taste and stimulate the mental faculties. He seems early to have devoted himself to the pursuit of literature; he became a disciple of Callimachus, the poet laureate of his day; and we may infer that he belonged to a family of high standing and wealth. With Callimachus, the dictatorial representative of the fashionable school of poetry, he must have received an orthodox training in the arts of composition, invention, and borrowing; he must have found delight and inspiration in the wondrous heritage of the classical genius, — a heritage which has descended to us sadly diminished, — and been taught to regard with reverence, if not always with just criticism, the poets of the earlier time. For Callimachus and his partisans, in the spirit of a popular school of modern fiction, maintained that the function of the poet was not to compose great epics which should rival Homer, but pieces less ambitious in design, more perfect in finish and in studied elegance.

The characteristic of Alexandrianism was its learning. The magnificent library founded by the Ptolemies gave its readers such opportunities for study as ancient scholars nowhere else enjoyed; and the list of librarians from 282 to 173 B. C. is a succession of great names that needs no comment: Zenodotus, Theocritus, Aratus, Callimachus, Eratosthenes, Apollonius, Aristophanes, Aristarchus. Endowed with far more of genius than any of the other epic poets of his time, and perhaps more deserving

¹ See the chapter on "Æsthetic Poetry," in Mr. Walter Pater's *Appreciations*.

of immortality than any later poet except Theocritus, Apollonius shared the spirit of his age and school, which borrowed more than it invented, and devoted its labor to happy combination and elegant expression. In the "Progymnasmata" of Theon we have the characteristic expression, 'Ανάγνωσις τροφή λέξεως, — "Reading is the nourishment of style;" and while it is not certain that this saying is rightly assigned to the author of the "Argonautica," the words may well have been his motto. The dry and tedious scholia on his poem have at least this interest, that they give us some knowledge of the poet's vast field of reading; and in noting suggestions, similarities, or borrowings, Lucillus, Theon, Sophocles, and Irenæus, the Dryasdusts of the reign of Tiberius, have cited a long list of two hundred and seventeen authors. The wonder is, not that he fell short of the highest degree of originality, but that his genius was not altogether crushed by the weight of his acquirements, and that he could win for himself, as he has done, the distinction of having first treated that romantic love which is the dominating passion of modern literature. Apollonius stands with Virgil upon a middle ground between the ancient poetry, sublime in the ideas of fate, nemesis, and the powerlessness of man, and the modern poetry, grand in its conceptions of passion and of the strength of human personality. "These laborious imitators of antique art," says Couat, "were the creators of a new art; these preservers of the past were the initiators of future progress."

Yet the Alexandrians, in their efforts to combine erudition and high literary finish with a close imitation of the works of antiquity, were by no means agreed as to the aims and methods of artistic composition. Innovation and conservatism were, as ever, at variance; and the Greek Anthology contains many traces of the curious and bitter struggle. The one party would seek its models in Homer, or, still better, in Hesiod and Antimachus, the types of learned mythology; the other condemned the audacity of such ambitious attempts, and pointed with pride to certain short pieces of the newer style, replete with all that delicate finish and grace which, it is intimated, Homer lacks. Μέγα βιβλίον, said Callimachus, in words which became proverbial, μέγα κακόν, — "A big book is a great plague." The natural retort followed: finical minuteness, laborious attention to words rather than to ideas, obscurity, were charged upon those who cultivated this style. Antiphanes vented his feelings in this epigram: —

"Bustling tribes of grammarians, grubbers of other men's muses,
 E'er digging deep 'mong the roots, wretched thorn-treading moths,
 You who are spots defiling the great, who delight in Erinna,
 Bitter and dried-up curs, snarling Callimachus-like,
 You who disgrace the name poet, and dim posterity's lustre, —
 Plague take you all, you sly ticks, backbiting masters of song." ¹

Against the position taken by his master Callimachus, Apollonius the pupil brought to bear all the force of his youthful ardor and genius. His ambition was to show by example rather than by argument that it was still possible to compose an extended and successful epic in the Homeric style. At the age of sixteen or seventeen, when he could hardly have completed the first draft of his poem, he read a portion of it publicly in Alexandria. The boyish production was greeted with censure and ridicule. Humiliated at his own disgrace and the triumph of his opponent, he withdrew from Alexandria, and sought a hiding-place for his mortification in Rhodes.

A bitter war of satire and epigram ensued. Callimachus expressed his hatred of the style of poem which Apollonius had attempted in these words: —

"Cyclical poems I hate, nor can I take any pleasure
 In that road which all men hither and thither conveys;
 Strolling loves I detest, nor from any popular fountain
 Drink I at all; I loathe all that belongs to the herd.
 Fair, very fair, is Lysanias; but ere this sentence is uttered,
 Cometh the echo back: 'Some one else has the prize.'" ²

Apollonius, in turn, gave utterance to a still more pointed attack: —

"Offscouring of a Callimachus, puppet, stupid old blockhead;
 He is the cause of it all, — he who the Causes composed." ³

¹ Γραμματικῶν περίεργα γένη, ῥιζώρυχα μούσης
 ἄλλοτρίης, ἀτυχεῖς σῆτες ἀκανθοβάται,
 τῶν μεγάλων κηλίδες, ἐπ' Ἡρίνῃ δὲ κομώντες,
 πικροὶ καὶ ξηροὶ Καλλιμάχου πρόκυνες,
 ποιητῶν λῶβαι, παισὶ σκότος ἀρχομένοισιν,
 ἔρροισ', εὐφώνων λαθροδάκναι κόριες. — *Anth. Pal.*, xi. 322.

² Εχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κύκλικον, οὐδὲ κελεύθῳ
 χαίρω, ὅτις πολλοὺς ᾤδε καὶ ᾤδε φέρει
 μίσω καὶ περιφοίτον ἐρώμενον, οὐδ' ἀπὸ κρήνης
 πίνω· σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια.
 [Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχῃ καλὸς καλός· ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν
 τοῦτο σαφῶς, ἤχῳ φησί τις "ἄλλος ἔχει."] — *Anth. Pal.*, xii. 43.

The interpretation of the last two lines, if they belong here, has caused much difficulty to commentators.

³ Καλλιμάχος τὸ κάθαρμα, τὸ παίγνιον, ὃ ξύλινος νοῦς
 αἴτιος ὁ γράψας Αἴτια Καλλίμαχος. — *Anth. Pal.*, xi. 275.

To disprove the intimation of his own lack of power, Callimachus wrote the epic "*Hecale*," — a poem which was received with enthusiastic applause, and established incontrovertibly his supremacy. Yet his defeated rival must be still further humbled; and against him was directed the long and bitter satire called "*Ibis*," the form and meaning of which we can guess only from Ovid's poem of the same name. Finally, we have an indirect criticism of Apollonius's school of poetry in a passage which he seems to have added in a revision of the "*Hymn to Apollo*:" —

"Envy maliciously whispered aside in the ear of Apollo :

'I do not fancy that bard who sings not as much as the sea-waves.'

Envy Apollo spurned with his foot, and thus he addressed her :

'Vast is the swelling tide of Assyria's river, but also

Much is the mud and the refuse it carries down on its waters.

Not from every source comes the bees' liquid load to Demeter,

Only that little stream which distils, in pureness unsullied,

Drop by drop from a sacred fount, its flower consummate.'

Hail to thee, lord ! and may Scorn retreat into Envy's seclusion." ¹

So much we know of one of the most curious of literary feuds, as it has been reconstructed from the fragments of bitter personality and recrimination that survive. Callimachus, already an old man, did not long outlive the quarrel. Apollonius, in later years, returned to Alexandria, to enjoy his fairly-won reputation, and to succeed to his master's position; and on his death, says his biographer, the two enemies were laid side by side in the same tomb.

The tale of Jason and the Golden Fleece was an old and familiar one in Greek mythology. Homer in the *Odyssey*, Hesiod in the *Theogony*, Mimnermus in *Nanno*, speak of it; Pindar's magnificent fourth Pythian is devoted to it; Æschylus had made use of it in four tragedies, Sophocles in five, Euripides in three; and a score of other poets and prose-writers, whose works we know only by report, had told the story at greater or less length. Apollonius chose a bold flight, but he chose wisely,

¹ 'Ο Φθόνος Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπ' οὐατα λάθριος εἶπεν·

"Οὐκ ἄγαμαι τὸν αἰοιδὸν ὃς οὐδ' ὅσα πόντος ἀεῖδει."

τὸν Φθόνον ὠπόλλων ποδὶ τ' ἤλασεν ᾧδὲ τ' ἔειπεν·

"Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο μέγας ῥόος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ
λύματα γῆς καὶ πολλὸν ἐφ' ὕδατι συρφετὸν ἔλκει.

Διοῖ δ' οὐκ ἀπὸ πάντος ὕδωρ φορέουσι μέλισσαι,

ἀλλ' ἥ τις καθαρὴ τε καὶ ἀχράντος ἀνέρπει

πίδακος ἐξ ἱερῆς ὀλίγη λιβάς, ἄκρον ἄωτον."

χαίρει ἀναξ· ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἔνθα νέοιτο. — *Call.*, II. 105–113.

and the task called forth his full strength. Says Couat: "He sought to compose a poem which should be at once an heroic epic, a romance, and a treatise on mythical geography, — where he might be antique like Homer and modern like Callimachus; where the story, the composition, the language, should recall the past even while it bore the mark of the present; he attempted, in short, the impossible feat of combining all these unlike things in the artificial unity of a continuous narrative." His first bitter disappointment caused his retirement into Rhodes, from which he received his surname; but years of patient labor in polishing and perfecting at last produced a result that commanded the applause of the literary world.

In an age when the epics which have always been regarded as the models of composition are declared to be patchworks and accretions of ill-assorted lays, without adequate *motif* or unity, criticism may perhaps judge leniently of Apollonius's development of his subject; but the story, as he has treated it, has "neither the grandeur of an epic, nor the unity of a drama, nor the sustained interest of a romance." "The unity of the poem consists in the arrangement and concatenation of facts, in the calculated proportion of parts." The first two books are taken up with an account of the sailing of the expedition and the long voyage. The various scenes along the course naturally give occasion for many digressions; but they are introduced so judiciously, and distributed so evenly, that one might leave Apollonius with the false impression that he has not allowed himself to wander so much as Homer. The third book is taken up with the love of Jason and Medea, and the means by which Jason won success in the trials imposed upon him, and carried off the Golden Fleece. Here the poet is at his best; and this book, with the first part of the fourth, is so much superior to the rest of the poem that the whole suffers by the contrast. "The representation of this passion," says Couat, "is only an episode, which, without unity itself, may, as Sainte-Beuve has justly said, be the dominating portion of the epic, but cannot give it unity." The fourth book relates the escape of the Argonauts from Colchis, and their return to Greece; and while Homer seems simple and truthful in his wildest statements concerning mythical geography, we feel a little indignation at being asked by an Alexandrian of the third century, who prides himself upon his knowledge of unfamiliar lands, to believe that the Argonauts sailed up the Danube into the Adriatic Sea, up the Po into the Rhone, and returned to Greece by

way of Central Africa. Before we have proceeded very far on this marvelous voyage the narrative flags; the fleece won, Jason and Medea united, we do not care for a repetition of geographical details and hairbreadth but somewhat tedious escapes, — which the poet himself seems to have had an undignified desire to cut short. We feel that the poem ought to end when the main object of the expedition has been attained, as the *Odyssey* ends when its hero has returned and recovered his throne. Pindar, with better taste, and perhaps with greater liberty, has avoided the mistake into which Apollonius fell, and has given a superior unity to the tale.

It is sometimes said that Virgil was the first to depict love in that higher, intense personal manifestation in which we moderns represent it. From the early, passionate, sensual expression of desire in Sappho and the erotic songs of the Greeks to the elevated, almost deified conception which inspires modern poetry is a long distance; but Apollonius had traversed much more than half the wide interval. Dido has stolen the glory of Medea; the Colchian maiden was the first to love as maidens love nowadays, at least in fiction; and hers was the first romance. This was not, to be sure, an individual development of Apollonius. “From the Alexandrians principally,” — again we quote Couat, — “and I do not forget either the Ionian elegy or the Æolian lyrics, — dates personal poetry, borrowed from the things of daily life, the echo of the sentiments, the sufferings, the joys, and the dreams of every one. This personal, and we should not hesitate to call it romantic, poetry is found above all in the elegy, in the epigram, where it is concentrated in short psychological analyses, full of delicacy, force, and brilliancy; it penetrates even into the epic, transforming its antique character, and introducing new sentiments. Love indeed became and remained, with the Alexandrians, the principal object of the literature of the imagination. With them it reigned in the more serious poetry as well as in the lighter.” Sainte-Beuve¹ has translated and paraphrased at length the third book of the “*Argonautica*,” where this subject has raised the poet so far above the level which he maintains in the mere epic history of wars and adventures. There is a truth, a purity, a modernness about the description of Medea’s night of anxious doubt, or of her confusion at the first meeting with Jason, which Sappho, with all her intensity and force, could never have attained. Compare, for instance, with our second fragment of Sappho, these lines of

¹ “De la Médée d’Apollonius” (*Portraits Contemporains*, tome V^e.)

Apollonius, especially as they are read in the Greek and in their connection:—

“Then sank her frightened heart, and withal were her quivering eyelids
Darkly beclouded with mist; o’er her cheeks the hot crimson mounted;
Backward or forward to move the limbs that obeyed not her bidding
Strength had she none, but her feet were rooted beneath her. And meanwhile

All her attendants apart had withdrawn, and tarried far from them.
Silent and voiceless were they, as they stood there, facing each other,
Even as stand two oaks, or pines, mayhap, lofty and noble,
Which close together are fixed in the mountain’s fastness in quiet,
When it is calm; but again, if the blast of the north wind be stirring,
Waked into motion, they roar unceasingly; thus, then, the lovers
Soon were to speak in abundance, impelled by the breezes of Eros.”¹

While no mere summary of the narrative can bring out all the keen touches of psychological analysis in which it abounds, it may be interesting to follow the course of this early love-story. Hera and Athena, in a morning call upon Aphrodite, whom they find combing her long hair, agree with the Goddess of Love upon a plan for the success of the Argonauts in their difficult and perilous undertaking. Eros (who is discovered playing jackstones with Ganymede “for keeps”) is enlisted in their cause; and as the heroes, after their long voyage, enter the palace of Æetes, the malicious little god, hiding behind Jason himself, sends an arrow with unerring aim into Medea’s heart. So far the inherited machinery of divine intervention has been maintained; henceforth all becomes human: love is the motive, Medea the agent, of the entire action.

“O cruel Love, man’s chiefest bane and curse!” cries Apollonius, at a later stage of the passion, in that tone of conscious, half-weary sadness which came to the Greeks only after centuries of accumulated experience, — a tone far different from anything in the older epic, different from the *Ἔρως ἀνίκατε μάχαν* of the Antigone, — “from thee proceed deadly feuds and mourning and

¹ ἐκ δ’ ἄρα οἱ κραδίη στηθέων πέσεν, ὅμματα δ’ αὐτῶς
ἤχλυσαν· θερμὸν δὲ παρηίδας εἶλεν ἔρευθος.
γούνατα δ’ οὐτ’ ὀπίσω, οὔτε προπάροιθεν αἰεῖραι
ἔσθενεν, ἀλλ’ ὑπένερθε πάγη πύδας· αἱ δ’ ἄρα τείως
ἀμφίπολοι μάλα πᾶσαι ἀπὸ σφείωι ἐλίσσασθαι.
τῷ δ’ ἄνεψ καὶ ἄναυδοι ἐφέστασαν ἀλλήλοισιν,
ἢ δρυὸν ἢ μακρῆσιν ἐειδόμενοι ἐλάτρησιν,
αἳ τε παρᾶσσον ἔκηλοι ἐν οὖρεσιν ἐρρίζωνται,
νηνέμηι· μετὰ δ’ αὐτῆς ὑπὸ ριπῆς ἀνέμοιο
κινύμεναι ὁμάδῃσιν ἀπείριτον· ὥς ἄρα τῷ γε
μέλλον ἄλις φθέγξασθαι ὑπὸ πνοιῇσιν· Ἔρωτος. — III. 961-971.

lamentation ; yea, and countless sorrows beside all these are by thee stirred up. Up, and arm thee against the foemen's sons, thou deity, as in the day thou didst inspire Medea with her fell murderous thoughts." ¹ From the very beginning the awful tragedy in which the alliance of Jason and Medea will end is vaguely present to our minds, and deepens the shadows of a piece which in itself contains all the elements of intensity and power.

But the passion is as yet in its inception. In solitude and reflection love is wont to fan and feed its own flame ; and during a night of restless anxiety the longing grew upon Medea to rescue the strangers from the peril in which they were placed by her father's demands. And yet what were they to her ? Besides, the sons of her sister Chalciope were involved in the danger ; let the appeal for aid come from her. Then, with the delicious logic of love, having decided that the advances should come from her sister, she herself started to seek Chalciope's room, and only the reflux tide of modesty drove her back to await the expected appeal. When the entreaty came, she required no great persuasion, but set about devising means to thwart the deadly purposes of her father.

"Then did night spread darkness o'er the earth," says Apollonius, in a most beautiful description, "and they who were at sea, the mariners, looked forth from their ships toward the Bear and the stars of Orion ; and now did every wayfarer and gate-keeper long for sleep ; and o'er every mother, weeping for children dead, fell the pall of deep slumber ; no more did dogs howl through the town ; no more was heard the noise of men, but silence wrapped the darkling gloom. Yet not at all did sleep shed its sweetness o'er Medea." Long she tossed and pondered, torn by the conflict of love with maiden modesty and filial duty. Only one way of release appeared to her : she rose, took her casket of baleful drugs upon her lap, to choose one which should bring final rest to her troubled soul, when suddenly "an awful horror of loathly Hades" filled her mind. The struggle was over ; Medea was conquered ; henceforth she waited only for the opportunity of devoting herself and her magical powers to the service of Jason.

Another scene among the many beautiful ones that follow particularly deserves our attention. An interview had been arranged in which Medea was to give Jason the magic herb that should work his deliverance, and to direct his course of action in the perilous trial. The two lovers — if Jason's weakly submission to

¹ This translation and the next are Mr. Coleridge's.

the connection forced upon him entitles him to that name — met each other alone for the first time. The passage in which their embarrassment is described has been cited above. The hero of that adventure which was surpassed in glory only by the siege of Troy, and the wondrous woman of charms, the mighty mistress of men and animals and of the wayward elements, stood abashed and speechless in presence of each other. Jason first recovered his composure; his nature knew little of the depths to which Medea's ardent soul was stirred. His own safety was his first thought: with a touch of the unconscious irony of tragedy which every reader must feel, he spoke of Ariadne, who had loved and delivered Theseus only to be abandoned by him. Medea, who "would have drawn her whole soul forth from her breast and given it him at his desire eagerly," directed his means of success and deliverance. Then, when shame had left her, she sought an assurance that he would not forget her in his far-distant land, and prayed that, if he should forget, some messenger-bird might whisper the news in her ear, and she be borne on the blasts of the wind to haunt and reproach him. At last the strong but sluggish spirit of Jason takes fire: he will never forget her; he will take her as a bride to his home in Greece, where she shall be honored among women. Thus they remained in the rapture of a new-found love, until the setting sun reminded Jason's prudent spirit that it was time for Medea to return to her father's palace.

Even in this imperfect sketch it must be apparent how exactly the two lovers typify ancient and modern art. Two streams of influence, opposite in their character, have flowed together and formed a union as perfect, let us say, as the marriage of hero and heroine, — each retaining its own individuality and tendency, but both combining into a fairly rounded and finished whole. In Jason survives the old machinery of divine intervention and guidance; he is the creature of destiny and circumstance; when he is left to himself, his counsels lack force, decision, originality. Medea is the representative of human personality and will, — not that which blindly raises its hand against the decrees of all-powerful fate and divinity, only to draw down the shattering stroke of Nemesis, but that which, in the sphere of human action, reverently yet fearlessly works out its ends, and rises superior to obstacle and trial. She is still the sensitive, dutiful, wavering maiden, with just enough of independence and self-reliance to impart character and charm; she has not as yet become the typical woman of drugs and incantations, the worthy niece of Circe the

witch ; and the terrible tragedy which Euripides has so pathetically wrought out casts only a vague foreboding shadow over the scene. Jason is a conventional figure ; he resembles too much that bore of every schoolboy, the “ pious Æneas ;” he does not even rise to all the possibilities of conventional treatment. Medea is a character whom the poet has created and loved ; whom he has portrayed with wonderful care and success ; and whom the sympathetic reader must love and admire and linger with as did the poet. Jason is human in his weakness and vacillation ; Medea is infinitely more human both in her weakness and in her strength.¹

Yet justice to the poet compels us to speak one word in defense of Jason and of those portions of the poem which seem to us inferior to the episode of Medea. Apollonius had undertaken to write an epic in the Homeric style ; and an epic without the constant presence and interference of gods could as little have been conceived as an “ Orlando Furioso ” or a “ Faerie Queen ” without magic. Apollonius has departed sufficiently from the conventional canons of epic art ; a total departure would have offended the taste of the poet and of his age, and been fatal to the success of his creation. The gods are no longer the old Homeric divinities ; but they must be brought in, and allowed to take a hand in the course of events. Apollonius has not made an unskillful use of the conventional material and obligations which were presented to him ; and if we do not find in all parts of the poem the same originality and power, there is everywhere grace, delicacy, and finish.

The question how far the literary artist can consciously separate himself from his own environment, and reproduce the scenery, sentiments, and language of another age, is always an interesting one in criticism. Writers of every class and of every degree of genius have attempted it with varying success, — never, it may be said, with complete truthfulness. One who is disposed to study the question in detail finds in Apollonius a singularly favorable field. To the modern scholar no particular phase of the Greek language is the familiar idiom drawn in with his mother’s milk, and equally unnatural for him to analyze ; the

¹ So it is elsewhere. “ Chariclea is the only interesting person in the work,” says Dunlop, speaking of Heliodorus. “ She is represented as endued with great strength of mind, united to a delicacy of feeling, and an address which turns every situation to the best advantage. Indeed, in all the ancient romances the heroine is invariably the most engaging and spirited character.” — *History of Fiction*, c. 1.

tricks of speech, which in the case of our native tongue are so ingrained that they escape us even in a use which is highly anachronistic, are to him matters of conscious acquirement and scientific classification; he has noticed when words and idioms first appear in the language, and can often judge better than Apollonius what is Homeric and what is not. In this way alone can the style of our poet be rightly judged. The test of an artistic imitation is its correspondence to the model; and while the poet shows throughout real originality and genius, the strict prescription of departments in Greek literature and his evident attempt to follow in the well-marked lines of the older epic invite such a comparison as the criterion of his success. The result of the examination would be highly favorable to Apollonius. He has attained a degree of success which we may well regard as remarkable in a conscious, artificial imitation of a dialect and mode of thought removed by many centuries of change and decay. We find words, indeed, which appear in the language only at a late date; we notice syntax which Homer could not by any possibility have used; in metre we find ourselves far advanced in a line of change which runs unerringly through almost every epic poet from the earliest to the latest. Yet, with these results of the influences of his own time, which the most skillful hand could never entirely remove, Apollonius has reanimated and reproduced the Homeric age in its true spirit and color. It is said that much of the effect of Thackeray's "Henry Esmond," with all the faithful scholarship and exquisite taste that it reveals, is due to the slight quaintness of the contraction "'Tis." Apollonius owes his success to no single trick of speech, nor to any mechanical use of the formulæ of lines and half-lines which are so common in Homer, but to an attentive, faithful, sympathetic reconstruction of the heroic world.

Nowhere do the imagination and artistic skill of an epic poet find more room for display than in the simile. "It may perhaps not seem difficult," says Bergk in his "History of Greek Literature," "to find an appropriate simile; yet none of the later poets has in this respect even approximated Homer's art. Either they are content with copying Homer, or, when they rely upon their own resources, we see their poverty of invention, their unnaturalness and artificiality. Nor does this apply only to the later Greek epic poets, but to the Roman as well. . . . There is in all Virgil hardly a simile which is not borrowed: Homer first, Apollonius next, are his sources."

The number of similes in the “*Argonautica*,” including both those worked out in detail and comparisons merely indicated, is one hundred and twenty-nine. They occur, on the average, somewhat more frequently than in the *Iliad*, and more than twice as often as in the *Odyssey*, and are much more evenly distributed than Homer’s. They are drawn in general from the same wide field as Homer’s, — from animate and inanimate nature, from the business and labors of common life, from mythology, — rarely from a subjective sphere. Illustrations from animal life are frequent and varied. Among wild animals, besides the indefinite *θήρ*, we have, in the extended similes, the lion, bull, boar, deer, serpent, hawk, dove, swan, fly, gad-fly, ant, and bee; among domestic animals, the horse, ox, sheep, and dog.

In the realm of inanimate nature and natural phenomena, where Apollonius is often at his best, the stars are his favorite comparison. They appear five times, thrice referring to Jason. Once the ordinary “star” is not sufficient; Sirius, the brightest of stars, can alone adequately represent the hero’s glory. The armed men springing from the dragon’s teeth seem like the constellations shining forth after a great snowstorm. Hercules appears to the keen-eyed Lynceus in the dim distance like the new moon, which one just sees, or thinks he sees; and again, at its full, we feel the joy which its beams inspire in the maiden’s heart. The rays of the sun, now first rising, now evaporating the dew, now reddening a cloud, now dancing in reflection from a vessel of water; the wind, and its roaring; the lightning; fire, and the eddies of smoke rising from a burning forest; a hailstorm; flowing streams, — all are pictured in extended similes. The sea is a less fruitful source than we might expect. The shouts of the Colchians resemble its roaring; we see the dashing waves, and the rock standing firm in the midst. Of motionless objects we have only trees — oaks, olives, firs — and their leaves. Finally, the tears of the mourning Heliades roll like olive-oil upon water.

The sphere of human activity, as in Homer, furnishes fewer comparisons than the world of nature; from this source, however, are drawn sixteen of the seventy-seven extended similes. The girl weeping at her step-mother’s ill-treatment and clinging to her nurse, the widowed bride mourning her dead husband, the captive maiden slipping sadly out of the rich house of bondage, the poor widow earning by her nightly toil a scanty subsistence for her orphaned children, and pale-faced men rushing up and down

through the city in terror at some peril or portent, illustrate the darker phases of life; the festive choral dance, the eager remembrance of home by a long-absent traveler, and maidens playing ball on the beach, the brighter side. It is to be noted that the greater part of these are taken from the life of women. Peaceful industry is represented by the wood-cutter, the tiler, the farmer reaping, the nurseryman, or grower of trees, the horse-jockey, the puffing of the smith's bellows; and once we hear the echoes of war in the clash of meeting phalanxes. Apsyrtus, in his interview with Medea, tries her as cautiously as a boy tries a swollen torrent through which not even strong men may pass.

Comparisons with gods are not frequent. Jason is likened to Apollo, Medea to Artemis, Æetes to Poseidon. Similar is the comparison of Amycus to the monster-children of Typhoeus or Gaea.

The minor comparisons for the most part cover the same range as the extended similes. Here, however, we find subjective illustration, in dreams, five times introduced. New animals are the seals, the αἰθνίαι (water-birds), and the φορβάς (grazing animal, cow or horse). Jason steals away like a thief; a blow rebounds as does the hammer from the anvil; the cattle of Helios are as white as milk; the ichor flowing from the ankle of Talos is like melted lead.

A few examples, chosen from the finer similes, may best illustrate Apollonius's power of invention and skill in elaboration. To see how he has copied and expanded a Homeric figure, let us compare a passage from the *Iliad* with one from the *Argonautica*:—

“And as when speeds the thought of a man, who, having far traveled
Over the earth, now thinks, in his mind's sagacious recesses,
‘Would I were here, or there;’ and many a place does he long for, —
Rapidly thus through the ether speeding her flight, lady Hera
Came unto lofty Olympus.”¹

“And as a man that roams afar from his country, as often
Wander we mortals who suffer and dare, sees lying before him
Land not far away, and every path he perceiveth;
Then of his home he thinks, and all the journey together
Over the land and the sea appears to his mind, and now this way
Bending his glance, now that, he eagerly ponders and searches, —

¹ ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἂν αἶξῃ νόος ἀνέρος, ὅς τ' ἐπὶ πολλὴν
γαῖαν ἐλθλουθῶς φρεσὶ πευκαλίμῃσι νοήσῃ.
“ἐνθ' εἶην, ἢ ἐνθα.” μενοινήσῃ τε πολλά.
ὥς κραιπνῶς μεμανῖα διέπτατο πότνια Ἥρη,
ἵκετο δ' αἰτὸν Ὀλυμπον. — *Il.*, XV. 80–84.

So then Athena, the daughter of Zeus, darting rapidly downward,
Set her feet on the shore of the cheerless Thynian island.”¹

“The poet’s similes,” says Mr. Mahaffy, “are rather introduced for their prettiness than for their aptness.” Homer’s favorite comparison with the lion, which appears no fewer than thirty times in the *Iliad*, gives place in *Apollonius* to the daintier figure of the star, which is used more frequently than any other. One of these is a good specimen of the poet’s light and graceful treatment:—

“Up toward the city he went, resembling a star in his glory,
Such a star as young brides, in their new-made cottages cloistered,
See and admire as it rises in radiance over the housetops,
And through the dark-blue air it charms their eyes and delights them,
Reddening fair on the sight; and the maiden is gladdened, beholding,
Longing to see her lover, who lingers in countries far-distant,
Him to whom she is betrothed, and her parents are keeping her for him:
Like such a star went the hero along the path to the city.”²

Here is seen the Homeric detail, which does not add to the likeness between the things compared, but serves to bring out more vividly the picture presented in the simile.

A neat and original conception appears in the following:—

“Fast beat her troubled heart, and fluttered wildly within her:
Even as to and fro in the house there dances a sunbeam,
Rising up from the water which one has just poured in a caldron,
Or in a pail, perchance; and the sunbeam hither and thither
Darts and whirls and vibrates aloft, in rapid pulsation,—
So in her heaving breast fast fluttered the heart of the maiden.”³

¹ ὥς δ' ὅτε τις πάτρηθεν ἀλώμενος, οἷά τε πολλὰ
πλαζόμεθ' ἄνθρωποι τετληότες, οὐδέ τις αἶα
τηλουρός, πᾶσαι δὲ κατόψιοι εἰσι κέλευθοι,
σφωιτέρους δ' ἐνόησε δόμους, ἄμυδις δὲ κέλευθος
ὑγρὴ τε τραφερή τ' ἰνδάλλεται, ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλῃ
ὀξέα πορφύρων ἐπιμαίεται ὀφθαλμοῖσιν.
ὣς ἔρα καρπαλίμως κούρη Διὸς αἰέεσσα
θήκεν ἐπ' ἀξείνοιο πόδας Οὐνῆϊδος ἀκτῆς. — *Argon.*, II. 543–550.

² βῆ δ' ἵμεναι προτὶ ἄστν φαεινῷ ἀστέρι ἴσος,
ὕν ῥά τε νηγατέχριν ἐργόμεναι καλύβησιν
νύμφαι θηήσαντο δόμων ὕπερ ἀντέλλοντα,
καὶ σφισι κυανέοιο δι' ἡέρος ὕμματα θέλγει
καλὸν ἐρευθόμενος, γάνυται δέ τε ἠιδέοιο
παρθένος ἱμέρουσα μετ' ἀλλοδαποῖσιν ἐντος
ἀνδράσιν, ᾗ καὶ μιν μνηστῆρην κομέουσι τοκῆς.
τῷ ἱκελος πρὸ πόλλος ἀνὰ στίβον ἦεν ἥρως. — I. 774–781.

³ πυκνὰ δὲ οἱ κραδίη στηθέων ἔντοσθεν ἔθνιεν,
ἡελίου ὥς τίς τε δόμοις ἐνιπάλλεται αἴγλη
ὑδατος ἔξανιούσα, τὸ δὲ νέον ἡὲ λέβητι,
ἡέ που ἐν γαυλῷ κέχυται * ἥ δ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα
ὠκείη στροφάλιγγι τινάσσεται αἰσσοῦσα.
ὣς δὲ καὶ ἐν στήθεσσι κέαρ ἐλελίζετο κούρης. — III. 754–759.

In a different style, vigorous and rapid, is one illustrating the passion of Hercules on hearing of the loss of Hylas:—

“As when a bull rushes on, by the gad-fly tortured and maddened,
Leaving the meadows and marshes, his pasture-lands, nor of the herdsmen
Nor of the herd does he reckon, but pushes his way and now stops not,
Now again stands still, and, lifting his neck in its hugeness
Utters a mighty roar at the sting of that terrible insect,—
So, in his longing intense, his swift limbs now he exerted
Ceaselessly, now again, from his labor suddenly pausing,
Piercingly far and wide he cried with a roaring tremendous.”¹

There is no such brilliant series of similes as that which describes the sally of the Grecian host to battle in the second book of the *Iliad*. The narrative of the trial of prowess exacted from Jason by Æetes is, however, enlivened by no fewer than nineteen comparisons, greater and smaller; the two likening Jason to an impatient war-horse which smelleth the battle afar off, and to a flash of lightning darting from the clouds, have something Homeric in their vigor and their representation of succeeding phases of the same action:—

“Just as a spirited war-horse desires to enter the battle,
Prancing and neighing and pawing the ground, and high in his mettle
Tosses his head aloft, with ears erect for the tumult,—
Thus did the son of Æson exult in his limbs’ manly vigor.
Restlessly hither and thither he trod, with high, haughty footsteps,
Shaking his shield of bronze and the good ashen spear that he wielded.
You would have said that lightning, leaping out from the darkness,
All in a winter’s storm, was flashing fast from the ether,
And from the clouds, what time they bring the blackest of tempests.”²

In the following simile the vividness of the picture is increased

¹ ὥς δ' ὅτε τίς τε μύωπι τετυμμένος ἔσσυτο ταῦρος
πίσεά τε προλιπὼν καὶ ἐλεσπίδας, οὐδὲ νομήων
οὐδ' ἀγέλης ὕθεται, πρήσσει δ' ὄδον, ἄλλοτ' ἄπαστος,
ἄλλοτε δ' ἰστάμενος, καὶ ἀνὰ πλατὺν αὐχέν' αἰέρων
ἦισιν μύκημα, κακῶ βεβωλημένος οἴστρω·
ὥς ὅ γε μαιμάων ὅτε μὲν θοὰ γούνατ' ἐπαλλεν
συνεχέως, ὅτε δ' αὖτε μεταλήγων καμάτοιο
τῆλε διαπρύσιον μεγάλη βοάσκειν αὐτῇ. — I. 1265–1272.

² ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἀρήιος ἵππος ἐελδόμενος πολέμοιο
σκαρθμῶ ἐπιχρεμέθων κρούει πέδον, αὐτὰρ ὑπερθεν
κυδιῶν ὀρθοῖσιν ἐπ' οὐασιν αὐχέν' αἰερεῖ·
τοῖσιν ἄρ' Αἰσονίδης ἐπαγαιοτο κάρτει γυλῶν·
πολλὰ δ' ἄρ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα μετάρσιον ἵχνος ἐπαλλεν,
ἀσπίδα χαλκείην μελίην τ' ἐν χερσὶ τινάσσων.
φαίης κεν ζοφεροῖο κατ' αἰθέρος αἰσσοῦσαν
χειμερίην στεροπὴν θαμινὴν μεταπαιφάσσεσθαι
ἐκ νεφέων, ὅτ' ἐπειτα μελάντατον ὕμβρον ἄγωνται. — III. 1258–1266.

by the introduction of a minor comparison, — a simile within a simile : —

“ And as a spotted snake goes winding his crooked pathway
When the rays of the sun beat down upon him too hotly ;
Hissing, he turns his head to this side and that, and his eyeballs
Glitter like coals of fire, his impetuous fierceness revealing,
Till he reaches his hole, and enters its cooling recesses, —
Thus went the Argo about o’er the lake, a passable outlet
Long time seeking to find.”¹

With these illustrations of Apollonius’s art we may conclude this essay upon one of the best of the Alexandrian poets. We may possibly have shown how much beauty and interest there is in a field which has been too much neglected by classical scholars, and by those readers who claim an acquaintance with the better-known works of Greek literature. The intense and absorbing beauty of the productions of the Hellenic genius at its prime blinds our eyes to the merit of later works, which, though inferior, are by no means contemptible. An earnest plea should be made for this aftermath of Greek culture. Aside from their literary worth, the products of Alexandrian study and thought must have an intensely human interest for one who has caught their spirit. The perfection of Homer, of Pindar, of Sophocles, makes us despair ; the imperfect strivings of Theocritus and Apollonius show us more of human nature, and charm us with the discovery of what man’s labor and effort, struggling against odds and unfavorable conditions, can accomplish. The gods, if we may use a figure suggested by one of the ancient admirers of this school of poetry,² may retain their seats in the heavenly Olympus ; but the giants have raised their Pelion and Ossa to no mean height above earth, — and the giants are our own kindred of an earlier day. Of Apollonius it is to be said that he was the greatest poet of his age. Even though we may not care to learn from him in the matters of language and form, though his long narrative may in places have

¹ ὥς δὲ δράκων σκολιὴν εἰλιγμένος ἔρχεται οἶμον,
εὐτέ μιν ὀξύτατον θάλπει σέλας ἡελίοιο ·
ροΐζῃ δ’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα κάρη στρέφει, ἐν δέ οἱ ὅσσε
σπινθαρύγεσσι πυρὸς ἐναλγικία μαιμώντι
λάμπεται, ὅφρα μυχόνδε διὰ ῥωχμοῖο δῆται ·
ὥς Ἀργὼ λίμνης στόμα ναύπορον ἐξερέουσα
ἀμφεπόλει δηναιδὺν ἐπὶ χρόνον. — IV. 1539–1545.

² Εἰ δ’ ὕμνων σκᾶπτρον Ὀμηρος ἔχει,
καὶ Ζεὺς τοι κρέσσων Ἐροσίχθονος · ἀλλ’ Ἐροσίχθων
τοῦ μὲν ἔφν μείων, ἀθανάτων δ’ ὕπατος. — *Anth. Pal.*, VII. 409.

Our version of the figure is juster.

little attraction for us, there always remains this interest, that the Alexandrian has gone far beyond his predecessors and masters in the representation of the passion of love, and that he first struck with any certain tone the chord which has dominated later literature, and which awakens the most responsive feeling in our breasts.

Charles J. Goodwin.

SOME EXPERIMENTS WORTH TRYING IN THE MINISTRY.

ONE of the greatest longings of a large class of young men in the ministry is for something new. Not necessarily new truths, nor new literary styles, nor new methods of converting men, nor new methods of preaching, but that consciousness of variety and freshness in the work of the profession that shall clothe old things with a new garment, and relieve the worker of the oppression which the thought of doing the same things that have been done in the same way so often gives him. I speak out of my own limited experience. For four years I have been trying to preach the gospel of the new creature in Christ Jesus. And the feeling that I have been threshing old straw and selling shopworn goods has very often raised the question in my own mind, "Am I then a new creature myself? Is it true that all things have become new with me? And if so, how does it happen that so many things are old and wearisome and monotonous to me? Thou a preacher of newness of life! Surely thou must have been converted, if at all, from the top downwards, and the process has not yet reached the heart, that source of all fresh springs of inspiration and all new visions of real life!"

Now it is the minister's business to win men to God the Father, and in that business the great law of service demands so much of a preacher, and rightly, that very many young ministers neglect the sources of self-development. Let me see if I can make that plainer. There is no doubt about it, — the ministry does demand an immense amount of self-denial, of continual service to all sorts and conditions of men. The drain on sympathy, and intellect, and spiritual forces, and time, and physical energy is something tremendous. The temptation to pour out all one's strength like water is a real temptation with many a man starting out in this profession of service. And it is right here that many a minister,

in his eagerness to help others, fails to help himself to a development which is not only his privilege but his duty, — a development which, in the long run, will increase his powers of service and make his profession what it ought to be, — the most stimulating and enthusiastic in the world.

Purely in self-defense, to keep the pond full, and have a definite course of action for a year, the following experiment has been tried. Nothing was said about it to the church. It was a personal scheme, followed out as faithfully as possible, and with no "remarks" to the public.

For a long time the writer was much perplexed at the desultory character of the minister's work. It seemed to be a chaos of sermon-writing, calls, hurried glances at one and another part of the field, and nothing mastered or learned in detail. In view of this, which was a real perplexity to him, he divided his whole work into the following groups, which he called

THE MINISTER'S OUTLOOK.

1. The Church Membership.
2. The Sunday-School.
3. The Week-day Service.
4. The Young People's Society.
5. The Sermon.
6. The Parish Visiting.
7. The Study.
8. The Element of Church Worship.
9. The Minister's Literary Specialty.
10. The Minister's Art Specialty.
- 11, 12. The Recreation Period.

To each one of these groups it was purposed to devote a month of special attention, preparation, and study in detail. With this purpose in view, everything that could bear upon the particular month was emphasized when that month came. There was no absolute shrinking of everything else, but the special month for Sunday-school work was made special, with that phase of the church activity kept to the front in every possible way. For example, the Sunday-school was studied with the superintendent. The names of the pupils, with their classes, committed to memory. Discussions held with teachers as to methods of class instruction. Blackboard exercises introduced into the opening service of the school. And the entire school given the morning preaching ser-

vice on Sunday in a series of short illustrated sermons on the attributes of Christ.

Again, take for example the month given to the Week-day Service. Letters were written to every member of the church asking his attendance. Lists of subjects for the meetings were carefully studied. As many men as possible given something to do; not asked to do it, but assigned it, as if it was expected they would do it as a matter of course, because they were church members. Special singing for the services was arranged; and special preparation given to each meeting, even to its minutest details of opening and closing.

These two brief illustrations will indicate something of the way in which each group was treated. Let us note the objections to such an experiment, and the advantages.

1. *Objections.*

(a.) Such a plan is liable to constant interruption, owing to the very nature of the minister's work, which of necessity is of a general and not of a specific character.

(b.) There is danger that a church will not understand the apparent loss of interest on the part of the minister in the different departments of his work as he transfers his special attention from one thing to another.

(c.) The particular period assigned for a particular study may not be seasonable for it, or the minister may not be in the mood to do that kind of work.

(d.) The plan does not leave room for spontaneity. It is too cut-and-dried. It lacks flexibility.

2. *Advantages.*

(a.) The plan, carried out as faithfully as interruptions will permit for a year, gives a minister a fair view of his entire field of work, and makes him familiar with details that otherwise he would never know.

(b.) As a means of personal development for the minister, the scheme is admirable, and almost any church could afford to let its minister try it for that reason.

(c.) The habit of concentration and continuous application upon one large subject at a time is strengthened by this experiment.

(d.) The plan discourages narrowness and specialty in the ministry, and invites a broader and more stimulating habit of study with some particular method behind it.

On the whole, after giving this experiment as good a trial as a

single man with no incumbrances could give it, I am ready to say that it is worth trying. It is only a year at the longest. A church will not suffer from it, even if it does wonder now and then what its minister is going to do next. The objections to the plan are not so serious as they appear, and the advantages are more apparent after trying it than they appear before. The special subjects can be made to fit special seasons; and there is no good reason why, at least one month in the year, a minister should not allow himself or give himself something to correspond to the Literary Specialty and the Art Specialty. I gave those months to particular work in story-writing and in rose culture, and I do not think that I preached any poorer, or was any less welcome in the houses of my sick and troubled, because I had succeeded, after infinite pains, in getting some rare blooms of the "Meteor" and "Papa Gontier," and waked the sluggish faculty of imagination once more by writing boys' dialogue again. How shall the preacher of the new life be himself an exponent and a healthy example of that life unless he drink from all sources of healthy, happy power? And if a church cannot trust a Christian minister to regulate the disposal of his time and the particular methods of his own necessary development for their better service, then one or the other needs converting over again. This we must say to avoid any misunderstanding. No experiment is worth trying in the ministry which weakens or discourages the idea of *service* which underlies the whole true thought of the ministry. It is only a question as to how that service shall be best enlarged and developed. Surely the workman must have time to sharpen his tools, and money to buy new ones, or his work will not please the Master. There is no wisdom in using extra strength to swing a dull axe. Better stop and sharpen it.

One of the most useful and happy experiments I have ever tried in the ministry has been a very simple method of getting my church and congregation to help me write my sermons. For instance, I have a series of sermons on "Christ the Reformer." I print synopses of these sermons, as follows:—

CHRIST THE REFORMER.

Series of Sunday Evening Sermons, beginning February 1, 1891.

SYNOPSIS OF SERMONS.

- Feb. 1. An age of "Reform." Social unrest. Labor agitation. Changing parties. Shifting legislation. Press and pulpit in the struggle. The danger line. What has Christ to do with the question of "Reform"? Christ's attitude defined.

- Feb. 8. Christ and the individual. Christ and the State. Christ and the Church. An ideal government. What is possible? The first step.
- Feb. 15. Some of the "Reforms" demanded by the present age. Discussion of same. What can be done by Law? What by the Press? What by the Church? What by the Individual? What are Results and what are Causes in social inequality?
- Feb. 22. Man's REAL needs. The "Rights" of mankind defined. Teaching of Christ. The duty of young men. The present outlook. The imperative thing to do. Christ as a necessary factor in the permanent solution of any question of "Reform." Relation of the spiritual man to organized society.

For the first sermon, I give to one of my church members, say a workingman, a brief slip, together with the above plan, asking him to look up the history of labor organizations, and the changes in laws affecting labor. For the second, I ask another member to look up passages in the New Testament bearing on Christ's attitude towards organized society. For the third sermon, I ask still another to look up a list of legislative enactments bearing on the "Reforms" of the day. And for the fourth sermon, I ask another person to give me the legal definitions of man's rights. Credit is given in every case for work done. I mean in public. Very much of the work handed in I do not use at all in the sermon as delivered. A good deal in the way of figures and statistics is valuable, and the time saved in getting it from others is incalculable. If it be thought that this is a cool way of getting facts, or work done, the answer is conclusive that in every case the work is eagerly and cheerfully done by the church; the individuals who do the special work are themselves the gainers by it, and the facts and figures secured are generally much more reliable than those gleaned from newspapers and hearsay, and the interest excited in the preaching of the sermons is in proportion to the number of persons engaged in their preparation. I have at present a good part of my Young People's Society at work on a series of evening sermons on Christ the Saviour. The work consists in looking up all the passages in the New Testament in which Christ is spoken of as a Saviour. I have given out the twenty-seven books of the New Testament to as many young people, asking each person to give me, within a certain time, all the passages from his assigned book that bear on the subject. And, to give them an intelligent search for the words, I have given each one of them a brief plan of the sermons, which will extend over two months.

Nothing is so embarrassing in the ministry as the parish work where families of other parishes or strangers move into the neigh-

borhood. This is especially true in larger Western towns, where the population is shifting continually, and people are coming and going as they never do in more settled Eastern parishes. The embarrassment lies right here: There is another church about five blocks off. It is growing. It has come to stay. It has a constituency scattered over eight or ten blocks of territory. The two parishes overlap. Each minister wants to do his duty to strangers and new families in the neighborhood. And yet neither wishes to poach on the other's grounds. A delightful way of solving this difficulty is for both ministers to go together and make their calls on every family within their respective church or parish boundaries. This is an experiment which is worth trying, even where the Evangelical Alliance flourishes; and where that organization has not been formed, or where it has had a trial and has been abandoned, the advantages of this dual parish work are apparent at the first trial. A little form can be struck off on a mimeograph or a neostyle, stating the object of the canvass of the neighborhood, and asking, as a favor, replies to a few simple questions relative to church and Sunday-school attendance, requesting the return of the papers by mail. A stamped envelope, with the address of one of the ministers, will insure the return of about two thirds of the papers, and on that basis some general idea of the whole territory canvassed may be gleaned. But the greatest advantage is to the ministers who do the work together. The experiment is perhaps best worth trying, or most feasible, in a town or city where groups of churches of different denominations are separated by geographical boundaries capable of being united into one field of work if two churches were united, and one church building erected in the centre of the geographical territory. I know of no plan which would help more practically to wipe out denominational rivalry and jealousy than two ministers making their calls on a neighborhood together. This canvass could profitably be made at least once a year. An average of twenty-five or thirty calls a week can easily be made.

There is one experiment which I have tried with such continually increasing pleasure and profit that it has well-nigh passed out of the region of experiments into that of assured practice. It is an experiment begun while in the seminary, and continued in the ministry with increasing enthusiasm and faith in its value. It consists in a practical attempt to put myself in the other man's place. That is, to illustrate literally, there is a man in my congregation whom I love, and for whom I have a real esteem. A

friendship exists between us. It is true and sincere. He would share his property or his last meal with me, I have no doubt. But this man is not a Christian in the sense that Christ meant it. He will not confess Christ, nor unite himself to any church. I want to win that man. We will say he is a carpenter, or a cabinet-maker. He lives a different life from mine. He may have difficulties, troubles, discouragements peculiar to his work, which make the Christian life seem unreal or even impossible. Very well. I will learn that man's trade, or at least as much of it as it is possible for me to know. It is not necessary for me to say anything to him about it. It is better that I don't. But the very attempt to realize for myself the actual conditions of his daily existence makes it more possible for me to reach him and win him with the new spiritual life. Why not? How shall I enter into this man's philosophy of existence (and be assured he has one, and a very decided one, too) unless I enter, in part, into the atmosphere in which, perchance, his philosophy and his disbelief had their beginning? Suppose this friend of mine is a clerk in a store. I cannot very well leave my work as a minister and go into a store and clerk, in order to put myself literally into his place; but I can acquaint myself with his surroundings, in a great many ways, if I have the willingness to go into the store and learn the conditions of his life. The experiment in each case is personal, and belongs to that department of a minister's activity of which the least he says about it the better. The philosophy, however, which underlies it is, I am fairly convinced, based upon a right principle and a correct view of the powers and demands of the ministry. No other activity known to men calls for such knowledge of all sorts and conditions of men. No other calling demands so much interest in the human. It is preëminently the *man-building* business of the world. And whatever honestly and truly promotes one's efficiency in that business is not only legitimate, but highly desirable and worth trying.

I have of late been much impressed by one of George MacDonald's shrewd sayings:—

“To try too hard to make people good is one way to make them worse; the only way to make good is to be good, remembering well the beam and the mote. The time for speaking comes rarely; the time for *being* never departs.”

One may present in the ministry the appearance of struggle, and unrest, and anxiety, and he may make too hard work of trying to win men, forgetting the latent and reserve power of the

truth as it always exists among the preacher's materials. There is also the danger that experiments may lead to iconoclasm of things that are and ought to be eternally the same. It is one thing to wipe the dust off a masterpiece, so that it can be seen better, and another thing to take chisel or brush in hand to make it look more modern. There is also, in the trying of experiments, the risk of being misunderstood, the danger of irritating a church into a growing sense of uneasiness concerning the next move, and on the part of the minister a dissatisfaction with old things simply because they are old.

This must be said concerning any new methods in general. Methods are largely personal. What one man makes successful another may make a failure. Yet a copy is sometimes better than an original. An experiment in the ministry or anywhere else ought to have the individual personal element in it, with this thought to steady the whole work,—experiments are means to ends. They are not the work; they are only new tools, or old tools sharpened to do the work. The best things in the ministry are the old things. With this idea a fixed quantity, I do not see any danger in trying very many experiments. The ministry has not developed itself as other professions have done. It has been too much on one line. I cannot help believing that the new creature in Christ Jesus is the whole man expanded in all possible ways, and winning other men to the same life which the Master said He came to bring to the world "more abundantly."

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A NEW CHAIR.

THE increasing prominence of social science is making its study an indispensable part of the curriculum of our higher institutions of learning. The modern church has taken but little interest in this department of knowledge, till she has lost a leadership she ought to-day to possess. It is, however, one of the hopeful signs of the present that all those questions which spring out of man's relations to his fellows are demanding consideration on the part especially of our theological students. The outcome of Christ's new commandment is now being recognized by those who are responsible for the training of such as are proposing to follow in

the footsteps of Christ's disciples. The late encyclical of the Pope clearly shows what he thinks the church has to do with the so-called labor question. "No practical solution of it," he states in this remarkable deliverance, "will ever be found without the assistance of religion and the church. Every minister of holy religion must throw into the conflict all the energy of his mind and all the strength of his endurance." The real significance of the encyclical consists in the fact that it asserts that the social question is preëminently one with which the church must deal. This is a great step in advance for the Church of Rome, and other churches, not to be outdone, will have to take as pronounced a position. In the colleges for the training of the Roman priesthood, practical sociology will hereafter supplant to some extent the study of speculative theology. Every Catholic priest will henceforth be expected to bring the teachings of the Holy Father, as declared in this encyclical, to bear upon the social problems in his own parish. This new field of applied ethics is one which all teachers of religion must now perforce enter. They will find that the material wants of men must be considered, for the appeal of the hour is to help mankind into a better social order. There are vast complications connected with the observance of that which Christ pronounced the second great commandment. With so much now written on social questions, with the doctrinaires and demagogues who are assuming to instruct the industrial world, it is high time that in our divinity schools such careful and systematic instruction be given as will prepare the future ministers of the churches to deal intelligently with these grave themes. As service becomes more distinctively the recognized function of those in our pulpits, more and more will be felt the need of better understanding how to help men. This is the burning question of this generation. It is applied Christianity the world is hungry for, and it is this sort of Christianity we want emphasized in the schools whence are to come the religious teachers of the times. The domain of knowledge undoubtedly widens, and it is difficult to introduce new studies into an already over-full course without an extension of its time. So post-graduate courses have been arranged to meet this embarrassment, but social science cannot safely be relegated to such extra courses.

The gospel of Christ has to do with practical things, like temperance, crime, charity, rights of wage-earners, child labor, duties to the unfortunate and dependent classes, housing of the poor, Sabbath toil, etc. It is the ethical side of the gospel, that can

no longer be safely neglected. Christ knew far better than his disciples what a world they were called to labor in, and the extraordinary equipment required for doing it. He certainly laid emphatic stress upon the philanthropic spirit, the educational impulse, the humanitarian sentiment. The wail of the widow, the cry of the orphan, even the self-created misery of the reckless and rude, called forth from Him both conduct and aid which were attractive and helpful. He is in these respects especially an example for his followers. With the mass of men, religious life is a practical necessity; they need to get hold, therefore, of its help-side. It is back to Christ we now need to go. The air rings with the proof that social problems are supreme. Sociology, as it is called, is the paramount practical science, and it is, withal, an intensely spiritual science. It is in pith and substance as old as the selfish cry of the slayer of Abel, "Am I my brother's keeper?" It was the learned Rothe who once said: "I do not for one moment doubt that the Lord Jesus Christ has far deeper interest nowadays in the development of our political condition than in our so-called church movements and questions of the day. He knows well which has the more important issues behind it." Christ's method is too often spoken of as exclusively inward, but that is an unwarrantable conclusion. As to bulk, he did more in his ministry for the outward welfare of men than the inward. He met their physical needs with his beneficence, gave healing to their bodies, freed them from maladies of the mind, and discharged really the duties of a social missionary.

Man in his hitherto sharply defined and selfish individualism is being superseded by mankind in coöperative communion and mutual beneficence. The yearning of the age finds voice in the poet's prayer, —

"O God, give us no more giants,
Elevate the race."

The field of the church's fiercest conflicts and greatest triumphs will henceforth not be in that of dogmatic polemics, but in the domain of social problems. Can it evangelize its own cities, going down into the cellars and up into the garrets of its own heathen at home? is the crucial question. It must, therefore, be borne in mind that all our social problems are spiritual at heart. Do they not concern "shattered ambitions and broken hearts; defeated energies and maimed lives; wasted efforts and blighted hopes; starving children and crushed old age; agonized women learning at death's door how they should have lived, and men educated in

theft as if it were an accomplishment, and trained in vice as the readiest means of living; bitter despairs, breeding weakness, wickedness, and keen miseries that make darkness more welcome than light, and the grave the only gospel of rest?" Truly all these are things of the spirit. These are the concerns which drive us to the very sanctuary of souls, to the throne of the Holy Ghost, and to the welcome consolations of the compassionate Christ. The long story of civilization is but the record of the way in which societies of men have met and mastered, or been met and mastered by their social problems. It is therefore a matter of some moment to know if our theological seminaries, especially, are in touch with this social side of the gospel, and are aiming to prepare their graduates to grapple with the social problems of our humanity. A noted English preacher has said "that the bitterest ingredient in the cup of French misery is, that her social progress has been mainly effected by men opposed to her churches and her religion." It will be a sad day for American churches when this hand-to-hand grapple with the woes and wants of the people is taken up by those outside of its membership. The only safe place for the church is in the van of every battle with iniquity, leading in every effort that promises to prevent the waste of manhood, and to contribute to national well-being and to the salvation of the souls of men. Economic impotence and despair are what the church must escape, and to this end the social mission of Christianity must anew be studied and carried out.

Our plea in this paper is a particular one, namely, that to cope with the needs of the world of to-day, to make the gospel of Christ felt as a social and economic force, we need a new chair in all our seminaries, which, perhaps, might be called *the chair of Social Science*. Instruction in this department I would have cover all the questions already alluded to. "What is wanted," says Mr. Ely, "is not dilettanteism with respect to those duties we owe our fellows, but hard study pursued with devotion for years." Courses of lectures on this subject have been maintained in Andover, Yale, and Hartford, and possibly other seminaries, but they have lacked the system and fullness they would have were they from one of the recognized professors in the faculties of these institutions, having an assigned time adequate for the ends in view, and so arranged as to cover the three years of the seminary course. Less than this would not comport with the importance of this proposed department, nor the instruction that the students should receive. We have been so accustomed to exalt the

study of theology that to bring in, as on a par with it, the study of sociology, will strike not a few as a questionable innovation. If philanthropy be the dynamics of Christianity, surely it is worthy of as much attention as we give to the science of theology. Every one familiar with the work of Charles Kingsley and Frederick Denison Maurice knows that it was their leadership in lines of social reform that gained them their best and widest usefulness. Ministers as a rule have not been conversant with the humanitarian possibilities of the gospel, nor have they as a class been able to deal in a practical and commanding way with questions of a social and economic character. They have lacked preparation for this side of their work, and have been influenced more by the conservatism of the church than the imperious and various needs of the world they are to help save and bless. The pulpit is quick to speak upon the errors of socialism, but how few are heard expounding and enforcing the truths of socialism! The times, however, are changing, and churches are beginning to respond to their duties to the masses. Here and there we find them organized for a wide and varied philanthropic work. The Toynbee Hall Mission of East London is being reproduced in American cities, and "Universities Settlements" are now to be found amidst the squalor and sin of our great centres of population. These, however, are ventures of men and women who have gained some deeper, broader understanding of the gospel than has customarily prevailed. These new movements of the Church to cover fields she has hitherto neglected are what necessitate the establishment in all of our theological seminaries of the chair in question. When once the need for it is admitted by those intrusted with the management of these schools, the place for it will be found. Time, too, will be accorded to the teachings of this chair, so that it will not be regarded as a sort of appendix to the professorships which have thus far been considered as essential. It is exactly this sort of feeling we believe must be overcome, ere this new chair will have the rank and field accorded to it which it deserves. We hold that instruction in social science must be henceforth regarded as important as that which is given in the department of theology, and homiletics, and Biblical criticism. Why should not our seminaries be leaders of thought in economic and social studies? Why should not the coming minister be one who has had systematic instruction in reference to the application of the principles of the gospel to the mooted social questions of the day? If the incumbents of our pulpits are to assail every wrong institution and be-

friend the weak and the oppressed, they must know how to do this part of their work with a Christ-like intelligence and spirit. It is a holy and a constructive work, too, to engage in earnest efforts to diminish vice and disease in the cities' slums; to arraign the sweating system; to abolish the present unhealthy and immoral herding of the people in tenements; to protect childhood from enforced labor; to secure for women a living wage for their work; to see that public charity is wisely administered and pauperism curtailed, and that our reformatory and penal institutions are rescued from the domain of politics, and managed according to the most advanced principles developed by the study of penology. The coming minister must be a man of the world, in the sense of understanding its problems, able to meet the workingman on his own grounds and deal with the industrial questions now being discussed in every labor organization. The occupant of a metropolitan pulpit is face to face with every question agitating the commercial world, with every problem of our complex civilization, with the wrongs of the wage-earning classes, with the menacing perils arising from congested wealth, with the dangerous classes and their leaden instincts. This, and more than this, is making the modern minister's outfit one of great concern both to himself and the world which he is to serve. Because of the social side of the gospel he is to preach, the call for its application in new conditions and to classes it has not reached, is the reason why this Chair of Social Science is made one of the pressing requirements of our theological seminaries. Its establishment would bring them into touch with the world, and would bring the students of these institutions into sympathy with this now-developing side of the minister's function. We have trained for theology, why not for these newer phases of life and work? Why not seek to educate saints for the industrial life, like Arnold Toynbee, and hand-to-hand warriors with city misery and wrong like Edward Dennison? We are already beholding apostles of this type in the persons of such workers as Drs. Judson and Rainsford in New York. They lead the way in a ministry which is to require immediate and large reinforcements.

The funds for the establishment of this chair will be forthcoming whenever the trustees and faculties of our seminaries show any decided interest in it. In fact, the lectures already provided in some of these institutions are indicative of a growing feeling as to the importance of instruction in social science. But lectures without any fund supporting them are apt to be regarded as only occa-

sional necessities, and they do not take rank with the professorial instruction which is continuous and comprehensive. Dr. Wescott, Bishop of Durham, standing at the head of "The Christian Social Union" of England, declares through its manifesto, "the problems raised by human society are manifold, intricate, and immense. . . . It is therefore a work that needs care, study, patience, and preparation." In Oxford a profound awakening has been witnessed in reference to social questions, and in its lecture rooms some of the most scholarly minds are giving instruction to increasing numbers of thoughtful students. The incumbent of such a chair will need to be a man of broad sympathies and careful research. The field to be covered is a large one; but the subjects are related, and are such as would arouse the deepest enthusiasm on the part of students. Our men of wealth have ever generously befriended the divinity schools of the country. This is an addition to their teaching corps they will be quick to appreciate, and for which, it cannot be doubted, they would make liberal provision. At all events, the time has come to advance from mere sporadic and subsidiary instruction in this department to the foundation of a chair of social science. Let the curriculum of study be so adjusted as to give this chair equal opportunities with all others. In importance it certainly cannot yield to any other, and through its instruction we may look to see a felt want supplied, and a kind of preparation for ministerial work provided which has hitherto been neglected. "The future will be with the church," says Dr. Allon, of London, "that has in it the greatest moral forces." The same may be alleged of the theological seminary. The future will be with the one that puts itself into touch with the great troubled world, and seeks to train its students in social science, to fit them to become practical leaders in all those problems on whose right solution so much depends. For I believe it cannot be denied "that the social problem is the field on which the decisive battle of Christianity must be fought;" therefore let haste be made to provide for our seminaries the chair which will give evidence to the world that its social phenomena are being reverently studied. Then will the social side of Christ's gospel be appreciated, and its principles applied to the social and economic difficulties of the present times.

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EDITORIAL.

A BENEFIT OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

IN our August number some of the general advantages of Biblical Criticism were pointed out in respect to the essential truths of revelation, which are not only retained, but are even recovered in a higher spiritual reality. A definite example of the service thus rendered is now offered in confirmation of the views presented in the previous article. This example is drawn from the interpretation of prophecy. The tendency of those studies which result in a better knowledge of the development of Biblical literature is to do away with a bald literalism in the interpretation of Jewish and Christian prophecy, and to replace it by a reasonable and spiritual understanding of those predictions. A concrete instance of this result may be as convincing as more general claims.

Within the present year a singular theory of the fulfillment of prophecy has been given to the public, and has apparently gained many adherents. Its most conspicuous representative is Colonel Totten, of West Point, teacher of military tactics in the Scientific Department of Yale University, a position to which he is appointed by the War Department. Besides various pamphlets and books previously published, he has recently issued, in a well-known illustrated weekly, a series of articles, accompanied by tables of dates and statistics. These articles have drawn out several letters and editorials on the subject. It is quite evident that his theory is readily accepted by no small number of people in various Protestant denominations. A few words are enough to indicate the character of this theory. It is simply a new phase of premillenarianism, with the assignment of a definite date for the visible coming of Christ to reign on earth a thousand years. It is maintained that the closing week of history previous to the second coming is the seven years which begin in March, 1892, and close in March, 1899; that the signs of the times are already plain enough to indicate the approaching crisis, and that next year they will become unmistakable in great world-commotions, which, through a series of wars involving all the nations of Europe and the East, and brought to a single issue at last in Palestine, will be ended by the descent of Christ upon the Mount of Olives, when the rebellious nations will be subdued, peace will be universal, and Christ with his saints will rule a thousand years with a rod of iron. It is also maintained by some that those who, previous to March, 1892, shall have deciphered the prophecies and discerned the signs of the times correctly, will before the end of the seven years, probably in March, 1895, be translated, that is, will escape death, and will make up the number of those who reign with Christ over the nations; while those who fail to believe before next March, even though they are sincere Christians, will enjoy no such privileges.

What, now, is the basis and justification of such a theory? It is the assumption that the prophecies of the Old and New Testaments, embodied in symbols and mystic numbers, are history written in advance; that God saw fit, from time to time, to record his plans in such a way that there would be an exact correspondence between early symbols and later events, a correspondence which could be observed only when the events had in part occurred; and that the very dates were indicated in mystic numbers, which, by the aid of later astronomical knowledge, could be accurately determined. For example, the long day of Joshua is considered a pivotal point. It is calculated from following back the conjunctions of sun and moon that the battle occurred on a certain Wednesday; and, by following down the Biblical chronology from the creation of Adam, that the battle occurred on Tuesday of the same week; and so the additional day, when the sun hastened not to go down, is accounted for. With this point fixed, a system of triangulation is applied to various passages of Scripture. The dial of Ahaz, on which the shadow went back, accounts for a forty minutes' rectification of the calendar which is needed; the seventy weeks of Daniel stretch over the centuries; the beasts, and horns, and wheels, and above all the number of the beast, which is 666, described in the Revelation, disclose their significance in subsequent political changes, and, — the puzzle is worked out; the date 1899 is given as the result of various lines of investigation carried on independently of each other; it is proclaimed that the dial is close upon the midnight hour, that the times of distress and horror are impending, but that when the seven years are ended the day will break and the millennium of peace will begin.

For the purposes of such theories, the surface of the entire Bible is one dead level. Passages are seized on without any regard to the writer's characteristics or environment. Genesis, Revelation, Ezekiel, Thessalonians, Psalms, Matthew, are cited as of equal value and authority, and in any order. Phrases are detached from their setting, figurative and poetical style is reduced to mechanical prose, and historical perspective is wholly lost. The entire structure of such a scheme rests upon a belief in the verbal inspiration and the complete infallibility of every part of the Bible. If that belief is without adequate support, this crazy edifice of chiliastic expectation falls at once to the ground. Not only this particular theory, but every other theory of a visible reign of Christ on earth which has been held through the Christian centuries, has for its necessary basis this mechanical literalism in the use of the Bible. Those who do not assign a date for Christ's coming, but yet await it in constant expectation as a coming in power to accomplish those triumphs for which the present dispensation of the Spirit is thought to be incompetent, assume the literal and verbal inspiration of every verse in the Bible, precisely as it stands. Not all believers in the equal authority and correctness of all passages of Scripture are premillenarians, but all premillenarians are believers in the infallibility of all Scripture.

We claim, now, that the so-called Higher Criticism of the Bible renders a valuable service to the church and the world by exploding these alarmist notions, and by taking away the very foundation on which they rest. That widening knowledge of the Bible which finds the setting of history, the human growths and limitations, the divine education of the race by slow degrees, and many other like results, is fatal to gross, literal expectations such as those we have described. Those beliefs, we think, are fraught with mischief, and, so far as they are accepted, retard the kingdom of Christ. They disparage the existing agencies of truth and love. Those who await the coming of Christ, to subdue the nations and usher in the reign of peace, rely on omnipotence rather than on that grace which transforms character. Assuming that the world is growing worse rather than better, they look for that which is startling, spectacular, dramatic, external, miraculous, to subdue the world to God. The renovation of society by the gradual process of ethical and spiritual growth they do not expect and do not believe in. Individuals may be saved, and so rescued from impending danger, converts may be made to these startling interpretations of prophecy, but the nations of the earth wax worse and worse, judgment on them is impending, society is becoming rotten, Christianity in its present forms is a failure. Such theories not only ignore facts all about us, and are blind to the progress of the world under the gospel, but also lead to neglect of the proper work of the church, draw laborers away from toiling in the vineyard to idling in the watch-tower, and throw a glamour of unreality over religion, so that it seems fanciful and visionary. These expectations are not mere harmless beliefs, which if one hold he is none the worse, and if he refuse he is none the better. They have always diverted men from the true work of the gospel, have exposed Christianity to ridicule, and have been followed by disappointments. It is not necessary to refute in detail these opinions, although it is apparent that so complicated an arrangement of numbers and symbols is easily liable to mistake at various points, and that the parallelism of modern history with ancient predictions is an arbitrary selection of events which have some fancied resemblance to the pictorial sketches of prophecy. Such theories are refuted before they are stated, for the entire assumption is false. The most important elements of the problem are left out of account. The real character of the literature which contains the Messianic hope is not understood. The local and temporary is not distinguished from the universal and permanent. The progressive character of revelation, as involving the incompleteness of its earlier stages, is practically ignored. The true spirituality of God's kingdom through the centuries and to the end of the world-age is scarcely recognized. When such elements are omitted it is useless to seek interpretations of numbers and symbols in the later history of the world, or to establish an exact chronology on such suppositions as that Adam was created 5,992 years ago, and that the solar system was held

stationary 23 $\frac{1}{3}$ hours in the time of Joshua. All such methods and results are set aside when the actual historical development of the writings is understood, and when the human conditions of revelation are recognized. Scholarship renders an important service by substituting facts for fancies, and by replacing the letter by the spirit of truth.

And this service is rendered not merely after a destructive fashion. The Higher Criticism does not crush crude chiliastic expectations by taking away the authority of the Bible, but by distinguishing the great truths of God's revelation of himself from the modes in which they have been apprehended and stated, by reinstating that truth which is the power for renewing character and reconciling God and man in its royal place, and by tracing the ever-growing hope of the kingdom of God through its crass, materialistic forms; in which men at first of necessity apprehended it, to its purer Christian forms, in parables of leaven and mustard-seed, in beatitudes, and prayer and precept concerning the kingdom.

The only merit we can discover in the theory under consideration is the desire it expresses to work out a philosophy of history. It makes a survey of the nations, it notices socialistic commotions and political disturbances, it observes the recent emigration of several thousand Jews to Palestine, it recognizes the possibilities of war which lie in the so-called Eastern question, and out of it all frames a comprehensive theory of the triumph of the kingdom of God. But the little merit there is, in sweeping so wide a horizon to see the unfolding of God's world-plan, is lost in misinterpretation of facts and in crudity of conclusion.

As against every such theory of a display of omnipotence and a drama of miracle, it is enough to remember that the very genius of Christianity is entirely foreign to the assumption that its progress and results are offered in the shape of a puzzle which can be worked out only by a complicated scheme of solar, lunar, and astral years.

We believe that the results of Biblical scholarship are already felt through the churches to such a degree as to make intelligent Christians more and more impatient of those uses of the Bible which are of the letter rather than of the spirit, and that the value which is given by the Higher Criticism to the spiritual truths of Christianity cannot fail to be recognized more and more fully by the church at large, till it is seen that the kingdom of God is a kingdom of righteousness and peace, — a kingdom of purified character and of renovated society.

RECENT SPECULATION IN CANADA.

WE use the word "speculation" in its older and nobler sense, in which it characterizes an endeavor to see into the meaning of phenomena, and to forecast the consequences of what is observed. We shall also confine our comments to one phase of this speculative thought, in which it deals

with the problem of the political prospects and destiny of the Dominion, or of its oldest province.

In the commercial and industrial warfare between leading nations, which has succeeded to the military contests of the centuries immediately preceding, there is now in this country a motive of self-interest adverse to schemes of political union with adjoining countries. The prizes of this new warfare are not provinces, but markets; not opportunities to govern, but to sell; not conquests which would involve administrative responsibilities, but a commercial domination which can fill our coffers, while we are released from the troublesome questions likely to arise in connection with any form of civil authority or confederation. But this method of dealing with other lands, whether near or far, although more refined than that of our marauding ancestors of distant times, and less destructive as well as less heroic than the sanguinary wars which run through the earlier period of our history, will eventually fall under the same moral judgment which now restrains the nations in their use of shell and shot; and thoughtful men are wisely endeavoring to discover in the permanent conditions of human life on this continent, as well as in its existing social, religious, and political factors, indications of what is to come, and guides to the effort which may hasten a better day.

As interesting signs and effective expressions of these more thoughtful studies, we would call attention to three works, divergent in aim, embodying conflicting opinions, yet each contributing something distinctive to the larger problem we have indicated, and all reflective of a type of thought which, however narrow at times may be its range, does at least attempt to look before as well as after, and to counsel accordingly.

One of these books is written by a well-known author, cosmopolitan in his training and habits of thought, an Oxford professor, an American lecturer, a loyal British subject, and true Canadian. Another is from a barrister of the Dominion, versed in constitutional history, and inspired with the newly awakened spirit of devotion to the Confederation, and charmed with the vision of the "New Empire." The third book is from a Jesuit Father, who represents the aspirations of a powerful section of the Dominion, and who sees in the overflow of the French Canadian population into New England and Northern New York the omen and beginning of a possible New France, which will more than fulfill on these shores the promise which was blighted, but not destroyed, when Wolfe, on the Plains of Abraham, "died victorious."

The key-note of Professor Goldwin Smith's "Canada and the Canadian Question"¹ is struck in its first sentence: "Whoever wishes to know what Canada is, and to understand the Canadian Question, should begin by turning from the political to the national map." Such a map

¹ *Canada and the Canadian Question*. By Goldwin Smith, D. C. L., with map. Pp. x, 325. Toronto: Hunter, Rose & Company. Williamson & Co. Macmillan & Company, London and New York. 1891.

faces the words we have quoted, and shows the Dominion to be composed of four geographical divisions, each separated from its adjoining political associate by wide spaces of water or wilderness, or both, or by mountain ranges. In this classification Quebec and Ontario are grouped as "Old Canada." They, too, are really separated from each other, though in a different way, namely, ethnologically and religiously. Each of the four geographical divisions is naturally related to the territory lying south of it and included in the United States. "Such is the real Canada. Whether the four blocks of territory constituting the Dominion can forever be kept by political agencies united among themselves and separate from their Continent, of which geographically, economically, and with the exception of Quebec ethnologically, they are parts, is the Canadian Question." The discussion of this problem is followed through nearly three hundred pages of clear and effective argument, with which are blended an instructive sketch of Canadian history, and a valuable analysis of the Constitution of the Dominion, the latter deserving to be read with Senator Hoar's recent admirable comparison of this Constitution with our own, in a paper presented last April to the American Antiquarian Society. If political combinations were necessarily determined by economical relations, the contention of this book that sooner or later the United States and Canada will form one Federal Union would prove a sure word of prophecy. Its author is not unaware of the difficulties in the way of such a consummation. We cannot charge him with overlooking or failing to consider any element of the complicated problem. The place for difference of opinion must be found, if found at all, in the estimate of forces. It is extremely difficult to gauge some of these, — for instance, that of local patriotism, or the desire, composed of many distinct elements, to develop an independent nation in Canada. So far as we can judge, the "Dominion" is at present rather a convenience than an object of affection and loyalty. The cry of Canada for Canadians is rather the conscious aim of a literary class than a spontaneous and widely diffused patriotism. It must needs reinforce itself by an appeal to the "British spirit," which provokes a strong antagonism, the Celtic, whether Irish or French. The latter is an important factor in the problem. It may throw its weight into the scale of provincial independence, and prove decisive as against union with this country, as well as against the development of a national unity under the existing Confederation, or the continuance of political dependence upon England, or every political scheme of a "Greater Britain." We suppose, however, that Professor Smith would deem any and every form of independence as merely transitory, and as preparatory to something larger and better, and much may be said for this view. We are not so sure, however, as he appears to be, of the ultimate settlement of the question by geographical conditions and political economy. There is a spirit in communities, as in men individually regarded, that shapes their destinies.

Whatever may be thought of the conclusiveness of this very readable and interesting discussion, it is fitted to stimulate and guide inquiry, and we shall be pleased if this brief reference to it serves in any way to increase the number of its readers and attention to its problem.

Mr. Howland's book¹ is a thoughtful and independent contribution to the question discussed by Professor Smith, and is probably more representative than his of the present attitude of the literary class in Canada whose native tongue is the English. Like Professor Smith's, it offers much matter that is of value on this side of the line, and apart from its bearing on the main contention of the author. Such, for instance, is the treatment of the American Revolution in its influence upon the history of English liberty and the unwritten constitution of the British Empire, — its marking the turning-point from government by prerogative to government by the people. Another instance is the extended historical review of the treaty of peace (1783) between the American colonies and the mother country. Particularly deserving of attention at the present time, in view of the industrial warfare to which we have referred, is the author's account of the negotiations which brought about this treaty, and of the part played by Lord Shelburne. We agree with our author that an "insufficient popular appreciation of historical and political facts" is answerable for much of the narrow and demagogical character of the discussion, in portions of the public press, of questions that arise from time to time between this country and Great Britain, and we heartily commend his endeavor to recall attention to such facts.

The animus and purpose of "The New Empire" may be shown by a single citation: —

"A single generation, in this century of anniversaries, will soon have witnessed the centenaries of three great dates in the history of the British Empire, critical in the political progress of the whole English race. One of these occasions has been celebrated with great and appropriate *éclat*; one passed in unnoticed silence; the third is almost at hand. Of the two dates the centenaries of which are already past, one was 1760, the year when the conquest of Canada had consummated the old Colonial Empire, and raised it, militant and overbearing, to the height of its glory. The other was 1776, when the blow was struck under which the ancient structure began to dissolve away. But a third, and for us a greater, anniversary will arrive in 1891. 1791 is memorable as the date of the Act which set apart the new Province of Upper Canada to be the home of English emigration. . . .

"The Constitution granted to the new Province (and to the sister Province of Lower Canada), in the words of Governor Simcoe to his first Parliament, was 'no mutilated Constitution, but an image and transcript of that of Great Britain.' The Canadian Constitutional Act created the first of the modern Colonies. The rights of self-government guaranteed to the inhabitants of Upper and Lower Canada did not originate by the capricious grace of a Royal

¹ *The New Empire*. Reflections upon its Origin and Constitution, and its Relation to the Great Republic. By O. A. Howland, of Osgood Hall, Barrister-at-Law. Pp. xix, 608. Toronto: Hart & Company. 1891.

Charter, but by a full, irrevocable cession of powers from the whole Parliament of the United Kingdom. This is what chiefly distinguished the Canadian Constitutional Act from the charter of the older Province of Nova Scotia, and from the charters of all former Colonies. It was not a charter, but a Constitution. It was a recognition of one of the contentions that had ended in the American Revolution : that charters of self-government were vested rights of the people, not transitory creations of the Royal will. Along with the clauses establishing the Local Legislature, there was a clause declaring that there should be *in Canada a Council for the affairs of Canada*. It is this Council, commencing in the eighteenth century, as an engine of the Prerogative, which, by successive enactment and by steady practice, has developed into complete Constitutional Government : such as obtains to-day in all the chief Colonies of the Empire.

"Thus the Canada Act of 1791 contained within itself the prolific germ of all that constitutional progress which has since been effected throughout the modern Colonial system. The foundation of Upper Canada was the beginning of the New Empire." ¹

The secret of the New Empire is thus the autonomy of the Colonies. On this basis the author rejects the usual trilemma proposed for Canada, — Federation, Independence, or Annexation. He contends that another kind of government already has become established, — local self-government, together with union in a vast Empire, of which the "Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof" is the august head. This traditional title, the author contends, has already gained a new meaning with the close of prerogative government. The relation of a Canadian to the Queen is not derivative and mediate, but direct. The Queen is Queen of Canada, no less than of England. Every Canadian is *ipso facto* not only a subject of the Queen, but also a citizen of the "New Empire." This citizenship, however, as the author develops his scheme, becomes more and more shadowy. He criticises the Federationists for their adherence to the common conception of federal union which involves a central authority, executive, legislative, and judicial. The autonomy of the Provinces in the "New Empire," in his interpretation, is to extend, not merely to their internal administration, but to their foreign relations. Indeed, an "Imperial Supreme Court" seems to be the only federal sovereignty which retains its substance. Notwithstanding, therefore, the generous ardor with which the writer espouses the cause of the Empire, we think that his argument and proposals favor that of Independence. The unity he eulogizes is intrinsically moral, and in a good sense sentimental ; it lacks indispensable elements of governmental unity. It is noteworthy that, from the ideal side of the Canadian problem which this book appreciates and represents, the Federation theory of the Empire is found to be defective and impracticable, as it is from the economical and practical. At this point Mr. Howland and Mr. Goldwin Smith will be found to reinforce

the remarkable attack in the last "Edinburgh Review" on Imperial Federation, and to promote its contention for "Colonial Independence."

The London "Spectator,"¹ while agreeing with the "Edinburgh Review" in its rejection of a federal union, contends, as does Mr. Howland, for a "community of citizenship" throughout all the countries now subject to the Queen. What this involves of obligations and rights is left wholly unexplained. It leads up, however, to a suggestion of indissoluble treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive, and of courts of arbitration, and includes in this plan the United States, as well as Great Britain and her Colonies. How it is to be decided that a *casus belli* has arisen is not explained. Mr. Howland advocates, with sustained and effective eloquence, the establishment of "a common tribunal" for the adjustment of disputed questions between this country and Canada. The plan deserves careful consideration. If it should be carried into effect, the consequences would be far-reaching and most salutary.

So far, the outcome of the argument favors, as the next important stage in Canadian history, practical, perhaps formal, Independence.

This, too, is the aspiration of those who control the politics, and have behind them the leading social and religious forces, of Old Canada. It is not, however, the sovereignty of the new Dominion for which they principally care, but the ancient leadership of the sons of France, emancipated from dependence on their mother country. In a word, the dream is of a New France, as others are seeing in a beautiful vision the new British Empire. The third book² to which we would invite attention fills out the scheme of this New France to larger proportions by including the anticipated peaceful conquest of New England by the settlement in it and rapid multiplication of French Canadians. Lest we should convey a wrong impression, we would distinctly declare at this point that the main purpose of Father Hamon's book is not political, but religious. Its subject is the French Canadians in New England, and its object to aid them in preserving their faith. This, however, requires, in the author's view, that they maintain their language and their nationality. The book thus becomes incidentally, but all the more strikingly for this reason, a testimony to a purpose in a large portion of the citizens of the Dominion at variance with either of the methods of solving the problem of its political future on which we have hitherto commented. We shall probably recur at some other time to this volume on account of the valuable information it supplies respecting the French Canadian settlements in New England, and the methods and aims of the Roman Catholic Church. We notice it now simply for its outlook upon the political future. And what is noteworthy is that the writer seems to be as good as ignorant of the first member of the Canadian trilemma: "Two suppositions appear to be

¹ July 25, 1891.

² *Les Canadiens-Français de la Nouvelle Angleterre*. Par E. Hamon, S. J. Pp. xv, 484. Québec: N. S. Hardy, Libraire-Editeur, 9 et 10 rue Notre Dame. 1891.

possible: either the Province of Quebec will have one day its autonomy, and will become an independent people; or it will annex itself to the United States."

The author leaves out of account in his reasoning many elements of the problem, not only those justly emphasized by Professor Goldwin Smith, but moral and spiritual forces as well. On this side of the line Quebec is the stumbling-stone in the path of union. But our author's forecast as to one possible result of the French-Canadian migration may in the end be justified, though in a very different way from the one which he maps out.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONGREGATIONAL COUNCIL, — WHAT IT ACCOMPLISHED; WHAT IT REPRESENTED.

It is doubtful if any other body of Christians could have assembled in a representative capacity, and have given so little time to ecclesiastical affairs as the Congregationalists gave at their recent Council. We will not at this point raise the question whether the absence of ecclesiasticism was or was not a mark of denominational strength. We are now simply recording a fact which is evident from the perusal of the papers and discussions which occupied the time of the delegates. No attempt was made to minimize denominational interests. There was no affectation of indifference to such matters. The historical background of Congregationalism was never lost sight of, and the practical workings of the system under the variations of differing social and political conditions were carefully presented; but evidently the interest of the Council was in matters of common religious concern. Nothing could have been broader, more catholic, more Christian, than the opening address by the President, Dr. Dale, upon the "Divine Life in Man." It was a noble and lofty utterance, worthy of being sent out as an encyclical to all the Congregational churches, and worthy of being held up as an expression of a true catholic Christianity. It struck the real note of Christian unity. We doubt if within the century so generous words have been uttered towards religious opponents as the following words recognizing the devotion to a common spiritual principle by the sacramentarian party of the Anglican Church: "It is the faith of all churches and of all theologies that can be called Christian, that the end for which the Lord Jesus Christ came into the world is the realization by man of the righteousness, the blessedness, and the glory of the life of God. Here we are at one with the great religious communities with which we and our fathers have had grave and sometimes fierce and bitter controversies, — controversies on the nature and polity of the church and its place in the spiritual order; on the methods by which the divine grace effects the salvation of men; on the ideal and discipline of Christian perfection; on the authority which should determine the faith and practice of those who confess that Christ

is their Saviour and Lord. Among the men from whom we are divided by these cruel conflicts, but from whom our hearts should never be estranged, we recognize a saintliness shining with a glory that has its fountains in God; in their very contention and argument for errors which seem to us to obscure the light and impair the power of the Christian gospel we catch an accent which is the sign that they, too, are the children of the Eternal. If they maintain with passionate earnestness a doctrine of the priesthood and of the sacraments, which appears to us to be irreconcilable with the whole spirit and substance of the Christian faith, if they regard those who reject and assail this doctrine as the worst enemies of the human race, it is because for them the sacraments, when duly administered, are the appointed means by which the grace of God first originates and then sustains the divine life in man. It is this which in their judgment makes the sacramental and sacerdotal controversy so critical, so awful. In that controversy, as they suppose, the whole power and glory of the Christian redemption are at stake. They are contending for the sacredness and efficacy of the institutions by which they believe that the eternal life of God is made the actual possession of mankind."

It became evident, as soon as the theological discussions were reached, which early engaged the attention of the Council, that the theological attitude of the English Congregationalists was much freer and more fearless than that of their American brethren. Dr. Dale's magnificent affirmation of the deity of Christ in his address had been followed by the clearest and most absolute vindication of the heritage and rights of the whole human race in Christianity. When Dr. Fairbairn rose to speak, he addressed himself at once to the higher criticism, and was very pronounced in his advocacy of it. "I stand to plead for this, — historical criticism has given us back the lost Scripture. Instead of saying that we had in the old doctrine a doctrine of inspiration, I am prepared to maintain that we lost it, and turned what was meant to be a great living history of redemption into a repository of evidential texts unscientifically used, and meant only for occasional service. Through the newer criticism we get at the older Scriptures, — nay, we come to see this, that the entire history that went before Christ concerned Christ; it is not a dead letter, to be read as is a will and testament: it is living history that throbs with Him, that contains Him, that blossoms into Him, and that, therefore, has Him as first, has Him as last, has Him as all in all, — the revelation, the manifestation of God in his redeeming power and saving might for men. Since, then, we have these tendencies, we have great reconstructive energies in our midst. We are nearer a systematic theology to-day than in the days of Pye Smith and Ralph Wardlaw; we are nearer a true theory of inspiration than when the Westminster Confession was formulated, or when the Congregational Union of England and Wales was founded; and we are nearer it because we

are nearer the old standpoint. If Luther came back to some of the men of to-day, he would make short work of some of their theories. I wish John Calvin would return from Geneva; he would be quite prepared to take up the cudgels on behalf of the men who are seeking to recover the Scriptures against the men who are seeking to lose them."

Dr. Bradford's strong plea for the emancipation of the American churches from doctrinal creeds as tests of membership served to bring out the comparative freedom of the English churches at this point. It has often been said that such a theological controversy as that through which we have passed would have been impossible in the English churches, not because of looser organization, but because of a different theological temper. We think that the truth of this remark must have been apparent to the American delegates at the recent Council. Indeed, had the Council been held ten years ago, it is not unlikely that it would have made the conflict impossible here. But the freedom which might have been gained by this larger and more cosmopolitan sentiment would not have been the equivalent of the freedom which has now been earned. Professor Stearns set forth in his paper very fairly, in its negative results, the effect of the theological contention in our New England churches: "During the last decade we have been discussing, as the world pretty well knows, the relation of the heathen to God's grace in Christ. The old view which prevailed during the last century, and had many advocates until quite recent times, doomed the heathen as a mass to perdition. This severe doctrine has been generally abandoned. Our discussions have not been upon this point, but upon the question as to the manner and grounds of the salvation of those heathen who are saved. The common view has been that their imperfect faith, based upon their natural knowledge of God and of such elements of truth as are contained in their corrupt religions, is reckoned to them for righteousness for the sake of Christ who gave himself a ransom for all, and that so their eternal destiny is settled on the basis of the decisions of this life. The able and devoted teachers in our beloved mother theological seminary at Andover have urged the other view, common in Germany, that an opportunity is granted the heathen in the other life, between death and the judgment, to hear the gospel, and accept or reject Christ. I do not propose to enter into the merits of our controversy. So far as it has involved unchristian bitterness, we are ashamed of it. We are hard fighters on our side of the water, and both parties have dealt heavy blows. The result of the discussion has been to emphasize the silence of the Scriptures on this subject. The majority still hold the older view, because it seems to us more in accord with the general drift of the Scripture and the principles of our New England theology. But there is increasing willingness to admit that our speculations cannot exhaust the possibilities of God's redemptive grace, and that a point of this sort can never permanently be made a test of orthodoxy."

The advantage of American above English Congregationalism was apparent in the sessions devoted to questions of polity and organization. Congregationalism is more indigenous to the institutions of this country than to those of England. It has had therefore more scope in social and political affairs. It has had also greater opportunities for administrative effect. The rapid expansion of the country has called into play the inventive side of religious activity, and developed a great variety of "means" not known elsewhere because unnecessary. All this, as characteristic of American Congregationalism, was set forth in the admirable address by Mr. Fullerton, on the part which Congregationalism had taken in the making of New England and of the United States; in the more technical but highly informing papers by Drs. Quint and Ross on the economy of Congregationalism; and in the vigorous and enthusiastic speeches of several of the American delegates representing the various missionary organizations of the denomination, and the work of societies like the Christian Endeavor.

The interest of the Council seems to have culminated in the session set apart for the discussion of social and economic questions, though of discussion in the sense of debate there was none, and no difference of opinion was developed. A striking personal contribution to the meeting was made in the speech by Ben Tillett, a day-laborer, one of the most prominent among the labor leaders in London, and a member of an East London Congregational church. The speech was without bitterness, but alive with passion in its urgency for *action*. "We are always inquiring, always searching, yet we never do any work, — always analyzing, yet never altering. We want some moral force brought to bear that shall give momentum to altruistic principles, — some power brought to bear to break the hard crust of sordid greed. I know of no humanitarian effort so potent in rationalizing influences as the Christianity that can lend itself to practical every-day life. Statesmen require neither knowledge nor evidence, for they are surfeited with both already. Neither do we require conviction; the lame excuses of the rich testify that they realize their wickedness. Let us develop a conscience alive and responding to all generous instincts; a Christly sanity in judgment; a religion warm and merciful, pulsating with heroic nobleness, breathing out life and soul, rebuking and chastening all sins — conventional or unconventional — whose ultimate results mean misery."

Dr. Gladden gave a terse, axiomatic review of the present economic situation, out of which has come that "social residuum which furnishes the real problem of Christian statesmanship," and then discussed the remedy. To individualism he conceded the initiative in all enterprise, but would not pause to refute its selfish and heartless conclusions. To socialism he denied any further relief than that effected by the use of the state to equalize taxation, extirpate monopolies, and to resume corporate powers which have been unwisely surrendered to private parties. The real and

only remedy is in the application of Christianity to industry and trade. "Mr. Carnegie's idea is the prevalent one, — a man must be an industrialist while he is making his fortune, and a socialist after it is made; is it not better that he should be a Christian all the while? So I, for one, believe; and if it is true, then the Church of God has no more urgent business just now than to convince the world that it is true. The effect of believing it would be a quiet industrial revolution. It would not abolish private property, but it would enforce the obligation to administer private property for the public good. It would preserve the individual initiative in business, but it would put an end to industrial feudalism. The employer, with this law fixed in his mind, could no longer insist that his business was his individual affair; he would know that his employees were his business partners. The employee, instructed in this wisdom, would cease to regard his employer as his natural enemy, and would begin to think of him as the captain to whom his loyalty was due, his leader in the ways of welfare. Such tempers must conduct to the adoption, in some form, of the principle of industrial partnership, — the end of the feud between laborer and employer, the practical identification of their interests."

The sessions of the Council, extending from July 13th to the 21st, were crowded with prepared exercises, while all the intervals between seemed to have been utilized to the fullest extent in social festivities. Much of the time was taken up — far too much for any succeeding Council — in a comparison of views, and far too little time was reserved for the free discussion of the greater subjects. As a result, we miss any enunciation of principles, corresponding, for example, to the deliverance of the Lambeth Conference on the unity of the church. And we miss equally any serious exhortation to the churches on the tremendous issues involved in the present social distress. We content ourselves — for the outcome in this direction is very assuring — with a large increase of practical Congregational fellowship, and with a considerable widening of opinion and faith throughout the Congregational churches. What the churches of this country have needed during the past few years has been a change of atmosphere; and we doubt not that the more mellow though not less vital religious climate of England will prove to have produced a healthful effect.

A more important if not more interesting question than, What the Council accomplished? is the question, What it represented? It is not enough to say that it represented Congregationalism. For Congregationalism has not of late years presented itself before the religious world in the large and well-defined proportions of the great Protestant bodies. Its power has been recognized and acknowledged in its indirect effects, — its social, educational, and political influence, — but it has lost ground relatively as a polity. A correspondent of "The Guardian," the

organ of the English Church, writing in criticism of the Council, asks why Congregationalism in the United States, which had the start and the ground, has allowed all the newer organizations to outstrip it; and, further, why it has not gained upon Congregationalism in England, where the conditions are seemingly adverse. The answer of the correspondent to the latter question is, that Congregationalism needs the stimulus of controversy and oppression to give it growth and vitality. "It looks as if American Congregationalism just needed the stimulating influences which English Independency finds in the struggle with what its orators call a persecuting church. Any way, it is a fact of no little significance that the more political form of Independency which exists in England presents a stronger front to the world than does the sister denomination in the States. We would not for one moment say that Congregationalism in England is nothing more than a political organization, having for its highest aim the overthrow of the church, yet the facts revealed in the International Council, in regard to Independency in America, do more than suggest that the political character of Congregationalism at home constitutes a most important and powerful factor in its history. Not only does it form the stronger part of its aggressive action, but it gives a certain cohesion, directness, and force to a religious system which, when deprived of all political associations, fails, under the most favorable conditions, to achieve a success at all equal to that which is reached by the younger and less favored sects." Various answers might be given to the first question proposed, more or less explanatory of the comparatively slow growth of Congregationalism in the United States, — the early Unitarian defection and controversy, the period of dallying with Presbyterianism, which lost the great Middle States to Congregationalism; and the exclusion from the South while slavery was a religious question, — still the fact remains that Congregationalism as a polity has not been able to compete with the more highly organized denominations. The Baptist churches, which are largely congregational in form, have, indeed, become very numerous, but no one would claim that polity, rather than ritual, accounts for their growth.

What, then, does Congregationalism represent as a polity, especially in the United States? We think that it represents two things, each of which is a very pronounced factor in the religious life of the people. First, it is proving itself a natural form of Christian association and development in the newer parts of the country. Where the conditions are free and elastic, where the people come together from various sources and with varying religious habits, the *natural* basis of union is Congregationalism. Congregationalism is proving itself a conserving and saving force in the rush of immigration into the newer States; and its growth there, as compared with its previous growths, is phenomenal; and this later growth, it is to be remembered, is *religious*, not chiefly educational or political, though the Congregationalism of the newer West is loyal in these respects to the New England traditions.

And, second, Congregationalism is a potent factor in the more highly organized bodies. It lives and asserts itself under absorption. It marks a distinct line of cleavage in the bodies which have seemed to gain at its expense. Methodism has drawn little if anything from Congregationalism, and is therefore undisturbed by the Congregational element. Still it acknowledges Congregationalism as an outside disturbing force by the increasing draft upon its younger ministry into the Congregational ranks. But of Presbyterianism and Episcopacy it may fairly be said that they are divided by the Congregational principle. Congregationalism is present in each body, and active under every undue assertion of institutionalism. Occasionally it takes the aggressive in the revision of creeds and in the election of bishops.

No one has measured Congregationalism in America who has left out the vast influence which it at present exerts in its protest *within* the more ecclesiastical bodies against the tyranny of institutionalism. And in any efforts toward Church Unity this element, within all the various denominations, must be reckoned with, quite as much as that which remains without, and organized into Congregational churches.

JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL.

THE death of James Russell Lowell on the 12th of August deprives America of her representative man of letters, and of intelligent, patriotic, independent citizenship. The range of his activities was not confined to literature; his achievements were widespread in their character and influence. The versatility of his talents is the striking characteristic of his distinguished career. As moral reformer, university professor, magazine editor, diplomat, public speaker, literary, social, and political essayist, and poet, he has won a richly merited fame.

In a passing word concerning his services as professor, editor, and diplomat, it is sufficient to say, without detracting, that his professorial and diplomatic career will leave no lasting mark. His lectures on *Belles-Lettres* in the University, especially the inspiring course on Dante, are still referred to with enthusiasm by the few Harvard men who listened to them. Many of us, who were not privileged to enjoy that good fortune, pleasantly remember the gracious manner in which he met our occasional appeals for counsel and information. As the nation's minister to Spain, and subsequently to England, he entered into congenial fields for the study of literature and the philosophy of government. Little opportunity was afforded him in either country for any display of the special gifts of diplomacy. At the court of St. James he was a splendid social success. His elegant culture, charming urbanity of deportment, sturdy American patriotism, and remarkable ability as a speaker on festive and literary occasions, gained him the high and just appreciation of all classes of English society. No man has contributed more to the development

of the present good feeling which exists between England and America than Mr. Lowell. It was his cherished hope that the two nations would some day be united by the establishment of a supreme tribunal. "It is a beautiful dream," he said, "but it is none the worse for that. Many of the best things we have began by being dreams." His editorial labors covered a period of fourteen years. When the "*Atlantic Monthly*" was instituted he reluctantly consented to be its first editor. For five years he continued in that capacity with conspicuous success. He was afterwards associated with Charles Eliot Norton in the very able conduct of the "*North American Review*" for nine years.

Though doing much of the world's work, he was rarely seen in the world's ways. He was not one to command an eager enthusiasm amongst the people; the people scarcely knew him by sight. Nevertheless, there are few men who will be more sensibly missed by cultivated minds as a stimulating, moulding, and fruitful influence upon their life and thought. Happily for them, and for succeeding generations of those who more or less will lead the intellectual life, the essential qualities and products of his genius are treasured up within the goodly volumes of his personally edited published works.

As to these writings, it is not an uninteresting question whether Lowell has bequeathed a legacy of prose and verse which will "resist the flow of time." It is less a matter of serious interest whether his true fame will rest upon his achievements as poet or as critic. Beyond controversy, Nature lavishly endowed him with the susceptible imagination of the poet and the judicial intellect of the critic. He owed his original position in the world of letters to his poetry, perhaps, more strictly speaking, to his humorous and satirical poetry. The seriousness and depth of his thinking was strengthened with the varied experience of his advancing years; and his increasing care for form and finish resulted long ago in making him a consummate artist of poetic expression. For years he had enjoyed the distinction of being the cherished poet of men of literary culture. But while his poetic faculty had more than forty years of productive energy, we may justly claim for Lowell equal eminence as a prose-writer. The consensus of competent opinion awards him the title of ranking amongst the first critical essayists of his time. Not that he is to be thought of as the literary successor of the French Sainte-Beuve. Sainte-Beuve has had no successor. Lowell had not such profound insight as Emerson, and he was surpassed in originality and brilliancy by Edwin Percy Whipple. In the variety and general character of his gifts and achievements he had more in common with Matthew Arnold and John Morley. But Arnold had not Lowell's gifts of diplomacy; and Morley, with all his genius for rhythm, lacks "the accomplishment of verse." Lowell's qualities of graceful and effective public speech are perhaps matched in Morley, while Arnold's attempts at public speaking were unmitigatedly bad. Keen satirist as Lowell was, he had not Arnold's gift of sustained

light irony, — his “happy malice of the pen.” Lowell was more of a genuine humorist than Arnold, but never was so irritating as he. Both had a spirit of moral rigor in their work derived from strong hereditary impression; and both nearly realized in their fascinating literary manner the ideal of what Arnold called the Attic style, with its “warm glow, blithe movement, and soft pliancy of life;” though Arnold, on the whole, more nearly realized the Attic ideal than his American contemporary. In the moral and intellectual character of their criticism, Lowell’s strain was far healthier, more trustworthy, and consequently more helpful. Lowell could discern faults and dangers, and could blame with stinging speech when disapproval was needed; but he never, in criticising, put on the airs of a superior being, nor employed the tone of superciliousness, as his English brother-critic too often did.

A more important question than the longevity of Lowell’s fame, or the comparative values of his work in poetry and criticism, is whether or not his work, while he was living, was a vital force, permeating, shaping, enlightening, elevating, and enriching the public mind and heart of his own day and generation. Unquestionably, he directly aimed at exerting a beneficent influence upon life in its individual, social, and political aspects; unquestionably he achieved his purpose. No better evidence can be furnished of the positive effect he produced, not only upon the ablest men amongst his own countrymen, but also in no inconsiderable degree upon the leaders of opinion in English letters and politics, than the impressive and glowing tributes to his life and writings paid by the highest authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. This sincere admiration was expressed long years before his death called out the recent eulogiums upon his genius. From the time that he awakened the attention of his countrymen through the trumpet-call of “The Present Crisis,” and the wit and wisdom of “The Biglow Papers,” down to the publication of “The Commemoration Ode” and “The Cathedral,” and the delivery of the great addresses upon “Democracy” and “Harvard University,” his writings often have been the theme of the choicest companies of the thinkers and scholars in literature and politics, both in England and America. While the verdict of posterity is the only competent one that can be trusted as to the endurance of his fame, we may safely venture to imagine him as never losing his present high place from the front rank in America’s classic literature.

The permanent interest in his work will lie chiefly in the fact that the sources of his inspiration sprung from the deep ethical and spiritual nature of the man. Behind the critic in him lay the poet; behind the poet was the humanitarian, the patriot, the instructor and interpreter of the public conscience; and within and blending with them all was the pure strain of a noble, fearless, self-respecting Christian manhood. In a word, Lowell’s greatness came from the force of his character. He was a New England Puritan, enlightened and modernized. The best blood

of the older New England, modified and strengthened by the best blood of Scotland, ran in his veins. The instinctive heredity of his robust mental and moral health, of his shrewd, homely good sense, of all that goes to make up what in the phrase of modern culture is styled *sanity*, gave to his entire mental product its prime distinction.

In addition to his keen perception of the deep things of the world and the higher things of the spirit, he successfully appealed to the enduring elements in human nature. He kept in sensitive touch with the men and problems of his own time. While he wrote and spoke to the best intellectual life of his day, he was alive to truths of moral import and æsthetic value that are more abiding than the fleeting tastes and opinions of the hour. Even his themes of ephemeral interest received an artistic treatment which implied a most convincing and attractive temporary fitness. "The Biglow Papers" will long be read with delight, because of the practical knowledge of human nature and the wholesome spirit of humanity that pervade them, and the wonderful art that so flexibly employs the uncouth Yankee dialect for their vehicle of expression. The humorous and satirical sentiment and the moral and political significance of these unique Papers are enhanced by the fine philological scholarship of their author. They are preëminently the classic work in the diction and idiom of the quaint speech of the rural New England of an earlier day.

To speak still further of Lowell's literary art: it is obvious that a lofty character, noble aspirations, and varied intellectual endowments do not necessarily constitute the poetical or critical faculty. To have great art, the excellence of form in literary expression must be identical with dignity of substance. Lowell's poetic art was strong and good because of the depth of the central fire of poetic passion within him, and his easy mastery of metrical composition. His delicate apprehension of the spiritual essence in common things, which made him a mental kinsman of Wordsworth, is embodied in most of his serious verse in diction and rhythmic form and movement that is distinctively poetic. In the poems, expressed in the language of every-day feeling, the graces of a nimble wit and a delicious humor play among the virtues of noble conceptions, and are held in the control of an almost perfect *technique*. To many people, especially in England, Lowell will be remembered only as a great humorist. "Hawthorne is easily your first American novelist," said the accomplished editor of the London "Saturday Review" to the present writer, "and Lowell is easily your first man of humor. We have nothing like him in England." "The Biglow Papers" will stand as the high-water mark of American humorous and dialect poetry. But Lowell was rarely humorous merely for the sake of raising a laugh.

In the hands of this master of satire and ridicule, these qualities of his mental equipment were primarily weapons to be used in the warfare of humanity. Both in the war with Mexico and in the war of the Great Rebellion, the controlling purpose of the "Biglow Papers" was to

stimulate the sense of national righteousness, and his true literary instinct told him wherein his great strength lay: it was in satire; and into the use of that weapon, which was peculiarly his own, he put his whole power. Within the humor and lightness of the expression was the strong inherited moral earnestness that nerved and directed the effective blows.

Seriousness of purpose like his is generally rooted in religious faith. No justice can be done to Lowell which does not recognize the deep religiousness of his nature. Referring again to Arnold, his English analogue, we find him to be the poet of modern doubt. The general characteristic of his poetry, as it was that of the poetry of Arthur Hugh Clough, is moral and intellectual doubt. Their views of life were sorrowful and desponding. Lowell regretfully said of his friend Clough: "He will be thought, a hundred years hence, to have been the truest expression in verse of the moral and intellectual tendencies, the doubt and struggle towards settled convictions, of the period in which he lived." In happy contrast with these despairing brothers of song, we turn to Lowell, whose genius was nurtured under the same intellectual conditions of the times, and we find the poet of religious affirmation. One cannot read thoughtfully many of his shorter poems, like "The Search," "Godminster Chimes," "The Foot-Path," and "Rabbi Jehosha," without coming into touch with a heart that loves his fellow-men, and profoundly trusts in God. But this poet of religious faith strikes his highest notes in the most popular of all his poems, "Sir Launfal," and in the introspective and deeply spiritual poem which confessedly ranks the noblest of all his productions, and crowns them all, as indeed it is the top and crown of the whole temple of American poesy, — "The Cathedral." In this American "In Memoriam," how clearly sounds the voice of faith! how decisively he treads upon the firm ground of belief in the Divine Providence! But in the expression he does not strive nor cry. His temperance, as was said of Emerson's reticence on the high matters of inner experience, was "the modesty of spiritual manliness."

The self-revealing quality of his poetry enables us to see that his faith was strengthened by sorrow. Of the life of his affections and friendships but few have the right to speak. Enough is known to heighten our respect for his memory as a man whose domestic qualities made him idolized in the household as husband, father, and friend. Bereavements of the sorest kind often clouded his home-life. But the man of faith submitted his heart to the purifying power of sorrow. And some of the tenderest chords of pathos that ever were touched owe their inspiration to his sad personal experiences. "The First Snowfall" is an exquisite poetic remembrance of his first-born. "The Changeling" cannot be surpassed in the unadorned simplicity of its pathetic expression. Nearly all his poems and ballads that deal with human emotions are glimpses we get of the force of feeling and affection that made up the reality of a strong man's heart.

After "The Cathedral" was written, Mr. Lowell's genius took on a new form of expression for his later thought, — that of public address. The occasions of his public speaking were not numerous, and must have been peculiarly agreeable to him. The speeches partook of the nature of occasional addresses upon academic and literary themes. He generally spoke with careful preparation; hence his oral discourse carried much of the charm of thought, richness of coloring and illustration, and felicity of phrase, that marked his literary style. Still he was better as a writer than a speaker. There is more freedom of expression, less of conscious prudence and the reserves of social tact, in his essays than in his speeches. In the addresses delivered in England it is easy to see that it is the well-balanced diplomat and the careful literary critic that is speaking; and yet the note of sincerity is never lacking. He always said what he thought; not perhaps all he thought, but never anything he did not think. But in his great Harvard oration, spoken at the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Harvard University, he evidently assumed that he was amongst sympathetic friends, and gave himself full liberty of speech. His oratorical delivery was the perfect expression of a perfect gentlemanhood. It had the "temperance which gave it smoothness." His voice, which was a most agreeable baritone in its musical register, was used in the quiet, earnest modulations of a cultivated man addressing a group of interested friends. He rarely made a gesture. His was not the temperament that could face a mob, like Wendell Phillips; but he could furnish that matchless orator with poetic sentiments which often winged the piercing darts of his eloquence. His was not the gift of commanding promiscuous assemblies, which is the splendid possession of his friend, George William Curtis. Lowell had little of the essentially popular fibre. He was a public speaker of the finished academic and after-dinner sort, rather than an orator in the amplest sense of the term. He needed the power to rise into the eloquence of passionate and ringing speech to be quite perfect as an orator.

After the publication of "Democracy, and Other Addresses," Lowell lived in well-earned retirement at Cambridge. The seventy-two years of his life were closed at "Elmwood," his ancestral home, where, on the eighty-seventh anniversary of Washington's birth, February 22, 1819, his life was begun. He was stricken down, in the very fullness of his powers, anticipating fresh efforts in his chosen field of labor, and actually engaged upon a "Life of Nathaniel Hawthorne," which he was preparing for the series of "American Men of Letters." It is to be devoutly hoped that the work was sufficiently near completion to warrant its publication. Lowell's literary portrait and critical estimate of the genius of the wonderful romancer would enrich the language, be a priceless boon to American literature, and add a new lustre to his own brilliant reputation. He is made closer the friend of our spirits by death.

He will be remembered for many a long year by what is best and greatest amongst his countrymen. The verdict on such a man can be passed only by a judgment as clear, calm, and yet as sympathetic as his own, and by a pen as skillful as his. If impartiality of judgment be possible to intimate friendship, we are confident that Professor Charles Eliot Norton is amply equipped for the service which the friends and admirers of Lowell so earnestly desire to see rendered.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

A GENERAL VIEW OF MISSIONS. SECOND SERIES.

X. INDIA (*continued*).

SIR WILLIAM HUNTER, than whom no higher authority can be cited for India, says, as quoted in the "Missionary Herald" for January, 1890, in speaking of the missionary work in India: "It has been rich in results in the past, and it is fraught with incalculable blessings in the future." "The Indian native Protestants have now grown into an Indian native Protestant church. They have their own pastors, numbering 575 men, ordained in one body or another of the ministry. They have also a body of 2,856 qualified lay preachers, born in the country, educated in the country, working in the country for the welfare of their own countrymen. The native Protestant church in India has ceased to be an exotic, and if the English were driven out to-morrow, they would leave a Protestant native church behind them. When the Protestant Christians in India numbered about half a million, there were nearly 200,000 pupils in Protestant mission schools. This is an immensely significant fact; significant of missionary zeal in the present, but still more significant of Christian influence in the future."

Sir William guardedly commends "ascetic missions," defining them simply as a way of "quiet self-denial." There are hundreds of thousands, he says, who will be best reached by this method, while those who are best reached by the blessed influences of the Christian family are counted by the million.

A proposal, in Bombay, to change the time of the mail steamer for England to Sunday called out a great demonstration against it. "The Town Hall," says the "Herald," "was packed to overflowing by representative Christians, Jews, Parsees, Mohammedans, and Hindus. It was a grand gathering, and men of all nationalities and of nearly all faiths uttered in the strongest language their feeling in reference to the value of the Christian Sabbath. A Parsee lawyer spoke of the Sabbath as 'an institution which has worked itself into the common life of the city, and which contributes in no small measure to the preservation of its welfare.' He described it as 'the respectable, the beneficent, the humane Sunday of England.' A Hindu gentleman said: 'I say that by the introduction of a Christian government into India we were taught one of the grandest of Christian virtues, and it was the observance of Sunday as a day of rest.' A Mussulman, though referring to Friday as the Mussulman's sacred day, yet strongly defended the observance of Sun-

day. The writer in 'The Harvest Field' may well speak of this movement as a sign of the leavening influence of Christianity in India."

The same number of the "Missionary Herald" quotes from a letter of a Brahmin student of a mission school, addressed to a Hindu newspaper, which had contemptuously denied that Christianity was making any real impression even on the minds of such pupils. He says: "If it is true that we are not at all impressed by the truths of this religion, then what is the import of the words: 'If need be, close the high schools, but don't allow them to come under the control of the missionaries'? What is the reason for establishing the new sects of the Brahmo-Somaj and Prarthana-Somaj? The leaders of these sects have no conception of the extent to which we have been impressed by Christianity."

"I mention a few points in which this influence may be seen. We do not believe in our senseless rules about ceremonial purity. Looking on festivals as mere holidays, we take no pains to observe them religiously. We are convinced that ablutions and pilgrimages can afford no relief to the sin-burdened. We think there should be spiritual union with God. Knowing that there is salvation only through the one *sinless* Saviour, we long to accept him, and with this in mind we offer prayer in secret to him, morning and evening. If this is not 'being impressed,' what is it?"

"But how hard it is to make a public profession! Not only must we leave father, mother, relatives, and loved friends, but they all become our bitter enemies, as though we were guilty of some terrible crime. To escape this really needless suffering, although we do not embrace this religion openly, still, not doing so, we endure mental agonies, night and day. When this suffering becomes unbearable, feeling that something is better than nothing, we are impelled to join the Prarthana-Somaj (The Prayer-Somaj), and to-day there is a considerable number of such students belonging to that body. Later on, however, feeling that these sects are not of God, but devised merely with a view to meet the present state of things, we weary of them. Then, indeed, our condition is a sad one."

The following from Mr. Jones, of Madura, reported in the "Missionary Herald," illustrates that singular want of mutual coherence between belief and action, and that singular indifference to consistency of belief itself, in the Hindu character, to which we referred in our last article, and which is an almost fatal obstacle to the wide extension of the gospel in India: "Our catechists have just been on the itineracy, and report a great deal of interest in the truth among the villagers. Would that it worked so mightily among them as to lead them entirely to Christ for salvation! There are so many people all around us who are on the very threshold of a confession of Christ, who are 'almost persuaded,' and yet who are willing to stay in that state year in and year out, and pride themselves even on their indecision, that it is at times very discouraging. The capacity of a native to be convinced of the truth is boundless; but the remoteness between that state and conviction or conversion is extraordinary. I often wonder whether any other people on earth could, with such equanimity as the Hindus, seriously and sincerely affirm that Christianity is the true religion, and that it will ultimately prevail, and yet at the same time manifest such devotion to their old religion. I have unbounded faith in the ultimate and not remote Christianizing of this whole people, but it must be accompanied, if not preceded, by a great transformation in the mental fabric and moral attitude of the people towards truth in general and in their relationship to the same."

The following account of the ordination of a native pastor, in the Madura Mission, illustrates, as the "Herald" remarks, the difference between points of principle, as to which a missionary is bound to be inflexible, and points of mere usage, as to which he can hardly be too flexible, however they may jar on his own sense of good taste. "The examination was very satisfactory. The next morning the services were held ordaining him. As Brother Jones had to return to Madura, I was the only missionary present. The people wished to escort us through the village, so the pastor-elect and myself rode in the carriage, and followed the noisy native band and the company of Christians. The space in front of the church was beautifully adorned with a long, covered way made of plantain-trees, and ornamented and roofed with cocoanut leaves and mango leaves. Before the services commenced, a procession of the leading church-members marched in, to present their pastor-elect with a long, purple robe, which he put on in the presence of the audience. After the services were concluded, sandal-paste and rose-water were passed around for each to dip his fingers; wreaths and limes were presented, and a procession escorted the new pastor to his house, where he was enthroned in a chair, while the others sat on a raised floor."

The "Missionary Herald" for January, 1891, remarks: "Christians in this land do not apprehend what fearful trials most Hindus must pass through in forsaking their own religion and entering the Christian church. It would be comparatively easy to bear physical tortures, if these were all, but in most cases methods are employed to prevent the converts from confessing their faith which would appeal strongly to their better feelings; they must literally forsake father and mother for Christ's sake. We find in 'The Missionary Herald' of the English Baptist Society a touching description of the trials which he underwent, given by a young Hindu who had received Christian baptism: 'I fear I cannot convey to you any idea of what my mourning mother is doing.' She scarcely eats at all. During these five or six days my sister has been reduced almost to a skeleton. Whenever I think of or look at her, my heart nearly breaks. When I think that they are suffering so much mental agony for me, I pray to God, and find consolation in the thought that God and truth are the cause of this lamentation. Last evening I went to bed after prayer. In a little while my sister called to me to have my supper. I was introduced to a scene which must remain indelibly impressed upon my memory as long as I live. My mother was lying prostrated on a bed overwhelmed with grief. Now and then she was sighing. Beside me was my elder brother, weeping like a tender-hearted woman. He wept, and wept, and wept till I could no longer bear to remain there. When I was about to leave, my brother told me to remain for a little. Then he described the piteous condition of our family, . . . and he pleaded, 'My dear brother, I have done much to give you an education, scanty though it is. I will do more if you retain caste. I am willing to sell the little patrimony (on which the subsistence of our family depends) to provide for your expenses required to prosecute your studies. Take now as large a sum of money as is required, *but grant me only this petition, preserve the life of mother*, who will certainly pine away to death in your absence. Worship whom you will, but retain caste.' I could bear these things no longer; so, beseeching them to take food, I retired to pray. . . . When I asked my Lord whether I should do what my friends tell me, a clear 'No' came, accompanied by the tender command 'Fol-

low Me.' I clearly saw that dear and affectionate friends on earth must be forsaken, if necessary, in order that one may be 'rich towards God.' But this is a truth very difficult. I do not fear either kind of persecution. If the whole world stands against me, I am ready to be crushed for Him who died for us while we were sinners. Lord, I am thine forevermore.' At the close of his letter he says: 'I can do nothing for my mother, but pray that she may be led to see the blessedness of the course I have taken. All of you constantly pray for me and my friends. I don't know how to express my gratitude. Your humble brother in Christ Jesus.'"

The "Herald" for February, 1891, has a very valuable translation, by C. W. Clarke, of a paper from the "Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift," by William Digner, on "The Elements of Missionary Preaching in India." Speaking of redemption, he shows that Hinduism treats it as consisting essentially in the abolition of individuality. "It is declared that the Deity is in a state partly of dream, partly of wakeful consciousness. Hence arises the deceptive phenomenon of many individuals, and hence all the evil in the world. The only state worthy of the Deity was that of the deepest, dreamless sleep, in which pure Being, pure Reason, pure Blessedness are closely united in undisturbed rest to an absolute, impersonal 'Source of Light.' This conception of salvation is shared by all classes in India at the present time. However their writings may teem with material pictures of the joys of heaven and the pains of hell, there ever remains the final redemption to be gained by sinking into the ocean of Deity.

"That is the final outcome of the wisdom of India. In contrast to it none can fail to recognize the superiority of the Christian conception of salvation. This, all agree, is attainment of the kingdom of God, not abstract conception, but a living fact, a community of personal beings whose very name declares its ethical character. This was Christ's message. He brought the kingdom of God, realized it in himself, and to it sought to bring mankind. . . .

"Now, as to points of similarity and of difference, it is easy to show that in both religions is the idea, grounded in the very nature of man, of salvation, of union of mankind with God. The Hindu religion bears the strongest possible witness that the human spirit is created for communion with God, and can never find rest till it finds it in God. But here the likeness of the two systems ceases, and the superiority of Christianity appears. Hinduism secures rest in God at the cost of utter loss of personal being, which is declared by some to be a delusion, by others a deterioration of the Deity. This is the first weak point in Hinduism. In contrast, Christianity neither denies the existence of evil nor attributes it to the Deity, but, recognizing the reality of the created individual and of sin, offers a means of relief which preserves individuality while redeeming from sin and evil. Again, the Hindu deity, being without personal consciousness, has no ethical characteristics, so that in the conception of salvation the ethical element of release from sin and guilt is lost beneath the physical or metaphysical element of destruction of personal consciousness. Such an idea of salvation affords no motive to moral action, or to anything more than uncomplaining acquiescence in a dark fate. The life of the people expresses this despair. Their moral life is paralyzed and perverted to corruption. On the other hand, we can prove both by present experience and by history that Christianity brings a

moral regeneration of the individual, and is a constant power for the moral invigoration of nations. This is an especially strong point with those classes that have lately been aroused by European influence to new intellectual and moral activity. If this movement is to be sustained, they must be shown a 'highest good' which shall include both the highest moral ideal and the highest moral power.

"Finally, to the unperverted human understanding, the purely physical element in the Hindu salvation is not a good to be desired. Despite the logic of the philosophers, the missionary has the assent of his audience when he says, 'You do not wish to be blown out like a light,' while they recognize the fact that the gospel salvation, the communion of the personal life with the personal God, is a true good, meeting the needs of the human soul. All admit that, if facts are as we say, we have truth and final victory on our side. Many, who thought they had long done with Christianity, have been led by such considerations as these to new investigation of its claims."

It has been lately remarked by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, of Northern China, that China is like the Roman Empire in one important respect, namely, that the country districts are dependent on the cities, and the cities of a lower rank on those of a higher rank, in an ascending scale. This is one of the reasons why Mr. Reid, although a Presbyterian, favors the extension of episcopacy, and this, apparently, in its metropolitan gradations, since this polity, moulded by a similar form of civil life, would, he judges, be eminently congruous to China. India, on the other hand, as the "Missionary Herald" remarks, is "characteristically a land of villages and hamlets; its population has not yet become urban; there is no city of 1,000,000 in all the Asiatic peninsula. There are 93 cities not exceeding 30,000 and hundreds of towns of 5,000. The vast majority of the 280,000,000 dwell in rural hamlets." Nor is it a vast agglomeration of connected, but a vast mass of isolated villages. It should seem, then, that missionary methods and expectations must be very different from those of the Mediterranean world, where, the cities once gained, the *pagani*, "the people of the communes," were left to assimilate themselves at their leisure. Indian methods of evangelization appear likely to be slower and more laborious, and perhaps thereby all the more complete. "The resurgent heathenism" of European unbelief in our own day does not, indeed, seem to have much connection with the too carelessly treated *pagani* and *heathmen*. But slighted work always avenges itself in some way. Even in England, Southey remarks, the country people had once been Catholic, and then became Protestant, but, before the rise of the Wesleys, had never been Christian. India seems to be so arranged as to insist on much more thorough-going work.

The "Church Missionary Intelligencer" for January, 1890, remarks: "Thirty-nine of the Protestant missionaries in Madras, representing nine different societies, have addressed an 'Open Letter to the Churches.' Observing with thankfulness the increasing interest on the part of the home churches in the Indian mission-field, they desire by this letter to supply such information regarding the conditions amid which missionary work is carried on, and the elements with which Christianity is now in conflict, as will render both the sympathy and the criticisms of home friends more intelligent, and consequently more effectual. In a few graphic sentences are described in succession the South Indian mission-field; modern Hinduism, both as a popular religion and as a philosophical

system ; the present condition of the people ; and the various missionary agencies. The effects of popular Hinduism are summed up in these words : ' It desecrates the treasures of earth, it degrades the intellect and genius of man, it demands and destroys the virtue of woman, and dishonors the holy God, and practically shuts Him out of his own world.' We observe with much sadness, and all the more so because recent letters from some of our own South Indian missionaries have convinced us how true the indictment is, the following words regarding the Salvation Army's methods of work : —

" ' It has swelled its ranks with the converts of other churches, who have not been improved by the transition, and many of them have again returned to their own folds. The whole of its work has been done within areas under process of evangelization by other societies, and only where churches have been planted, and work firmly established by other mission agencies, have Salvation Army agents planted themselves, and then only to exert a disturbing influence on existing churches. By such a course only, unjust and objectionable as it is, has it been possible for the agents of the Army to exist in India. Compelled by their rules to seek local self-support, they have found it easier to exhibit their need, and appeal with success to Christians, than to appeal to Hindus, and in this way they have diverted funds from other Christian work. Only the merest fraction of their support has ever come from non-Christians. Though there are many districts in which, from want of laborers, no missionary work is done, the Army has carefully avoided these. It has been compelled to seek the common necessities of life first of all ; so the choice of fields has been determined, not by the spiritual needs of Hindus, but by the material needs of the Army.' "

In 1875 the Prince of Wales, passing through the extreme southern district of India, called out a demonstration from the native Christians of Tinnevely, under the episcopal care of Bishops Sargent and Caldwell. There were then 1,100 Christian congregations ; 54 native clergymen ; 60,000 native Christians ; 10,378 communicants ; 12,315 scholars. In 1889 Prince Albert Victor was the object of a similar demonstration. He found 1,636 congregations ; 113 native clergymen ; 95,567 native Christians (77,171 baptized) ; 20,024 communicants ; 23,524 scholars.

The " Church Missionary Intelligencer " for March, 1890, has a paper read before the Durham Diocesan Conference by the Rev. H. E. Fox, M. A., Vicar of St. Nicholas, Durham, in which he dwells on one happy result of the missionary work : " The prayer of the Great Head for union amongst his members must be answered. It is answered wherever his life passes into, and is manifested by, his people. Not, as is often assumed, by visible uniformity, for such is not the oneness of the Father with the Son, but in the unity of the Holy Ghost, a fact far deeper and more real than any ecclesiastical or liturgical conformity. Missionary work, more than any other, makes for this happy end. When Christian men meet in front of the armies of the aliens, necessity draws them together. And, more than this, the missionary, of whatever body, is, as a rule, one intensely in earnest, longing rather for the victories of his Master than of his particular church. He has neither time nor heart to quarrel with his brethren. The matters which divide them are as nothing to those which they hold in common. Happily the political dissenter and the exclusive churchman are almost unknown in the mission field. A spirit of charity and brotherly intercourse is found to be possible

there of which we know little here. The voyage throws men together, and mutual prejudices and antipathies which we magnify at home are quietly unshipped and thrown overboard. Every important centre of missionary work in India, and probably elsewhere, has its missionary conference, composed of representatives of all societies, who meet for prayer and consultation, arranging their methods and boundaries so that there shall be no collision or overlapping in the work of each. One of the pleasantest and most profitable meetings I ever attended was a gathering of the Madras Conference under the roof of the venerable bishop. Ephraim shook hands with Judah, and Judah spoke peaceably to Ephraim, without the reserve and constraint which these worthy tribesmen are in the habit of showing towards one another in their own land. I see in this the best hopes for the future of Christendom. If national churches are to arise in India or China or Japan, I do not think it will be by the reproduction of any one of the Western types, but by the fusion of many: could we wish it otherwise? It would indeed be a deplorable case of heredity if the daughters develop the unhappy divisions of their mothers. A Presbyterian missionary of long and wide experience in China told me that he quite expected to see all the various missions in that country at no distant day grouped into two, possibly even into one, comprehensive church. The problem of reunion, at least among Protestants, is nearer solution in the mission field than at home. It is a significant fact that among the warmest advocates of such a reunion have been some of our colonial and missionary bishops. Who can estimate the gain that would come thereby to our spiritual life? The energies dissipated in mutual antagonism would then be conserved for inward development and outward aggression. The great Antichrists of the age would in vain assail a united church. Its possibilities would only be measured by its opportunities. But if that day is ever to come, it will dawn in the East before the West. I expect to see the sunrise of the healing wings on the plains of India or the waters of Japan before it touches the shores of England."

As the Rev. Gilbert Reid thinks the historic Episcopate peculiarly congruous to the constitution and character of China, so possibly it may be as widely unsuited to the state of India. The Church Missionary Society or its organ has somewhere, as we remember, expressed its belief that its missionaries in India will never stickle for the continuance of the Episcopal succession as a condition of union there. There may be as good reason why an Episcopal Church of China and a Presbyterian Church of India should coexist in equal communion, as there was why the Episcopal Church of Smyrna should be in equal communion with the Presbyterian Church of Philippi, whose apostolic character was as fully acknowledged before adopting the Smyrnæan polity as afterwards. What redintegrations or resolutions of ancient polities, or what emergence of entirely unexpected types, may take place in the far East, may be safely left to the directing Lord and the animating Spirit.

We remarked in our last paper that the Brahma-Somaj, which on the whole has been cordial to Christianity, seems now to be more cordial than ever. The following from the "*Intelligencer*" would certainly lead us to think so: "On November 1st Babu Protap Chundur Muzumdar, the Brahma leader, who was visiting Lahore, gave a lecture on 'Jesus Christ, the Guide of Indian Youth,' in English. The lecture was the first of a series of fortnightly lectures which will be delivered in the

College Hall through the cold weather, and was well attended, amongst those present being a number of European ladies and gentlemen. In the course of his speech the lecturer laid great stress on the usefulness of the Bible as a text-book, and exhorted the native students to read the precepts of Christ diligently, and adopt them in their daily life. He referred to the greatness of Christendom, and the progress made by the Christian countries in science, etc., as being wholly due to the teachings of the Bible. The native student, he said, could find no better text-book than the Bible for morality, literature, philosophy, or any other branch of learning."

The Rev. F. Bower, of Cochin, South India, writes in the "Intelligencer:" "A short time ago I was sent for by a Namboorie Brahmin, as he wished to know more about Christianity. He also asked questions concerning Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Judaism. He was an elderly man, and one of the most intelligent and gentlemanly Namboorie Brahmins I ever conversed with, though very infirm in body and almost blind. He appeared to be really anxious to know the truth, and wanted my opinion as to the method of expiating sin. Being well acquainted with their sacrificial system contained in the Rig Veda, he readily understood the scheme of redemption. I read to him in Malayalam several passages of the Epistle to the Hebrews, on the subject of sacrifice, to which he listened most attentively. On hearing that Christianity was an experimental religion, and one which had more to do with the heart than the head, he asked me to relate my experience, for which I was most thankful. When I spoke of the joy and peace which flowed into my soul as soon as I believed with the heart in Christ as my Saviour, the poor old gentleman appeared to be greatly impressed. He confessed that he had no real peace of mind, and admitted that his future was dark and uncertain. Being on the borders of eternity, he as much as acknowledged to me, in the presence of several angry-looking Sudras, that he was about to take a leap in the dark. I could not help feeling extremely sorry for the poor old man, and prayed that the words which had been read and spoken might be the means of leading him to the Redeemer, in whom alone he could find rest for his weary soul."

In our last paper we referred to the ancient Syrian Church of Travancore. It appears that of the Christian population of Travancore (and Cochin), being about one fifth of the whole population, the Syrian Church has 290,000 members; there are 150,000 Roman Catholics; and 60,000 Protestants, mostly attached to the London Missionary Society. In this native kingdom, therefore, Christianity is a stronger force than anywhere else in India, although it is hardly aggressive except in its Protestant form. The suggestion in our last paper, that the victorious metropolitan of the Syrian Church, Mar Dionysius, although representing the unprogressive party, was not actively hostile to Protestantism, is confirmed by the fact that he has given a handsome donation to the Anglican college, which is under control of the Evangelicals. Indeed, six young clergymen of the Dionysian party are now studying theology under Bishop Hodges, with the approbation of their metropolitan.

The energy of opposition to missions which is rising in some parts of India, especially in the Northwest, in the Punjab and Sindh, appears in the following letter from Miss Phillips, an English zenana missionary. She writes from Peshawar: "You know perhaps what a very bigoted city this is. The fanaticism of the people is continually fanned by

Mullahs (Mohammedan priests). But now the opposition is so organized and so thorough that, looked at from a human point of view, the work must fall through. Princes of the royal family of Cabul, poor men, merchants, Hindus, and Mohammedans, all are united in a common cause. 'What if two or three men are hanged,' was said the other day, 'they will be martyrs! Whatever happens, the Mem Sahibs (lady missionaries) shall be turned out of the city, and prevented from corrupting our wives and children!'" The threat of excommunication, enforced by a house-to-house visitation of the Moslem families, has brought down the number of zenana pupils to one third of what it lately was, with a probability of soon losing all. Still later reports, however, show a considerable abatement of opposition, and a serious falling-out among the Moslem antagonists. The government, moreover, has signified its disapprobation of combinations which have so much the character of boycotting conspiracies. Notwithstanding such opposition in the Northwest, the "Gleaner," quoted in the "Intelligencer," remarks that, in Calcutta at least, the stream of converts is, though quiet, so steady that baptisms are now scarcely mentioned outside of the immediate circle of the baptized.

An influential Christian lady of Madras, Mrs. Sattianadhan, has just died, who represented Indian Protestant Christianity of the fourth generation. Her husband was a convert from heathenism. Before there is anything like a rush of conversions in India, Protestant Christianity is likely to have gained a broad basis of hereditary stability and spiritual development. Very possibly our Lutheran brethren around Tranquebar can boast of more than the fourth generation of Protestant Christians.

The "Hindu," a Madras paper, representing the native religion, remarks: "The progress of education among the girls of the native Christian community, and the absence of caste restrictions among them, will eventually give them an advantage which no amount of intellectual precocity can compensate the Brahmins for. We recently approved of the statement of a Bombay writer that the social eminence which the Parsis so deservedly enjoy at the present moment was due to these two causes, namely, their women are well educated, and they are bound by no restrictions of caste. These two advantages slowly make themselves felt among our native Christian brethren, and it is probable they will soon be the Parsis of Southern India; they will furnish the most distinguished public servants, barristers, merchants, and citizens among the various classes of the native community."

The Free Church deputation remarks on one profoundly important distinction between the higher castes, from Brahmins to Sudras, and what it calls "the depressed castes." The precise definition of these latter we have not been able to catch, for the missionaries talk of them with a provoking evasiveness, forgetting that we cannot understand without being instructed. We gather, however, that these "depressed castes" are not Pariahs, entirely without social and religious acknowledgment or privilege, but that they consist of classes which have been reclaimed from the lower and ruder aboriginal religions in later times, after the great ancient castes had been already constituted. Whatever the precise difference between them may be, Messrs. Lindsay and Daly remark that, while in the upper castes a convert is thrown right out, and the wall of excommunication closes up behind him, in the "depressed castes" the family instinct is much stronger than the instinct of caste; and a single

convert of any weight will often, through the ramifications of blood and marriage, bring after him a great faction of his caste ; while even between the Christian and the Hindu fragments it should appear there is no such definitive division, but that additional sections, from time to time, are likely to fall away from heathenism. In other words, conversions in the upper castes are individual ; in the lower, largely corporate. These gentlemen remark, however, that the strong family feeling of the Hindus shows decided signs, even in the upper castes, of gathering strength against the compression of this tremendous institute. When this reaction of the family against the caste reaches a certain point of prevalence, it is likely to be the harbinger of disintegration to the latter.

It should be noted that higher and lower *castes* in India are by no means identical with higher and lower *classes*. Caste is a religious, class a social distinction. Thus, a wealthy and highly educated Sudra considers himself, and is universally considered, as standing vastly higher in society than a poor and ignorant Brahmin, who, indeed, may be his clerk, or even his cook. Yet he never dreams of usurping the sacerdotal prerogatives of his Brahmin servant, who is religiously as much his superior as he is socially his inferior, just as, for instance, at a communion in the Church of England, the most insignificant peasant that chances to be in deacon's orders receives the sacred elements before the queen. An unconscious confusion of class and caste is continually blurring our mental pictures of Hindu society, and causing us to misinterpret the force of the influences that are making for or against the elder order. It is doubtful whether the Brahmins themselves are any more capable of uniting against the progress of Christianity than any other caste ; for besides being strown along the whole scale of social position, and dispersed over an almost continental region, they are subdivided again into a number of lesser castes, and are rent apart by sectarian antipathies more embittered than almost anything known in Christendom. A Hindu, being once pressed to say in what the unity, not of Hindu usage, but of Hindu doctrine, lay, replied : " We differ in everything else, but we universally agree in two points, that the cow is to be worshiped, and that woman is to be utterly contemned." Indeed, we have seen it mentioned as a singularity of a small sect in Lower India (and this not so much a Hindu sect as a dissent from Hinduism), that their men return the salutations of the women.

On the whole, notwithstanding a certain pause in evangelizing work in India for reflection and readjustment, and notwithstanding the checks of native reluctance or even of angry opposition, the general impression made upon the mind of India is probably not ill-expressed by the leader of the Brahmo-Somaj when he spoke of " the great army of missionaries under their invincible captain Jesus Christ."

Buddhism, once so mighty in its native India, but expelled from it as much as a thousand years ago, still remains upon its skirts in Lesser Thibet and Nepaul, in Farther India, and in Ceylon. But nowhere, in these rigorously Buddhist countries, is there any great advance of the gospel. Compared with Atheism and Annihilation, even the Hindu doctrine of Absorption into Dreamless Deity has in it something positive and hopeful. Except in Nepaul, where a theistic tendency has established itself, the deadly chill of Buddhism appears in the environs of India to be very slightly tempered by any concessions to the human heart, and in Ceylon it can hardly be said to be tempered at all. " An-

nihilation is our Salvation," is the proudly contemptuous reply with which Cingalese Buddhism meets "the good tidings of great joy." In Burma, it is true, the American Baptists, notwithstanding certain importunate intrusions, are still going on gathering numerous converts of gratifying steadfastness and zeal. But these are still mainly gathered from among the Karens, who are not Buddhists, and in whom a Messianic longing already awaited the gospel message. In Lesser Thibet, it is true, the Moravian brethren have for forty years maintained a mission, and gathered a little body of Christians. They are held in the highest honor among the whole population, and, whenever they visit the Buddhist monasteries, are received by the lamas with such deafening acclaims of their huge silver trumpets as to lead them sometimes to beg for a respite. But as yet, as a Buddhist abbot has told them, the main visible result of their labors is, that they have given Buddhism a resurrection by reviving the general religious sense. Still, if they are conceded to be so influential as this, they may well be hopeful, inasmuch as the religious sense, once thoroughly awakened by Christianity, will soon find itself intolerably straitened and contradicted by Buddhist pessimism. The exuberant jollity of the Tibetan temperament, it is true, extracts out of this all the crumbs of consolation it offers, while the unrestrained immorality of the Tibetans frankly contradicts the precepts of both religions alike. But the eminent traveler, Mrs. Isabella Bird Bishop, says that the Moravian converts are "quality, if not quantity," and gives her emphatic judgment against abandoning this Himalayan outpost of Christianity.

In Netherlands India, we pass alike beyond Hinduism and Buddhism, and come upon unorganized heathenism of the lower sort, which, however, is being rapidly absorbed by Mohammedanism, which seems here to be distinguished in an extraordinary degree by the intense spiritual pride and almost unbounded influence of the Hadjis, that is, the pilgrims returned from Mecca. The Dutch government long encouraged Moslem and discouraged Christian missions. But now it is reaping as it has sown in the growing disaffection which goes with the advancing wave of Mohammedan proselytism, and at last it is turning in dismay to the Christians, and begging them in all haste to save and reclaim what may be saved and reclaimed. In the northern arm of Celebes, the Minahassa, Christian missions are doing an admirable work, and have gathered in about 100,000 converts. In the great island of Sumatra, the Rhenish Missionary Society, which had about 12,000 converts previously, reports that the last year has been more highly blessed than any earlier one, there having been many hundred additional baptisms. The heathen Battas have been so overjoyed that the Dutch government has at length consented to trust them with the lives of the missionaries, that they, of their own motion, have declared themselves Netherlands subjects. The minds of the people have been profoundly impressed by the fact that a considerable district in the interior of the island has become a Christian country. The Christians are thus enabled to meet what we should judge to have been a previous contention of the Mohammedans, that, whatever the gospel might do for individuals, Islam alone was fitted to be the religion of a land. It is worthy of note, in view of the fanaticism of East Indian Mohammedanism, that about half the Christians of Sumatra have been gathered from among its adherents. Sir William Hunter, on learning this fact at the London Missionary Conference, declared that it was one of the most profoundly important and encouraging facts respecting Mohammedanism that he had ever come to know.

What effect the sudden withdrawal of state acknowledgment will ultimately have upon Buddhism in Burma, remains to be seen. But of the three great religions of the East Indies, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, Hinduism, by far the most ancient, and by far the most numerous, and by far the most profound, appears destined to yield first to the conquering Cross.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY. A Sketch of the Progress of Thought from Old Testament to New Testament. By CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY, Professor in Harvard University. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1890. 8vo, pp. xviii, 456.

It was John Stuart Mill, if I mistake not, who being asked by an angry opponent whether he would concede that two and two make four, replied that he must first know what use would be made of the concession. The opposition manifested to some of the plainest conclusions of modern Biblical science can be accounted for only on the ground of fear lest the concessions should be put to a wrong use. This fear will no doubt be stimulated rather than allayed by the book before us. Professor Toy is in a sense the coryphæus of the higher criticism in this country. In this volume he uses its data in a manner not at all calculated to defend "the views commonly held by the church." But not to prejudge the case, let me give an outline of the book.

The Introduction is on the general laws of the advance from national to universal religions. "The rise of Christianity out of Judaism is a fact which, though of enormous significance, is yet in conformity with a well-defined law of human progress," is the first sentence. Religion is developed in society, and may be regarded, therefore (like language and ethics), as a branch of sociology. The growth of society is subject to laws of growth. Religion will be subject to these laws. The general conditions under which religious progress has been made are the same as those which control the formation of nations, and those which determine progress within the nation. "A religion in the better sense of the term is the organized product of a national thought concerning man's relation to the divine" (p. 7). Historically, religions have generally grown up by aggregation, well-known examples being the pantheons of Egypt, Babylonia, and Greece. Even the so-called universal religions are subject to this law. "In Islam we have a mixture of ideas from three sources, — the old Arabian religion, the Jewish, and the Christian. Christianity has blended with the religious and moral ideas of the New Testament much un-Jewish European thought. The Judaism of the two or three centuries just preceding the beginning of our era combined Hebrew and Greek conceptions. Wherever there is intimate intellectual intercourse between nations, this larger religious syncretism must follow" (p. 11). Besides this law of external growth, religion shares the internal growth of society, being constantly modified by changes in science, art, and ethics. Its advance will be in accordance with the general character of

social progress. The conclusion of the Introduction is made by a brief mention of the universal religions which illustrate the law, — Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. The author considers, also, some “stunted and arrested growths,” as Stoicism, Confucianism, the religions of Egypt and Persia.

The proper theme of the book is the development of religious thought from Old Testament to New Testament. The proper starting point is the time of Ezra. At this time the religion of Israel had attained its full growth. The nation had reached a practical monotheism; it had worked out a reasonably sound and satisfactory theory of practical social ethics; and the organization of public worship in the temple was substantially the same as in New Testament times. “It is at this point that we begin our study. We are to trace the history of the Jewish religious ideas from the fifth century on, and to follow them into the New Testament times” (p. 50). The first inquiry concerns the sources of our knowledge, that is, the literature of the period. Professor Toy accepts the prevailing critical theory as to the date of the Law, though he recognizes the fact that “the divine instruction (*tora*) had been gathering volume for centuries, and the national feeling had been moving toward the conviction that this instruction was its organic law” (p. 49). He also accepts the late date of Zechariah ix.-xiv. and Joel. He places Jonah, Esther, Judith, and Tobit together, between 250 and 150 B. C., and a little later, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus, though “the book of Proverbs is no doubt the result of numerous collections made at different times.” Further, “the theology and the historical conditions of the great body of the songs of our Psalter indicate the Greek period as the time of their composition” (p. 61). The book of Daniel is put, of course, about B. C. 164, and the book of Enoch not much later. With these must be classed the Sibylline Oracles, the Assumption of Moses, the Book of Jubilees, and the books ordinarily known as Apocrypha of the Old Testament.

The doctrinal development, as shown in this literature, passing on into the New Testament, is considered under the heads: God, Subordinate Supernatural Beings, Man (including Sin and Righteousness), Ethics, the Kingdom of God, Eschatology, and the Relation of Jesus to Christianity. The longest chapter is the one on Man. These chapters are so full of matter that it is extremely difficult to compress them. Perhaps the outline of a single subject will give an idea of the author's method. Under the rubric Righteousness he proceeds as follows:—

Old Testament Conception.

Old Testament conception of moral goodness: prophetic standard.
Nomism.

Succeeding Development of the Idea of Righteousness.

Synagogues (origin and influence).
Parties (Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, and Zealots).
The Sanhedrin (legal schools).

New Testament Conception.

Teaching of Jesus (spiritual character of his nomism).
Paul's doctrine of imputed righteousness (Old Testament basis: doctrine of faith).
Opposition to Paul's Apparent Antinomianism.
Subsequent History of the Idea in the New Testament.
The Insufficiency of the Jewish National Nomism.
Contrast between the Outward Method of attaining Righteousness . . .
and the Inward Method.

There is clearly room for a treatise on every one of these points. The limits proper to a review will not allow detailed discussion. I will mention a few points of general interest.

The author does not find an entirely consistent Biblical psychology. He does not accept trichotomy as the doctrine of the New Testament, though he modifies this so far as to say: "It is true that Paul employs the terms *spirit* and *spiritual* in a peculiar way to express the regenerate nature, — the soul of man after a new life has been breathed into it by the divine spirit. It is a distinction which seems to be confined in the New Testament to him and his school" (p. 180).

The author recognizes the practical character of the New Testament revelation: "The characteristic of the New Testament teaching is its intense conception of sin as the one great evil in the world, as the central fact of life, around which range themselves all the powers of heaven, earth, and hell. All the manifestations of God in history look finally to the annihilation of this malignant power of the human soul" (p. 220).

He has a high idea of the prophetic teaching: "For the old mechanical idea that the Deity was appeased by a gift, the prophets desired to substitute the conviction of the necessity for repentance and reformation. This protest of the prophets represents a most important advance in the ethical conception of sin and the deliverance from sin" (p. 221).

He emphasizes the originality of Jesus: "It was a profound spiritual instinct of Jesus which led him to make it [the idea of the Fatherhood of God] the central point of his theistic teaching. He discerned its dominant relation to other sides of the conception of God; he infused into it the warmth and coloring of human feeling and the practicalness of everyday life, and therefore he is to be regarded in a true sense as its author" (p. 86). "The very conception of God as Father implies a tenderness of sympathy and a spirituality of relation which involved a new departure in religion" (p. 269). "In a few words Jesus has comprised all that is essential in moral principle, and held it up as the one necessary condition of perfected human society. Even where he does not offer direct solutions of social-moral questions which have arisen since his time, he furnishes the principles which contain the solution" (p. 341, compare pp. 417, 435).

As a consequence, he gives Christianity the highest place among religions: "Christianity, starting from the national Judaism, found itself forced . . . to abandon the merely national point of view, and to regard divine worship and the divine presence as divorced from human limitations. This divorcement was best expressed in the language of the time by the declaration that God was [? is] a spirit, — a designation which ascribed to him the sum-total of the highest side of existence. The idea, once announced, became a possession for mankind destined to be fruitful of best results. It has not always retained its purity, but it has never completely faded from men's minds; and it is to early Christianity that we owe its definite formulation and its establishment as an element of human life" (p. 89). Though we know of no religion that is actually universal, it is "difficult to see why Christianity in its simplest New Testament form should not prove universally acceptable" (p. 36).

Nevertheless, the author's point of view is naturalistic: "Religion must be treated as a product of human thought. For, supposing a supernatural intervention for the communication of truth, it must, in order to be successful, conform to human conditions and have a real genesis in

man's mind" (p. 1). The Messianic hope was "a *natural*¹ product of the conviction of Yahwe's care for Israel" (p. 49). "The gospel accounts which ascribe miraculous powers to him [Jesus] may be explained as the product of reverent tradition" (p. 125). "How he [Paul] came to his special view it is impossible to say with definiteness. It was most likely an intuition, — an idea that burst up in his soul out of the mass of material over which he had been brooding; he describes it as a revelation" (p. 274). "The belief early established itself that he [Jesus] had risen from the dead, . . . a belief which may be regarded as the *natural* pendant to the conviction that he, though he had died,² was the Messiah" (p. 426). Here is where the issue will be raised. Let us concede every minor point. Let us admit the critical presuppositions of the author. Let us, with him, emphasize the logical connection of Judaism and Christianity, and the orderly development of one from the other. Let us concede the influence of Greek thought upon the New Testament writers. The question still remains, Do we still recognize God in this process? The originality of Jesus, — was it simply a talent for religion, or was it in truth God manifest in the flesh? On this point our author leaves us in doubt. Perhaps he will say this is a matter of personal concern, and that in a treatise on the science of religion he has no right to assume anything more of Christianity than of any other religion. But many of us it seems more of an assumption to take the other position.

Henry Preserved Smith.

LANE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, CINCINNATI, OHIO.

THE CHURCH FOR THE TIMES. A Series of Sermons. By WILLIAM FREDERIC FABER. Pp. 81. Westfield, N. Y.: The Lakeside Press. 1891. 25 cents.

The author of these sermons is pastor of the First Presbyterian Church in Westfield, N. Y. Their subjects are: The Church's Faith; the Church's Worship; the Divine Church; the Church's Mission; the Church's Methods; the Church's Confidence. The preacher's conception of the church is spiritual and catholic. Alive to all that makes for progress in doctrine, worship, and ministry, he is thoroughly imbued with the historic spirit, and his utterances have a consequent breadth, depth, and weightiness, combined with stimulating power. For the importance of the themes of these discourses, their method, wisdom, and timeliness, we wish that they may have a wide circulation.

Egbert C. Smyth.

THE EXPOSITOR'S BIBLE: the General Epistles of St. James and St. Jude. By Rev. ALFRED PLUMMER, M. A., D. D. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son.

This is one of the best in this series of popular homilies upon the Scriptures, and combines very skillfully instruction and religious edifica-

¹ The italics here and elsewhere are mine.

² In a note, p. 425, Professor Toy accounts for the noteworthy fact that the disciples retained their faith in Jesus even after his death by the parallel cases in other religions. He seems to overlook the fact that in these cases continued faith in the prophet did not produce the belief that he had risen from the dead.

tion. It is especially happy in its frank and helpful suggestions upon questions now agitating the public mind concerning the infallibility of the Biblical writers and the bearing of New Testament references upon the interpretation of the Old Testament. One cannot but be grateful also for the estimate put upon the Old Testament Apocrypha, and the plea for a better acquaintance with it. The various critical questions concerning the authorship of these epistles, their relation with other parts of the New Testament, and their right to a place in the Canon, are discussed soberly and lucidly. It may be doubted, however, whether the effort to place the *onus probandi* upon one who questions the authenticity of these epistles is quite successful. The fact that, after a considerable period of doubt and divided sentiment, the church finally accepted them as canonical, has its weight, but does not relieve the student from the necessity of testing their right to a place in the Canon with much care and caution. It does not seem to be a very decisive argument.

William H. Ryder.

THE WRITERS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT: THEIR STYLE AND CHARACTERISTICS. By the late Rev. WILLIAM HENRY SIMCOX, M. A. New York: Thomas Whittaker.

This little book is a supplement or continuation of the somewhat larger volume which appeared last year upon the language of the New Testament. It notes especially the peculiarities of the different writers of the New Testament which distinguish them from one another. It is the work of a careful scholar and, though of less value than the book which preceded it, it will assist to the better understanding of the contents of Scripture. The author holds that the internal evidence against the genuineness of Mark xvi. 9-20 is quite decisive, and that the pastoral Epistles are probably written by the apostle. Two useful Appendices fill more than half of the volume, — one noting the affinities in the vocabularies of different New Testament writers, the other, the differences between the Greek of the New Testament and that of other Hellenic and Hellenistic writers.

William H. Ryder.

Japanese Girls and Women. By Alice Mabel Bacon. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1891. Pp. ix, 333. \$1.25. — This gives that intimate view of Japan which can only be given by a woman, and that only in giving knowledge of the interior sex. It goes to the heart.

The book begins with babyhood. One envies Japanese babies and mothers, both for the simplicity and naturalness of baby-clothing. On the other hand, insufficient nourishment, and the singular neglect of milk, breed weakness and disease. The habit of sitting on the legs, begun in infancy, the author shows to be the main cause of Japanese diminutiveness.

The author thinks that Japanese babies inherit better manners than ours, and this native start, especially with girls, is steadily improved upon, giving a most attractive combination of simplicity and dignity. Irresponsibleness, entire dependence, combined with the reception of affection and respect, brings about, says the author, a female character sweet, pure, bright, though with all the depths of the being unstirred. But

marriage closes in upon her, and the bright, happy girl soon becomes "the weary, disheartened woman," looking forward, for her one consolation, to the honor and care which Japan lavishes upon old age.

The old system of education, especially for girls, was all memory and dexterity. The new, the author thinks, lays too heavy a burden on both sexes. The Japanese are too eager and precipitate. "How to give to the young minds the best products of the thought of two such distinct civilizations is a question that is as yet unanswered."

As to divorces, Japan seems to be just twice as bad as the worst counties of northeastern Ohio,—one divorce to three marriages in some parts, against one to six. The wife can now sue for a divorce, but, having no right in her children, often remains for their sake. Yet there is much "quiet, undemonstrative," and permanent love. At present, the new education and the old dependence jar harshly. Christian homes alone have a guaranty of happiness in the permanence of the relation and the reverence for the wife. The tyranny of the mother-in-law appears to be much the same as in China. But chivalrous Japan seems to be as destitute of consideration for the weaker sex as burly Germany. The husbands, however, "often become much in love with their sweet, helpful wives, though they do not share with them the greater things of life, the ambitions and hopes of men." Yet women often appear in novels as widely influential, and there have been nine female Mikados. And henceforth it is provided that neither the throne, nor any noble title, or perhaps estate, can pass, except to the son of the legitimate wife. Old age, especially where there are children, brings such honor and attention that Japanese women are always eager to appear fully as old as they are. As with the Irish peasantry, the parents (where it is possible) give over work early, and the children expect, as of course, to support them.

The author explains the rise of the Shogunate, and the recession of the Mikado into ceremonial seclusion for so long, with great distinctness. It was owing to the combined influence of Buddhist meditateness, then very potent with the emperors, and the slow advance of the frontier against the aborigines, requiring rougher service than the semi-monastic court cared to see. Therefore the palace became the seat of elegant literature and of general culture, of which the noblewomen were the especial bearers, by their quick national instinct keeping Japan from being submerged by Chinese ways. Wealth and luxury gathered around the Shogun, high-bred refinement around the Mikado.

One most extraordinary and most painful peculiarity of Japanese morality is remarked on by the author. The Japanese women are thoroughly pure in their instincts, but hitherto the great ideal has been that of unbounded devotion to superiors, so that a woman who surrendered her person for the support of her husband, or parents, or husband's lord, was esteemed a heroine. Christian teachings and the decline of feudality are obliterating this dreadful exaggeration of self-devotion. But all that is permanently noble in the chivalry of the samurai still subsists, above all in their women. And as the necessities of existence have sent the samurai down through the whole lower range of society, they are raising the standards of this. The peasant women, helping in the family support, have much the same respect and influence as farmers' wives among us. Among the servants, male and female, the curious mixture of deference and freedom, faithfulness and self-will, seems to be much like the style of old-fashioned servants in Scotland, though modified by the

manners of a much politer nation. And, as in all feudal countries, the retainers of the high are themselves almost noble among the humble.

The peculiar charm of Japan, of course, is redoubled in this book, with its mixture of searching criticism and kindly and hopeful sympathy.

As it is in Heaven. By *Lucy Larcom*. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1891. Pp. vi, 156. \$1.00. — The intention of this excellent little book, as the author remarks, is spiritual rather than literary. It includes large extracts, especially from E. H. Sears, J. H. Thom, and George MacDonald. It does not consist of speculations, but of such judgments concerning heaven as appear to be essentially involved in the words of promise and the premises of faith. Heaven is, not merely *will be*. It does not need to be *brought near*, but to be *unveiled*. The humble shall find the same familiar sunshine in which they walked below, though serener and clearer. The unloving would find darkness in the blaze of the Great White Throne. Nor can the rest of heaven be an idle rest. It must always be an active rest of ministering love, whatever the forms of it may be. And “the beauty and the glory of the immortal life is that it is an eternal entering in.”

The Bohlen Lectures, 1890. — *The General Ecclesiastical Constitution of the American Church.* Its History and Rationale. By *William Stevens Perry*, Bishop of Iowa. Delivered in the Church of the Holy Trinity, Philadelphia, in April and May, 1890. New York: Thomas Whitaker, 2 and 3 Bible House. 1891. Pp. 291. \$1.50. — This is a book which will please High Churchmen of the extravagant school, be superseded for Low Churchmen by Dr. McConnell's immeasurably more valuable work, and for Christians at large be only interesting as an object of melancholy curiosity, because it shows that a Christian bishop may be able to write a work of nearly three hundred pages as empty of Christianity as if it were a treatise on magic, which in some sort it is. We would not guarantee that one might not, by carefully sweeping up in every corner of the book, as they do in the mint, secure a handful of the gold dust of substantial religion, but we have not been able to find it. It reminds us, by a direct analogy, of what the severely accurate Hallam says of Laud's correspondence, that it does not show the faintest sense of duty either to God or man. It is unmitigated priestliness. The book is written entirely in the spirit of Seabury's adherents, who contended that those who set aside Episcopacy, even temporarily, “scarcely deserve the name of Christians.” It is true, the Right Reverend author by no means disguises the fact that William White held very different opinions. But there is this redeeming feature about this utter externalism, — it is lenient to the mere opinions of those that are, after all, in actual participation of the magical benefits of an external succession.

The keynote of the book is found in two sentences, of which it is hard to say which is the worse. He describes Bishop White's ideal — even yet only partially realized — of the merely formal and ecclesiastical constitution of the Episcopal Church in this country, as a vision of “our new Jerusalem descending in its beauty from the hand of God.” And this description, which would be presumptuous and almost blasphemous if it referred to the reconstitution of the Universal Church, is applied to the mere machinery of one of its smaller parts! It would be hard to find a church in Christendom over whose origin there has presided a more absolutely externalistic spirit, a smaller measure of visible solicitude for the advancement of that in which St. Paul declares that the kingdom

of God consists, namely, "righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." According to Dr. McConnell's fearless exposition of facts, a preponderant part of early Pennsylvanian, Virginian, and Carolinian Churchmen, clergymen and laymen (certainly of Virginians and Carolinians), would hardly be libelled if described as sons of Belial. And of the bishops, although the obstinate Marylanders came short of intruding the scandalous Smith into the Episcopate, yet Provoost was a religious indifferent, and Madison commonly accounted an infidel, while Seabury and White, though sincere and estimable men, are certainly not widely known to posterity as ministers of essential righteousness. It is true, indeed, we ought to acknowledge with humble gratitude that our church is now a living and growing force, both for Christian piety and for social amelioration. "There are last which shall be first." But this ought to be admitted as a marvelous instance of God's miraculous power to raise up children unto Abraham out of the very stones. Of all Episcopal lines in Christendom, that to which this author belongs is the most bound to deport itself with "modest stillness and humility." The fair hopes which are opening on our American church depend for their realization on casting down the author of this book from his self-assumed function of interpreter for the Lambeth Conference. But why need we forebode, now that Phillips Brooks is to be Bishop of Massachusetts?

The second sentence is found on page 130. He speaks of "the principle of the divine origin of the historic Episcopate, so lately characterized by the great Lightfoot as the backbone of the faith." Now we are going to commit ourselves fairly into the hand of the Right Reverend author. We affirm, without reverification of our distinct remembrance, that Lightfoot has said no such thing. He has said that the Episcopate, not as a doctrine, but as an historic fact, has been the backbone, not of the faith, but of the church. And this, as respects the vast majority of Christians, is an obvious truth. As Professor Egbert Smyth has remarked, compared with this ancient and universal institute every other form of church polity appears as yet new and provincial, exactly, we may add, as every form of republicanism, until lately, appeared new and provincial compared with the ancient and universal institute of hereditary monarchy. But if Lightfoot, who shows us Philippi governed only by elders, and Smyrna governed by Polycarp, in tranquil communion, and the Bishop of Alexandria for six or seven generations consecrated by his own presbyters, had afterward made the declaration which our author puts into his mouth, he would simply have lapsed from Christianity into Antichristianity. "Other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ." According to Bishop Perry, those Maronites who were lately found ignorant of the existence of Christ, nevertheless adhered to "the backbone of the faith," for they were submissive subjects of the Historic Episcopate. We know by what subtleties of explanation the author will endeavor to disguise the shamelessness of his statement. But "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh."

To maintain that Christ has instituted the Episcopal succession, and that all proper church authority lapses with a defection from it, however untenable, is perfectly compatible with an overmastering zeal for essential Christianity, and with a large brotherliness towards all true Christians. How many fairer types of both virtues have there been than a Ken or a Smythies? And both virtues shine illustriously even through the extra-

vagant Ultramontanism of a Manning. But the spirit which underlies this book, and which animates a considerable (we would fain hope a not over-numerous) school of churchmen, is nothing more than an unintelligent religious sorcery, which in itself makes against both experimental and ethical Christianity, however it may be found combined with one or both through the incoherencies of our curious nature. It is this school, not Anglo-Catholicism in itself, which Dr. Sterrett doubtless has in mind when he protests against showing it any further allowance. We know only one worse thing in the Anglican communion, and that is the school of Evangelicalism represented by "The Rock." From both these gangrenes may the Lord speedily deliver his church!

Christian Missions in the Nineteenth Century. By Rev. *Elbert S. Todd*, D. D. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe. 1890. Pp. 174. 75 cents. — This little book is dedicated to the people of Grace Methodist Episcopal Church, Baltimore. It is intended to vindicate the reasonableness of modern missions and of their expectations. It does this very well, although exceptions might be taken by opponents to some of the positions. For instance, notwithstanding the barbarism of our heathen forefathers in England, we know that Christianity has approved itself as congruous to the European genius in a measure which does not as yet appear true of any other national genius. Early European missions, therefore, afford plenty of evidence to encourage Christian faith in undertaking missions throughout the world, but hardly enough as yet to convince doubters. By the way, though it does not affect the argument, the author attributes, as is still usual, the conversion of the English to Rome, which really converted very little more than Kent. Two thirds of England was converted by the Irish of Iona, and most of the rest by Gauls and Burgundians, with no particular mission from Rome. Rome organized what others had brought in. Iona, however, is made more prominent towards the end of the book.

The argument from the missionary triumphs of Mohammedanism and Buddhism over widely alien races is very effectively handled. The author, moreover, very justly remarks that in all ages, and more than ever in our age, the temporal successes and authority of Christendom have been a preliminary motive disposing the minds of pagans to submit to the God of the Christians. He shows how statesmanship and simple humanitarianism, in spite of themselves, are now forced to favor missions as the only influence that goes deep enough to stir radically the desire after higher standards of living. The author, as a Methodist clergyman, does good service by tacitly rebuking the hideous indecency which rules out more than half of Christendom from the Christian name, and puts it on one plane with Buddhism, at the same time that he treats Protestant missions as being what they undoubtedly are, — the great advancing force in most parts of the heathen world.

We note a few particulars of interest. It is a striking remark that Paganism is songless, and Islam almost so. The note of religious joy is hardly found outside of Christendom. Buddhism, especially, is mute, as the religion of mournful acquiescence in extinction as the only remedy of evil. Another striking remark is, that the Orient, once converted, may well interpret for us many of "the waste places of the Bible." He notes how almost all non-Christian religions attribute salvation, so far as they have a salvation, to works alone, for which he quotes Max Müller. It should have been Sir Monier Williams. This must be modified, how-

ever. The Shin sect of Buddhism upholds salvation by faith, though a faith rather mechanically conceived. And an Indian missionary explains that Vishnuism and Sivaism represent respectively salvation by faith and by works, aggravated to a fury of mutual dissent hardly known in Christendom.

We cannot see that interest in Chinese conversion obliges a Christian nation to suffer its territory to be overflowed by Chinese, any more than interest in city missions would oblige a Christian householder to see his parlors and bedrooms overflowed from the slums. But the author gives stinging emphasis to the various acts of crying injustice of which we have been guilty, and which we refuse to make good. As to the liquor and firearms with which our Senate consents that we shall still flood Africa, they speak for themselves.

Concerning the reproach of slow advance, — which might have been made for centuries of a large part of northern Europe, — the author very effectively quotes, in conclusion, John Stuart Mill: "Sudden effects in history are generally superficial; causes which go down deep into the roots of future events produce the most serious part of their effects only slowly, and must have time to become a part of the familiar order of things."

It is an interesting and enlightened little treatise, and is sure to be very useful.

Fourteen to One. By *Elizabeth Stuart Phelps*. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1891. Pp. 464. \$1.25. — Mrs. Ward's productions are sufficiently familiar and approved not to need any very extended comment. This is a rather gruesome collection, but we suppose "it is for our good." Nor is the author so absorbed in suicides and murders, accomplished and half accomplished, intended, half-intended, and accidental, but that she finds ample leisure to dwell with all the superiority of benevolent wealth on every shabby detail of poverty, rightly judging that there is often tragedy enough in these, too. The ugly harshness of realism in these stories can hardly be said to be transfigured by the luminousness of faith and love, but it is at least mitigated.

The catastrophe of the Rev. Malachi Matthew appears to indicate a possibility rather than a fact. Congregationalist folly over Extended Probation seems to have been mainly confined to religious newspapers and missionary board meetings. We believe no flesh-and-blood council has really rejected a candidate on this account.

The phrase "to the *manor* born" shows the author's memories of Hamlet to have been not quite fresh.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.



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AN ADVANCE STEP IN SUNDAY-SCHOOL BIBLE STUDY.

IN the "Andover Review" for October, 1890, the writer presented some reasons for a change in our methods of Sunday-school Bible study, together with some suggestions as to a comprehensive course of such study, and a full outline of a proposed course of lessons on the Life of Christ. The suggestions met with the very warm approval of many distinguished pastors and laymen of various denominations and in widely separated places, and the need and demand for the proposed lessons was so apparent that the publication of them was begun January 1, 1891. What was but a dream a year ago has now become an accomplished fact, and I gladly avail myself of the kind interest of the editors of the "Andover Review" in this matter to state what has already been accomplished, and to announce further plans for the future.

I. THE LESSONS PUBLISHED. The Outline Inductive Bible Studies on the Life of Christ, to which reference is made above, were first published in three grades, — Intermediate, Progressive, and Advanced, — which supplied the needs of all departments of the Sunday-school excepting the primary.¹ On the first of

¹ *Professor Harper's connection with these Lessons.* The system and method of studies proposed in the above-mentioned article met with such hearty approval by Professor (now President) William R. Harper that he earnestly desired to adopt it as a part of his own general scheme of popular Bible study. At his request, an arrangement was made with him concerning them, and the numbers for the first six months therefore bear his name as editor in connection with that of the author. But he, being unable on account of his numerous engagements to give the studies the benefit of his personal attention,

July primary lessons and cards, prepared by Miss Lucy Wheelock, instructor in the Boston Primary Teachers' Union, were added, so that the series is now in use in all its grades.

II. SUCCESS. From the first these lessons were an assured success. So far as can be judged from letters received from all parts of the country, they have commonly more than satisfied the expectations of those who adopted them. The numerous letters of recommendation from those who have used them establish beyond question the following facts:—

(1.) That, although these lessons cannot be used without some study, say an hour on each, yet, for all who are willing to give their Sunday-school work any reasonable amount of time, these lessons are easier to study and easier to teach than the International Lessons.

(2.) That, where the teachers enter into the spirit of these lessons, they in many cases to a marked degree arouse new interest in Bible study, and very often increase the attendance in the classes using them, and this alike in all classes, from the youngest to the oldest.

(3.) That the classes generally are learning vastly more under this system than they ever did under any other. It is not claimed that these lessons have been a success in every school or class

secured the services of Ernest D. Burton, Professor in New Testament Interpretation at Newton Theological Institution, Newton Centre, Mass., to do this work for him, and at the end of the first half year withdrew from the enterprise, as stated in the following announcement:—

"In view of the peculiar responsibilities which have been placed upon me recently, I have felt compelled to withdraw my connection from the course of studies on 'The Life of Christ,' prepared by the Rev. Erastus Blakeslee. I have, therefore, transferred my interests in the same to Mr. Blakeslee, whose work on these studies I heartily commend to those who feel the need of improved methods of Sunday-school Bible study. The examination on this series of studies offered by the American Institute of Sacred Literature will be held at the close of the year, as already announced.

(Signed)

W. R. HARPER.

"NEW HAVEN, *June 8, 1891.*"

Simultaneously with this withdrawal of Professor Harper, the publication of the studies was transferred from the Student Publishing Company, Hartford, Conn., to the much larger facilities of the Bible Study Publishing Company, 13½ Bromfield Street, Boston, Mass., and Professor Burton kindly consented to continue his editorial work upon them, so that the transfer of interests should work no detriment to the character of the lessons. At the desire of the author, Professor Burton, whose name now appears as editor in place of that of Professor Harper, is now giving these lessons the most careful attention, and has made, and will continue to make, many valuable suggestions.

using them. It is not possible that any system can be, but the exceptions in this case are rare, and are largely overbalanced by the enthusiasm of the great majority concerning them. Their circulation has steadily increased from the first, and they are now used in a large number of schools and classes in considerably more than half the States in the Union, and in Canada, Japan, and West Africa.

These results have been achieved notwithstanding the natural reluctance of schools to give up the lessons to which they had been so long accustomed in order to experiment with a wholly new and untried system of lessons, and notwithstanding the fear which many felt that they would not be able to dispense with the multitudinous helps of the International Series. So great success attained in so short a time not only stamps these lessons with the verdict of public approval, but also strongly emphasizes the awakening interest of our Sunday-schools in better methods of Bible study.

III. REASONS FOR SUCCESS. (1.) *Dissatisfaction with the International Lessons.* This success is doubtless in part due to the deep and widespread discontent with the International system. Facts that have come to my knowledge within the past year show that this dissatisfaction is much greater than I had supposed. I should be unwilling to publish some of the statements of opinion concerning that system which have come into my hands, lest I should seem unreasonably to antagonize and discredit a scheme of Bible study which was probably the best scheme possibly attainable at the time it was adopted, and which has done a noble work, but which has not grown to meet the demands which itself in part has created. Were any evidence of the existence of this dissatisfaction needed, it would be only necessary to point to the frequent attempts to minimize it in the addresses and publications of those most deeply interested in preserving that system unchanged.

(2.) *Some reasons for that dissatisfaction.* (a.) *Not comprehensive.* When considered with reference to the real needs of all well-established church Sunday-schools, the defect in the International system is a radical one. It is often said that the system is a good one, and that all that is needed is some better method of teaching it. Interpreted in the light of current comment, that means that the International Lessons can be and should be so taught as to give a comprehensive knowledge of the Bible. I find many remarks of that general import in my file of newspaper clippings for the past year, but no one has as yet arisen

to tell us how it can be done. It certainly cannot be accomplished through brief notes on the events intervening between the lessons, for the best lesson helps have used such notes for years without attaining the desired end. Teachers and scholars alike most commonly regard these and other similar notes as appendages to the lessons, and not as integral parts of them, and so pass them over almost unnoticed. Meanwhile, notwithstanding these well-meant and laborious efforts, the conviction is steadily deepening that the International system fails just at this point. It cannot be otherwise, for the lessons are not selected for any such purpose. Sometimes they jump over many chapters, putting into two successive lessons events widely separated in point of time, and with only the most distant if any relation to one another; and again they make two lessons out of a single event which must be studied as one whole in order to any really intelligent understanding of it. The truth is, that the defect in the International system in this respect is fundamental; that system cannot be made to do duty for a method of Bible study for which it was not designed. The system has many excellencies, but the promotion of comprehensive Bible study is not one of them.

(b.) *Requires supplementary lessons.* In further evidence of this, let me refer to the large number of so-called "Normal class" and other similar outlines of Bible study which have been prepared by the promoters of the International lesson scheme for the express purpose of supplementing its deficiencies in this respect. One of the latest and best of these is the Outline Studies in Biblical history, geography, etc., prepared to accompany the Pilgrim Lesson Series. The editor of that series, in his last annual report to the society which he represents, speaks concerning these supplementary studies as follows: "That some such course is necessary to supplement the International Lessons is apparent to any one who knows the deficiencies of that system. It has not yet been made apparent that any better system can be devised for use by the Sunday-schools than is given in the International Lessons. *That, however, leaves a scholar with a fragmentary and undigested knowledge of the Bible*" (italics mine).¹ When one of the warmest friends of that system speaks of it in such language as this, it is needless for others to urge its deficiencies in this respect. The "Congregationalist," in an editorial warmly commending the above-mentioned Pilgrim Outline Studies, says:

¹ *Annual Report of the Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, 1891, p. 39.*

"The enlargement of present plans of Sunday-school study will naturally be in the direction indicated by these Outlines." In this it undoubtedly reads the signs of the times correctly; there must be a change in this direction before long. It was with this in view that the Outline Inductive Bible Studies represented by myself were prepared. Their object is to unite the study of the outlines of the Bible with the study of the Bible itself, or, in other words, to study the Bible along its own lines of construction, — to take the dry bones of these normal and other outlines, and cover them with the flesh and blood of Scripture, so that in the end the Bible shall be known for what it is as a whole, and not through a skeleton of it stored in one corner of the mind, and a mass of "fragmentary and undigested" extracts from it in another.

(c.) *Wrong in theory.* The real difficulty in the case lies in the principle on which the International Lessons are selected; it is not educational but hortatory. So far as can be judged from the lessons themselves, passages are selected for study with reference to their adaptability to so-called "practical applications," rather than with reference to the general course of history, or the general statements of doctrine with which they are connected. It is true that many of the lessons contain but very little material available for such use; but the fact that no lesson-book maker presumes to send out his quarterlies without a considerable number of practical applications for each lesson, whether they grow naturally out of the subject or not, shows how deeply rooted is the idea that the great end of Sunday-school instruction is hortatory rather than educational.

This principle of selection is one which applies to most excellent advantage in all mission Sunday-schools, and wherever the chief ends in view are evangelistic, but it is not one which satisfies the educational needs of our regularly established Sunday-schools. I know how liable this remark is to be misunderstood, and how easily the defenders of the International system can construe it into a blow at the very life of the Sunday-school. But I request all, to whom, in view of the popular methods of speech at Sunday-school conventions, such a statement may seem startling, to ask themselves these questions: (1.) Whether the large majority of the members of our Sunday-schools who are also members of the church ought not to be furnished with some scheme of Sunday-school instruction which shall give them a better knowledge of the Bible than is possible under the Inter-

national system? (2.) Whether the children and youth who are growing up in our Sunday-schools, and whose knowledge of the Bible is universally conceded to be woefully deficient, have not some claims upon their pastors and teachers for better methods of instruction? And (3) whether, as a matter of fact, "the practical application" idea in the Sunday-school does not in practice commonly degenerate into a random discussion about things concerning which neither teacher nor scholars know very much? I am aware how many good, earnest teachers we have who sincerely desire to instruct and help their scholars, but I ask them whether, in the material put before them in the International Lessons for study, and in the treatment of it in the lesson helps, they are not often most sorely perplexed to make their precious Sunday-school hour little else than a disappointment and a burden?

(*d.*) *A change necessary.* I am firmly convinced that no great improvement can be made in the present condition of our Sunday-schools except by introducing some method of study which shall give real instruction in the great facts and truths of the Bible. And I also believe that, when the great facts and truths are fairly presented to the mind in the way in which the Bible presents them, the question of practical application will take care of itself. There never should be a practical application which does not grow directly out of the heart of the Scripture studied. Coming thus, it is weighty; coming otherwise, it is valueless. If I may believe the testimonies which have come to me from various quarters, I cannot doubt but that those who have studied the lessons on the Life of Christ during the present year have received much profounder spiritual impressions from them than they ever have received from any other Bible study. This is not through questions of practical application, for such questions have been very few, but it is because the truth of the Bible has been brought out through the lessons, and then left to do its own blessed work. Out of this study, there has risen up in the minds of very many a vision of Christ which has been to them a new revelation of his person and work.

IV. THE LESSON SCHEME. Over against this hortatory or homiletic theory of Sunday-school study let us put the theories on which the Outline Inductive Bible Studies are based. They are these:—

(1.) That our Sunday-schools are designed, first of all, to *instruct* the children and youth of our congregations in the facts, teachings, and practical truths of the Bible.

(2.) That a comprehensive general acquaintance with the Bible as a whole, especially in its relation to the person and work of Christ, should precede the minute and thorough study of its individual parts.

(3.) That, after this general study has been completed, it should be followed by the most exhaustive possible study of individual books or subjects.

(4.) That, as the doctrine of redemption is the principal theme in the Scriptures, the Bible should be studied first with reference to this fact; and, therefore, (*a*) that our Sunday-school study as a system should begin with the study of the Life of Christ, and that this should be presented as completely as possible, not from any one Gospel only, but from them all, so that the several parts of his life and teachings may be clearly presented as a whole; (*b*) that this study of the life of Christ should be followed by a similarly comprehensive study of the results of his work, as seen in the history and doctrine of the Christian church in the Acts, the Epistles, and the Book of Revelation; and (*c*) that it should then take up the history and beliefs of the Old Testament church, with special reference to the origin and progress of the Messianic idea, thus completing what the Bible has to say on this subject.

(5.) That this general comprehensive study of the whole Bible, with these particular ends in view, should be carried on through a graded series of lessons which should present to each grade, according to its age and capacity, such facts and truths as are suited to it, so that children using these several courses should go through the Bible once in four or five years, each time in a different grade and with different methods of treatment, but always studying on one general plan and in such a way that what is learned in one grade may not need to be unlearned in another.

(6.) That these graded courses of study should be looked upon as a definite and characteristic portion of Sunday-school Bible study; that they should be so arranged that if begun in childhood they will be completed at maturity, or, if taken up at a later age, will be completed in from four to eight years; and that their completion, whenever begun, should mark the time of graduation from the Sunday-school into the Bible class, properly so called.

(7.) That it should be always kept in mind that these Comprehensive Outline Studies are intended to provide a broad and firm foundation for subsequent minute and exhaustive study of particular Biblical books or topics, and that in the Bible-class depart-

ment of the Sunday-school such study should be carried on continuously.

It will be noticed that the above scheme presents a complete outline of general graded Sunday-school Bible study, which requires for its completion, say the first sixteen years of a child's Sunday-school life. During this period, assuming that there will be four courses of study of four grades each (two courses in the New Testament and two in the Old), and that none of them are repeated, the child will go through the Bible four times, and with steady progress in his work from beginning to end. It is most likely, however, that many schools will prefer to give more than one year to some of these courses, as, for instance, that on the Life of Christ, and to continue this most profitable kind of study for a longer time. The scheme also provides that, whenever these courses are completed, those who have had the benefit of them, and any others qualified for such work, shall engage together for an indefinite period in the careful study of special parts of Scripture, which study, being based on the general knowledge of the Bible acquired through the comprehensive courses above referred to, will be invaluable. Incident to this scheme of study is its influence on the much mooted question of graded Sunday-schools. With a system of graded text-books once provided, our best, most enterprising Sunday-schools would work into the graded system almost as a matter of course, and so another most important advance step in Sunday-school work would be taken.

V. THE GRADES. As at present designed, these Comprehensive Outline Studies comprise four grades in each course : —

(1.) *Primary Grade.* This should be prepared by acknowledged experts in primary teaching, and in such a way as to interest the youngest children in the principal stories and the simplest, most essential truths of Scripture. Neither the topics nor the Scripture text of these lessons need always be just the same as in the higher grades, but they should be always on the same general parts of Scripture, using such portions of it as are adapted for children, and in such a way that the lessons of this grade, when completed, shall give a reasonably complete children's view of the whole range of Biblical facts and truths.

In the Life of Christ Series, now being published, this grade is provided for, as has already been stated, in a series of Primary Lessons and Cards prepared by Miss Lucy Wheelock. These lessons include a singularly complete and beautiful statement of the Lesson Facts, with Golden Text and Lesson Hymn, and also

a Kindergarten Sewing-card for each lesson. The working of the designs on the sewing-cards gives the children something to do at home, and, by interesting them, fixes the lesson in mind. These lessons and cards have been in use with very great acceptance among primary teachers since the first of July.

(2.) *Intermediate Grade.* This grade is designed for the younger classes, including in some cases, perhaps, the older ones in the primary department, and is intended to combine clear and definite instruction in the stories and principal truths of the Bible, with instruction concerning the names and order of its books, and the abbreviations used for them; practice in finding references; the principal facts concerning the chronology of the Bible; the geography, manners, and customs of Bible countries; and whatever else is necessary to an intelligent, general acquaintance with the Bible as a book. It is not intended that these supplementary facts about the Bible shall be taught apart from the regular lessons, but that they shall be incorporated into the lessons themselves, and by frequent reviews kept in mind. Another special feature of this grade, which is designed for children who are in what is sometimes called the "memory age," will be the memorizing of the choicest parts of Scripture as they come up in the lessons.

(3.) *Progressive Grade.* This is designed for the older classes, and is the key to the whole system. It includes a carefully directed study of the outlines and general characteristics of the Scripture material in each lesson, supplemented by questions intended to stimulate thought and discussion on its principal doctrinal and ethical teachings. It is designed that this grade shall complete the outline or elementary study of the Bible, and shall give the scholar a firm grasp on all its great facts and principles.

The Written-Answer Method. This is used in both Intermediate and Progressive grades. It consists in leaving space for writing the answer under certain questions, especially such as are answered from Bible references. This device is a very simple one, but the experience of the past year has proved it to be exceedingly helpful to both teachers and scholars, since the looking-out and writing-down of the answers affords something definite and interesting to do at home, and awakens and stimulates interest in the study of the lesson where there was none before. The testimony on this point is conclusive. These written answers are compared in class, and the Bible referred to in settling differences of opinion regarding them.

It will be noticed that the Intermediate and Progressive grades are somewhat alike in their general characteristics, but they are intended to be thoroughly different, in that one is designed for the use of children not long out of the primary department, and the other for the main body of the Sunday-school. Although the lessons in both grades are in general on the same parts of Scripture, the Intermediate grade uses only so much of the lesson material as can be made useful for children, and lays especial emphasis on the lesson facts; while the Progressive grade is intended to make a complete outline presentation of all the important things contained in the passages under consideration, and to enter much more fully into the lesson teachings. The Intermediate grade is really preparatory to the Progressive, while the Progressive is complete within itself; thus the two, while harmonious in spirit, are very different in purpose.

(4.) *Advanced Grade.* Here we come to a wholly different method of study, and one that is designed to hold an intermediate place between the distinctively outline study above described and the minute and exhaustive study of particular books or topics which will succeed it. It is designed for those who, through the thorough, general knowledge of the Bible attained in the previous grades, or by other similar study, are prepared to devote themselves mainly to the doctrinal and ethical teachings of the several lessons. It therefore presents its material in the form of conversation topics, with questions which are designed to stimulate and lead discussion on them. These topics, when fully brought out, will comprise practically a course in Biblical theology and ethics, the topics treated being taken up, not in a systematic way, but in the Biblical way; that is, in the order and in the connections in which they occur in the Bible itself, and then followed out into their relations to other parts of Scripture.

In the current lessons on the Life of Christ this grade was begun in accordance with these principles, but it was soon found that very few classes had that previous acquaintance with the facts of Christ's life which would enable them to enter into the questions raised to good advantage, and that many were giving it up and taking the Progressive grade in preference. This grade was, therefore, combined with the Progressive grade in July for the remainder of the present year; but it is intended that on the revision of the Life of Christ studies another year, for the purpose of bringing all the grades into the closest possible conformity to the theories on which these lessons are based, the Advanced grade

shall be completed in exact accordance with its original purpose as above explained, and it is expected that it will eventually become the most valuable grade of the series for those who are prepared to use it.

The features in the lessons on the Life of Christ which have been most warmly commended by those who have used them have been those in which the lesson theories above stated have been most fully realized, and it is therefore intended, as far as practicable in the grades published, to follow these principles much more closely in the lessons of another year.

VI. OBJECTIONS. The objections to these lessons have come for the most part from those who have not tried them. Among the most serious of these objections are the following:—

(1.) *They destroy uniformity.* Although much has been said and written about the grandeur of the thought that Sunday-schools everywhere are studying the same lesson on any given Sunday, yet I suppose no one would seriously argue that it is commonly a matter of the slightest importance to any one school what any other school is studying at any given time, any more than it is what lesson helps or hymn-books they use. The only real question before any Sunday-school is what, in view of its own peculiar circumstances, is the best course of study for it, and no school has any right to impair its own precious opportunities for Bible study by adopting or clinging to any course of study simply because some other school does.

But, passing beyond mere sentiment in the matter, there appears at first sight to be a great advantage in uniform lessons, in that they induce a multitude of notes on the lessons in the religious and other papers; or, as has been said for substance, that they set the whole world to thinking and writing on a given topic. As shown in my article in the "*Andover Review*" for last October,¹ this is really one of the most serious weaknesses of the International system. This multiplicity of notes and comments leads away from the study of the Bible itself by substituting in place thereof a study of what other people say about it, and so defeats the very end for which they were designed.

(2.) *Lack of helps.* The habit of dependence on notes and comments, which the International system has cultivated, has become so fixed in many teachers and scholars that they think it impossible to get along without them. This feeling has probably

¹ A copy of this article will be sent to any address, on receipt of a stamp for postage, by the author, P. O. Box 549, Spencer, Mass.

been more potent than anything else in preventing the introduction of my lessons into many schools, but, as a matter of fact, this objection disappears as soon as these lessons are tried, and classes begin to experience what one pastor calls "the luxury of a thorough study of great Bible truths" from the Bible itself. These lessons are so rich in material that every moment spent upon them is effective, so that, in the words of an experienced and busy teacher, "an hour's study on these lessons gives me a great deal more that I can use in my class than the same length of time spent on the International Lessons." The testimonies on this point are very emphatic.¹ No one need hesitate a moment about adopting these lessons for fear that he cannot use them through lack of his accustomed helps.

(3.) *The scholars will not study them.* This objection is based on the fact that they do not study the International Lessons, and on the assumption that, therefore, they will not study any. The numerous testimonials of those who have used these lessons show that this fear is unfounded; and that whole classes who have formerly regarded their Sunday-school lessons with indifference, have entered into the study of these lessons with very great profit and interest. This objection is precisely that which was urged at first against the Christian Endeavor Society; namely, that the young people would not do what it required of them, and the answer is the same — *that they do do it.* The magnificent success of the Christian Endeavor movement is due to its founder's faith in the willingness of the young people to do religious work when it is properly put before them, and experience proves that under similar circumstances our Sunday-schools, as a whole, are equally willing to do their Sunday-school lesson work. These things at least are certain, that any class that will study any other lessons will study these also, *that very many who will not study any other lessons will study these gladly*, and that all who do study these lessons get much more benefit from them than they can from any others now in use.

VII. COURSES OF STUDY. The courses of study provided for in this scheme, as at present formulated, subject of course to such modifications as may hereafter seem wise, are as follows: —

¹ A pamphlet of testimonials covering this and other points of objection to these lessons will be sent to any address on application to The Bible Study Publishing Company, 13½ Bromfield Street, Boston, Mass.

(1.) *The Life of Christ*, from the four Gospels. This is the course which has been in successful use since the first of January, 1891.

(2.) *The Apostolic Church*, — a comprehensive outline study of its history and teachings as found in the Acts, the Epistles, and Revelation. This course will be ready for use in 1892. A full analysis of it, with explanatory notes, etc., is appended to this article. It will be issued in two grades, — Intermediate and Progressive, — which will be sufficient for the needs of any Sunday-school excepting in the primary department, where it is proposed to use Miss Wheelock's Lessons and Cards on the Life of Christ, as being the most attractive possible course for little children, and as the proper point for them to begin their systematic Bible study. It is expected that the grades published will be issued in quarterly form, and that the first numbers will be ready for delivery in November.

(3.) *Old Testament Courses*. It is proposed to follow these New Testament courses, in 1893-94, by similarly comprehensive outline courses on the history, biography, and prophecy of the Old Testament, with especial reference to their relation to the coming Messiah, thus completing the series of outline courses on the whole Bible.

(4.) *Special Courses*. As suggested in the foregoing article, it is expected that as occasion shall arise these general outline courses will be followed by minute and exhaustive special studies of particular Biblical books and topics.

VIII. THE BIBLE STUDY UNION. As an aid in the preparation and introduction of this series of Biblical studies, a Bible Study Union has been formed, embracing in its membership several well-known professors, pastors, Sunday-school superintendents and others interested in Bible study, who have either used or carefully examined the lessons already published, and who heartily recommend them and this general scheme of Bible study for Sunday-school use. Their names will be published at a later date.

The business affairs of this enterprise are in the hands of The Bible Study Publishing Company, 13½ Bromfield Street, Boston, Mass. (Henry D. Noyes & Co., General Agents.) This company proposes, *with the aid of the best scholarship that can be procured*, to carry out this general scheme of study as rapidly as circumstances permit. It asks the coöperation of all interested in improved methods of Sunday-school Bible study.

OUTLINE INDUCTIVE BIBLE STUDIES.

SECOND SERIES.¹

THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH.

ITS HISTORY AND PRINCIPAL TEACHINGS AS RECORDED IN THE ACTS, THE EPISTLES,
AND REVELATION.

NOTES.

1. OBJECT. — These studies are designed to present an outline historical sketch of the growth and development of the Christian church in the Apostolic age, and an outline of the Apostolic teachings, as recorded in the Book of the Acts taken as a whole, and in so much of the Epistles and of the Book of Revelation as may be necessary for these purposes, the doctrinal matter from the several Epistles being incorporated with the historical matter of the Acts, partly with reference to the development of the Christian doctrine contained in them, and partly with reference to their probable chronological sequence.

2. TREATMENT OF MATERIAL. — In view of the large amount of material assigned for each lesson, it should be remembered that *it is designed to treat this material comprehensively and in outline only*, and not minutely or in detail, the object being to give a general view of the history and doctrine of the Apostolic church and of the character, contents, and mutual relations of the various New Testament books describing it, as a basis for the more particular study of separate books or doctrines at some future time. A single lesson may suffice for the exceedingly interesting and profitable outline study of an Epistle which would require months perhaps for its exhaustive study.

3. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS. — In order to make these lessons as complete as possible, each book as it is taken up will be prefaced by a brief statement regarding its authorship, date, and purpose, and also a careful analysis of its contents. *Each book will thus be presented as a whole and in its relations to other books*, although in accordance with the theory and purpose of these studies it will be necessary to dwell on such portions only of the Epistles and Revelation as are essential to a reasonably full presentation of the history and principal beliefs of the church in the days of the Apostles.

4. CHRONOLOGY. — Much of the chronology of the Acts and the dates of some of the Epistles are uncertain. The dates given in these studies are those supported by some of the best authorities, especially Weiss and Meyer.

LESSON TOPICS.

(General statement, subject to revision.)

PART I. — BEGINNING AT JERUSALEM, — THE FOUNDING OF THE
CHRISTIAN CHURCH. Acts i.-vii. A. D. 30-34.LESSON 1. — *Power from on High.* Acts i., ii. May, A. D. 30.

(1) Introductory, — analysis of the Book of Acts.

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- (2) Waiting for the promise of the Father. (Chap. i.)
- (3) The promise fulfilled, — the day of Pentecost. (Chap. ii.)

LESSON 2. — *The Beginning of Opposition.* Acts iii. 1—iv. 31. A. D. 30.

- (1) The healing of the lame man at the gate Beautiful. (iii. 1–10.)
- (2) Peter's address in Solomon's porch. (iii. 11–26.)
- (3) Peter and John arrested, threatened, and released. (iv. 1–31.)

LESSON 3. — *Brotherhood within the Church, and Persecution without.* Acts iv. 32—v. 42. A. D. 32, 33.

- (1) Having all things common. (iv. 32–37.)
- (2) Ananias and Sapphira. (v. 1–11.)
- (3) Many Apostolic miracles. (v. 12–16.)
- (4) The Apostles imprisoned, miraculously released, and again arrested. (v. 17–32.)
- (5) The counsel of Gamaliel. The Apostles beaten and let go. (v. 33–42.)

LESSON 4. — *The First Christian Martyr.* Acts vi., vii.

- (1) Deacons appointed. Rapid growth of the church. (vi. 1–7.)
- (2) Stephen's ministry and arrest. (vi. 8–15.)
- (3) His address before the Sanhedrin. (vii. 1–53.)
- (4) His vision and death. (vii. 54–60.)

PART II. — CARRYING THE GOSPEL FROM JERUSALEM TO ANTIOCH,
— THE DISPERSION OF THE DISCIPLES AND THE BEGINNINGS OF
THE MISSIONS TO THE GENTILES. EARLY CHRISTIAN TEACHINGS.
Acts viii.—xii. 1 Peter. James. A. D. 35–44.

LESSON 5. — *The Beginnings of Larger Things.* Acts viii. 1—ix. 30. A. D. 35–38.

- (1) The first general persecution. The church scattered abroad, preaching. (viii. 1–4.)
- (2) Many Samaritans converted. Simon the sorcerer. (viii. 5–25.)
- (3) Philip and the Ethiopian. (viii. 26–40.)
- (4) The conversion and baptism of Saul. (ix. 1–19 a.)
- (5) Saul's labors and perils in Damascus and Jerusalem. (ix. 19 b–30.)

LESSON 6. — *The First Gentile Converts.* Acts ix. 31—xi. 18. A. D. 39–42.

- (1) Rest from persecution; rapid growth. (ix. 31.)
- (2) Peter heals Æneas, and raises Dorcas from the dead. (ix. 32–43.)
- (3) Peter's vision, and the conversion of Cornelius. (Chap. x.)
- (4) Jewish exclusiveness *vs.* God's grace, — Peter defends his conduct, and the church in Jerusalem joyfully accepts the Gentiles as believers. (xi. 1–18.)

LESSON 7. — *A Gentile Church in Antioch. Renewed Persecution in Jerusalem.*
Acts xi. 19—xii. 25. A. D. 43-45.

- (1) Saul at Antioch. The first Gentile church. (xi. 19-26.)
- (2) The famine; contributions for the saints at Jerusalem. (xi. 27-30; xii. 25.)
- (3) Herod's persecutions; James' martyrdom; and Peter's imprisonment and miraculous release. (xii. 1-19.)
- (4) Herod's miserable death. (xii. 20-24.)

LESSON 8. — *Comfort in Tribulation.* Selections from 1 Peter.

Remark. — Most commentators put 1 Peter (Lesson 8) and many put James (Lessons 9, 10) at a later date, but they are inserted here partly on the authority of Weiss (see Introduction, vol. ii. pp. 104-106 and 140-142), but mainly because they present early phases of Christian doctrine.

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the First Epistle of Peter.
- (2) The living hope, and the redeemed life. (Chap. i.)
- (3) The spiritual house, and the royal priesthood. (ii. 1-12.)
- (4) Suffering evil patiently. (ii. 13-25.)
- (5) Proved through trial. (iv. 12-19.)

LESSON 9. — *Doers of the Word.* James i., ii.

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the Epistle of James.
- (2) Enduring temptation. (i. 1-18.)
- (3) Receiving the word with meekness. (i. 19-27.)
- (4) Without respect of persons. (ii. 1-13.)
- (5) Showing faith by works. (ii. 14-26.)

LESSON 10. — *The Fruit of Righteousness.* James iii.—v.

- (1) Restraining the tongue. (iii. 1-12.)
- (2) Having wisdom from above. (iii. 13-18.)
- (3) Seeking the friendship of God and not of the world. (iv. 1-12.)
- (4) Trusting not in self or in riches. (iv. 13—v. 6.)
- (5) Waiting the Lord's coming in patience. (v. 7-11.)
- (6) Praying in faith. (v. 12-20.)

LESSON 11. — *Review of Lessons 1-10.*

PART III. — CARRYING THE GOSPEL INTO ASIA MINOR AND EASTERN EUROPE, — PAUL'S FIRST TWO MISSIONARY JOURNEYS, AND HIS FIRST TWO EPISTLES. Acts xiii.—xviii. 1 and 2 Thessalonians. A. D. 45-54.

LESSON 12. — *Paul's First Missionary Journey, — Carrying the Gospel into Asia Minor.* Acts xiii. 1—xiv. 26. A. D. 45-51.

- (1) Paul and Barnabas sent forth. (xiii. 1-3.)
- (2) A Proconsul converted in Cyprus. (xiii. 4-12.)

- (3) Success and persecutions in Pamphylia, Pisidia, and Lycaonia. (xiii. 13—xiv. 25.)
- (4) Return to Antioch and long tarry there. (xiv. 26—28.)

LESSON 13. — *The Council at Jerusalem.* Acts xv. 1—35.

- (1) Its occasion. (xv. 1—5.)
- (2) Its proceedings and result. (xv. 6—35.)

LESSON 14. — *Paul's Second Missionary Journey, First Part, — Carrying the Gospel into Macedonia.* Acts xv. 36—xvi. 40. A. D. 52, 53.

- (1) Separation of Paul and Barnabas. (xv. 36—41.)
- (2) Paul revisiting the churches in Asia Minor. (xvi. 1—5.)
- (3) The Macedonian cry. (xvi. 6—10.)
- (4) Paul and Silas at Philippi. (xvi. 11—40.)

LESSON 15. — *Paul's Second Missionary Journey, Second Part, — Carrying the Gospel into Achaia.* Acts xvii. 1—xviii. 22. A. D. 53, 54.

- (1) Paul is driven out of Thessalonica and Beroea. (xvii. 1—15.)
- (2) He addresses the Athenians on Mars Hill. (xvii. 16—34.)
- (3) Has great success in Corinth. (xviii. 1—17.)
- (4) Returns to Antioch. (xviii. 18—22.)

LESSON 16. — *Paul's First Two Epistles.* 1 and 2 Thessalonians.

(Written from Corinth, A. D. 53, 54.)

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
- (2) Paul's love for his converts, and tender solicitude for their welfare. (1 Thess. i. 2—iv. 12.)
- (3) Comfort and exhortation from the fact and manner of Christ's coming again. (1 Thess. iv. 13—v. 11.)
- (4) Practical errors concerning Christ's coming corrected. (2 Thess.)

PART IV. — ESTABLISHING THE CHURCHES IN THE FAITH, — PAUL'S THIRD MISSIONARY JOURNEY, AND HIS FOUR GREAT DOCTRINAL EPISTLES. Acts xviii. 23—xxi. 14; 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Romans. A. D. 55—59.¹

LESSON 17. — *Rapid Growth of the Church at Ephesus.* Acts xviii. 23—xx. 6. A. D. 56—58.

- (1) The preaching of Apollos. (xviii. 23—28.)
- (2) The baptism of John. (xix. 1—7.)
- (3) Paul's two years of great success. (xix. 8—20.)
- (4) Diana and the silversmiths. (xix. 21—41.)
- (5) Paul's departure to Macedonia. (xx. 1—6.)

¹ Some authorities put the dates in Part IV. and V., and a portion of those in Part III., one year earlier.

LESSON 18. — *Christ for us, and we for Christ, — The Folly of Party Spirit.*
1 Cor. i. 10—iv. 21.

(Epistle written from Ephesus, A. D. 58.)

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of 1 Corinthians.
- (2) The parties among the Corinthians. (i. 10—17.)
- (3) Human wisdom *vs.* divine wisdom. (i. 18—ii. 16.)
- (4) Many ministers, one God ; many builders, one foundation. (Chap. iii.)
- (5) Not puffed up one against the other. (Chap. iv.)

LESSON 19. — *Christian Liberty and Christian Love.* 1 Cor. viii. 1—xi. 1.

- (1) Eating meat sacrificed to idols ; lawful, but not loving. (Chap. viii. ; comp. Rom. xiv. 13—23.)
- (2) Paul's example in waiving rights. (Chap. ix.)
- (3) Warning from Old Testament history. (x. 1—13.)
- (4) Argument from the Communion. (x. 14—22.)
- (5) Conclusion : use not liberty, but love. (x. 23—xi. 1.)

LESSON 20. — *Spiritual Gifts.* 1 Cor. xii.—xiv.

- (1) The diversity of gifts. (Chap. xii.)
- (2) Love greater than all "gifts." (Chap. xiii.)
- (3) Prophecy the most edifying, hence the best gift. (Chap. xiv.)

LESSON 21. — *The Christian Ministry.* 2 Cor. iv. 1—vi. 10.

(Epistle written from Macedonia, A. D. 58.)

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of 2 Corinthians.
- (2) Preaching not ourselves but Christ. (iv. 1—15.)
- (3) Walking by faith, not by sight. (iv. 16—v. 10.)
- (4) Ambassadors on behalf of Christ. (v. 11—vi. 10.)

LESSON 22. — *Christian Charity, — Ministering to the Saints.* 2 Cor. viii., ix.

- (1) Giving incited by the example of the Macedonians and of Christ. (viii. 1—9.)
- (2) Exhortation to complete what has been begun. (viii. 10—15.)
- (3) The agents of this charity recommended. (viii. 16—24.)
- (4) Prepared for giving. (ix. 1—5 ; comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 1—3.)
- (5) Sowing sparingly *vs.* sowing bountifully. (ix. 6—15.)

LESSON 23. — *Glorying in the Lord, — Paul's Defense of his Apostleship.*
2 Cor. x. 1.—xii. 13 ; comp. Gal. i. 11—ii. 21.

- (1) Paul apologizes for glorying. (xi. 1—21.)
- (2) Glories in his labors and trials. (xi. 21—33.)
- (3) Glories in his revelations and his sufferings. (xii. 1—13.)
- (4) The source and recognition of his authority. (Gal. i. 11—ii. 21.)

LESSON 24. — *Review of Lessons 11-23.*LESSON 25. — *The Liberty of the Gospel.* Gal. iii.—v.

(Epistle written from Macedonia, A. D. 58.)

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the Epistle to the Galatians.
- (2) The antagonism between works and faith. (Chap. iii.)
- (3) The freedom of the son *vs.* the bondage of the servant. (Chap. iv.)
- (4) Liberty, not law. Love, not license. (v. 1-15.)
- (5) The spirit, not the flesh. (v. 16-26.)

LESSON 26. — *A Salvation Needed.* Rom. i. 16—iii. 20.

(Epistle written from Corinth, A. D. 59.)

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the Epistle to the Romans.
- (2) The gospel for all. (i. 16, 17.)
- (3) Condition of the Gentiles without the gospel. (i. 18-32.)
- (4) Condition of the Jews without the gospel. (i. 1—iii. 20.)

LESSON 27. — *The Salvation Provided.* Rom. iii. 21—v. 21.

- (1) Christ our propitiation through faith. (iii. 21-31.)
- (2) Salvation in Old Testament times through faith. (Chap. iv.)
- (3) The blessedness and excellence of salvation through faith. (Chap. v.)

LESSON 28. — *Complete Salvation.* Rom. vi.—viii.

- (1) Faith delivers from sin as well as frees from penalty. (Chaps. vi., vii.)
- (2) Therefore now no condemnation. (viii. 1-13.)
- (3) Children of God, and more than conquerors. (viii. 14-39.)

LESSON 29. — *Practical Christianity.* Rom. xii. 1—xv. 13.

- (1) Our relations to our fellow-men. (Chap. xii.)
- (2) Our relations to the civil authorities. (Chap. xiii.)
- (3) Living unto the Lord. (Chap. xiv.)
- (4) Bearing the infirmities of the weak. (xv. 1-13.)

LESSON 30. — *The Close of Paul's Third Missionary Journey.* Acts xx. 7—xxi. 14. A. D. 59.

- (1) Eutychus restored to life. (xx. 7-12.)
- (2) Paul's farewell to the Ephesian elders. (xx. 13-38.)
- (3) The voyage to Cæsarea. (xxi. 1-7.)
- (4) Paul's imprisonment prophesied. (xxi. 8-14.)
- (5) Review — Lessons 25-30.

PART V. — PREACHING THE GOSPEL IN ROME, — PAUL IN CHAINS,
AND THE FOUR EPISTLES OF HIS IMPRISONMENT. Acts xxi. 17—
xxviii. 31; Philemon; Colossians; Ephesians; Philippians. A. D.
59-64.

LESSON 31. — *The Mob at Jerusalem.* Acts. xxi. 15—xxii. 29. A. D. 59.

- (1) Paul's vow. (xxi. 15-26.)

- (2) The uproar among the people. (xxi. 27-40.)
- (3) Paul's defense before the mob. (xxii. 1-21.)
- (4) His appeal to his Roman citizenship. (xxii. 22-29.)

LESSON 32. — *Paul's First Two Trials.* Acts. xxii. 30—xxiv. 27.

- (1) Tried by the Council. (xxii. 30—xxiii. 10.)
- (2) Saved from assassination. (xxiii. 11-35.)
- (3) Tried by Felix. (Chap. xxiv.)

LESSON 33. — *Christ the all in all.* Col. i. 9—iii. 17.

(Epistle written from Cæsarea about A. D. 60.)

Remark. Scholars are greatly disagreed as to the dates and order of the Epistles of the Imprisonment. Most assign them all to the imprisonment at Rome, but Weiss (Introduction, pp. 326-357) and Meyer (*Com. in loc.*), whose authority we chiefly follow, assign Philemon, Colossians, and Ephesians to the two years of the Cæsarean imprisonment, and Philip-
pians to the Roman.

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the Epistle to the Colossians.
- (2) The preëminent power and glory of Christ. (i. 9-23.)
- (3) The object of Paul's ministry. (i. 24—ii. 7.)
- (4) Warnings against human wisdom. (ii. 8-23.)
- (5) Doing all things in the name of Christ. (iii. 1-17.)

Read Philemon in connection with this lesson.

LESSON 34. — *A Perfect Salvation.* Eph. i.—iii.

(Epistle written from Cæsarea about A. D. 60.)

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the Epistle to the Ephesians.
- (2) Redeemed through the blood of Christ. (Chap. i.)
- (3) Saved by grace through faith. (ii. 1-11.)
- (4) Fellow-citizens with the saints. (ii. 12-22.)
- (5) Rooted and grounded in love. (Chap. iii.)

LESSON 35. — *Walking Worthily.* Eph. iv.—vi. 20.

- (1) The unity of the Spirit in the body of Christ. (iv. 1-16.)
- (2) Living righteously before men. (iv. 17—v. 21.)
- (3) Domestic and social maxims. (v. 22—vi. 9.)
- (4) Putting on the whole armor of God. (vi. 10-20.)

LESSON 36. — *Paul's Third Trial and his Appeal to Cæsar.* Acts xxv., xxvi.
A. D. 61.

- (1) Tried by Festus. (xxv. 1-12.)
- (2) Brought before King Agrippa. (xxv. 13-27.)
- (3) His defense, and appeal to Cæsar. (Chap. xxvi.)

LESSON 37. — *Paul's Voyage and Shipwreck.* Acts xxvii. 1—xxviii. 15. A. D. 62.

- (1) The journey. (xxvii. 1—xxviii. 10.)
- (2) The arrival in Italy. (xxviii. 11-15.)

LESSON 38. — *In a Strait betwixt Two.* Acts xxviii. 16–31 ; Phil. i. 1—ii. 18.

(Epistle written from Rome about A. D. 63.)

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the Epistle to the Philippians.
- (2) Paul a prisoner at Rome. (Acts xxviii. 16–31 ; Phil. i. 1–14.)
- (3) Desiring to depart. (Phil. i. 15–30.)
- (4) Having the mind of Christ. (Phil. ii. 1–18.)

LESSON 39. — *Pressing toward the Goal.* Phil. iii., iv.

- (1) Counting all things loss for Christ. (iii. 1–16.)
- (2) Citizenship in heaven. (iii. 17–21.)
- (3) Rejoicing in the Lord. (iv. 1–9.)
- (4) In whatsoever state, content. (iv. 10–23.)

LESSON 40. — *Review of Lessons 31–39.*

PART VI. — OTHER APOSTOLIC TEACHINGS, — THE CATHOLIC EPISTLES.

LESSON 41. — *Paul's Last Words. The Victory won ; The Course Finished.*
(Selections from Titus and 1 and 2 Timothy, with analysis, etc.)

Remark. — The date of these Epistles is uncertain. Probably they were written after Paul's release from the Roman imprisonment recorded in Acts.

LESSON 42. — *Growth in Grace.* 2 Peter.

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the Epistle.
- (2) Adding virtue to faith. (i. 1–11.)
- (3) The word of prophecy made sure. (i. 12–21.)
- (4) Warning against mockers. (iii. 1–7.)
- (5) Looking for the day of God. (iii. 8–13.)
- (6) Without spot and blameless. (iii. 14–18.)

Read Jude in connection with this lesson.

LESSON 43. — *The Nature and Work of Christ.* Selections from Hebrews.

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the Epistle.
- (2) The divinity of Christ. (i. 1—ii. 4.)
- (3) The humanity of Christ. (ii. 5–18.)
- (4) The priesthood of Christ. (iv. 14—v. 10.)
- (5) The sacrifice of Christ. (x. 1–25.)

LESSON 44. — *The Necessity and Nature of Faith.* Heb. x. 26—xii. 13.

- (1) Danger of unbelief. (x. 26–39.)
- (2) Examples of faith. (Chap. xi.)
- (3) Running with patience. (xii. 1–13.)

LESSON 45. — *Children of God.* 1 John i.–iv.

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the Epistle.
- (2) Walking in the light. (Chap. i.)

- (3) Overcoming the Evil One. (Chap. ii.)
- (4) Holy living. (Chap. iii.)
- (5) Loving one another. (Chap. iv.)

Read 2 and 3 John in connection with this lesson.

LESSON 46. — *The Messages to the Churches.* Rev. i.—iii.

- (1) Introductory, — analysis of the Book of Revelation.
- (2) The Sender of the messages. (Chap. i.)
- (3) The seven messages. (Chap. ii., iii.)

LESSON 47. — *The New Heaven and the New Earth.* Rev. xxi. 1—xxii. 17.

- (1) The holy city, New Jerusalem. (Chap. xxi.)
- (2) The river of life. (xxii. 1–5.)
- (3) Warnings and promises. (xxii. 6–17.)

LESSON 48. — *General Review of the Lessons for the Year.*

Remark. — This lesson scheme leaves four Sundays in the year for reviewing lessons coming on very stormy Sundays, or for Easter, Christmas, missionary, and temperance lessons, or for vacation, as may be preferred.

Erastus Blakeslee.

SPENCER, MASS.

THE CHEROKEE OUTLET.

A LANDSCAPE, however beautiful, when contemplated for a long time from the same point of view, is liable to become too familiar to be specially interesting; it will cease to attract attention, not even furnishing material for a passing remark. A little change, however, in the observer's standpoint, may be all that is needed to invest the prospect with a new array of beauties; the eye will be charmed with a fresh supply of delights, and the mind will discover still broader and richer fields for profitable reflection. For the last two or more centuries our view of the "Indian Question" has been almost exclusively from the single standpoint of the white man; hence its proverbial staleness. What we know of the Indian has come down to us mainly through channels of the white man's own devising, — channels which have ever been only too ready to color their transmissions to the praise of the latter and to the blame of the former, and with but little regard for the claims of even justice between the parties. Therefore, appreciating the great evil of too narrow a chance for observation, I shall invite the reader to step with me over the line of race distinction; to put himself for once in the Indian's place; and to

take a glance at the question through Indian eyes. By such an adjustment of position he will be enabled, doubtless, to listen with better patience to the elementary arguments of this article, and perhaps find truths which might otherwise continue to lie undiscovered.

When a human being makes a promise to another in avowed good faith, we naturally feel that the latter (the promisee) has the right not only to expect, but to insist upon, its fulfillment. Why this is so, we can assign no reason other than that it is a law of our moral nature. It is the duty of the promisor to do just as he has agreed, especially if he has already received a valuable consideration as the result of his engagement. Nor does the race to which the promisee belongs, nor his ignorance, nor his poverty, nor his weakness, furnish any ground for an exception in the application of this general rule. It is also equally clear that the greatness, the power, and importance of the promisor are matters that weigh nothing in estimating the strength of the obligation. He can never absolve himself worthily from his engagement, except by fulfilling its terms. Nor can he plead the great exigencies, by which he has become subsequently pressed, as an excuse for his default. Suppose the giant should say to the pigmy: "True, my little man, I promised you in good faith. But my circumstances have since undergone such a change that I now find my guaranties only fortifying you as an obstruction in the way of my prosperity and self-aggrandizement. I must take care of my own interests as best I can." His conduct, taken in connection with that enhanced degree of turpitude which, to a virtuous mind, always seems to rise out of such an inequality of footing between the parties, would be indeed most reprehensible, and would need only a sufficient notoriety to call down upon it the abhorrence of all mankind.

But why here all this special emphasis upon these "weak and beggarly elements" of moral and legal science? Are they not already recognized throughout the civilized world as the fundamental principles upon which all dealing between man and man must be conducted? They are, indeed, between white man and white man; but he who will acquaint himself carefully with the dealings of the white man with the Indian cannot fail to be convinced that these elements are, at least in that sphere of human intercourse, by no means settled questions. Whether the government of the United States, having made a promise to the Cherokees in reference to their enjoyment of the Outlet, will deem itself

bound to fulfill the engagement, or whether it will default and plead the pressure of subsequent exigencies in justification, is at present, in the Indian's mind, a mooted and at the same time a very interesting subject of discussion.

There lies before us at the very moment of this writing the copy of a public document entitled the "Cherokee Outlet." It purports to embody the views of the Committee on Territories in the Lower House of Congress upon the propriety and feasibility of "opening up" these Cherokee lands to white settlement. Of course, the Cherokee title is the only barrier in the way of such a consummation. Speaking in reference to this obstruction, the committee first enumerates the vast white population immediately surrounding these lands, and, finding the sum total to be over five millions, goes on to say, in the style of an appeal:—

"Here are five and a half millions of an aggressive, progressive, surging, and ever-changing population, large numbers of whom, with longing eyes, turn to these fair lands for homes hitherto denied them. Shall this condition last longer? Your committee say, in their judgment, it should not; that the time has come for Congress to determine what is right and just to be done for the Indians, and that it should then act accordingly."

Out of such reasoning as this on part of the white man arise simple questions, not a few, which are, to the Indian's mind, extremely puzzling. For instance, how can the greatness of the number of these people who are desiring to do him a wrong be cited in justification of the wrongful deed? How can the "aggressive, progressive, surging, and ever-changing" character of this population be, in any sense, a palliation of such a wrong? How is it that these "longing eyes, turned to these fair lands" of the Cherokees, are entitled to any more sympathy than they might be, should they chance to be turned with the same glare of cupidity upon the wheatfields of Illinois or Pennsylvania? How can Congress, a body whose only function it is to devise peremptory legislation, "determine what is right and just to be done for the Indians"? Would not this latter service be more properly referred to the judicial branch of the government, whose office it is to "determine what is right and just"? What white man would be willing to let Congress make the title to the farm which he owns a subject of legislation?

The same committee, after a copious citation of court decisions (none of which are perceptibly in point), proceed as follows:—

"In the light of these decisions of the Supreme Court, cited by

General Shields" (the Attorney-General), "your committee have entire confidence of the power of Congress to dispose of the vexed question of ownership of the lands of the Cherokee Outlet in the manner provided for in the bill submitted and reported.

"On part of the Indians, it is claimed that \$1.25 an acre is not adequate compensation for their interest in the lands. To this proposition your committee cannot assent. It is well known that the government has at all times, from the beginning of its disposal of the public lands, sold them, without regard to the quality, to its own citizens at \$1.25, or less, per acre. It may be said that the practice of the government, approved by the assent of our people, has established \$1.25 as the uniform price for all public lands. The price of \$1.25 per acre is a large price for wild lands producing no income, upon which the alleged owners cannot settle, cannot improve, cannot lease, and cannot sell to any person other than the United States, except by its assent, which, because of public policy, will never be given."

These words illustrate, in a very remarkable manner, the great distance to which the white man is disposed to depart from sound principle in his dealing with the Indian. If there is one right of property more fundamental and better understood than all others, it is that by which a person is authorized, when he owns anything, to say what he will take for it. That the Cherokees have an interest of some kind in these lands is conceded; else what means all this effort on part of the United States to purchase the same of them? Now, if a railroad corporation, or an individual citizen of the United States, owned this same interest (whatever it is), there can be no doubt but that such owner would be allowed the privilege of choice as to whether he would sell at all or not; and, in case of a sale, to set his own price upon the property. And upon what principle of justice can the Cherokees be denied a like privilege?

But the reasoning of the honorable committee is singularly weak in another respect. Let it be, for argument's sake, conceded that the price fixed by the government in selling its lands is \$1.25 per acre, what logical bearing has that fact upon the question in hand? The government, in this instance, is not a *seller*, but a *buyer*. Will it be said that, as it fixes the price of its lands when it sells, so it will do the same thing when it buys? We think not. The Cherokee Outlet is not government land; if it ever was, it ceased to be such, and became the private property of the Cherokees, by means of a sale thereof to them by the United States, as we shall presently see.

But, the honorable committee say, \$1.25 per acre is, indeed, enough for these lands, especially in view of the fact that the Cherokees themselves "cannot settle, cannot improve, cannot lease, and cannot sell" the same to any person other than the United States. And here again we are brought up face to face with another striking instance wherein the Indian's mind finds great difficulty in reconciling the dealings of the white man with the primary elements of moral and legal science. It is only too true that the Cherokees "cannot," etc. But that is not the question exactly; their inability to do these things is by no means incompatible with their *right* to do them. They concede that, by virtue of a special agreement, they have no right or power to sell to any other than the United States. They cannot believe, however, but that, if they had their dues under their treaties and their patent, they would be allowed to settle, improve, and lease these lands at their own discretion. Assuming that the Outlet is, indeed, the absolute property of the Cherokees (a fact which we hope soon to show conclusively), it would seem that the citing of these limitations upon their enjoyment of the property as an argument for "opening it up," especially as they are but the results of arbitrary action on part of the government, is not much unlike an attempt to plead a former wrong committed in justification of a new one in contemplation. At least the reasoning cannot be very convincing to a candid mind that is in possession of all the facts.

The honorable committee, it seems, in coming to their conclusions in reference to the nature of the Cherokees' title to the lands of the Outlet, have relied with much confidence upon the opinions of the Attorneys-General of the United States. The principle here by which they allowed themselves to be guided in their search after the truth, however popular it may be, is by no means unquestionable. There is no land-owner in the United States, being a citizen thereof, that would for a moment brook the idea that a question affecting his title should be referred to, and adjudicated by, an *attorney* of any kind. Yet the title of such citizen to his farm, and that of the Cherokees to the Outlet, are precisely of the same nature, with the single exception that the former can sell his land to any person, whereas the latter only to the United States. If, therefore, it should be deemed in the one case unsafe for the party to have his landed interests adjudicated by any other tribunal than that of a court of judicature, why, we may ask, would it not be equally so in the other?

And, in this connection, we are led to speak of a certain hardship which has long been afflicting the Cherokee people. Except what these folk have in the value of their land, they are generally poor. Their lands constitute well-nigh the whole of their earthly possessions. It is natural, therefore, that they should be careful, nay, very jealous, for their preservation. It is true, they hold these lands with all the formal guaranties that characterize the title of such property in the States; yet the arm of the government upon which they have to depend for the enforcement of these guaranties is not at all the same to which the citizen of the United States is privileged to look for a like service. For the purposes of interpretation, these muniments of title are in the hands of Congress as a tribunal of last resort; though, until Congress acts, the President has in general the power to pronounce by executive order upon all questions arising under them. Under this arrangement, it is obvious that the guaranteed rights of these Indians are brought down from the position of high sacredness where, under the Constitution, the tenure of individual property really belongs, and are classed as mere police regulations, upon the low level of expediency; that is to say, that practically the Indian title, with all its solemn guaranties, is not a question of right, but of policy. It is subject to the legislative power; and the same reasoning that would sustain a measure for building a custom-house, or a national bridge, is generally regarded as equally available, and is as frequently used in Congress for the extinguishment of such title, with a view to "opening up" the land in question to white settlement. It is thus made feasible for any one, who may choose to make an attack upon these Indian communities, to cause a bill to be introduced in Congress assailing their title; a powerful lobby, armed with great political and financial influence, are summoned and put to work for the purpose of bending the legislative mind into the proper direction. Sometimes, indeed, the "opening up" of these Indian lands is made an issue at the polls, in order to shape the two houses of Congress aright for such a work.

In this way these Indians are kept forever in a fever of unrest and apprehension, lest, at some moment which they know not, they may, by some piece of claptrap legislation, or an executive order, be dispossessed of their property, and themselves and their families reduced to the condition of homeless beggars in their own land. The effect of this state of things upon the people, especially the Cherokees, is deeply to be deplored. It is needless

here to particularize, even if we had time to do so. Let the imagination paint the picture. Suppose a community of white people should, in reference to their landed interests, be subjected, only for a day, to a like condition of doubt and uncertainty; is it not obvious that the wheels of business would stop at once? Capital would fly away and hide itself; general discontent among the people would ensue; the worst passions of the human mind would be turned loose; rebellion would rupture the foundations of society; and the car of civilization itself would be rolled backward in blood for a distance indefinite in the direction of original barbarism.

Yet it is said this manner of treating these Indians is all right, because they are only "wards of the nation." But this reasoning is so weak that, like all other vain attempts to apologize for a wrong, it reacts with condemning force upon the author of it. Moral principle, as well as the law of the land, forbids the guardian to oppress his ward, or to make free with his property. Suppose a guardian should ask the court to allow him to sell his ward's real estate, and that, too, at a very reduced price, at the same time assigning as the only reason therefor the fact that there were others, more needy than he, who were wanting it for homes. The court would doubtless revoke his letters of guardianship and discharge him as unworthy of the trust.

Much discussion has been had upon the nature of the Cherokees' title to the Outlet. Those who are desiring to "open it up" contend that it is not a "fee simple," but only the right to use and occupy. But suppose they were right, how could that help them in accomplishing the end which they have in view? Whether the Cherokees can be ousted or not does not depend upon the *quantity* of interest that they may have, but the strength of the guaranties by which the property is secured to them. It would be just as hard for Congress to annul the guaranty of an "use" as it would be to annul that of "absolute ownership." On December 29, 1835, a treaty was made with the Cherokees, in which it was agreed as follows:—

"In addition to the seven million acres of land thus provided, the United States further *guarantee* to the Cherokee Nation a *perpetual* outlet west, and a free and *unmolested* use of all the country west of the western boundary of the said seven million of acres, as far west as the sovereignty of the United States and their right of soil extends."

By these words the Cherokees are guaranteed, at least, the *per-*

petual and unmolested use of these lands. Does the honorable committee, whose report is now before us, regard this guaranty any more subject to nullification than it would be if the title conveyed by it were a "fee simple"? If the Cherokees have a right to the *use* of these lands, the fee being in the United States, it would be none the less wrong to deprive them of that *easement* by an arbitrary act of legislation.

That Cherokees have only an easement in these lands is a conclusion which the honorable committee have arrived at through a false interpretation of the word "Outlet." They maintain that it means only the "right of transit" outward. The Cherokees hold that it means now, and did at the time the treaty was made, the soil. But whether it is the one or the other of these two things is a question to be settled by the ordinary rules of interpretation and construction. We submit that the most popular signification of the word is the opening, or aperture, through which the egress is to take place, that is to say, in this case, the land itself which afforded the "Outlet." That this is a correct view is corroborated by a long established custom, as well with the United States as the Indians; that is, to give particular names to specified tracts, as the Neutral Land, the Strip, the Home Tract, the Outlet, No Man's Land, etc., among the Cherokees. And the same practice prevails among all the other tribes. These are not technical terms, but in each case the soil is the thing signified. Again, that the Cherokees, as well as the United States, understood that the word "Outlet" had reference to the soil, and not to a mere easement upon it, is clear from the further fact that the latter agreed to grant the same to the former by patent, that is, in "fee." By the third article of the treaty of 1835, —

"The United States also agree that the lands above ceded by the treaty of 1833, including the Outlet, and those ceded by this treaty, shall be included in one patent executed to the Cherokee Nation of Indians by the President of the United States."

Now, to grant an "easement" by patent, that is to say, "in fee simple," is, to say the least, a very novel mode of conveyancing in this country. No, the terms in which the title to this land was, in the first place, promised by the United States, are too broad, deep, and solemn, and the instrument by which it was subsequently to be conveyed and guaranteed is of too high a nature, to be consistent with the idea that, after all, the Cherokees were to take only a poor determinable easement.

That the United States understood the word "Outlet" to signify

the soil, and not a mere "right of transit," is further evidenced by the frame of the patent itself. This patent was issued December 31, 1838. In the preamble of this patent is recited: —

"And whereas the United States have caused the said tract of seven million acres, together with the said *perpetual outlet*, to be surveyed *in one tract*, the boundaries whereof are as follows," etc.

And, after concluding the preamble, the patent proceeds as follows: —

"Therefore, in execution of the agreements and stipulations in the said several treaties, the United States have given and granted, and by these presents do give and grant, unto the said Cherokee Nation, the two tracts of land so surveyed and hereinbefore described, containing in the whole 14,374,135 $\frac{1}{100}$ acres, to have and to hold the same, together with the rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the said Cherokee Nation forever."

Now, as bearing upon the question as to how the term "Outlet" was understood by the United States at the time of the negotiation, we may notice: 1. That the United States actually measured off this Outlet in solid acres of soil; we do not measure easements in this manner. 2. That this Outlet, thus measured out in acres, is classed with and considered a part of the seven million acres; there is no reference here to any "easement." 3. That this measuring of the Outlet, and the other tracts, and grouping them together for the purpose of conveying the same by patent, is said to have been done in pursuance of the treaties.

As showing further that the United States understood that the Cherokees' title to the Outlet was a "fee simple," the words of the sixteenth article of the treaty of 1866 are conclusive. Speaking of the tracts to be occupied by such friendly tribes as might be settled upon the Outlet, the treaty says: —

"The boundaries of each of said districts to be distinctly marked, and the land conveyed in *fee simple* to each of said tribes."

Here, then, is an agreement with the United States that the Cherokees should convey portions of this same Outlet in "fee simple." But how could they do this unless they owned the "fee"? What sense would there have been in the United States agreeing with the Cherokees that they should do this unless she at the time understood the Cherokees to be the owners of these tracts in "fee simple"?

The history of negotiations in reference to this Outlet shows beyond doubt that the parties to the treaties understood, at the time of the agreement, that the Cherokees were taking the land by grant in fee, and not a mere easement. And it is a well understood rule of construction that as the parties understood the contract at the time it was concluded, *so shall it be*.

To "open up" the Cherokee Outlet for white settlement, without the consent of the Cherokees, would be a deplorable violation of vested rights.

D. W. C. Duncan.

TAHLEQUAH, I. T.

CRITICISM VERSUS ECCLESIASTICISM.

II. ECCLESIASTICISM.

WITH the fall of Napoleon the wave of reaction which the French Revolution had excited rolled swift and far throughout Europe. The excesses of the revolutionary movement had frightened the timid and conservative, and, except under extraordinary circumstances, these are always the vast majority. The tide set so rapid and strong that it seemed, at least to the superficial observer, as if Europe would be carried back to the state it was in previous to 1789. The governments of the various European countries appeared to be established upon a basis more solid and conservative than before. A system of coercion and repression was put into operation that for a time, at least, eliminated all prospects of advance or progress. All institutions which tended to preserve the old order were cherished and enlarged. Politically this tendency expressed itself in that solemn absurdity, "The Holy Alliance," while the fears of men sought continually for new channels through which to express their utter abhorrence and detestation of the Jacobite spirit. The Christian religion had been attacked and rejected by the revolution, and therefore it was now looked upon as one of the mainstays and preservatives of law and order.

The ill-treatment and persecution of the Pope had excited the sympathies of Europe, and the church thus gained a prestige which it had not enjoyed for a long time. Statesmen strove to impress upon the popular mind that which it was too ready to receive, that the church which had such a long and venerable history, which was so widespread and universal in its activity, whose

power over the mind was so deep and strong, and whose spirit was so cautious and conservative, was one of the firmest and wisest friends of civilization.

An ecclesiastical reaction set in, proportionate in strength to the destructive and hostile tendencies of a previous generation. Europe was sick of French infidelity, atheism, and goddesses of reason. The Pope became again one of the great figures in the drama of European history, and the Roman communion gained influence, importance, and authority in the most widely separated localities.

Few things are more striking in the history of modern Europe than the sudden change which took place in the attitude of men toward religious institutions as shown in the position which the Roman Church occupied in 1820, contrasted with that in which it stood thirty years before. But it was not with reference to the Latin communion alone that this tendency displayed itself. The Protestant churches felt the same movement, and an ecclesiastical party arose in Germany which exerted a very widespread and marked influence over the progress of Christianity in that country. However interesting it would be to trace the growth of the Roman Church from the revival in the early decades of this century until it reached its final and logical culmination in the Council of 1870, the ecclesiastical movement has a more direct and personal interest as it developed itself in the Established Church of England.

It will be necessary for a clear understanding of the causes and strength of this movement to take a swift glance at the political, social, and religious condition of England in the early part of this century.

In its opening years England was engaged in the greatest contest of modern times. What Spain was in the sixteenth century, that France was in the nineteenth, and it was given to the same nation to shatter the power of both. The long agony of the Napoleonic wars was drawn out for almost a generation, and those who saw the Constitutional Assembly, and hailed the birth of the new era of liberty, had for the most part passed away when the battle of Waterloo settled the fate of Europe.

During this terrific struggle all other interests besides those of patriotism were swallowed up in this sea of fire, and there was a general stagnation of public activity in all other directions save of war and defense. So little did men seem to care for other things, so strong was the antipathy excited by the career of Napoleon, that,

after peace was restored, it was determined to efface that terrible quarter of a century in which Europe had struggled for her very existence, and ignore all the new hopes and thoughts which had been stirred into life. With the return of peace, however, the minds of men were turned to those affairs which had been so long pushed aside, and the check to the normal activity of public life only caused an increased interest, and the stream flowed on with accelerated speed.

The outlook was in many respects singular. A generation had grown up whose training had been such as to stimulate the highest intellectual activity, but the institutions, customs, and ideas which still prevailed were those of the eighteenth century.

The process of adaptation must now go on with an energy that should give some promise of producing that harmonious relation which exists between a nation and its laws, institutions, and ideas when the national development has not been interfered with or checked. If the political ideas seemed but ill-adapted to the new conditions amid which the nation found itself, the religious life of the people was no more hopeful or promising. That great portion of the people called the middle class, and so largely composed of dissenters, was coming more and more prominently into view.

The Established Church, however, still remained unchallenged, and all who belonged to it as yet seemed satisfied with the state of affairs. The church was divided into the two great parties that have always existed, the High Churchmen, and the Low Churchmen, or Evangelicals.

The old-fashioned High Churchman was as dull in the reign of George the Fourth as he had been under George the First.

This is the one party in the church that seems to change the least, and certainly never intends to change at all.

It repeated its formulas, executed the routine functions of its office, and was in all ways well satisfied with itself. It was as indifferent to the great mass of the new and powerful classes which were forming as they were to it, and had sunk into respectable desuetude.

The Low Church party, or Evangelical, had done a great work. The spirit of the Wesleys had found in it a hearty recognition, and the deeper religious life which it had called forth saved the church from becoming utterly dead.

Though the Evangelical spirit survived in many localities, the party was fast losing its power, and the intolerable weariness and

deadly chill which follow excitement and heat now fell upon it. The Evangelical party lost its leadership because it did not think.

There was depth of feeling but no intellectual activity. In its scorn of learning and intelligence it arrayed itself against the whole vast body of philosophy and new thought which burst in full force upon the world as soon as the peace gave men time to realize what surrounded them. It is not hard to see why the Evangelicals failed, but the Nemesis which overtook them haunts the footsteps of every party that places anything between the most earnest and fearless intellectual activity and Him who is the source of light and truth. The old soil was exhausted, and the Evangelical party had nothing to offer to the new times except a most earnest philanthropy and a narrow and tenacious orthodoxy. The church was in truth out of touch with the times. A new spirit was abroad, — the spirit of Reform, as it was called, and the religious chiefs hated and feared it.

When the Reform Bill was thrown out of the House of Lords on its first reading, the bishops with one exception voted solidly against it. "Twenty-one, exactly enough to turn the scale."¹ It was clear that unless a great change took place in the church, it would not long be able to retain any hold upon the nation, or its place of influence as the Establishment. But a change was about to take place, or rather many of them, which were to alter the whole tone and spirit of the church, and widely affect the Christianity of the whole English-speaking people. The indications were already clear of something in the way of new movement and life in the universities.

The old, quiet, scholastic life had already been rudely disturbed by the winds which blew from the great moving world without.

A type of men to which the universities had long been strangers filled the old halls with the exciting atmosphere of political and religious controversy.

The intensity and passion of modern life were already agitating those new spirits to whom the destiny of the future was so largely intrusted. The passage of the Catholic Emancipation Bill, and the mutterings of that discontent which found utterance in the great Reform Bill of 1832, did not fail to make a profound impression even in what was considered the most conservative institution of the Church of England, the University of Oxford. There had been connected for several years with the University, and now rising to prominence and influence, one of the most

¹ Martineau's *History of the Peace*, vol. iii. p. 276.

interesting and striking figures in her long and splendid history, and whose career throws a halo of romance about those venerable walls, even in these practical, sordid days of ours.

It is this personality, so pure, so austere, so impressive, that is the key to the great ecclesiastical revival called the Oxford Movement.

In the order of time, it is true, we must place Keble and Froude first as the real originators of the thoughts which the movement was intended to express. Undoubtedly there would have been a movement of some sort tending in the same general direction, but, as a matter of fact, Hugh James Rose, Keble, and Froude were swept into the train of the man whom they had taught. The peculiar form of the movement is due to Newman, and his career expresses not only the growth of the ideas and their gradual expansion and application, but also illustrates the real logic of the theory upon which the party stood as no other life connected with it does to anything like the same degree. He is the type by which its significance can be learned, and the order and fulfillment of its thought.

His own words, and the course and growth of his own thoughts, are the best guide through this perplexing labyrinth which had so many causes, and to some such a strange and unexpected issue.

One of the most fascinating books which our literature possesses is that volume in which Newman tells us, with a frankness that would be suspicious in some, and with a charm and grace of style all his own, the story of these early days at Oxford. Serious men were growing anxious about the condition of the church as well as the state.

In the eyes of many, the discontent seemed prophetic, and the attacks upon the church aroused the deepest apprehension. Under such circumstances it was that these young Oxford tutors and fellows began the earnest discussion of a subject that was to end in revolutionizing the Church of England, and in placing the opposing parties farther apart than they had been since the Puritan controversy.

The first clear indication that a new spirit was stirring in the Church of England was manifested not only by the publication, but the reception, of Keble's "Christian Year," whose sweet piety and graceful melody gave a new interest to the subjects it dealt with, and touched a long forgotten strain in the memories of English Churchmen. The story is old now, but it showed that many hearts were troubled and looked towards the future with anxious

forebodings. After the Reform Bill was passed, the prospect of a quiet settlement of all questions on the old basis was ended ; and when the Reform Parliament began the attack upon the Church of Ireland, Newman and his friends considered it as the harbinger of a storm which was about to burst upon the Church of England and sweep away the most cherished and solid foundation of Christianity in the land. Liberalism, they declared, was the great foe the church had to dread, and liberalism was the enemy they determined to fight with all the strength they possessed. If liberalism was in its spirit hostile to the church, then they were right. At all events, their antagonism to that tendency, so marked in the national life of the age, is the key to their position.

The movement which they inaugurated was intensely and essentially reactionary. They did not attempt to meet the foe by the development and expression of a vital principle or a new conception, but by the revival of the past. It was antiquarian Christianity, rather than progressive truth, which was to check and beat back the fierce, aggressive intellect of man. Newman says Hurrell Froude was the real leader of the movement, but any reader of his writings will at once perceive that the rather childish and passionate author of "The Remains" was not of the stuff of which leaders of great movements are made. The intense, deep nature, with its silent brooding, his marvelous gift of expression, his winning attractiveness, combined with a rather imperious temper, marked Newman as a true leader of men. He himself, however, wishes us to believe that he was influenced by others, very largely even by the liberal friends of his early manhood ; but a nature such as his was more likely far to exert influence than to yield to it, and the whole history of the movement verifies the statement.

His was the standard which all the young, eager spirits who flung themselves into the struggle followed, and the motto of each was, "Credo in Newmannum."

Newman's imagination was essentially conservative, and the ideal which it loved to dwell upon was in the past. The sky to which he lifted devout and solemn eyes was filled with a glory all its own, but it was the splendor of the setting not the rising sun. Against this restless, doubting age of ours his only weapons were those borrowed from the past, and not the past about which the halo of great deeds and heroic acts was flung, but a past that was disliked by the large mass of Englishmen, and which concealed

within its folds some of the bitterest memories of the national life.

In the church of the Stuarts, and the doctrines which were the guiding principles of the school of Laud, Newman found the only hope of the church of the nineteenth century. The ecclesiastical and the political thought of an age have certain affinities, though we may not always perceive them; and it is not surprising to find that one who held the theory of Apostolic Succession with the most unswerving faith should also believe in the divine right of kings. In tracing the broad, general sweep of his thought, we are also tracing the course of the movement. The disciples waited to hear him speak, and until the hour when he left the English Church and acknowledged the Roman supremacy, he was practically the movement.

It was hoped that if the English Church could be restored to the position it occupied in the writings of the divines of the seventeenth century, particularly of the Laudian stamp, different results would follow from what ensued at that unfortunate period. With the reëstablishment of church authority the power and position of the Episcopacy was to be vindicated, the vile Erastianism of the eighteenth century was to be abolished, the clergy were to develop into a sacerdotal caste, and in the train of these great changes, or rather alongside of them, was to be developed a new conception of Christian truth and a reaffirmation of long-neglected doctrines. The movement has had such a wide influence, and exerted such a power over the uncritical and ignorant, and leavened so largely the clerical body, that it is very difficult to recall the views of a generation which now seems so far away. Yet some of the subjects which we are told have been settled beyond dispute were approached by these men with considerable hesitation. The doctrine, as it is called, of Apostolic Succession rests upon so solid a basis, we are assured, that in consequence it is denied to be a subject of debate. Yet as late as 1837, when the movement was well advanced, Oakley wrote to Keble asking if Apostolic Succession is necessary, and the answer was extremely dubious.¹ Things have changed since that day considerably. Even to the leaders of the agitation, the views which they were seeking to impress had an air of novelty about them, and they knew that to the vast body of the English Church they were entirely unknown. There is a certain accidental character about some of their views which fills one with amazement.

¹ *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, p. 461.

Newman tells us he was taught the doctrine of Apostolic Succession in a walk round Christ Church meadow.¹ He seems to have accepted it without any hesitation. There is a daring about such men as these that is striking, to say the least.

As a natural result of the uncertainty and dissatisfaction in men's minds, no concerted action took place at the beginning. It was the keen eye of Newman again which discovered the means by which their thoughts might be expressed, and by which, also, a party might be formed, which would be educated and organized at the same time. The keynote was struck, Newman tells us, by Keble's assize sermon on "The National Apostasy," and in the same year, 1833, the first of the famous Tracts for the Times was issued, and the strife which was to agitate the English Church as it had not been stirred in two hundred years began. Whatever credit there is for the conception of this series belongs to Newman. On him rested the chief responsibility. The Tracts are rather dull reading now, when so much stronger and bolder statements are made, but they excited at the time the most profound and varied feelings. Their original aim was to familiarize men with the whole system of thought which belonged to the Laudian divines, and here at first they seemed content to rest. The ideal they aimed at had been already realized in the English Church, and they sought only to restore to the church the doctrines which had been so long neglected. But in a study of the literature of that age, they saw how large a space the early church had occupied in men's minds, and they, too, began to study the primitive and Nicene periods, in order to get a clear conception of what the church had been in ages when no doubts were thrown upon its purity and orthodoxy. The note of "Antiquity" thus became the great key to the problem, and the early Fathers began to be studied with new eyes and a new faith. All that belonged to the great church of Athanasius and the Gregories seemed to have a claim upon them which they were quick to recognize. It is true this church differed most widely, in every respect almost, from the Church of England in which they found themselves, but the note of "Antiquity" covered all, and created an authority which the passage of time and the change of thought in no way weakened.

The cast of Newman's mind made the power of the appeal still greater. His conception of religion was essentially dogmatic.

"From the age of fifteen," he says, "dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion; I know no other religion; I

¹ *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, p. 61.

cannot enter into any other sort of religion.”¹ Dogma being of such unquestioned authority, one would suppose that an effort would have been made to arrive at a clear conception of what dogma is, and its relations to religious truth, but this is assumed.

We find Apostolic Succession and the dogma of the Trinity regarded as having the same claims and the same authority, and the lack of intellectual clearness here manifested is one of the great weaknesses of the movement.

Newman, with the same delight in definitions which characterizes the schoolmen, fell into the same mistake that many of them did.

A dogma is but the expression of a truth, an opinion or definition if you will, not the truth itself. The ultimate ground of the acceptance is reason, not authority. No definition corresponds exactly with the thing defined, nor is it coextensive with it. This is preëminently true in religion. Such distinctions of thought seem frivolous to many, yet they are true and vital, and lift the religious life of man out of the field of mere logic. Belief in the dogma of the Trinity, for instance, does not by any means correspond with belief in the Trinity. One may be a mere intellectual assent, the other a spiritual state. The dogma is a description of the mode of God's existence which must be recognized as having limits to its accuracy and fullness. God as the object of human faith through Christ is apprehended as Triune.

Apostolic Succession, on the other hand, is not a dogma in any sense of the word, not even a doctrine. It is a statement whose truth can be tested by simple historical rules of evidence, and no amount of precedent or authority can make it any more or less true than the facts verify or disprove.

These grave intellectual defects are strikingly manifest in almost all that Newman wrote on historical theology, and are stamped upon the literature of the whole movement. One of his friends has told us that “the sacredness of tradition and the authority of the religious instincts lay at the root of Newman's philosophy.”² Had he said the authority of the church, his statement could be accepted without any qualification, for church authority represented to Newman's mind the external embodiment of conscience, and before its demands he bowed with reverent humility. It was this thought, also, which took possession of his most active and ardent disciples, and led one of the most brilliant with him into

¹ *Apologia*, p. 96.

² *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, p. 56.

the Church of Rome. He states the argument for this position very clearly in the following words, and his master would not have dissented from them:—

“On the other hand, this advance of the spiritual life cannot proceed equably and healthily without some guide external to the individual; he cannot otherwise be preserved from narrow-mindedness and idiosyncrasy. . . . Nor can this external guide be adequately supplied otherwise than by some living source; . . . therefore was the church set up, ‘the body of Christ, the fullness of Him who filleth all in all,’ endued with power sufficient, if rightly employed, to insure her purity and faithfulness, and charged, among other duties, with preserving for her children what may be called the apostolic atmosphere in the midst of which she began.”¹ The abstract conception of a church existing apart and independent of the individual Christians who compose its membership is a thought as old as the ages in which the Tractarians delighted; but in spite of its antiquity it has no real existence outside of the minds who conceived it, and has been the source of endless confusion and disaster. It is a sheer figment of the brain. There is no church except the historic church, which we can see realizing itself in the lives of its members. Yet even if we assume the correctness of such a mode of thought, which we assuredly do not, the church is here placed upon a pedestal of authority which most men would feel implied infallibility. That his statements implied as much, Mr. Ward’s own act shows.

When one compares the actual history of the church with this language, they are only able to preserve their respect for the moral nature of the writer by remembering what he himself has told us, that history was a subject of which he and some of his friends professed total ignorance and want of capacity.²

Yet to reconstruct in an *à priori* manner the actual features of the Christian church, without studying the long and complex Christian history, argues more boldness than judgment.

The appeal had been made to the English Church of the seventeenth century, but had passed to the church of the third and fourth centuries. The question now was, Would the attraction of that age have sufficient influence to check further appeal? Was “Antiquity” the only or the chief note?

Newman tells us that the chief men in the movement did not agree as to what was coming or where they were going. In fact,

¹ *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, p. 91.

² *Ibid.*, p. 95.

most seem to have had no anticipation or expectation, and all went merrily along. Old-fashioned High Churchmen were content with a moderate appeal to the Nicene age, but Newman was not an old-fashioned High Churchman, and the limits which they set for themselves he did not respect, and did not see any reason why they should be respected. If the church is orthodox and pure in the fourth century, when did it change?

If we are to accept the development as normal, natural, and healthy up to the days of Athanasius, the Gregories, Jerome, and Augustine, why should we stop there? Is it not the same church in the tenth that it was in the fifth century, and the thirteenth that it was in the third? A new thought began to take the place of the old dream of Antiquity, that of Catholicity. It did not extinguish the other, it only superseded it, and certainly it had a right to a hearing. Moreover, it had its highest expression in the growing reverence of mankind for the See of Rome. The stately sentence of Augustine, Newman assures us, shook his wavering mind: "*Securus judicat orbis terrarum.*"

The battle was nearly over. Hope for the Church of England grew fainter and fainter, faith grew weaker and weaker, and sad and lonely thoughts filled his mind. The growth of Newman's thought is interesting in this connection because a corresponding change was going on in the party. Three years previously Dr. Pusey had joined it, and it is a strange illustration of the value of family and position in England that the movement, which before seemed contemptible and insignificant, now became respectable, important, and conspicuous, and to the vast majority of Englishmen it was known by his name, though a smaller man seldom gained a greater fame.

Yet the real influence was Newman, for it was by him that the picked men of the party were guided and directed. About the same time the changes in Newman's mind, described above, took place, that is, about the year 1839, a band of younger men than those who inaugurated the movement began to make themselves felt. This new party was headed by Oakley, and included such men as Froude, Ward, and Mark Pattison. The Nicene age had little or no attraction for them. In fact, it might be said they knew nothing about it. Their thoughts were turned to the mediæval church. They swept away the lingering doubts in the minds of many, and made the Latin Church the subject of their enthusiastic admiration and praise.

It is easy to understand what the attraction was to Ward, but

the clear intelligence and sanity of such men as Froude and Pattison must have been most powerfully affected before they yielded themselves to an influence whose workings were clearly so repugnant to their whole nature.

Newman felt a warm sympathy with this new element which appeared in the party, and which was so strong and confident in its faith. But the haste and enthusiasm of his young disciples annoyed him somewhat, and forced conclusions from him which he was not quite prepared to adopt; still, from the way his mind was working, it was clear he must sooner or later accept them.

The excitement, however, in which the party moved did not blind men to the strange possibilities which lay in the distance, or destroy the sense of loyalty to the institution to which they all belonged. The leaders of the movement had been most vigorous in their denunciation of the Church of Rome. They were also profoundly dissatisfied with the prevalent Protestantism, and found what they considered a happy compromise in their theory of the *via media*. If this was destroyed, then their explanation of the articles as neither Romish nor Protestant collapsed, and they felt themselves irresistibly impelled by their own theory towards the Church of Rome. The question which caused such deep and anxious thought was also the burden of their speech. Newman tells us the matter was pressed upon him from all sides: "How about the Articles?"

No one seemed prepared with any solution of this problem, which even the most superficial felt to be the fundamental one at this time. The pressure grew so great that Newman felt compelled to give an answer. He was reluctant to do so, possibly because he had none ready, or at least none that was satisfactory to himself.

"Anglicanism claimed," he said, "to hold that the Church of England was nothing else than a continuation in this country (as the Church of Rome might be in France or Spain) of that one church of which, in old times, Athanasius and Augustine were members. But if so, the doctrine must be the same; the doctrine of the old church must live and speak in Anglican formularies in the Thirty-nine Articles. Did it? Yes, it did."¹ Thus Newman answers the question that was weighing so heavily on the minds of his followers, and to prove it he wrote the last and most famous of all the Tracts, No. 90. More than a year had elapsed since his faith in Antiquity as a mark of the English Church had been so

¹ *Apologia*, p. 171.

rudely shattered, and now he makes a last attempt to find harmony between the Roman communion and the English Church by interpreting the Articles in the interests of what he calls the Catholic faith. The Articles were to be received, not in the sense of their framers, "but in the one Catholic sense."¹ In explaining his motive, he says: "It was a wish to go as far as possible, in interpreting the Articles, in the direction of Roman dogma."² The result of his effort was not altogether a surprise, but even he seems to have been astonished at the furious storm which his Tract raised. His mind had traveled a long distance since he first began in 1833, and long familiarity with these ideas prevented him from realizing how utterly strange and foreign they were to most Englishmen.

The practical application of his theory meant simply a revolution of the whole religious life of the English Church; and the most exasperating feature of it was that the author of the most astounding proposal that had ever been advanced by an English Churchman was entirely calm and cool in the midst of the tumult that raged around him.

It did not seem to him either unreasonable or undesirable that men should regard the church to which they belonged as in fact quite in sympathy with the Church of Rome. The sharpest sting of the Tract was in the last words: "The Protestant Confession was drawn up with the purpose of including Catholics, and Catholics now will not be excluded. What was an economy in the reformers is a protection to us. What would have been a perplexity to us then is a perplexity to Protestants now. We could not then have found fault with their words; they cannot now repudiate our meaning."³ He was to discover very soon whether they would repudiate the meaning or not. Such logic as this, Englishmen were unaccustomed to, but they have always been masters of a logic of their own which men are at no pains to understand or feel. It was somewhat later than this that Ward's famous phrase, "non-natural interpretation," was used, but the motive and the illustration of it are clearly seen in Tract No. 90. We see how academic and abstract the theory of the Tract was when we consider the historical circumstances of the English Reformation. However the Articles may be interpreted, one way, at least, is excluded by every regard for the truth of history and the character of the men who framed them, and that is the Roman way.

¹ *Apologia*, p. 172.

² *Ibid.*, p. 124.

³ *Tract No. 90*, p. 84, New York, 1841.

If not, what possible explanation is there for the conduct of Protestants and Romanists alike, during the reigns of Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth? If Newman's principle is to be universally applied, the Declaration of Independence and the Stamp Act are but different expressions of the same truth, and we can play fast and loose with all the solid and accredited facts of history. Men's passions and purposes, their loves, hates, ambitions, sufferings, struggles, and deaths, are but fantastic dreams drifting across the mind in this troubled sleep of life. "A mad world, my masters."

The wrath of Englishmen is usually slow to rise, but in this case it expressed itself very promptly, and the quick cry of indignation and anger grew into a steady storm of rage and execration.

The Tract is a marvel of subtlety and sophistry, but the line and method of argument were such as only to madden the opposing party, who felt unable to grasp such a dexterous, subtle, and evasive opponent. However his followers may have been affected, Newman himself was undismayed; he only felt that the church had been weighed and found wanting. He stopped the Tracts, gave up the leadership and all active part in the movement, and retired to await results. The high-water mark had been reached, and a steady growth of opposition, alert, disciplined, and fully armed, made the intellectual struggle hopeless. He lingered a few years in retirement, and then passed over into the Church of Rome, and with him, or within a few years, passed over also a large number of bright, enthusiastic spirits, who had not only the courage of their convictions, but the logic of them also.

The charm, grace, and high refined thoughtfulness of the great leader had no counterpart in the group of men he left behind him, and no one of the Tractarian party has ever exercised any influence over really fine intellects at all comparable to his, in extent or depth.

As a movement affecting the more thoughtful minds of the universities and the church, it ceased to exist. Since 1845, no name of first rank in learning, philosophical depth, or literary power has appeared in the party.

The university to which he belonged repudiated the school which he established, and so feeble was the hold, and so destructive the influence with which it came in contact, that, in order to preserve its name and prestige at the great centre of English academic life, a special college was established, which, from present appearances, is failing somewhat to answer the end designed. The great enemy which Newman dreaded has conquered, and

Oxford has been liberalized as no act of Parliament could have done it.

The old movement having collapsed, a new one was begun, or rather "the Rump" of the old one continued its existence under the leadership of Pusey, but it moved on a decidedly lower level, and aimed at things Newman cared nothing about. Tractarianism was a theological or doctrinal controversy. Ritualism was something in every way distinctly inferior, and therefore more likely to be popular.

Considered from the theological point of view, ritualism is but a kind of bastard Romanism, without the dignity, splendor, and power of the old church. It is but a feeble imitation of a great reality which exists side by side with it, and with which it is only necessary to compare it in order to recognize its ineffectiveness. "Depend upon it," writes Newman, "the strength of any party lies in being true to its theory. Consistency is the life of a movement." The theory which he had taken up involved steps which he eventually saw and did not hesitate to take, but the position of the Ritualistic party in the Church of England has been that of an imperfect logical development, and stamped deep across the whole face of the movement is the impress of Newman's methods and habits of thought. Any one who has ever read Tract No. 90 will recognize this fact. That was an attempt, and a desperate one, to justify by sophistry, evasion, and the dexterous use of words, a position which was totally alien to the whole intellectual character of the church, the temper of the age, and utterly opposed to the Protestant spirit of the English people. The fierce doctrinal controversies which were waged during the early days of the movement, to a large extent ceased, and the party developed tendencies which, though latent in it, had found no place in the eager thought and keen spiritual life of Newman and his friends. As a recent German critic says, in speaking of the loss of Newman: "The party itself survived the heavy blow, but has subsequently shunned cautiously the slippery region of dogmatics, and devoted itself with the greater zeal to the elaboration of a ritual as nearly like that of the Catholics as possible."¹ Newman himself cared nothing for ritual, and seems never to have devoted any attention to the subject. "At his own parish church of St. Mary's, Oxford, was retained the custom, said to be from Puritan times, of handing the several elements to the communicants at their places down the long chancel, the desks of which, covered

¹ Otto Pfeleiderer, *Development of Theology*, p. 362.

with white linen for the occasion, looked much like tables.”¹ With the departure of Newman, however, a great change took place; forms and ceremonies, rites and customs, habits and usages of the mediæval church were revived by these new ecclesiastics and made the most prominent and emphatic facts of the Christian life. Religion became outward and external, expressing itself in a most elaborate and intricate symbolism. Salvation was based upon the objective efficacy of the sacraments, and ritual became a synonym for worship.

“Believe in the Pope,” said Dr. Arnold, “I should as soon believe in Jupiter.”² Things as unbelievable as Jupiter and the Pope were now offered to sober, thoughtful men to believe. The whole mediæval theory of life was lifted up, and declared to be the great reality for which men were sighing. The magical view of the sacraments, the sacerdotal character of the Christian ministry, masses, penance, absolution, and all the morbid mechanical inventions of a stifling religious age, and which perish in the free and open air of intelligent Protestantism, were affirmed with a positiveness that censured doubt as unbelief, and refused to tolerate discussion. The whole theory is unnatural, artificial, and antiquated. It has, however, taken hold of a certain class of minds, and has had power enough to mould and stamp them in the image of itself, and has thus produced a type of clergymen whose individuality is as little apparent as that of any Jesuit.

When we study the causes of the growth of the Ritualistic party, including its predecessor the Tractarian movement, we discover that their apparent strength was in reality in certain weaknesses which belonged to them in common with the English Church life of the day. The movement began in an age that was unprepared for it, and incapable of critically weighing its character and pretensions. It was an ecclesiastical revival, pure and simple. It attempted to restore a past age of the church, and consequently was historical. In the year 1833 there were very few men in England who had any but vague ideas of the early church, and fewer still who had any critical knowledge of it. The men who inaugurated the movement held to the traditional view of the early church, and had an apparent advantage over their adversaries in the multitude of authorities with which they reinforced their position. The words of the Fathers were abundantly quoted, but the opinions of the Fathers were not called in ques-

¹ Mozley's *Reminiscences*, vol. i. p. 346.

² *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, third series, p. 93.

tion, and the influences which moulded and shaped the intellectual expression of their faith were never examined. Their unquestioned authority was assumed on all points, and the very readiness with which this was accepted paved the way for the development in thought which ultimately took place; for it was soon discovered that all the later expressions of the Latin faith had their anticipations at least in the utterances and opinions of the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries. It is true, in the beginning they adopted the principle which had been the established rule of the High Church party, to attack all developments in the church later than the great conciliar period; but a slight respect for logic and a different approach to the subject made this impossible after a time, and opened the way in the most natural manner for that mediævalism which now delights in the name Catholic. Its weakness has been in the absence of a genuine historic feeling which sooner or later makes itself known. The theology of the party is borrowed, and this is its boast, not recognizing the truth written on every page of church history, stamped broadly on the face of the Greek Church to-day, that theology must have the closest and most intimate relations with the age in which it exists, or it is but a lifeless mechanical theory, a bare antiquity, a relic of a more vital and vigorous period.

As a natural consequence, the learning of the party has been too often a dry, soulless erudition or a controversial pedantry. One who knew the whole history thoroughly, and participated in the most exciting events, has well described the learning as that "of the lawyer who searches for precedent, not that of the historian who resuscitates the whole spirit and force of a buried age."¹

Clad in such armor as this, Newman and his friends advanced against their foe, but such weapons were ill-adapted to meet the fierce activity and robust intelligence of our best modern life, and their defeat was followed by Newman's retirement from all close contact with the great stream of living thought and energy which characterizes our modern Christianity.

With the ready adoption of the Nicene and mediæval theology came for the first time clearly into view the vital weakness of some of the views prevalent in those periods, and the enormous advances made so gradually and silently that they have hardly even now been fully recognized.

Protestant scholarship has produced a profound change, not only in the knowledge of the Bible, but in the methods of inter-

¹ *Essays by Mark Pattison*, vol. ii. p. 287.

pretation and the conception of the means necessary to its understanding. No better illustration can be found than the statement of one of the most active and influential of Newman's lieutenants. Dr. Arnold, in a volume of sermons, in speaking of the true method for the interpretation of Scripture, said: "We maintain the sufficiency of private judgment in interpreting the Scriptures in no other sense than that in which every sane man maintains its sufficiency in interpreting Thucydides and Aristotle. . . . And we contend that, as by this process we discover for the most part the true meaning of Thucydides and Aristotle with undoubted certainty, so we may also discover, not indeed in any particular part or passage, but generally, the true meaning of the Holy Scriptures, with no less certainty." To which Mr. Ward thus replies: "We (Tractarians) maintain that the true sense of Scripture is handed down from age to age by tradition, and that the witnesses to it profess no more than to deliver what they have received; also that private individuals depend more or less upon the word of those more holy than themselves, who assure us that they go on continually to find greater accordance between the written and the unwritten Word. . . . But what does Dr. Arnold and those who think with him in this matter substitute? He attacks the prophetic office of the church as founded by the apostles, and gives us as our prophets, grammarians and philologists.

"Humble believers are to look for Christian truth from the lips, not of those who are better Christians, but better critics; not of those who have more experience in holy living, but in manuscripts and Greek constructions; not of those who succeed the apostles, but of those who succeed Porson and Hermann."¹

This seems very clever, but it is obvious that Mr. Ward knows nothing about history, and less about exegesis; otherwise he would hardly, with the many striking gifts which he possessed, have fallen into such a hopeless confusion of ideas. Mr. Ward would scarcely deny that Porson and Hermann, Bentley or Tischendorf, were better able to tell us what is the exact meaning of the Greek Testament than the most pious washerwoman or the most devout undergraduate. He would probably also admit that Origen or Jerome were better able to understand and interpret the Gospel of St. John than an Egyptian monk or a Syrian nun.

This is all that is required to destroy his whole theory; for if you admit the personal equation in the slightest degree, you break the rigidity and force of such a line of reasoning.

¹ *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, pp. 89, 90.

Newman, with a far wider knowledge of theological thought, accepts the traditional interpretations, not on the ground of their piety, or even we may say on the authority of tradition, but because these interpretations were the result of a method which was bound up with the whole history of the early church, and had been authorized by the universal acceptance of the Catholic Fathers. The church recognized this method and stamped it with its approval.

In that very singular book written just before his joining the Church of Rome, Newman says: "It may be almost laid down as an historical fact, that the mystical interpretation and orthodoxy will stand or fall together."¹ As he meant the theology of the Latin Church by the term orthodoxy, he was undoubtedly right. He had a long list of authorities for his claim for the mystical method as being the correct one, — Clement and Origen among the very earliest and most important, and the power of Origen's great name undoubtedly did much to fasten this theory upon the church; but he received the theory from the Gnostics. He says again: "If additional evidence be wanted of the connection of heterodoxy and Biblical criticism in that age, it is found in the fact that, not long after their contemporaneous appearance in Syria, they are found combined in the person of 'Theodore of Heraclea.'"²

Marcion we know was a bitter foe to the allegorical method of interpretation, and the whole Antiochian school of exegesis was committed to the grammatical theory. The inference from these facts, Newman would say, was perfectly obvious. Such an attitude is intelligible at least; whether it is reasonable is a matter which each person must decide for himself. One fact stands out beyond question, and that is, the Catholic theology is bound up with the allegorical theory, and the allegorical theory has been rejected by the whole army of intelligent students of the Bible. Moreover, with it goes logically that puerile and childish notion which assumes that a fragmentary passage of Scripture can furnish ground and proof for a doctrinal position which a deeper knowledge of science and history makes intolerable.

In a sketch so incomplete as this, only a few salient points can be touched upon, but these in reality decide the whole controversy. In addition to the unsatisfactory historical and exegetical views of the Tractarians, there were theological difficulties of the pro-

¹ *Essay on Development*, p. 153.

² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

foundest importance which they did not see or understand. They entirely misunderstood the deep theological significance of the Reformation. It is popularly regarded as a revolt against papal supremacy and scholastic theology, and there is a certain superficial justification for such a view ; but had this been all, the revolt would not have been a revolution, as it really was. The Reformation has a theological interest, aside from its ecclesiastical aspect, that marks it as one of the great eras in human history and Christian thought.

At the root of the whole movement of the sixteenth century is the assertion of a new principle of life that gives it the vitality and endurance which it possessed. It is the principle of Faith. The Reformation did not start from any previous dogmatic proposition, nor was it the expansion of any existing theological ideas, but rather the development of a new form of Christian consciousness, and called forth a new principle of the spiritual life.¹ Its historical antecedents, indeed, suggest it, but the fullness of its expression depended upon the depth and clearness with which it was felt in the first instance by one man. Christianity with Luther was neither a morality nor a cult, but a religion, a spiritual relation, issuing and expressing itself in a free, divine life. He had a deep and changeless reliance upon God, because he felt that God was a being whom he could trust absolutely and forever. God was present to his soul as the source of all its activity and life, the fountain of all righteousness and holiness, and with this deep sense of his relations to God he gave himself in humble self-abnegation into his hands. God revealed in Jesus Christ appealed to the profoundest depths of his nature, and he responded with the complete dedication and consecration of his life to Him.

Self-surrender to God is the supreme act of the life, if that may be called an act which consists primarily in submitting the life to the direct action of the divine nature, and asserting that the only life and strength in the soul is that which has been bestowed upon it. A conviction so profound and solemn as this must stir the deepest and most powerful emotions, and produce the most radical effects. A man then sees that he is an object of the communion and fellowship of God, moulded by his will, filled by his Spirit, living in and breathing a divine atmosphere. A son of God in truth he becomes if he but accept the offer given him by God through Christ. His faith is not a mere assent to a doc-

¹ Baur's *Vorlesungen über die Christliche Dogmengeschichte*, Dritte Band, S. 2.

trinal proposition, but a vital act involving the most awful consequences. As has been well said of Luther, "He changed the religious and moral ideal of life as none had done since the apostolic age."¹

His attitude towards all earthly or human institutions, no matter what their claims or character, was controlled and influenced by the divine sense of freedom, the freedom of the Christian man, the liberty of the sons of God. The charge of Antinomianism was brought against the Reformation principle, but it might and could be just as readily brought against St. Paul's principle of faith. We know, indeed, that it was, and the parallel is almost complete. The Reformers claimed to be returning to St. Paul, but whether they succeeded in doing so or not is not a matter which can be decided by their Romish opponents, for they neither understood them nor their principle. In opposition to this radical, far-reaching conception of faith, that of the Latin Church seems meagre and thin. Although the Tridentine synod says, emphatically, "Faith is the *initium, fundamentum, radix omnis justificationis*," yet the peculiarity of the Catholic conception of faith consists in this, that it is understood in reality to mean simply knowledge. As Bellarmine expressly says: "*Catholici fidem in intellectu sedem habere volunt*." Faith is only the Christian faith everywhere, not the special faith of the individual Christian whose object is the love of God revealed in Jesus Christ.²

The Protestant position leads undoubtedly to what has generally been called mysticism, and we know that mysticism has always been bitterly opposed by the Roman Church.

The position of the Reformers was grounded on the New Testament, that of the Romanists upon history. The dogmatic conception of faith is one that originated early in the history of the church, but represents an entirely different mode of thought and apprehension of Christianity than that which existed in the apostolic age.

The primitive personal idea of faith disappeared to make room for the acceptance of a certain series of speculations or propositions, and the position thus usurped has been maintained to the present day.³ Such a mode of conceiving the truth practically

¹ Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, Band iii. S. 707, 708.

² Baur's *Vorlesungen über die Christliche Dogmengeschichte*, Band iii. S. 201.

³ E. Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*, p. 310.

excludes all probability of divine guidance or communication with the individual as such; the truth has been given, and all that is exacted of him is obedience, and an obedience unqualified by doubt. The full development of the dogmatic theory of faith, which was the foundation of the High Church party as well as of the Tractarians, Newman rapidly saw had but one inevitable result. However painful, as a personal matter, the taking of the final step might be, it was but the development of the thought which had always been with him. Dogmatism and Protestantism are inconsistent, and a real union between them is inconceivable. The principle of Protestantism is the foundation of the noblest and fullest life of our times, and against it the attacks have been feeble, and are growing feebler every day.

A brief summary will close this paper. The chief, and we may say the only, achievements of the Ecclesiastical movement have been in the region of church music, architecture, and liturgies. To the deeper thought of the age it has made no contributions. Its philosophy of history has been Chinese in its retrograde and reactionary character. Its theory and treatment of the Bible have been mediæval and patristic in their spirit and methods. In theology it has been incapable of understanding the most profound and radical change that has come over the human spirit since the gospel first spread its light over a bewildered and hopeless world. To say this is to say everything. Let us see what its exact historical position has been in this century. This last hundred years, so fast drawing to a close, has been one of mediæval revivals. It began with *Ivanhoe*, was continued in art and architecture, and culminated in the celibate orders of the English Church. Scott gave the literary impulse which developed in the Pre-Raphaelitism of the middle of the century, and finds its final expression in the Bishop of Lincoln. The mass was once a word of offense to English ears, but now not only the word but the thing has returned, and we have, in addition, incense, candles, prayers for the dead, confession, absolution, Mariolatry, martyrology, and all the ecclesiastical machinery and theological theories of the thirteenth century, minus only the papacy. These are now all regarded as necessary elements of a perfervid but not too intelligent devotion. Terms once peculiar only to monkish ears are now the entire stock in trade of many a young seminarian.

Quite a number of religious orders, both for men and women, have sprung up in England and America since 1840, but they do

not seem to flourish, and it is always well to remember that the greatest foe the Roman Church ever had belonged to one of the mendicant orders. It is a profound remark of one of the most extraordinary men of modern times that great ideas never retain their vitality and power for more than three centuries. It may be that the ruling ideas of Protestantism have lost their force, and that a transformation is about to pass over the religious world, but that the change will result in what our so-called Catholics expect, no man who has read history will believe. There are abundant signs that the contest the ecclesiastical party undertook has been too great for it. It called forth enemies which it knew not of, and went forth to a conflict which it could not wage successfully with the weapons with which it was armed. The keen sword of criticism is wielded by no weak or reluctant hands, and is slowly but steadily cutting away the strength of this strange growth.

If for a time the religious world should roll back into those much-loved "ages of faith," with all their morbid results, some one will surely be found to clear the vision and correct the judgment, if need be, even by a modern edition of the once famous "*Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*."

Stewart Means.

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

IS CHRIST HIMSELF THE SUFFICIENT CREED OF CHRISTIANITY?

A SENTENTIOUS volume bearing the sententious title, "Christ Himself," has just been published by the Rev. Alexander McKenzie, D. D., of Cambridge.

The book may be described as a presentation of the doctrine of Christ, including both his nature and his work, in the form of a personal portraiture.

The topics of the successive chapters are: —

Christ and the Father; Christ and the Jews; Christ and the Romans; Christ and the Cross; Christ and the Resurrection; Christ and the Scriptures; Christ and the Redemption; Christ and the Christian; Christ and the Holy Ghost.

Such a discussion involves nearly every doctrine of the evangelical system. These doctrines, however, are not stated in an

abstract or generalized form. They appear as living facts. From the nature of the case, this characterization is more manifestly applicable to the earlier chapters, which deal with historical occurrences, than to the later, which treat of spiritual relations. But even relations, though they are properly only the precepts of subjective thought, can be stated as personalities. They are here put before us with all the vividness of objective qualities. The relations of the Divine Man to his Father and to the Holy Spirit, and to the race of men, as well as to the abstract attributes of love and justice, the *fas* and the *jus* of moral law, are made as sharply concrete in this delineation of "Christ himself" as are the incidents at Jacob's well and in Pilate's court. The book is a painting rather than a treatise.

When it is added that not an intricate sentence, if even a superfluous word, can be found from the beginning to the end, the value of the volume as a model of popular and pulpit style is evident. Its homiletical value is, however, specially indicated by the thorough doctrinal analysis that lies hidden beneath its realism. This element in the author's power, both as a writer and an orator, deserves notice. Good drawing is the essential condition of successful painting. Scientific elocution is always the basis of eloquent speech. Men may know nothing of the science, and may even scoff at it. But they will feel its effects, and respond to its power. The expert, moreover, will discover the hiding of this power. The scientific critic will readily trace the exact anatomical knowledge of Michael Angelo or of Rembrandt in forms of beauty which, to an æsthetic critic, are simply miracles of a mystical and seemingly almost superhuman genius. The trained theologian will note in these successive chapters the finest distinctions established in the Nicene and Socinian discussions made with the skill of an easy familiarity; while the expert in exegesis will detect the various alternatives in interpretation so put as to determine assent or rejection "by reason of the reason that is in them." Meanwhile the unprofessional reader cannot fail to be impressed by the "sweet reasonableness" of the argument, and the silvery distinctness of the style, as his gondola glides from one quiet waterway of thought to another.

The book will be read with a certain special attention growing out of the present theological unrest. It is a matter of interest just now to know what a trustee of Andover Seminary, who is a *quasi* defendant in a heresy case on trial before the Supreme Court, and who is also the secretary of the Harvard University Corpora-

tion, is disposed to say, in a published book, for example, as to the triunity of the Godhead, the dual nature of Christ, the objects and necessity of the Atonement; the content of the repentance and faith attached to it as the conditions of its personal efficacy; the authority of the Fourth Gospel and of the Epistle to the Hebrews; the continuity of divine revelation in the Old and New Testaments; the canonical status and inspired authority of a book of apostolical origin, as well as the historical value, in determining such origin, of the decisions of the apostolical churches, to whom it was given, as is stated of the church in Ephesus, to "try them which say they are apostles and are not, and to find them liars."

As these and kindred theological touchstones are applied to this Christ-book, the most orthodox reader can hardly fail to be satisfied with the mark left upon the successive chapters. The chief interest of the volume is, however, rhetorical rather than theological. The question of pressing importance to every preacher of the gospel in our day is the question placed at the head of this article: Can the living personal Christ be so presented to men that they shall see in the picture the creed of Christianity, and if so, upon what conditions? What must be the manner and method of the presentation, and what must be the previous training of the preacher himself?

The general answer which is furnished to these inquiries by this undeniably successful presentation of "Christ himself" is, as already intimated, that the scientific study of the doctrine of Christ must precede the attempt to embody that doctrine in the person of Christ. The technique of every art must be mastered before the art itself can be acquired. Preaching is an art of which theology is the technique.

This general answer may be made specific in several particulars. Two of these are prominent alike in importance and in the attention given them in this book. One is, that the theological study of Christ must include the entire revelation concerning Him, omitting nothing and underestimating nothing simply because it may seem to us strange or even incredible. The other is, that the study shall include nothing not contained in the revelation, nothing which is added simply as a conjectural gloss, or to furnish a philosophical nexus, or to serve as the logical norm of some preconceived system of theology.

The one is illustrated in our author's treatment of the dual nature of Christ; the other in his presentation of the Redemption. Both are forms of that strait and strict loyalty to evidence which

distinguishes true science from its counterfeit in every department. The method of exclusion characterizes a rigid and uncandid skepticism everywhere, and "reckless rejection" is the special complaint entered by theology against criticism. The method of inclusion characterizes dogmatism and speculation everywhere, and a "dogmatic bias" is the special complaint entered by criticism against theology. If Dr. McKenzie has avoided both extremes, his book will have a value, as a model of the scientific method, only secondary to its value as a model in Christian thinking.

In his treatment of the union of the divine and human natures in Christ, though the theological formula of the Trinitarian argument — "names, attributes, works, and worship" — nowhere appears, *the man* Christ Jesus is so pictured that the full force of each of those forms of proof presses upon the candid reader till he comes unconsciously into sympathy with the author's words, "While we look at this truly human life, we are aware of a Presence that is more than human" (p. 16). The paragraph on page 21 conveys the same thought, and gives at the same time an example of the author's method and style in the whole discussion :

"I have called attention to the true human nature and life of our Lord, and again to the nature and the life which are higher. Both are apparent, — the human and the divine. The latter is the more prominent. I think that the former is not found by itself. The divine is always shining through. There is a constant transfiguration. I once thought that I could separate the life into its two parts. I can never forget the surprise with which I discovered that this could not be done. I fancied that I could divide a sheet of paper into three columns in which I could place the human, the divine, and the union of the two. The third column was readily filled, and the second, but for the first I found nothing. I saw Jesus asleep in a fisher's boat, with his head resting upon the steersman's leather cushion. This was the man. But the narrative was not finished, and could not be interrupted. To break it in pieces, reserving one part or both, would destroy it. It would be like Solomon's experiment, which might determine the true mother, but would be fatal to the child. It was only fair and wise to read to the end. From his sleep Jesus awoke; and he rebuked the wind, and said unto the sea, 'Peace, be still.' The seamen feared exceedingly, and said one to another, 'Who is this, that even the winds and the sea obey him?'"

Plainly this loyalty to positive revelation, however minute, however baffling and seemingly contradictory, that revelation may be, is essential to a portraiture that can be trusted to supersede a

creed. A portrait-painter who is more than a mere copyist will catch every changing expression and enter into every contradictory mood of his subject, and will produce upon the canvas a consistent and harmonious ideal. It is a very commonplace art which copies only a single phase of expression. So it is a very small style of theology that accepts all the texts which present Christ as a man, and declines all that present him as God; that reads with open-eyed eagerness the passage, "Of that day and hour knoweth no man, not even the Son, but the Father only," and sees only through a glass darkly the words, "He needed not that any should testify of man, for He knew what was in man."

The same may be said of the doctrine of moral agency, — the anthropology of theology. An indolent or a preoccupied student finds it easy to construct a system of theology, either on the pre-supposition that man is a machine, or that he is an autocrat. It is then only necessary to make the *easy* synonymous with the *rational*, and the tyro is a theologian at once. But if the student is to frame a conception of moral personality that shall contain at once the elements of certainty and freedom, dependence and responsibility, he must abandon both money-making and love-making till he has wooed and won the coy metaphysic of freewill, and can hold it by a form of sound words to be a possession for life. Then, and not till then, will he be prepared to be a preacher to men, and to carry into his pulpit both a mouth and a wisdom which all his adversaries shall not be able to gainsay or to resist.

Our analysis requires the notice of another and a complementary element of Dr. McKenzie's popular power. It is his sturdy refusal to pass the line of evidence into the region of the unknown and the unknowable.

There is a story of the Rev. Dr. Emmons, who, when trying to convince a pragmatic old lady in his congregation as to some hard doctrine, said, "Now, madam, let us suppose" — But "madam" was prepared for that favorite logical stratagem of her minister, and met him promptly with the interjection, "No, Doctor, I won't suppose!" "Yes, madam, but supposing" — "I tell you, Doctor, I won't supposen! I won't supposen nothing!" And so the thrust and parry were kept up till, as the story has it, the great theologian retired discomfited.

This mother in Israel had probably somewhat hazy ideas as to the scientific value and rights of hypothesis. She was on her defense, and instinctively picked up the first club that came to her hand. But her unintelligent shrewdness makes a really agreeable

contrast to the follies of debate and dogmatism that crowd almost every page of philosophical and theological history. The same substitution of suppositions for facts is also the weakness of natural science, in which it often becomes grotesque from the evident unconsciousness that the broad relations between genera, in things as truly as in thought, cannot be successfully studied, like individual attributes, with the microscope and micrometer, either in the department of observation or of consciousness. If, however, a scientific theologian, who may have become somewhat appalled by the wide prevalence of this logical "heart-failure," will turn to our author's chapter entitled "Christ and the Redemption," — that most hypothesized of all theological dogmas, — he will be greeted with the refreshing statement that *Christ propounded no comprehensive doctrine of Redemption*. This statement may be somewhat expanded by saying that Christ has revealed some facts *about* Redemption which can be combined into a doctrinal formula, like the Apostles' Creed, and that such a statement, though partial, will contain certain necessary implications, and indicate certain necessary exclusions. These revealed facts, with their involved adjuncts, both positive and negative, may be woven, by a rigidly inductive process, into an elaborate creed, like the Athanasian, which shall be exhaustive of all we know, and exclusive of all we do not know. But it will not be the doctrine of the Redemption, but only of that which has been revealed *as to* the Redemption.

Thus, in stating some of the external reasons which made our Lord's sufferings and death necessary, our author is careful to add that *the* reason, in its completeness, is far out of our sight in the depths of Infinite Wisdom and Love. This is a scientific generalization, because it expresses exactly what we know, and no more, of the totality of the reasons which brought the Son of God from the bosom of the Father. "*The necessity for the Redemption is to be found in the divine nature,*" is the wise generalization in which our author leaves this central mystery of the divine government.

But the objective *occasion* of this subjective necessity in the heart of God is, in part at least, traceable. "Jesus does say," remarks our author, "that He gave his life a 'ransom for many.'" It appears, then, that the many are, in some important sense, in need of a ransom, that is, are in captivity. Here we have made known one of the occasions or objective reasons for the Atonement, the subjective reason — *the* reason — still being that it was a necessity of Christ's nature "to bring liberty to the captives."

In like manner, other occasions or reasons are given or implied in the Scriptures, but without any intimation that all even of the objective reasons are given, or even that those which are given can be fully comprehended by a finite mind. "Which things the angels desire to look into."

On page 137, a very forcible answer is given to the question, "Why should not God have left the disobedient world to itself?" The old inquiry, Why was not this captivity to evil removed by sheer Omnipotence, or Why did Omnipotence suffer it to occur? is not entirely passed, though the discussion of the nature and conditions of moral agency, in which the answer is to be found, is not entered upon.

Assuming that, for *some* reason, even Omnipotence was unequal to the work of preventing or removing man's bondage to sin, and that suffering alone could bring even partial relief, the question is again met, Why should the *Son of God* take upon himself this necessary suffering? The answer again recurs, It was a necessity of his own nature; it was a necessity of *love*. "Lo! I come: I delight to do thy will, O God."

In answer to the remaining question, Why should this redemptive suffering take on the *punitive* form? the same solution is offered: It was a necessity of the divine nature, a prompting of love, not now in the form of pity, but in the form of *holiness*. "*Thus* it behooved Christ to suffer." The suffering endured must be in the form of a *sacrifice for sin*. It must be a propitiation, not of hostile man, as the earlier Bushnell theory taught, but of God *in his holiness*.

The necessity for the Atonement is therefore in these two necessities of the divine nature, which are really one, love and holiness. The Lord passes by us, in the consummation of the work of redemption on Calvary, as he does in its inception on Sinai: "The Lord God, merciful and gracious, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin, *and that will by no means clear the guilty*." The fragmentary God of the Universalist, and the equally fragmentary God of the hyper-Calvinist, are united, and the moral sense of men will accept the union and respond, "This alone is the true God and eternal life." Our author says (page 39):—

"Why does not God save us without a Saviour and redeem us without a Redeemer? Why need the Son of God give his life to ransom us? The answer is not difficult. It is like the answer to all similar inquiries. Redemption in the Son is the expression of his own nature and char-

acter. It is because he is God that he does not save without a Saviour, even as because he is God he does save through a Saviour. He is holy, the Holy One, and his holiness must be manifested in all which He does. The world is unholy, and holiness cannot regard it with approval, or make light of its guilt, or disown itself to save the guilty from the guilt which they have freely incurred and willfully retained. Holiness has expressed itself in its commandments, written in the law of God and in the heart of man. Holiness has expressed itself further in making pain and death the result of unrighteousness. In the mind of God, right and wrong are infinitely apart, and their results are infinitely apart. The Holy One looks with horror upon the evil which debases conscience, dishonors reason, brings discord into harmony and darkness into light, and separates man from the approval of God, and brings him under the censure of righteousness, and under the penalty which in the nature of things attends unrighteousness. We are not able to conceive the depth and intensity of the divine condemnation of evil. We shrink from naming the 'wrath of God;' but the phrase, as we use it, but feebly describes the attitude of holiness when it confronts guilt. When, therefore, the Holy One would save the guilty, He must have regard not only to his pity and love, but also to his holiness, which has already and always manifested itself in providing the pain which belongs with guilt."

As might be expected after such words, the relation of *punishment* to guilt is indicated by a firm stroke of color upon this portraiture of the living Christ: —

"Guilt cannot be transferred from one to another, but suffering can be borne by one for another. Pain and death must remain the attendant result of guilt; but these can be borne by the innocent that the guilty may not be compelled to endure them. We are not unfamiliar with sympathy and sacrifice, and our chief lament is that they accomplish so little. With God they could be divinely efficient. Incarnate, He could suffer for man, bearing the pain from which He would set man free. We cannot deny to Him that which we hold the highest privilege of affection. Bushnell spoke of 'my divine birthright, the luxury of sacrifice.' The words of Robertson are very strong, but the light of heaven is in them: 'The death of Christ was a representation of the life of God.' To me this is the profoundest of all truths, that the whole life of God is a sacrifice of self. God is love; love is sacrifice."

Why holiness or law, which is the formulation of holiness, could not be satisfied without penalty, is another question that our author wisely does not attempt to answer. Beyond a certain self-examination in which certain vindictive demands of our own moral nature are revealed, no adequate answer is within our reach. Roman law would answer readily; punishment is exemplary, it

would say, and the severer it is, the greater the restraint it generates. In other words, punishment is governmental; it is convenient to the police; it helps the civil magistrate to be a terror to evil-doers, and a praise to them that do well. The same provision for exemplary punishment, including the *lex talionis*, "an eye for an eye," appears everywhere in God's administration as the civil ruler of the Hebrews. Sometimes the Mosaic civil law was like a military code in the sharpness and promptness of its penalties. The thirteenth of Deuteronomy is highly suggestive at this point, especially as it was the mistake of transferring this statute from a civil to a spiritual kingship that was made the basis of the condemnation of Jesus. The purport of the enactment was, that if any one should question the supremacy and absolute autocracy of Jehovah as the tutelary deity of the nation, saying, "Let us go after other gods," though he wrought unimpeachable miracles in support of the claim, though the enticer be "thy brother, thine own mother's son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend which is as thine own soul, . . . thou shalt not consent or hearken unto him, neither shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare." The law seems to have been what we now term *lynch law*. The discoverer was not to wait for the magistrate or the judge: "Thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be *first* upon him to put him to death, and *afterwards* the hand of all the people."

Now, we may admit that these two codes, the Roman and the Jewish, are of the highest value in *civil* jurisprudence, without conceding that they are broad enough or deep enough to furnish precedents for the moral government of the universe. Every jurist acknowledges the value of Roman law in the police of modern society. But no greater mistake can be made than the use of its analogies in constructing a "governmental theory" of punishment and atonement for the Infinite Ruler, unless it be the transfer of the natural law of necessity to the spiritual world of free will. Yet both these calamities have come upon theology under the influence of Roman law. From the date of the supremacy, in the current theology of the church, of the Latin over the Greek Fathers; from the advent upon the field of Christian thought of Tertullian, who was a Roman lawyer, the son of a Roman centurion, and the graduate of a Roman camp, and of Augustine, who, aside from the influence of his mother, was educated, up to his mature manhood, in the ideas of Roman heathenism, both of whom saw in the human race simply an expansion of the Roman army,

obedient, and bound with the exactness of a machine to a supreme will, and, in the individual man, simply a Roman soldier, possibly only a Roman captive, enslaved to Satan as his antitype was to Cæsar, — from the date of that irruption of *military necessarianism* into the sphere of Greek individualism, Christian liberty and apostolical simplicity, which were the constituents of the earlier church thought, — from that date the Dark Ages of Christianity began. Out of that Roman militarism soon grew the Roman hierarchy and the Roman theology. The Reformation discarded the former while it cherished the latter. The church is still in the penumbra of that great eclipse. The shadow of semi-Augustinianism still darkens Christendom, as a few years since the smoke-cloud from an Asiatic volcano darkened the air of both hemispheres. Any view of God's government should be distrusted which has been photographed through this gloom.

We need to remind ourselves, also, that the Hebrew civil code, considered apart from the sacrificial ritual, furnishes no sufficient analogue from which we may reason as to the punishment and forgiveness of sin under the moral government of God. Indeed, the transfer of the Jewish civil law to the moral relations of men was the precise point of contention between our Lord and the rabbis, from the Sermon on the Mount to his final condemnation. That civil law undoubtedly contained, *in its measure*, the universal law of right, just as the Roman law recognized the *fas* as involved in the *jus* in every statute, just as the modern law of contracts contains, *quoad hoc*, the universal law of equity. Yet we should never be liable to confound a civil statute, requiring a debtor to return to his creditor as good a dollar as that he borrowed, with the Golden Rule; nor should we consider a Kansas mortgage fully expository of God's command, "My son, give me thine heart." We might as well claim that an opera-glass sufficiently reveals the organism of the starry heavens as to claim that any "governmental theory" of human sin and of divine forgiveness can be successfully constructed either out of our *à priori* conceptions, or out of Roman or Hebrew jurisprudence. Indeed, we may as well admit at once that, while we can "judge even of ourselves" what is the foundation principle of right, and can sometimes judge with absolute certainty that in a particular case it has been violated, we are not competent to judge of all the applications of that principle, in statute and in sanction, through the eternities, and over the universe of being.

There is a better way than that either of dogmatism or of

speculation. That way has been followed in this volume. It is, to abandon all specializing as to statute law and forensic justice, and to fall back at once upon the love and holiness of God. There, and not in any governmental exigency that forces God to punish sin lest He should lose his throne, or lest his hatred for it should not be adequately expressed, is the necessity for the penalty of sin, and for its forgiveness only through propitiatory suffering. It is the love of God which provides an atonement; it is the holiness of God that determines the kind of atonement.

The treatment of our author consists in rising above the field of controversy into a region where controversy ceases. It abandons the quest for what we do not know and cannot know, and seeks the sure possession of that we can know and do know. It virtually refuses to answer the curious question, "Are there few that be saved?" by the earnest exhortation, "Strive to enter in at the strait gate."

In fact these technical points, everywhere kept out of the sight of the reader, soon fade from his thought as he is borne by the discussion into the full glow of "the Light which lighteth every man which cometh into the world." The book is a lens through which the rays of the Sun of Righteousness are gathered and concentrated in a minute but vivid image. No loving disciple can read the chapters, "Christ and the Jews," "Christ and the Roman," "Christ and the Cross," without the deepest emotion. While the individual incidents are all familiar, the combination produces the effect of a new discovery. The author has responded to the longing expressed to Philip by the Greeks in the Temple, "Sir, we would see Jesus." With accurate fidelity, in faultless phrase, and from a glowing soul, he has given us a vision of "the beloved Son in whom God is well pleased." The transfiguration cannot fail to call out a repetition of the words, "It is good to be here."

John Putnam Gulliver.

ANDOVER, MASS.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE PULPIT IN A TIME OF
CRITICAL RESEARCH AND SOCIAL CONFUSION.¹

I CONGRATULATE you, gentlemen, upon your devotion, in this time of intellectual distraction, to the study of theology, and upon your consecration, in the midst of the present opportunities for material advancement, to the service of Christ in the church. Your presence here in increasing numbers, and the general growth of our theological schools in numbers and influence, are a rebuke to those who prophesy the mental and spiritual declension of the ministry.

The times in which the service of the church has proved most attractive to men have not been times of intellectual ease and safety. Certainly the call to the ministry has been most effective when it has come as a challenge, rather than as an invitation, or even as an appeal. At such times it has caught the ear of all who have been willing to think, to work, and, if need be, to suffer. I believe that the times upon which we have fallen — times of intense and peculiar intellectual and social strain upon the ministry — will prove no exception to this rule. I have no hesitancy in predicting that what have now come to be the less difficult, the less perplexing, if you will, the less hazardous intellectual and moral callings, will not long content the better minds amongst us. I anticipate an increase to the ministry, in quality and in numbers, in direct proportion to the seriousness of the problems which confront it.

Your interest, however, in the things for which religion pre-eminently stands to-day, is a part of the general interest, so general that it may be said to be the one interest in reserve among all thinking men. In a recent after-dinner speech by one of the judges of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, he quoted the remark of a friend, to the effect that, "after all, the only interesting thing is religion;" and then added, for himself: "I think it is true, if you take the word a little broadly, and include under it the passionate curiosity as well as the passionate awe which we feel in face of the mystery of the universe. This curiosity is the most human appetite we have." Now, if to this "most human appetite we have," which though latent in many is constant in all, you add the incitement of great disturbing questions, — questions of authority

¹ The Opening Address at Andover Theological Seminary, September 16, 1891.

and destiny and human welfare, — if you stimulate religion on the intellectual side by critical inquiry, and on the sympathetic side by contact with misery ; if you call upon Christianity as an historical religion to verify its history, and as a religion of humanity to accomplish the brotherhood of man ; if, I say, you increase and stimulate the common religious instinct, or “appetite,” by these extraordinary incitements and demands, you have brought about the exact state of religious thought and life which now exists. Without a doubt religion is to-day the most “interesting thing.”

And this being the fact, for which we ought to be profoundly grateful, we may pass directly to a much more serious matter, namely, the present authority of religion, as embodied in the religious teaching of our time. It is this subject which I now propose to consider, and for which I desire the aid of your careful thought.

Reducing the question to its lowest terms, I ask: *How are we to maintain the authority of the pulpit in a time like our own of critical research and of social confusion?*

Evidently the authority of the pulpit as the great distributing agency of Christian truth rests, and about equally, upon the certainty of the truth communicated and upon the certainty of its application. The uncertain truth, whether the uncertainty is in the truth itself (that is, in its sources), or in the personal apprehension of it, cannot be authoritative. And the certain truth, held in assured faith, cannot be authoritative or commanding if it misses its mark and is not really applied. Now at both these points, though at present, I think, chiefly at the latter, the authority of the pulpit has been reduced or impaired. Historical criticism is creating its own uncertainties in respect to the sources and methods of revealed truth. And the social confusion is becoming so great as to seriously disturb the aim of the pulpit, and throw a vast deal of truth afield which never finds men. Something of the old precision in the handling of truth seems to be lacking. Truth has not been carefully reorganized, and readjusted to the new social condition. Preachers are still individualizing, while the souls of men are bound up in institutions, in corporations, in unions, in the complicated machinery, industrial, political, and religious, of modern society.

The two causes which are now at work to weaken the immediate authority of the pulpit are so distinct as to require separate thought.

We will first ask for the true method of maintaining the authority of the pulpit pending the full results of historical criticism as applied to the Bible. I need not argue in this presence that criticism must and ought to go on, nor offer before you any plea for liberty. And it would seem as if it should go anywhere without saying that *Christian* scholars should be the last scholars to be forbidden to inquire into the sources and ground of faith. It would seem as if by common consent the church, which rejoices in the promise of the Spirit to be led by it into all truth, should stand, not simply for the defense of truth, but equally for its increase and enlargement. And it would seem to be beyond dispute that it were better for the church to owe the larger and freer truth, which in time it is always sure to accept, to its friends rather than to its enemies.

I will not pause to speak of the effect of trying to ignore or evade present issues, nor of the attempt to meet inquiry with dogmatism. Time deals very quickly, and none too gently, with all those who for any reason mistake the true attitude toward religious liberty and progress. Our inquiry at this point is direct and simple,—how are we to carry on the teaching function of the ministry steadily and confidently, without fear and without loss, under the critical investigations which involve to greater or less degree a reconstruction of popular opinion respecting the Scriptures?

A partial answer to the question is to be found in the opportunity which is now given to utilize those intermediate sources of authority which may have been neglected. This answer applies particularly to the pulpit of the most Protestant among the Protestant bodies, to those which have laid the largest stress upon the direct and immediate authority of the Bible. The providential value of the divisions in Protestantism appears chiefly in times of theological controversy. It is seldom that a theological controversy rages with equal intensity all along the line. While some parts of the church are profoundly agitated upon a given question, the other parts may be in comparative repose; the explanation of the fact being that the theological emphasis is not placed by all at the same point. The contention, of course, is strongest at the most emphatic point in the spiritual life of a denomination, at the point where it bears its peculiar testimony to the common faith, and where it makes its immediate appeal if the faith is supposed to be endangered. It is evident at a glance that the present critical controversy is most serious in the Presbyterian and Con-

gregational communions (including the Baptist), for in these the Scriptures have had the place of greatest evidential value. While the Scriptures occupy throughout Protestantism the place of final authority, they hold in these communions a comparatively solitary and isolated place, supported chiefly by the authority of reason. The Episcopal communion, on the other hand, finds its great supporting authority in the doctrine of the church; and the Methodist communion in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The Scriptures are not there put to the same use as with us, in argument or in evidence. The appeal is more easily and naturally taken to the Christian experience or the testimony of the church. It may prove to be greatly to our advantage, upon whom the stress of the critical controversy has fallen, if we are led by it to a deeper appreciation of these intermediate sources of authority. I can conceive of a vast increase of spiritual power to the ordinary Christian believer amongst us, to whom the appeal is made for the first time in downright earnest to his own experience, who is really challenged to find within himself the ground and reason of the hope that is in him. I have no fear that personal piety will shrink away and grow morbid and introspective under this test. I should expect rather a new confidence and courage born out of this revaluation of one's personal holdings in Christianity; and that the evidential worth of the process would extend beyond the believer himself, and make his life stand forth more conspicuously as an external argument for his faith. I therefore welcome every legitimate endeavor which is being made, like the admirable work of Professor Stearns in this direction, to recover and reestablish the evidence of the Christian experience.

But one may go further than this and urge the present utility of an evidence of which we have been much more suspicious — the testimony of the church. I grant the reason of the suspicion. But in our resistance to what we may believe to be false assumptions in behalf of the church, or of any given church, let us not deny at our cost any true and sufficient conception of it. If we cannot feel the security of a church which seems to us to hang by the brittle thread of tradition to a divine origin, if we cannot accept an authority communicated by outward and formal succession, let us not ignore or underestimate that glorious continuity of life which from the beginning until now has marked the power and progress of the indwelling Spirit. In fact, the less the insistence placed upon the claims of the church to authority, the readier the acknowledgment of such authority as inheres in

its very existence and growth. In the one case we must prove the authority; in the other the authority is self-revealing, and becomes the proof of that for which it stands. And the simpler and more spiritual the conception of the church, the more available its uses in the present emergency. I have nowhere seen this view presented with so much clearness and pertinence as by Dr. Dale in his address at the recent Congregational Council. I quote his words:—

“I should like to ask whether, in our relations to the controversies of our times, the Congregational idea of the church has exerted its proper and acknowledged influence? We believe that a church is a society of men, possessing the life of the actual Son of God, and having a direct access through Him in the power of the Spirit to the Father; of men knowing for themselves, at first hand, the reality and glory of the Christian redemption; of men to whom the truth of the Christian gospel is authenticated by a most certain experience, — the experience, not of the individual life merely, but of a society. Is this consistent with the agitation, the heat, the panic, created by the assaults of critics on the historic records of the Jewish and Christian revelations? We, of all men, should keep calm. These controversies leave untouched the strong guaranties of our faith. For us every church is a society of original and independent witnesses of the grace and power of Christ. For us the immediate manifestations of the eternal life which dwells in Christ are found, not merely in the words and deeds and sufferings recorded in the four Gospels, but in the company of the faithful. We know that Christ is alive from the dead, for He lives in them. The divine life in man, — this is a truth to which, in common with the Holy Catholic Church throughout the world, we bear our testimony.”

In advocating, as I now do, the recovery of the Christian experience and the testimony of the church as sources of authority of peculiar value at the present time, I interpose this caution: Let them be used sincerely, and according to their absolute and abiding worth, not as a temporary expedient, or because they offer a convenient retreat from the controversy now centring around the Scriptures. There can be no moral power in a theological position assumed by evasion of personal responsibility. That which has been secondary in one's mental and spiritual training cannot suddenly be made first simply because that which has been first is for the time in dispute. One is bound by the circumstance of his place in the kingdom of God, by the traditions of his faith, by

the exercises and discipline of his own soul, to take his part in the reëstablishment of whatever has been to him the primary source of authority. If that which has been held first proves upon sufficient investigation to have been misplaced, let him relegate it to its proper place, but let him not be guilty of fright and insincerity in the change.

I give, therefore, what seems to me to be a much more complete and consistent answer to the question before us when I say that we best recover authority to the pulpit in its Biblical teachings through the true understanding and intelligent use of historical criticism as applied to the Bible. Historical criticism, we are to remember, is not a thing in itself to be feared or loved. It is purely a scientific process applied to the Scriptures indiscriminately by friends and foes, or, if the subject-matter could be lifted out of controversy, to be applied without bias. The personal motives which may be foisted into the process are of very little account. The attitude of a critic or of a school of critics does not long affect the issue. We need to rid ourselves of these personal elements which so grievously vex the question, and, so far as the moral result is concerned, inquire solely what kind of a Bible historical criticism gives us, what kind of a Bible it has given us so far as its work has been practically accomplished. The question between the old and the new treatment of the Scriptures is primarily a question about the idea of Scripture. So that our chief concern with the results of criticism is not to reckon up the gains and losses occasioned by it at different points, but to estimate fairly the positive value of the conception of Scripture which it gives us.

We are in the habit of saying of the Reformation that it gave us an infallible Bible in place of an infallible church. Doubtless this was true as a secondary and controversial result. But if the Reformation had given us as its first and chief result an infallible Bible, it would never have delivered us from an infallible church. What it did give us as its great result was something infinitely more authoritative than infallibility, an open and living Bible, the Spirit of God brought by means of the truth in contact with the individual soul. The power of the Reformation did not consist in confronting one kind of infallibility with another, but in confronting infallibility with life. Infallibility may be and usually is the lowest form of authority; it is at best the negative, not the positive side of it. Apply the principle to the church and you see at once how it hampers and restricts its spiritual author-

ity, making it responsible for what may continually be called in question. It is strange that Protestantism, with the example of Romanism before it, should have allowed itself to be caught in the very same difficulty, and to have lodged authority in the least tenable position. It is still more strange that experience has not taught the Protestant churches to see that, though the Bible be allowed to be infallible, its real authority does not lie in its infallibility. Its authority lies, as at the beginning, as at the Reformation, as always, in the manifest presence of God in its pages; as God is therein revealed working through individuals and nations, making known his thoughts and desires and purposes, and finally declaring himself in sacrifice. The authority of the Scriptures conforms exactly to the sense of sacredness which, in varying degrees in different parts, they inspire. There is no other measure of it. The Bible is most authoritative just where it brings God nearest, when the voice within us instinctively cries out, "Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground."

Now, if we believe in the providence of the Reformation, can any one fail to see the providential function of historical criticism in compelling the Protestant churches to go back of infallibility into the deeper and more vital source of the authority of the Bible? Having repeated the mistake of Romanism in committing itself to the utterly insufficient principle of infallibility, could anything else have delivered Protestantism from this mistake, and brought it forth into the freedom and power of its birthright? The method may seem violent. The means may not always comport with the end. That has often been the case in Christian history. But the necessity was so great that it is difficult to see how anything less radical could have sufficed, and the results now reached in many parts are seen to be so positive and spiritual that we may no longer doubt the final gain to the authority of the Scriptures as a whole from historical criticism. Historical criticism has already given far more than it has taken away. It has put reality in place of infallibility in the chief seat of authority. Instead of a Bible communicated by verbal inspiration, of equal authority in all places, inerrant where mistakes would naturally, almost necessarily, have been made, it is giving us a Bible communicated naturally, through men who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost; who also believed and therefore spoke; who wrote of things they knew according to their knowledge, and of things transcending human knowledge according to

their quickened, purified, and enlarged apprehension of the mysteries of God; who bore faithful and true witness, according to the very diversity of their personal observation and experience, to the great facts and events through which revelation culminated, before their very eyes, in the life, passion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ; and who in a simple but grand unconsciousness left their work absolutely unencumbered by any unnatural claims, that so the outcome of Scripture as a revelation of God and of duty might become to the reasonable acceptance of the church an "infallible rule of faith and practice." Historical criticism has done away with the dilemma, terrible to many serious minds, — either the Bible word for word from cover to cover, or no Bible at all. It has given to honest and intelligent doubt the privilege of honest and intelligent faith. And it has given to faith itself, to untroubled believers, even though many may be unconscious of its source, a new enthusiasm. I think that it is not too much to say that historical criticism has reopened, reproduced, reanimated the Scriptures to the mind of the church. In asking its one determined question, What is historically true? its chief result has been, not the calling in question or disproving some things which had been assumed to be true, not the disturbance of dates and authorship, but the bringing forth into a greater reality and a more natural authority the contents of the Scriptures. Thus far, the unexpected and surprising effect has been the revivification of Biblical history. Having virtually gone through the New Testament, the final result is seen to be, not negative, but positive, and spiritually positive. For the first time since the traditions of his presence passed away, the church has been brought face to face with its Lord and Master as an historical person. This, of course, does not mean that the church until now has not known or believed in, or loved or worshiped, its Redeemer; but it does mean a change of conception on the part of the church from a theological to a historical person. In proof of this statement I need only remind you of the fact that the literary energy of the church is now being expended, not in formulating creeds about Christ, but in writing the life of Christ; and the significant fact about these lives is, that very few of them are apologetic. We have now reached, that is, the after and spiritual results of historical criticism. These lives are chiefly written in that eagerness of delight with which our generation rejoices in the recovered presence of the Christ of the Gospels.

And as historical criticism has moved back into the Old Tes-

tament we may fairly anticipate a like, though lesser result. For the principle is right, even when the method is for the time inconclusive. The principle is that a revelation, wrought out in and through history, must be understood and interpreted in the light of its historic origin and development. So that even if we are prepared to accept the working ground of one school of modern critics (I quote the words of Schürer), "that the stability of the Christian faith is not dependent on the question of the genuineness or the circumstances of the origin of the Biblical writings," for "it is certain that Christian faith existed long before the rise of the New Testament Scriptures, and therefore certain that the Christian faith is not faith in the Bible, but faith in the grace of God in Jesus Christ," — even if we are prepared to accept this premise, we must still admit that the authority of historically revealed truth cannot be separated from a right interpretation of its history. Spiritual inferences drawn from wrong data cannot be authoritative. No amount of spiritualizing can atone for the perversion or misapprehension of facts. And not only so, but the actual fact, whenever it is ascertained and measured, is always found to have more moral significance than the assumed fact. Hence the homiletic worth of the higher criticism of the Old Testament. Its worth is in direct proportion to the certainty with which it gives the preacher the facts, and events, and utterances, through which the truth of God first reached the conscience of Israel. These ascertained, the truth can be transferred and applied to the modern conscience. I am happy to be able to refer you, in illustration of the practical working of this principle, to the expository lectures of George Adam Smith upon the Book of Isaiah, lectures equally remarkable for their critical and spiritual authority. No preacher within the range of my knowledge has shown such power to discern the truth in its first application and uses, reading nothing into it which the event with which it was associated did not justify, and yet allowing for that natural expansion which makes up so true an element of prophecy. Here is his word on the Messianic prophecies of Isaiah: "It was enough for Old Testament believers if they found in Isaiah's prophecy of a Deliverer, as they did find, what satisfied their own religious needs, without convincing them to what volumes it should swell. But this does not mean that in using these Old Testament prophecies we as Christians should limit our enjoyment of them to the measure of the generation to whom they were addressed. To have known Christ *must* make the prediction of the Messiah different to a man. If we may use a rough

figure, the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament are tidal rivers. They not only run to their sea, which is Christ: they feel this reflex influence. It is not enough for a Christian to have followed the historical direction of the prophecies, or to have proved their connection with the New Testament as parts of one divine harmony. Forced back by the fullness of meaning to which he has found their courses open, he returns to find the savor of the New Testament upon them, and that where he descended narrow and tortuous channels, with all the difficulties of historical exploration, he is borne back on full tides of worship. To use the appropriate words of Isaiah, 'The Lord is with him there, a place of broad rivers and streams.'"

At present it can hardly be said that historical criticism reaches back of the age of the prophets for results of assured value to the preacher, but it is fast reconstructing that age, and giving to it that kind of reality which it has given to the age of Christ and the apostles. And though the way beyond may be beset with greater difficulties, and though the historical perspective may grow more uncertain, still I see no reason why the method, if thoroughly and carefully used, may not be followed as a trustworthy guide to the end.

Indeed, as I consider the capacity of historical criticism to recover the real authority of Scriptures, and to furnish the pulpit with a new wealth of historical material of high moral import, I cannot content myself with merely urging upon you that you qualify yourselves to make intelligent use of it. I find myself going back to the note of congratulation with which I began. I congratulate you upon the facilities which you have, above those who have gone before you in the ministry, for reëntering and reëxploring the riches of the Bible, that you may bring forth treasures new and old. And let no one think that his labors in this direction, as they may bear fruit in the pulpit, will be unappreciated. Above all, let no one deceive himself with the thought that there is no popular demand for the authority which such study may give him. The demand may come from unexpected sources. At an ecclesiastical council which I attended the last summer, called to ordain a recent graduate of this Seminary, after the candidate had made his statement, and the usual questions had been asked and answered, one delegate arose and said: "I should like to ask the candidate one more question before this examination closes. It is the question of a layman, of a farmer. I should like to know if this man knows Hebrew, for if he were to be my minister I should want to

be sure that, when he preached from the Old Testament, he knew what he was preaching about. I was glad to be able to relieve the modesty of the candidate by replying that he not only knew as much Hebrew as the Seminary required of every graduate, but that he had taken every chance to get all he could by electives. And you will allow me to moralize enough over this incident to advise you, at least those of you who are proposing to preach to farmers and from the Old Testament, "to do likewise."

I cannot leave the present part of my subject without dwelling for a moment upon the responsibility resting upon the incoming ministry of enlarging the popular faith respecting the Scriptures, of teaching the people how to read the Scriptures in the fuller light which is falling upon them. Under the training of the common definition that the Bible is the word of God, there can be no doubt that the majority have read the Bible chiefly in the light of a communication from God, rather than of a revelation of Him. This method has of course yielded most valuable results to Christian experience, even allowing for its tendency toward the excesses of literalism; but it has evidently had its limitations. For the Bible is more than so many commandments, and so many invitations, and so many promises, and so many warnings; and that something more which the Bible is, and which it gives, is the very thing which men want most when oppressed by the sense of the mystery of the universe, or, for that matter, by the sense of the mystery of their own lives. It is the true and sufficient conception of God, of God self-revealed in the Scriptures. When, therefore, historical criticism, without necessarily superseding the common definition, adds its own definition of the Bible, as the record which contains the revelation God has made of himself, it changes the direction of thought in the reading of the Scriptures, and puts the mind of the reader upon a new and even more reverent search after the truth which it unfolds. And the preacher who thus reads the Scriptures for himself will best teach by example this enlarged use of the Bible, and also make its teachings most impressive. "*Whom we preach*," says Paul. Here is the secret of Biblical preaching, not simply what we preach, but whom we preach. The message whatever it be from God is always less than the revelation it contains of Him; less for spiritual uses, for, as Paul goes on to say, "*Whom we preach*, warning every man and teaching every man in all wisdom; that we may present every man perfect in Christ Jesus."

I pass to the second part of our question, disconnected from that which we have considered by a sharp change of subject, but having a practical connection which we cannot ignore. You will recall the statement with which I began the discussion, that the authority of the pulpit rests about equally upon the certainty of the truth communicated, and upon the certainty of its application. Whatever seriously disturbs the application of truth must be taken into account in the estimate of its authority, quite as much as any disturbance at its sources. And evidently the present disturbance has to do with applied no less than with historical Christianity. We are forced, then, to go on and ask how we are to maintain the authority of the pulpit in a time like our own of social confusion. By the present social confusion I do not mean altogether the unrest and dissatisfaction occasioned by the extreme inequalities in social condition. I refer chiefly to the growing uncertainty in regard to a remedy. Men are busily crying out on every hand, "Lo here," "Lo there;" yet no one cry is recognized as authoritative. But meanwhile, it must be confessed, there is an increasing distrust of Christianity, or an increasing impatience with it, that it does not say the decisive word, or find the sufficient remedy. I think that we overestimate the present antagonism to Christianity. I think that we underestimate the present distrust of it as a practical force toward the social relief, and also that we underestimate the reasons for the popular distrust. We say to those who are struggling at the bottom of society, who make up the great social residuum, "Your only hope is in Christianity; all other remedies are a delusion." And they not unnaturally or unjustly reply, "That is what you have been saying for years, and here we are." The presumption that something can be done is certainly on the side of Christianity. It is strong enough to justify the assertion on our part that something can be done, and to have wakened the expectation on their part that something would be done. Under the most advanced forms of Christianity, intellectual, political, and religious freedom have been gained, and are to-day held in security. But it is under these same advanced forms of Christianity that the social unrest and confusion are the greatest. It is the Christianity of Germany, of England, of America, which is confronted with the social question. Of course it is infinitely to its credit that the question is not religious persecution, or political despotism, or intellectual bondage. Our Christianity has carried us through and by all these questions. Still the very progress

thus far made serves to intensify the feeling of impatience at the delay, the hesitancy, the indirection, of the applied Christianity of our time. And in the midst of this general feeling of distrust and impatience, and in so far as it can gain a hearing among those who cherish it, the pulpit is called upon to speak. Where, now, is its authority?

Here, again, I give a partial answer when I say that it may have the authority of a commanding sympathy. That, we are to remember, was the kind of authority with which Christianity began to assert its power over those who had made light of existing forms of religious authority. Here was the original distinction in the popular mind between Christ and the Pharisees. Here is the perpetual distinction in the popular mind between the Christian and the Pharisee. The Pharisee gives alms. This is no inconsiderable part of his religion. The Christian, if he has caught the secret of his Master, has learned to pay his *respect* to humanity; and at any cost. Respect is the price of influence. It is the respecting element in Christianity, more even than the pitying element, which compels the first acknowledgment of its authority, and which supports its after-claims. It may even support false claims. The Romish Church could never maintain its present dogmatic authority without that kind of religious equality upon which it insists, allowing no distinction between rich or poor, bond or free, white or black. The authority of sympathy is that authority which always attends the respect we show those who in circumstance and condition are below us. Sympathy, as I have intimated, is a very different quality from pity, or from charity in any of its conventionalized forms. It is the recognition of the human element which survives poverty and even degradation; it is the acknowledgment of the underlying equality between man and man beneath varying conditions; it is the appreciation of the endeavor and ambition to rise to higher levels; it is, above all, the willingness to make room for men as they rise, and to welcome them to the places they have earned. Pity ceases when the object of commiseration has been lifted a little out of the low estate. Charity follows a little way above in the ascending scale. Sympathy attends the man all the way up till he has reached the level of his manhood. Now the moral solvent of the present social situation is not pity, it is not charity in any of its common manifestations; it is sympathy. Analyze the situation, study society where the struggle is going on, and you will discover two clearly defined movements, the upward and the downward; one

class ascending, the other descending the social scale. On the one hand, the worn out, the demoralized, the degraded, falling steadily to the bottom. On the other hand, a certain vital element gradually emerging from the common mass, separating itself from base surroundings, organizing for self-protection and self-advancement, and finally able to stand with comparative security and lend a helping hand to those in the crude mass about it. A vivid illustration of the upward movement, just as in one instance it began to gain a slight momentum, was furnished by the dockers' strike in East London. Compare now the attitude of the church toward the upward and the downward movements, and you see at once that it has shown far more charity for the falling than sympathy with the rising class. The illustration to which I have just referred may seem to be in evidence to the contrary. It was in evidence to the contrary in very marked degree, and afforded thereby a remarkable example of the kind of authority which I am now advocating. The church rose in this crisis through its sympathy to the authority of a peacemaker. But the event was exceptional. It was the first instance in which the sympathy of the church was as conspicuous as its charity. The ordinary absence of sympathy on the part of the church with the efforts of workmen to better their condition explains in large degree their alienation from the church and want of respect for its authority. The average workingman believes that what he has thus far gained he has gained alone and unaided, and naturally asks what more he can do for the future than to perfect and enlarge his own organization. Hence he gives his money, his time, and his loyalty to his association or brotherhood, and looks on with indifference or amusement while the religious world discusses the reasons why men like himself do not fill the church.

How is this state of things to be brought to an end? Who is to make the advance toward a settlement? Who needs most a change of heart in this matter, the average churchman or the average workingman? The question, in whatever form you put it, makes its own answer. Sympathy is the function of the Christian church; much more difficult to exercise, I grant, than charity, and a severer test of its Christianity, but still its peculiar and appropriate function. And in the exercise of this function I believe that the time has come for some clear and sufficient recognition by the Christian church of the labor movement; not the indorsement of all its methods, not the furtherance of all its needs, but the honorable recognition of the principle which it

represents, and of the human beings whom it represents. The history of the labor movement, like that of every upward movement, has been in part a record of violence, of envyings and jealousies, of petty oppressions and tyrannies; it has been also a record of resolute purpose, of generous sacrifice, of unaffected heroism. I speak the passing word for the labor reformer, the labor agitator. Like his political prototype, he may be a demagogue, he may be a hero. Let us learn to discriminate in the one case as in the other; to measure the difference between the sandlots orator of San Francisco and the leader of the East London strike. Let us admit the rights of agitation and of organization. Gifts of speech, executive force, the power to waken enthusiasm or to create stability, belong of right to the labor movement as much as to any movement which has gone before. And whenever they are rightly used they are to be honored. Trades-unionism, for example, has been pronounced by a recent authority as "one of the conditions of business, one of the facts of industrial society of to-day." But trades-unionism represents the long and bitter struggle of labor to gain an acknowledged place in the industrial system; and I submit that the cause for which this struggle has been carried on has always been worthy of the sympathy of the church; and further, that, if this sympathy had been more freely extended, there would have been less occasion for criticising the method of the struggle.

In speaking, as I have done at this point, of the church rather than of the ministry, I have spoken advisedly. For I believe that the ministry has outrun the church in its sympathy, and that it is still liable to so far outrun the church as to make its sympathy very largely personal, and not representative and authoritative. I add, therefore, as a further answer to the part of the question now before us, that the pulpit will gain authority in the present social confusion according to its ability to instruct and lead out the church in its new social duties. At frequently recurring periods in the history of Christianity the church has been suddenly confronted with other than purely spiritual duties. Its spiritual work in the individual soul has gone on in constant power, but its intellectual and moral energies have been called forth and concentrated upon specific outward ends. Such was the period of the Renaissance, when Christianity awoke from the unreality of mediævalism to meet the demands of the "New Learning." Such was the epoch of Puritanism, when Christianity became political, and addressed itself to statecraft and government in the interest of

liberty. Such was the period out of which we have not as yet emerged, the period consequent upon the opening of the world, when Christianity became distinctly and courageously missionary and set itself to the task of saving the nations. And now, while the missionary duty is still unsatisfied, the church is confronted by another duty, not altogether new in the separate and diversified elements which it represents, but new in the fact that these have suddenly become crystallized in one imperative duty which has assumed the name of social Christianity.

Precisely what does this mean? What is the present social need which calls for this fresh adjustment of Christian forces? The new work of Christianity, at least amongst us, is an organic work in society, occasioned by the shortcomings, the failures, the unhealthy and violent working, at so many points, of the social system. Perhaps the most startling evidence of the wrong working of the system is seen in the morbid types of individual life which are thrown upon the surface. They have been to us, until now, strange and unfamiliar types. We have known the poor. But poverty, as we have known it, has meant hardship, struggle, the absence of luxury and comfort, sometimes absolute and distressing want, but, more frequently than otherwise, a stimulus to character and ambition. Now we are beginning to know the pauper, — the man not simply poor in his surroundings, but poor in himself, weak, enfeebled, debilitated, devitalized. We have known criminals. But crime as we have known it has been sporadic, liable to break out anywhere under stimulated passion or unusual temptations, contagious but not reproductive. Now we are beginning to know the criminal, the man born to criminality and bred in it, perpetuating himself along that line, and creating a class which is to-day refilling our prisons with criminal backsliders. We have been obliged to import a word into our vocabulary to express this, for us, new phase of criminality — recidivism, criminal backsliding.

The first impulse of society under such manifestations and disclosures is to act summarily. But soon the wisdom of Christ's caution appears, that men have a care lest in gathering up the tares they root up the wheat also. It is seen that the difficulty is organic, inhering in large part in society itself. We study pauperism; but we go only a little way before we find that, if we would analyze the poor man's poverty, we must stop and analyze the rich man's wealth. "We are members one of another." We study crime, and as we trace the criminal back into the causes

which are producing him, we are forced to take to heart in its partial truthfulness the saying that "society deserves the criminals it has." And when we turn to the institutions and forces which are naturally corrective of these and like results, to see what is their present working strength, the outlook is not assuring. We turn to the family as the great social safeguard, only to find that the family is beginning to yield under the immense strain which is falling upon it. We see that it has lost much in idea under the growth of individualism, and that it is losing much more in practice under the looseness of social customs. Marriage is no longer a self-protecting ordinance; it has ceased to be "honorable in the sight of *all* men." We turn to democracy as the great political safeguard, only to find how powerless it is to preserve social unity under the mighty economic forces which are pushing men into social extremes. We see that the same classification or stratification of society is going on here as elsewhere under the reign of industrialism. We find the old class antagonisms revived under new names and in new forms, creating social disturbances over wide areas. As Mr. Howells has recently said, the Farmers' Alliance is the modern form of the Peasants' War. Suppose that instead of our harvests bursting our storehouses, we had the gleanings of the fields of Europe!

Now it is simply impossible, in view of these social necessities, for the pulpit to retire into the old religious individualism, and content itself with exhorting every man to build over against his own house. What has been called "the social compunction," which is everywhere beginning to be felt, will not allow such a reactionary course. The conception of the church is rapidly changing in the minds of those within as well as of those without. It no longer stands simply for the rescue of individuals. It stands, by growing consent, for the improvement, the regeneration of society. It is interesting to watch the enlarging consciousness of the church under this widening of its duty. It is already beginning to feel itself a part of the social order, to know its place in the world, and to rejoice in these nearer possibilities of the kingdom of God. What the church, then, demands of the ministry at this juncture is intelligent guidance. Here and there it may be necessary to confront the churches with facts. But the outpouring of social statistics from the pulpit is quite useless unless the minister is prepared to show their meaning, and to trace results to causes. The people must be trained to think, and to think patiently, before they act. Of course they are not to be

expected to solve social problems. They are not to attempt the work of experts. But they have their own work to do. Experts and specialists must be supported by an intelligent public Christian sentiment, and by practical church coöperation. The new work of the ministry falls alike upon the teaching and upon the pastoral function. The church, that is, must be instructed in its social duties, and organized and led out into them. And the authority of the ministry in this whole matter will depend, not upon what is done over the church, but in what is accomplished *through* the church. Authority, at this point, I repeat, is not personal, but representative, and will be measured by the ability of the ministry to stimulate, inform, and organize the church, for the work of social Christianity.

It may have seemed to you, gentlemen, that in the stress which I have laid upon subjects of present concern in religious thought and life, I have made too little account of that constant and abiding element in Christianity which relates men of all times alike to their eternal destiny. Let me assure you that I have not been unmindful of it as I have written these words. The other-worldliness of religion forms an inseparable part of my religious thinking. But I can see no incompatibility between the eternal interests of men and their interests in time, least of all between the work of the church toward far-reaching spiritual results and the part it may take in fulfillment of its providential place in history. One of the first lessons of the ministry I believe to be that one shall learn not to find fault with the providence of God. It is a matter of surprise to me that preachers are so reckless in their denunciations of their age (it is always so), as if it had no place in the plan of God, and as if his Spirit were not present. I put you on your guard against the superficial and faithless interpretation of your own times. Do not overlook the presence of God, or be afraid to work where He is at work. The church has not often made the mistake of working too far out upon the advanced lines of God's providence. I know the danger of overstepping the lines, from rashness and impatience, or from culpable ignorance. But there are guidances and restraints of the Spirit which have been provided against this very need, and which are always available to those who will heed them. And at the present time I think that you may be sure that you have the mind of the Spirit if, in your critical research into the sources of truth, your chief concern is to find out for yourselves and for others the reality of

faith, and if in your social studies you are equally concerned to gain that wisdom through which you may contribute your part by word or in deed to the improvement of the social order. I commend to you, as something attainable by you all in your studies, the confidence of the great scholar, whose whole life work was cast in the perplexities of critical scholarship, who wrote concerning his last work, "Of one thing only do I think I may be confident, that the spirit by which it is animated comes from the good Spirit that guides along the everlasting way."

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

EDITORIAL.

THE RELIGIOUS REASON FOR BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

THE dislike which many Christian people have for the application of critical processes to the Bible is due in great part to their opinion of the motive impelling to the use of those processes. This they believe to be a merely intellectual one. The religious nature, they think, has no want to be satisfied by the critical impulse, and hence gives it no sanction. There is no reason why a Christian man, as such, should be a Biblical critic. The Bible was given to the church for religious uses, and will not fulfill its function unless it be used religiously. Christian scholars, who give their lives to studying it, and to helping the church employ it rightly, should, of all men, give it religious treatment. If in their study of it they maintain allegiance to Christ, they will have the sympathy of the church. But if they profess that in pursuing this study Science is their mistress, — Science, who requires her subjects to examine all things in the “dry light” of the intellect, and to bring all sources of knowledge before the bar of the reason, — they must expect the church to follow their labors not with sympathy, but with suspicion.

This objection to Biblical criticism (felt, we suspect, by many who do not give it utterance) has more influence in this country than in Europe, because almost all scholars, pursuing this criticism among us, stand in places of religious trust, and are pledged to do work looking directly towards religious ends.

We purpose trying to show that it is an unfounded objection; that the opinion underlying it as to the motive of Biblical criticism is a wrong opinion; that the critical impulse belongs to Christianity; and that those whose lives are given honestly to applying the principles of critical research to the Bible are ministering to a vital necessity of the church.

Scriptural knowledge — acquaintance with the religious and moral ideas contained in the sacred writings, and with the historical facts recorded in them — is necessary to Christian life; to its normal development and fruitful activity, if not to its existence. As to this, all Protestant Christians are agreed; and it is a doctrine on which especial emphasis is laid by those who hold the view about critical studies which we are discussing.

The religious ideas of the Old and New Testament prophets are so transcendently profound and vital that the church must always turn to them for religious instruction. The history of the Jewish church, the life of Jesus Christ, the rise of Christianity under the leading of the apostles, — in these facts lies a self-revelation of God to which the church must ever turn for living conceptions of his character and his ways with men. Christian faith feeds on knowledge, the knowledge to be obtained here, and here only, assimilates it, and transmutes it into conviction. So Chris-

tian motive is supplied and Christian character grows. The more knowledge, other spiritual requisites being supplied, the stronger conviction, the richer emotion, the riper character. This no one disputes. The desire to know the Bible is, all admit, strong in healthy Christian minds. To increase knowledge of the Scriptures is confessedly to minister to Christian life.

This is just what criticism does, as is perfectly apparent when one sees what it is. Criticism is the presumably sound method of examining what has come down to us in literature purporting to represent some of the life of the past. This literature carries an implied representation about its authors; who they are, why they wrote, what they said, etc. The task of criticism is to find the fact behind the representation. It also contains explicit representation, — that of the author about fact outside himself. The task of criticism is here rightly to use the author's statement as a means of knowledge about the facts involved. There is a right way of setting at work to find out the truth underlying these representations. Criticism is presumably the right way, that one which has been hit upon by the united and mutually corrective experiments of historical students, the one commended by the *consensus* of expert opinion. We have no disposition to claim perfection for the critical method, or infallibility for its results. No one who has employed it will deny it to be an imperfect instrument, and admissions of its imperfection from those who have used it most ably, and with most apparent success, are not wanting. All that is claimed is that this is the best instrument at command for the work to be undertaken. Man has had to shape a tool with which to fashion into an ordered structure of knowledge the store of information handed down to him from the past. The one he has patiently wrought out is presumably good for its end; at any rate, he is dependent upon it, and will be until he shall have made a better. There is little disposition on the part of intelligent men to question its serviceableness when employed in testing documents respecting whose authorship or contents there is no bias. Eminent Greek scholars were heard with respect last year when they assigned the lately discovered "Constitution of Athens" to Aristotle, and a few years ago men learned in Christian history formed the opinion of the public respecting the date of the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles."

One who is in earnest in desiring to know the Bible will study it critically. He will in his approach to it as literature apply the canons of literary criticism. He will first ask whether the text is made up of the words which the authors wrote, using in conducting his inquiry all the copies of the various books, printed and manuscript, at his command, and following in employing them the accepted principles of textual criticism. He will ask whether the several books of the Bible were written by their reputed authors, at what time, and under what circumstances. The result of his critical inquiries will evidently be likely to increase the

amount of his Biblical knowledge. If his textual criticism gives him a better text, it will help him to a better acquaintance with the thought of the sacred writers, since every corruption of the text blurs, albeit slightly, its meaning. If his literary criticism enables him to set an apostolic letter at its true place in its author's career, as is the case with First Peter, or Paul's Thessalonian letters, or to give it its true occasion, it aids the interpretation, since finer shades of thought are only to be discerned in their subtle connection with the author's mood or the reader's moral state. Criticism and exegesis necessarily go hand in hand. Critical insight is, all admit, indispensable to a competent interpreter of the Scriptures.

Genuine desire to know the Bible will also lead to the use of historical criticism upon its statements of fact. We suspect that some who have given assent to what we have said thus far will hesitate to follow us here. Because they are accustomed to regard the Bible as the sole and sufficient source of sacred history, they find the opinion that its statements must be subjected to criticism, to be rightly employed, inconsistent with its supreme value and religious authority. But a moment's reflection will, we think, justify our statement. Why does Christian faith go to the historical statements of the Bible for nourishment? Because it expects to learn by means of them of a historic self-revelation of God. A certain section of the world's life discloses Him as does no other. Thither it looks to see Him. Now this part of human history was shaped by the same laws which shaped all the rest, and is in vital connection with the whole. To be adequately known it must be known *historically*. Its events must be seen in their order and their mutual relations, and in their connection with the correlated facts of the world's life. The more nearly we approach such knowledge, the nearer do we come to obtaining the revelation of God which they give. He sees best the divine thought conveyed in the life of the Hebrew people who has the best knowledge of its life, who sees most clearly its development both in physical strength and spiritual stature, who estimates most accurately the forces, moral and physical, which by their mutual and combined action made it what it was. Such knowledge cannot be gained merely by reading the books of the Old Testament. The information they give is fragmentary, and, it must be owned, not altogether accurate. To be put to its best use, this information must be arranged, and to some extent corrected, by the critical faculty. It must also be set into connection with extra-Biblical events, if its spiritual elements are to appear in the clearest light. Old Testament criticism is to-day doing just this work for the church. Driver's "Isaiah" may be mentioned as one of many noble contributions made by the Biblical science of our time to Christian faith.

The help of criticism is indispensable in obtaining a knowledge of the life of Christ. The Gospel narratives are fragmentary, lack chronological arrangement, and are in some of their statements apparently at variance

with each other. A view of the career of our Lord as a whole, and in its connection with contemporaneous Jewish life, can only be gained by a critical process in which the Gospel material is arranged and supplemented by other historical matter ; such work as has been undertaken by Neander, Keim, Weiss, and Beysschlag. If this perfect human life were indeed as a whole, and not merely in its exceptional acts and experiences, the medium of a unique manifestation of God, then the church must always aspire to gain a knowledge of it in its wholeness, and always be putting the Gospels to the use suggested by historical science.

The pursuit of Biblical knowledge, then, involves Biblical criticism. The true student of the Bible cannot but be a critic, using the best instruments the human mind has forged in delving for its treasures of knowledge and fashioning them into serviceable form. He will be a Christian student, recognizing the spiritual elements in the life recorded in Scripture, and giving them their due influence in the formation of his critical conclusions. He will also be scientific, treating facts honestly, and reasoning from them fairly and fearlessly, as do faithful men in other departments of historical research, believing that nothing can be done for Christian truth by methods which are other than truthful. Such scholars the church has, and among her faithful servants they are not the least deserving of her sympathy and commendation.

THE EXTENSION OF AUTOMATIC ACTION.

It is a familiar fact in personal development, from infancy on, that actions which at first have to be performed by effort become automatic. What is difficult becomes easy, what is easy becomes spontaneous and unconscious. Except functional action of heart, lungs, and other organs, nearly everything has to be acquired after birth by experiment. Visual and tactual sensations, by which the shape, size, distance, heat, hardness, and weight of objects are known, require the training of repeated use. Adjustments and corrections have to be made as the conscious life develops. Such work is nearly all done in the early childhood which is forgotten, so that our sensations and perceptions now require no conscious rectification, but even the use of the senses becomes automatic by habit. The conversion of conscious and even difficult effort into unconscious action goes far up in the scale of human achievements. The use of language, the art of reading, the skillful playing on a musical instrument, the exercise of cultivated manners, and other highly complex actions become so easy and natural that they seem to require scarcely any conscious effort. A pianist, for instance, says that the notes are in his fingers, which seem to do the playing of themselves without the need of separate volitions. The reader is not conscious of the separate letters on which his eye rests. The true gentleman is said to be polite by instinct. His good manners cling to him as freely and as gracefully as his

clothes. There is even a certain automatism in morals. The saint is one whose goodness has become so much a second nature that others doubt whether it costs him any struggle or deserves any credit. Yet the varieties of goodness are called habits rather than instincts, and habits are acquired modes of action.

The extension of automatic action is to the advantage of the person. His freedom is not reduced, but enlarged. His energy is set free for the higher uses of conscious and voluntary action. The body becomes a unit, harmoniously and instantly obedient to the will. The outward world is a familiar home, giving itself to the support of life and the ministration of enjoyment. The person is master of all his faculties, and is master of the world, as he could not be if his sensations and perceptions had not been trained to communicate correct information automatically. The great musician is he who need not bestow a thought on the mechanism of instrumentation, but whose whole mind and soul are concentrated on the true interpretation of the sentiment of a composition which lies before him. The scholar, who reads his own or another language with perfect facility, comprehends the meaning of what he reads much better than one who has but an imperfect understanding of the medium through which the thought of an author is communicated, and must give it close attention at every point. And even in morals, he to whom virtue is easy and delightful is more largely efficient in services of goodness than one who has still a fight to carry on with his own inclinations. Automatism is mastery of the appliances of life, the unimpeded and unconscious use of faculties and powers which are the tools or mechanism of those higher endeavors in which consciousness and success, consciousness and enjoyment, are inseparable and commensurate. What is called education consists chiefly in gaining the familiar, almost unconscious use of intellectual tools, such as numbers, language, science, and music. The educated man is he who is nearly automatic in a wide range of those attainments which are channels of communication from the world of nature and the world of culture to his mind.

There is an analogy to this education of the individual in the progress of the social body. The advances of civilization are largely through extending the area of action which is so habitual as to be almost automatic. Our appliances, such as the locomotive or telephone, at first awaken wonder, but soon by frequent use become necessities of travel and communication on which we bestow scarcely a conscious thought. Like many other things which were unknown to our ancestors, these have become the customary mechanism of modern life. They enable us to accomplish much that otherwise we should not attempt at all, and do for us, without an effort on our part, that which in former times consumed strength and thought.

Within the social body, one class possesses the appliances which wealth provides, and becomes accustomed to many conveniences of equi-

page, dress, domestic service, food and drink, houses, and the like, which the poorer class does not have. The constant use of such appliances makes them merely the convenient means to other ends. They are not in themselves the sources of enjoyment. They would be missed, indeed, if taken away, as one would miss his hat or shoes, but are used as mere conveniences, except in the case of some newly rich and some immature persons, who find enjoyment in display of possessions, as barbaric tribes love to parade ornaments and bright-colored fabrics. The poorer class look with envy on these possessions, supposing that nothing more is needed for the complete enjoyment of life. But to those who are accustomed to the conveniences and luxury of wealth they are only the conditions within which the higher enjoyments of society, influence, or knowledge can be attained.

It is to the advantage of society that for all classes and all individuals the material needs of life should be provided for with such sufficiency that thought and energy may be liberated for that which is higher. At present, with many, the whole endeavor has to be directed to the supply of physical wants. All toil is expended in providing the bare necessities of life. And others who are in no danger of starvation must still devote themselves to securing the mere comforts of life. That class has an immense advantage which need not take anxious thought about material support. The socialism which is worthy the name looks beyond economical readjustments to the better life which would follow the removal of poverty. An interesting article on "Socialism and Spiritual Progress," in our July number, pointed out some spheres of action which will open ample room for energy when men are released from anxious thought for the things they shall eat and drink and wear. It was shown that art, science, and philosophy are inexhaustible in their resources, while, in the moral progress of the race, there will always be that temptation and struggle through which character is made strong; and that the desirable condition is moderate wealth.

"Observation tells us that a condition of moderate wealth most favors the development of character; the science of the human mind suggests to us that life advances through intrusting its lower functions more and more completely to the unconscious and automatic life."

So far as the material needs of life are supplied almost unconsciously, so far is the ground cleared for the real progress of mankind. Thus the writer just quoted also remarks:—

"Far from being free for spiritual development, our present society is held in degraded bondage to the flesh. We see extremes of bitter poverty and fatuous luxury, alike deathful to the spirit, alike contrary to the commands of Christ. We see even our middle class held by material struggle; society as a whole absorbed by the dominant and feverish consciousness of physical need. When this bondage shall be relaxed, when that rush for wealth which is the swinging of the pendulum away from the fear of starvation shall be no

more, then will unfold countless delicate spiritual powers unguessed to-day in the dreary uniformity of money-making. Longing for glory, longing for service, will play upon a humanity responsive, high-mettled, eager."

As we look back on earlier generations and see the waste of energy in accomplishing slowly, or not at all, what is now done quickly, so later generations may look on us with pity in view of our waste of effort on that which pertains to the material side of life. There may be, will be, a finer race of men, when through inheritance and a more equitable distribution of goods, much becomes automatic which is now laborious, and when time and vitality are set free for the higher enjoyments and services of society. The significance of corporate immortality is not the mere continuance of the race, but its improvement and elevation by means of the heritage of comfort, of knowledge, and of morality which enables the new generation to begin, as it were, where the vanishing generation leaves off, to possess and use habitually, almost automatically, what its predecessors gained by conscious and constant struggle.

Progress in religious thought proceeds along similar lines. Beliefs which we assume as a matter of course were once matter of intense difference. The postulates of to-day were gained in the controversies of yesterday. We can scarcely realize that common opinions respecting the church of God, his government of the world, the kingdom of God in society, and the spiritual conditions of eternal destiny, have, at one time and another, been disputed and even rejected. These beliefs are not, of course, automatically held in any mechanical sense, or without consciousness on our part of their value; but they are taken for granted, are the accepted conditions under which we expend our direct effort to realize them in the actual life and need of the world. It may therefore be hoped that certain conceptions of God's revelation of himself in Christianity, for which the few are now contending against the many, will become the generally accepted postulates of the Christian faith, and that energy now consumed in discussion will be liberated for a larger and finer service in the purification of earthly society. The saints and religious heroes of the future may not surpass those of the early age, but society as a whole will rise to a higher level of spirituality through the common appropriation of the noblest faiths.

The point of view we have taken looks out on many related questions. Is the extension of automatic action a limitation of personal freedom? It is sometimes argued that habit produces involuntary, even necessitated action, and that the process is constantly going on, until the very appearance of choice vanishes. But the considerations we have been presenting look the other way. The extension of automatic action in the lower range of faculties is the enlargement of freedom and power in realizing the higher objects of personal life, for it is growing facility in the application of means to ends. The more things a man can do without conscious effort, in the use of his bodily powers, in the use of

reasoning faculties, of memory, of languages, of music, the wider range he has in the great pursuits of literature, science, philosophy, art, and religion. He has more power and he has wider area. Animals have more automatic action at the start, but make little appreciable gain upon it, and get no release for higher uses. Man, by increasing his unconscious and subconscious action, of which he has but little at the start, widens his range continually, and increases the effectiveness of his personality, which guides native and acquired powers to the ends he may choose. And there is no ascertained limit to enlargement of power through the extension of habitual action into the various facilities of which man is capable.

One of the strongest supports of the belief in personal immortality is at this point. The capability of mastering many branches of knowledge and of gaining many kinds of power seems unlimited. The more one learns, the more he is able to learn. What is wanting is not ability, but time. We can hardly believe that a creature who has the capacity for becoming facile to the point of automatism in so many physical and mental attainments will lack time to realize his vast possibilities, or will ever reach a stage in learning, or skill, or insight, or appreciation which must be called the final stage of knowledge or power.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

THE CONGRESS OF CATHOLIC SAVANTS.

[Translated from the author's MS. by Rev. Charles C. Starbuck.]

WHILE the Evangelical Alliance was holding its general assembly at Florence, the Catholics were meeting at Paris in a scientific congress. This is a fact to which, somewhat curiously, the Protestant journals of France have paid no attention; they have not even thought it worth while to mention it. We might allege in excuse that their thoughts were entirely engaged with the important gatherings that have just been held in Italy; but such an excuse would amount to nothing. It is only too well known that we are accustomed to view Catholicism only on its weak sides; we are no longer capable of comprehending, nor even of studying, its real life. But if it is really our enemy, it is singularly bad policy not to keep an eye on its movements; otherwise we are condemning ourselves to the mere reiteration of commonplace criticisms against it, and are preparing for ourselves unhappy surprises.

Is this congress, however, of real significance? Let the reader judge by the following account. In 1885 a local assembly of the Catholics of Normandy was about to meet at Rouen, having in view the organization and encouragement of certain works of charity, of Christian patronage, of apostolic activity, and of instruction. Some gentlemen, who had promised to assist at this congress, asked themselves whether they ought not to avail themselves of this reunion of enlightened priests and competent laymen to lay before them a grave question. They had been struck

with a twofold fact. On the one hand, it is always science which unbelievers oppose to Catholicism; on the other hand, respect for science is so universal that it would be dangerous to allow men to believe any longer in a radical antinomy between the character of a Catholic and that of a savant. Among those on whose minds this peril weighed was Canon Duilhé de Saint-Projet, author of a "Scientific Apology for Christianity," which in a few years has reached a third edition and has been translated into the principal languages of Europe. M. Duilhé de Saint-Projet succeeded in impressing the organizers of the Rouen congress with the gravity of the question; a section was created charged with the duty of studying the means of warding off this danger, and after long and serious deliberations this section expressed the desire that a scientific congress of Catholics might be convened with the least possible delay. This desire was realized in 1888; it has just been realized in 1891, and it will be again in 1894. We see by this that we are not dealing with a casual fact, but with one which it is hoped to elevate into established usage. It is a new line of proceeding which Catholicism thus appears minded to adopt, and it behooves us to consider its import.

I.

The enterprise of which we speak, and which we see to have turned out a genuine success, was not well received at first. In the beginning it encountered difficulties on all hands, and if the men who initiated it had been easy to intimidate they would soon have renounced their plans; but they had not lightly embarked on an ill-devised adventure. They had weighed beforehand the seriousness of the obstacles; they had foreseen the various objections, and were not behindhand with their answers.

They encountered at the beginning the hardly-concealed opposition of Catholic savants. These advanced a very plausible pretext. "Science," said they, "is ill-suited for public display; it ought not to lie at the mercy of a more or less transitory fashion. If the congress succeeds but indifferently, such a failure would be very prejudicial to Catholic savants." This motive of hesitation, unquestionably, was very honorable; but those who expressed it might well have added another reason of deeper import, but one which it was more embarrassing to avow. Many of them cultivate the sciences without any *arrière-pensée*; feeling themselves good Catholics, not being annoyed by the ecclesiastical authorities, they are little inclined to ask how the liberty of their researches is compatible with the *Syllabus*. This problem dismays them. They do not permit themselves to approach it, and declare themselves incompetent to resolve it; they remain submissive Catholics and free savants, without exploring a contradiction which they end by no longer so much as perceiving. This explains why M. Duilhé de Saint-Projet's proposition was received with so little warmth. Without closely entering into their own sentiments, many Catholic savants have had vague forebodings of painful questions of conscience; they have stood aghast at the possibility of coming in collision with problems which they choose rather not to see. This is at the bottom of so many hesitations, which those who felt them did not judge it wise to explain distinctly.

It is curious, but the theologians have been at one with the savants in

rendering homage to the good intentions of the initiators and in raising up obstacles before them. Their motives are easily divined. They were bethinking themselves within what limits the innovating spirit of thought could be indulged in the liberty which it desires. "Would one be strong enough to say to the savants, 'So far may you go, and no farther'?" Especially, would one succeed in interdicting them from the examination of certain questions appertaining alike to science and to faith? Priests do not love to raise certain cases of conscience in the souls of laymen; no wonder, therefore, if they were somewhat dismayed at the idea of a scientific congress of Catholics.

In view of such difficulties, the organizers of the congress held themselves on their guard against an offensive precipitancy. They had in view, not a half success, but an entire, a brilliant success. It would not have sufficed them to gather together certain priests and certain lay-savants; they wished to evoke a veritable manifestation of Catholicism. Ambitions of such a scope were incompatible with haste; accordingly, they postponed till April of 1888 the congress which it had been originally intended to hold in 1887. This delay gave room for the inauguration of a vast propaganda for obtaining adhesions, for combating the objections of the undecided, but, above all, for securing the intervention of the supreme authority of the church. The Archbishop of Paris was heart and soul with the initiators of the enterprise; he undertook to submit their project to the Pope, to whom, after some negotiations, he dispatched a memorial on the question. This memorial was at once submitted to examination by a special commission. Now, Rome is not only the capital of orthodoxy, it is also a marvelous centre of information. Not only was decision given there that the project contained nothing heretical, but it was also judged that it matched exactly with the special necessities of France, and that it saw the light at the most suitable season. Accordingly, under date of May 20, 1887, a papal brief was addressed to the Archbishop of Paris in the terms following: "The matter which you have in hand is laudable in itself and honorable to you. It may also well be fruitful of happy results, as well for the genuine honor of the sciences as for the defense of the Catholic faith." Moreover, to this full and formal encouragement, which closed the mouths of waverers, the Holy Father added counsels admonitory of the temerarious: "In particular, things divine are too exalted and too sacred to be suitable for discussion in a congress, not to say that many of you lack the authority implied in holy orders. Accordingly, even in such questions as have a certain affinity with theology, properly so called, each one will see to it that he remains within his proper range, of scientist, historian, mathematician, or critic, without ever usurping the province of the theologian."

It is easy to divine the result. The Pope's brief was accepted as a word of command. No one any longer believed himself at liberty to advance any objection to the initiators of the enterprise; silent if not enthusiastic acquiescence had become a duty. Adhesions forthwith began to come in from all points of the Catholic world; they amounted to more than 1,600, and of this number not far from 600 were from foreign nations, — Austria-Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, England, and Germany. More than 400 members took part in the proceedings of the congress; among them there was remarked an American prelate, M. O'Reilly, who was at the head of a pilgrimage to Montmartre.

We cannot afford the space to give in detail the history of the congress; it lasted four days, and displayed a great activity. It was divided into six sections: (1) religious sciences, (2) philosophy, (3) law and political economy, (4) history, (5) mathematical, physical, and natural sciences, (6) anthropology. The papers read and discussed in these sections have been published in two volumes. The success was complete; the quality of the adhesions had been as eminently satisfactory as their quantity. Savants of the first order had given their personal attendance, and had thus contributed to secure to the congress the attention of the indifferent and even of the anti-religious public.

The initiators of the work had good reason to felicitate themselves on their perseverance. All the difficulties anticipated had been surmounted; to the initial fears and hesitations had succeeded a universal enthusiasm, and it had been unanimously decided to convene a second congress in April of 1891. Has the satisfaction been as great at the Vatican? The facts shall answer for us. As soon as preparations were in progress for the second congress, thirty cardinals of the Roman Curia and of different countries, almost all the French bishops, and about fifty foreign bishops declared themselves the patrons of the enterprise and recommended it to the Catholic world. And the Pope himself, in a brief of the 16th of March last, took occasion to express to the Archbishop of Paris his sympathy and his good wishes for the assembly which was about to gather. Is there not deep significance in such a prodigality of encouragements?

Need we say that a work undertaken under such auspices, so powerfully sustained by all the authorities of the church, could not fail of success? This time adherents have reached the number of 2,500, of whom 1,700 were French. Among foreign countries, Canada and the United States (especially the Catholic University of Washington) had sent in adhesions and some memoirs. More than 600 persons took part in the congress; 149 memoirs were read and discussed during the sittings. The course of proceedings had been admirably organized. The sections, now numbering seven (a new one having been created for philology), held forty-four sittings in four days, from the 2d to the 6th of April. They did not always work separately; when a question appeared to belong to two sections, these joined in studying it together. Thus the sections of philosophy and of anthropology held joint session to study the problem of heredity, those of history and of the religious sciences to discuss the origins of Christianity. At other times a section would subdivide, to give opportunity for specialists to meet and discuss some detail.

It is impossible for us, even in a dry list, to enumerate the problems that have been agitated in these sessions and the conclusions that have been sanctioned; but some general remarks suggest themselves. First of all, the discussions have not been governed by the apologetic interest. Unquestionably it was not wholly wanting, and in certain cases it has been distinctly visible. For instance, we find the essay made to demonstrate how, saving the rights of the First Cause and the immediate creation of the human soul, the philosophical doctrine of evolution can be accepted by Christians. So also the proof was attempted that the most certain results of contemporary science accommodate themselves better to the metaphysical framework of St. Thomas Aquinas than to that of Descartes. Indeed, there were even present imperturbable dis-

ciples of scholasticism to defend the Thomist cosmology in its details, and to declare that nothing therein ought to be changed; but we must acknowledge that apologetics have by no means appeared to be the sole object of the congress. On one hand, many of the conclusions discussed or even admitted had no relation, however remote, to Catholic orthodoxy; they were grounded on properly scientific arguments, which were entirely foreign to any dogmatical prepossession. On the other hand, one might often wonder why this or that mathematical or physical question was treated in this congress, in what way its solution could concern the faith.

It would be absurd to insinuate that the organizers of the enterprise desired to demonstrate that there is a Catholic physics, a Catholic chemistry, a Catholic anthropology, a Catholic physiology. They would be the first to laugh and to shrug their shoulders at such an accusation. But this very fact renders still more enigmatical the fact just noted by us; we have no right to state it without endeavoring to make out the reason of it. Men as enlightened as M. d'Hulst, rector of the Catholic Institute of Paris, Cardinal Richard the Archbishop of Paris, and their eminent collaborators, do nothing haphazard. The scientific congress of Catholics was devised on a deeply meditated plan; why has it shown so little dogmatic preoccupation? Why has it affected so high and intelligent a measure of scientific disinterestedness? This question is well worth proposing, but it cannot be resolved singly. A little attention soon shows that it comes out on this other: Why have the Catholics established this congress of savants? Why does the Pope lavish his encouragements on this new work? What results are expected from this enterprise? Let us approach this problem; in studying it we shall enter into the inner thoughts of many of our contemporaries.

II.

There is a text on which Catholic preachers love to preach: *Custos, quid de nocte?* *Custos, quid de nocte?* (Isaiah xxi. 1.) It expresses marvelously well a constant preoccupation of the Roman Church, that of questioning the signs of the times and of incessantly adapting its tactics to the exigences of the moment. Now it has come to apprehend in the younger generations new necessities, and makes haste to meet them by taking an unexpected attitude.

And in effect, the least attentive observers agree that we may distinguish in the students of our schools, general and special, the symptoms more or less serious of moral and religious aspirations. Note in what terms Professor Ernest Lavisse, who makes no profession of being a Christian, but who lives in intimate intercourse with students, last year signalized this phenomenon: "Our youth are no longer Voltairians. Irony and negation have been dragged down in the ruins of the affirmations of other times. However they may have continued their trumpetings, after they had wound up the work of necessary destruction; however they may have employed themselves in drying up the sources of the moral life; however gayly they have wrought on this melancholy task, — they are to-day detested. . . . Hence it comes that a part of our youth, the lesser part, gathers in serried ranks around the church. Another part, also small, demands of the church that she renovate herself. . . . Another part, in fine, more considerable, seeks a 'plus ultra'

in science and democracy, without knowing what it is, knowing only that it is, and that we are to tend thither. *In truth, one of the distinguishing marks of the youth of our time is the nostalgia of the Divine.*" Now the Quartier Saint-Sulpice, in which are cantoned the clerical forces, is not far from the Quartier Latin. The church has not been slow to perceive that many youthful souls regret their lost faith and long for fresh religious convictions; she has decided to plead her cause before the enlightened youth just as she pleads it before the working classes.

Catholicism, on the other hand, in its propaganda, has been obliged to renounce proceedings which it has never repudiated. When Louis Veuillot published in 1838 "*Les Pélerinages de Suisse*," it contained these words (vol. ii. p. 203): "As for me, let me say frankly and distinctly, if anything appears to me worthy of regret, it is that they did not burn John Huss sooner, and that they did not burn Luther as well. This is because there was not found, at the commencement of the Reformation, a prince pious enough and politic enough to set on foot a crusade against the countries infected by it." To those who reproached him with these extravagances, he answered (in 1881): "The heresiarch, examined and convicted by the church, was given over to the secular arm and punished with death. Nothing appeared to me more natural and more necessary. What I wrote in 1838 is what I still think." Many Ultramontanes among us still maintain these principles of the Middle Ages, and Père Monsabré has not shrunk from giving forth from the pulpit, in 1882, a fiery eulogy upon the Inquisition. But practically the church is constrained to dismiss her pleasing dream of a dominion of force; the secular arm is no longer at her service.

From this fact results a grave consequence. The church cannot content herself with hurling the anathema against the doctrines that displease her. Excommunication without the support of the secular arm is but a vain formality. There is henceforth only one efficacious mode of combating error: it is to dispute with it, opposing argument to argument. The champions of Catholicism have need of ideas in default of the stake.

The church, therefore, is now proceeding to lay out her strength in the field of apologetics. Now a serious apologetic must correspond to the moral state of those whom it is desired to convince and to bring to the foot of the altar; and it would be a grave error to suppose that our youth of to-day, desirous as they may be of a religion, are weary of science. The students who throng to our various departments of study have confidence in thought; they would give no heed to a preacher of obscurantism. "Without doubt," say they with M. de Vogüé, who is their favorite interpreter, "without doubt Time will act the reviser. Not impossibly it may cause a collapse, from top to bottom, of some of the results of contemporary science. Our systems of synthesis will not last any more than those of our predecessors have lasted. But our methods of analysis, our rational view of the world, the general orientation of the scientific spirit, — these are acquisitions which henceforth can never perish except by a complete collapse of civilization. Whatever we may rebuild, we shall rebuild upon this impregnable substratum." The church, then, finds herself between two alternatives, — either she must renounce the hope of conquering our cultivated youth, or she must prove that she does not repudiate reason and the results gained by science.

To the foundation of so extended an apologetic, the theologian, reduced

simply to his own lights, would not be adequate. What, in effect, shall be his attitude in face of scientific theories which he has had neither the time nor the means of sounding to the bottom? Does he not run the risk of spending all his strength against theories which, sooner or later, would vanish away of themselves, which would disappear like any other transient fashion? Does it never happen to him, on the other hand, to skirt the sides of theories the most subversive, without perceiving their dangers? And how many times, moreover, he is ignorant of this or that scientific truth, which would have aided him in his contest with error! The savant, therefore, will render to the theologian a triple service: He will indicate to him the hypotheses which it behooves him to condemn, those which it behooves him to combat, and those which it behooves him to take seriously, and not to treat with too lofty a superiority. I am simply summing up a thesis which has been maintained in more than one sitting of these two congresses, and which the Pope himself has underlined in his brief of May 20, 1887.

Everything coheres together, and when one begins to apply a principle he soon sees how it evolves its implications. The church calls the savants to her aid; it is reasonable that she should give them encouragement in return. And this, doubtless, is an essential object of the congresses which she organizes. It is not their sole object to enrich apologetics; they are useful especially to communicate strength to Catholic savants. Very often these are isolated in a corner of the province; if they are university men, they encounter the more or less disguised hostility of surrounding society. Doubtless they are well aware that they are not alone in cultivating the sciences while declaring themselves submissive sons of Rome; but they are unacquainted with those men in whose scientific passion and religious faith they share. They have never met with them, they discern them as it were through a cloud, and do not feel themselves really united with them. . . . One can now divine what kind of service the congresses render to the Catholic savants. When each of these returns to his home and resumes his daily task, he has brought away in his remembrance the living images of men who think with him, who believe with him; he is no longer alone, he is strong. The governors of the Roman Catholic Church are psychologists of the first rank; they understand the needs of their workmen, and this is why the organizers of these congresses take extraordinary pains to explore all the secluded nooks of France in order to discover in them all the Catholic savants. Each bishop charges an influential man of his diocese with this novel species of recruiting service. And the better to encourage these savants, who are often somewhat timidly retiring, to give them a still more decisive sensation, one is not content to assemble them, to bring them to make acquaintance with each other: one brings them in presence of a great number of foreigners. The international character of these congresses is still another stroke of politic ability.

I need hardly add that the encouragements given to science may develop scientific vocations. The organizers of this enterprise know this, and they found great hopes on the moral effect of these congresses. Care has been taken to assemble them at the seat of the Catholic Institute at a time of year when the students are all at Paris; and the Catholic circle of the Luxembourg (a circle of students) has had the honor of receiving the members at a *soirée*. Eloquent appeals have been addressed to cultivated youth to seek in science the influence which politics refuses it. We shall be surprised if they remain unheeded.

The congress which we have endeavored to describe had, then, for its object to strengthen apologetics while encouraging savants and inciting to scientific vocations; and, indeed, it was itself an apologetic act. It had as its special object to show by the very fact of its meeting that there is no divorce between the church and science. Let us explain ourselves. The object was to prove, not that this or that Christian truth has not been destroyed by science, but that the dogma of the church in no way finds fault with the liberty of scientific researches. The theoretical demonstration of this thesis is not easy; some believe it impossible. Therefore the effort is made to substitute for it the argument of a fact which strikes men's minds, the sight of men noted for the boldness of their thinking, who nevertheless humbly bow before the church. She sometimes, it is true, finds their theories a little heretical, but she is very little inclined to harass those whose submission is so precious to her. She has never said what she thought of the speculative ideas which M. Lachelier has developed, during a number of years, at the Superior Normal School; she has chosen rather to find her advantage in the at least apparent contrast which there is between his religious beliefs and his philosophical opinions. She knew that a professor so much loved and venerated is never accused of dissimulation; it pleased her to see the pupils of this master pause in astonishment before this psychological mystery of a believer at once so hardy and so humble, and seek in all his words the logic which presides over all movements of a great mind.

The effect which M. Lachelier produced at the Normal School, possibly without observing it, the Catholics have received express commission to produce in every circle into which they are able to penetrate. It has been remarked that for some years, at the meetings of learned societies which regularly assemble at the Sorbonne, many excellent papers are presented by ecclesiastics. "You see there nothing but cassocks," says a satirical journalist. This is an exaggerated sally; but it may be truly said that, among the laymen who take part in these meetings, many are fervent Catholics. A word of command is circulating in all the Catholic world; it is admirably received and obeyed.

But the propaganda which results from it is slow. At the present juncture there is a call to impress men's minds by blows that tell. The waverers are numerous; they are weary of the negations of a criticism *à outrance*, and they are not yet ready to cross the threshold of the church. It is for them that the need is felt of organizing great manifestations which shall deeply impress them, and extort the consent of their wills. M. d'Hulst, who is rector of the Catholic Institute of Paris, and who preached the last Lenten course of sermons at Notre Dame, has very distinctly avowed this opinion. In the words which I am about to cite he has been the interpreter of all the initiators of the scientific congresses: "It is good that Christian savants should be, as it were, lost in the ranks of scientific workers who do not share their beliefs, to show these that no obstacle withholds them. But it is good also, in our view, that they should sometimes break ranks; that they should form themselves into a sacred battalion; that every one, in seeing them, may observe at once their double character of savants and of Christians. Then only will the cause of Catholic science be won at the bar of public opinion. The masses used to be told, You must choose between faith and science. And behold, there defiles before our eyes a compact group of men who have won their laurels in all the provinces of knowledge;

irreligious Science herself has been obliged to do homage to the value of their methods, to the fruitfulness of their labors. We cannot withhold recognition from them as authentic men of science. Yet all these men of science believe in God, adore his Christ, listen to his church, find themselves at ease in their faith, chant with one voice the time-honored creed of Nicæa. All, therefore, have realized in themselves that accord which was declared impossible between knowledge and belief. And this is no longer an isolated fact, without notoriety and without results; it is a collective fact, visible to all eyes, and carrying with it that sort of demonstration which no one can refuse, the demonstration of the philosopher who proved the possibility of movement by walking."

What does the future reserve for us? Will the projects we have just set forth be crowned with success? Will the hopes of the Ultramontane leaders be deceived? It appertains not to us to play the part of prophets. We will simply remark this: The signs of the times observed by the Catholics are real; it is perfectly and exactly true that many unquiet souls would fain return to Christianity. But these souls are asking themselves whether they are to abdicate the independence of their thought, and this question troubles them; so long as they shall not have resolved it, they will not decide. The church exhibits consummate skill in showing to these seekers of religion the imposing spectacle of Christian scientists. M. d'Hulst and his friends do not deceive themselves; and the Pope has been well advised.

The whole question is this: Will these men whom it is hoped to seduce content themselves with demanding the liberty of science, and consent to bow before the dogmatic authority of the church? Will they proclaim the rights of the religious conscience? In this case they will not be long in discovering that the examination of certain problems is formally interdicted to them, and they will come into collision with the doctrine of infallibility. All the politic address of the church will have been displayed to absolutely no effect. But how many men are capable of virile vindications of their full right?

In such circumstances French Protestantism has noble and glorious obligations to fulfill. Is it not to it that the honor belongs of denouncing all spiritual tyrannies, and of inscribing on its banner the truly Christian formula, "Gospel and Freedom"? But we must not content ourselves with sterile declamations. The men of our time demand facts and not phrases. Are we supplying to them in our churches the sight of men who know how to unite in an ineffable harmony science and faith? May God put in the heart of our young students of theology those missionary ambitions which will bring them to discern in slothful ignorance a sin and in scientific culture a duty!

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NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

THE last few months have been full of interesting and significant events in our country. Not least of these in point of significance has been the International Council of Congregationalists, the meetings of

which were eminently hopeful and progressive in tone. Nothing was more noticeable throughout the papers and addresses, as well as in the conclusions of the councils, than the recognition of the mission of the Independent churches in the civilization of the world and the building up of a purer and stronger social organism; progress, theologically as well as socially, was admitted to be a condition of the life of the Congregational communities. An attempt was indeed made by a few to assume that the only possible faith for a Congregational minister or a Congregational church was the Calvinism of a century ago, but at the end of the council meetings those who had assumed this position found it untenable, or at least held their peace, and so silently acknowledged the possibility of another view. It was a source of constant regret that Dr. Dexter and Dr. Hannay, the originators of the council, were present only in memory. Possibly it was due to the death of these men that the arrangements as to papers and speakers was not quite successful; too many papers were read, and too much detailed ground was attempted. But, on the whole, the council was an undoubted success, and the idea of its reassembling — for it concluded by adjourning, not dissolving — was favored by all.

The protracted illness of Mr. Spurgeon has called forth from all classes of society and all sections of the Christian church an amount of eager interest and deep sympathy which shows how deeply and widely his eloquence and labors have appealed to his countrymen. Newspapers which usually would not favor his ecclesiastical, doctrinal, or political views, which were all so marked and always so forcibly expressed, have vied with his own disciples in expressions of sympathy. The Archbishop of Canterbury has been amongst those calling at Mr. Spurgeon's house to make inquiries, while many a heartfelt prayer has gone up from obscure country meeting-houses and from the lips of those who never heard the voice or saw the face of him for whom they prayed. Never, since the Prince of Wales, twenty years ago, hung for days between life and death, has the British public followed with such anxiety and eagerness the daily bulletins recording the progress of any great man's malady. This is strong proof of the power which Mr. Spurgeon has exerted in the religion and life of to-day.

Another testimony that, after all, the men and women who seem so to have but little interest or care beyond the temporal and passing events of the day have really a conscience, was given when the recent disclosures in the law court revealed the extent to which the highest class of society wastes time and money in gambling. It was of course because the Prince of Wales was an offender that so much attention was given to the question for a time. Some of course made it a ground for condemning the whole life of fashion and high society; really, however, the scandal was a mere incident in the history of one of our national vices, — the craze for gambling and betting. There is in connection with this question a pleasing fact to record, that some of the most conscientious of our newspaper proprietors are refusing to publish any record of the betting transactions on the race-course. This has cost the "*Leeds Mercury*," a well-known daily paper which has been long and honorably managed by one of our leading Nonconformist families, the loss of much patronage among a certain class; but it will surely gain for it prestige and position among those whose approval is most worth gaining.

The whole question, which I have previously referred to as one of those moral problems which have a political aspect, is coming more and more into prominence, and a recent attempt in Parliament to alter the law of money-lending as it affects those under twenty-one years of age, and the approval the attempt met with, leads one to hope that the national conscience is being aroused effectually as to the great issues involved.

In the political or rather social life of the country, an event of prime importance has occurred in the passing of an act of Parliament which will practically abolish school fees in nearly all the elementary schools of the country. On and after the first of September, the managers of any elementary school can obtain an additional grant from government of ten shillings (\$2.50) per head per annum, on condition of giving to their scholars free education, or of reducing the "school-pence" at the rate of threepence per week. This new arrangement is permissive, not obligatory, on the so-called managers, who are either the school boards where schools are under popular local control, or the self-elected committee where the schools are under no popular local control; but, undoubtedly, almost all managers will elect to take advantage of the grant and "to free the schools." Free education has been inevitable for some time past, and the protests that were raised against pauperizing the people and endangering the religious or "church schools" were very feeble and very useless. From the point of view of educational progress proper, the new act is open to very grave objection. It has been the policy of both parties in the state in previously increasing the grants of public money for popular education to insist at the same time upon increased efficiency and excellence in the education. Unfortunately this wholesome policy has this time been dropped. The Conservative ministry which passed the bill made no serious attempt to insist on this principle, probably out of a fear of making its supporters in the country districts suffer by being forced to improve their schools; the Liberal party, on the other hand, though they attempted to remedy this defect, were unwilling to press this aspect of the measure too far in fear of endangering the passing of the bill, in which case their opposition to a measure popular with the masses would have been a useful party-cry in the hands of their opponents. This state of affairs in the House of Commons was unfortunate; but what shall we say of the House of Lords, which struck out of the bill the provision that the free education grant should only be given to schools in which the school accommodation should be *suitable* and sufficient? It is a notorious fact that there are many privately-managed schools living on the grants of public money in which the education and accommodation provided for the scholars is miserably inefficient, and indeed far below the actual requirements of the Education Department. They are allowed to continue, as they were in existence before the present regulations and requirements were in force. The House of Lords have no fear of losing their seats at a general election, and should be above the fear of popular clamor, but, led by the bishops, they were willing to allow these unsuitable schools to continue rather than pay their own share of the local taxation which would be required to set the schools on a higher level, and so earn increased grants by giving a better education. It is short-sighted and mean-spirited actions such as this which have so often disgraced the House of Lords in the past, and which are confirming even moderate

politicians in the opinion that the time is coming either to "mend or end" the upper house of our imperial Parliament.

The first results of our recent decennial census, which was taken in April last, have now been made known. The total population of England and Wales is returned as 29,001,018, an increase of 3,026,579, or of 11.65 per cent. during the last ten years. The most salient facts hitherto disclosed by the census are that the population of London is now 4,211,056, an increase of 10.4 per cent. during the decade. London is thus now for the first time found to be growing at a slower rate of increase than the country at large, though it must not be forgotten that the suburban districts just outside London are growing with great rapidity; that the rate of increase during the last ten years has been less than it was during the previous period; that in thirty-eight counties of England and Wales there has been an increase of population varying from 36.3 per cent. downwards, while in fourteen counties there has been a decrease amounting in one case to 11.7 per cent., these latter counties being without exception agricultural districts. The total population of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is given as 37,740,283. Scotland has again largely increased, while Ireland has again largely diminished in population since last census. The number of emigrants from the United Kingdom during the last ten years is given as 3,552,952; of these over one and a half millions were English, over a quarter of a million were Scotch, nearly three quarters of a million were Irish, while nearly a million were of foreign extraction. But interesting and suggestive as these figures are, there are further returns to follow from the census, such as the number of persons living on unearned incomes and the number of families living in three rooms or less. This information is being taken from statistics which were collected for the first time last April.

Mr. Charles Booth has just brought out the second volume of his marvellous work, "Labor and Life of the People" (London: Williams and Norgate, 1891), dealing chiefly with central, southern, and outlying London. A terrible tale is unfolded of the amount of poverty, thriftlessness, and uncertain subsistence of many thousands; but the very facts that the life of the poor is treated in a patient and scientific spirit, that the conclusions are arrived at from such a mass of observations and based on such ample statistics, and that so many able persons are united in the labor of these volumes, make the work of unusual importance. Mr. Booth is very cautious in drawing conclusions, but he is of the decided opinion that "the *crux* of the situation" in view of the social wreckage of so many in our great city is not in the criminal and semi-criminal class, which he estimates at .9 per cent of the population of London, but in the very poor class, who live by casual labor a hand-to-mouth existence and are in chronic want. This class in London is 7.5 per cent. of the whole population, and "hangs fatally round the necks of the classes above it, and especially of those but just above it, and is industrially valueless as well as socially pernicious." To abolish this class is to have the social problem already solved.

Joseph King.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The Church in the Mirror of History. Studies on the Progress of Christianity. By *Karl Sell*, D. D., Ph. D., Darmstadt, editor of "Life and Letters of H. R. H. Princess Alice of England and Hesse-Darmstadt." Translated by *Elizabeth Stirling*, and dedicated by permission to Her Royal Highness Princess Christian of Schleswig-Holstein. New York: Scribner & Welford, 743-745 Broadway. Pp. viii, 250. \$1.50. — The first part of this book appears to us the clearest and tersest. After reaching the Reformation, and especially in treating of the local ecclesiastical conditions of Germany, the author seems to become somewhat more entangled and cloudy, at least to us who are not Germans. But the whole book is readable and profitable.

At the beginning, he admirably describes "this personality, transparent and clear as crystal, original in every utterance, attractive and benevolent, serious and gentle, tender and courageous." A miracle within the sphere of Judaism, exactly expressed by the church predicate, — the Godhead of Jesus Christ.

As to primitive divergences in the church, the author assumes a gradation of tendencies, even among the Twelve, who, however, acknowledged that Paul's mission was a true carrying out of the mind of Christ, though not all able to feel fully at home in it, and not always, we may remark, sufficiently courageous in defending it against undermining intruders. Since Ritschl and Weizsäcker, the notion of two antagonistic Gospels may be regarded as antiquated. But James and Paul still remain as two not very harmonious personalities.

The author, with Hatch, holds bishops to have been financial administrators, often also elders. He does not take account of Hilgenfeld's suggestion, that the ἀρχιεπισκόπου had episcopal functions, and so that Ignatian episcopacy is older than the church.

The author gives an exceedingly luminous exposition of the moral necessity felt by the nobler pagans of vindicating the Empire as the sum of all human achievement, material, moral, and even spiritual, against the undermining power of the church, which insisted on not stopping short of eternity.

The consolidation of the Catholic Church over against Gnosticism and Montanism, its decline from the true ideal, and yet its historical necessity for the triumph of the gospel whose freshness it dimmed, is treated familiarly, yet originally. As to the theological and christological controversies, the author, while admitting how far they went beyond practical possibilities, well says that "although they may appear incomprehensible and aimless to us, they concerned the essentials of Christianity, and were discussed in conformity with the ideas and opinions of that age." These decisions mark the main channel of Christian thought. Monasticism he treats as in part an early Protestantism, not breaking with the Catholic Church, but secluding itself from it. He gives a very fine description of the Civitas Dei, and of the true progressiveness of Augustine. This may help to correct some of those shallow Pelagianizing depreciations of Augustine of which to-day is so fond. It is a way of smiting Paul at second hand which seems to be much in fashion. Yet Augustine, while the prophet of the Reformation, was, as a Roman thinker, no less the prophet of the Middle Ages. He hardly, however, appears to be the

prophet of Franciscanism, whose extravagant love of poverty, nevertheless, remarks the author, exalted trust in Providence, independence of external accidents, boundless brotherhood and charity, marching side by side with the chivalric ideal, at last gained predominance over it among the people. The influence of the persecuted *fraticelli* on the birth of the Reformation seems to deserve a deeper investigation.

Of his own country, after the Thirty Years' War, Dr. Sell says: "Germany had lost all else that makes a nation great, — authority, power, honor, and wealth, — but she had maintained the Reformation." And these other things are now being added to her. "A sense of gratitude that the light of primitive Christian doctrine had again risen, after centuries of Egyptian darkness, was the motive power of the Reformation movement. That alone accounts for its uniting hearts instead of driving them asunder like a storm." That the open Bible engenders "as many creeds as it has readers," as the Catholics jeeringly say, is sufficiently refuted by the fact that the Reformation divided into only two parties. Even in the Anglo-Saxon world, remarks the author, multiplying church formations go hand in hand with deepening unity of fellowship and effort.

The author does full justice to the Martyr Church of the Huguenots, the child of "austere and sublime Calvinism." He also appreciates the Independents so highly that he seems even to glory in the execution of Charles I. Of early Independency he says: "It was the reign of inspiration, if but for a moment, and that moment was the greatest and the most fundamental in the history of England's evolution."

The author shows how the Spanish church had secured a reform in the sense of the Council of Constance. Instead of submitting to Rome, Spain rather domineered over Rome, and sometimes even made her tremble for her own repute of orthodoxy. He points out the strong resemblances between Jesuitism and Methodism, which yet are so antagonistic in principle, the one repressing individuality, the other advancing it. The Jesuit "is out and out a politician. That is his strong point, and the secret power wherewith he fascinates politicians; but it is also his limitation. There is no place for the living God in such a religion." He has abdicated in favor of his vicar, whom they control. The papacy has again reached a magnificent height, but all freshness of Christian life and thought under it is a reflection from Protestantism. Rome may now be worthy of interest, and not seldom of respect, but she is no longer worthy of awe.

Modern Protestantism, the author says, a victorious and civilizing force throughout the world, has less of the Reformation in it than of Pietism and Christianized Illuminism. It has opened the Bible, — it is now waiting for the coming forth from it of the Living Christ. Science and Religion, the author fancies, can only be reconciled through Kant. The legitimate aspirations of Socialism may be peacefully met, or it may pull down the fabric of modern society. The gospel, independent of any social fabric, will survive either event.

James Freeman Clarke. Autobiography, Diary, and Correspondence. Edited by Edward Everett Hale. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company. 1891. Pp. 430. \$1.50. — This book seems like a cheerful, rambling country mansion. It is plain that it would just have suited the taste of James Freeman Clarke. "Cheerful godliness" precisely describes his life and character. His own description of his happy and various childhood is charming. It was a good setting off to

such a life. His grandfather Freeman (his father's stepfather) had so entirely the art of teaching, without seeming to teach, that there was just so much of misery saved. And although the Latin school and the university were both conducted then in a sufficiently drudging and lifeless fashion, he never lost the first spring. Through life he steadily stood for the principle that life brings labor enough to exempt us from the duty of aggravating it to the young for the mere sake of "discipline." He was somewhat extreme perhaps, but hardly so, inasmuch as it is not difficult studies which he deprecates, but needlessly perplexing ways of going about them.

Dr. Clarke was always glad of the seven years of his early ministry in Kentucky. He admired the Kentuckians as much as they deserve, which is saying a great deal. Of course, this admiration respected the natural set and bent of his character, not the terrible deformations of it, induced mainly by slavery, partly by the lack of higher aims in the first settlement. Judge Speed and his family concentrated and embodied his unalloyed satisfaction in Kentuckianism. With this for a centre, but thinking of Western character at large (then bounded by the Missouri), he says: "Its simplicity charms me, its openness commands my sympathy, its free, unfettered activity calls for my admiration." These seven years were a good preparation for fifty years in Boston.

The specific character of the Church of the Disciples, as distinguished from the other Unitarian churches of Boston, is not brought out very vividly by either the pastor or the editor, at least for those unfamiliar with Boston Unitarianism. We only know this, that James Freeman Clarke had in it half a century of a placidly uniform and stirringly various pastorate. As near as we make out, he aimed at gathering a brotherhood of Unitarian doctrine and culture, and of Baptist or Methodist warmheartedness and unconventionality. Father Taylor's emphatic approbation of the organization answers sufficiently for the latter feature, and Dr. Clarke's own character answers for the whole, so long as he should live. He seems to have desired above everything to bring his people to be centred in the heart of mankind, by having them centred in the heart of Christ. A most thoroughly New Testament ideal, surely. And as he had none of the angelical absurdities of his dear friend, the younger Channing, the fire that he set caught. He seems to have had a great admiration of angelical absurdities, of which there were all sorts and kinds seething in Boston when he returned (not to inquire too narrowly into the parentage of all), but to have known very well how to hold his way through.

His two or three visits to Europe would have borne more opening out. The accounts of them are anything but effusive, out of Italy, but they take hold. His sitting in the old church in Basel, and wondering how he should vote on the deposition of the Pope when his turn came, and then going down into the far older crypt and anticipating, with dismay, the council that was to be held above in four hundred years more for deposing a Pope, gives just that sense of the reality of things old which is imparted by humor always adequate and never more than so.

The occasional letters from Emerson, Dr. Channing, and other great men, add to the book, though these are few. We need not speak of the author's steady courage and strenuous efforts against slavery. And when a man so little erratic has for many years upheld woman suffrage, this must be seriously considered. Forty or fifty years ago he pleaded for the friendly treatment of a *constructive* Socialism.

Faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, and a fellowship with his universal church, were always avowed by him as central principles. He speaks of himself as not differing widely in his theology from that eminently healthy teacher, Jacob Abbott. A certain lack of cogency, and the most trifling touch of corporate self-complacency, show the Unitarian. Corporate self-complacency has a specific flavor with each denomination. If we all had as little of ours as he of his, the Universal Church would soon be visible.

A Christian Ben Adhem.

The Makers of Modern English. A Popular Handbook to the Popular Poets of the Century. By *W. J. Dawson*, author of "The Threshold of Manhood," "A Vision of Souls, and Other Ballads," "Quest and Vision," etc. New York: Thomas Whittaker, 2 and 3 Bible House. 1890. Pp. viii, 375. \$1.75. — A sound, strong, and sunny book. The author calls himself a middleman, who in this hurrying age tries to sample for many what they cannot find time to peruse at full. But he has himself thoroughly digested it, and reproduces it in a delightful book.

He rightly remarks that English literature is a steady growth, interrupted by no chasms. Even the transition from the hard artificiality of Pope (who nevertheless has his own eminence and excellence) to the freer succeeding schools came gradually and almost unconsciously.

The author gives such a description of Burns as only a Scotchman could give, full of love and of appreciation on every side, without any necessity of glorifying that in him which was of earth and sin. So of Byron he says that the distractions of vice disturbed and poisoned his genius. But why does he throw on "the lively imagination" of Mrs. Stowe the charge which she simply reports? It was unfortunate, certainly, that the only form of womanly purity which Byron met was implacably unsympathetic. But there was little in him to answer to any form of female nobility. Though Byron helped to break up the traditions of despotism, the author rightly refuses to credit his aristocratic pride and intense selfishness with any love of man. His poetic work gave English poetry European currency, and the author esteems the admiration of Goethe well able to weigh down the somewhat finical literary fastidiousness of Arnold and Swinburne. And as to the man himself, there was at least that in him which was capable of giving itself to death for a noble cause.

The writer's contempt for Coleridge as a philosopher and theologian simply denotes that he himself appreciates poetry above philosophy and theology. The thoughts of Coleridge have entered into the very life-blood of both American and English Christianity. To say that twenty more pages like "Christabel" or the "Ancient Mariner" would be worth all his prose should be qualified by adding "for me."

The paper on Wordsworth, as is natural, is the best of many good. He describes very finely how the homely simplicity, self-restraint, and deep-rooted virtue of the Cumbrian dalesmen, and their depth of intimacy with Nature in all her moods, but especially in her graver moods, are at the bottom of his character. The Westmoreland novel of Mrs. Barr helps one to understand this better. The author notes the absence from his poetry of "the pathetic fallacy" which imposes our mood on Nature. He has been wont to submit himself in simple docility to her, and has discovered her to be charged with a divine message, personally

immanent in her. Therefore his poetry heals, purifies, and exalts. As the substance of his poetry, so his style, is at its best between 1798 and 1818. "It is direct, nervous, cogent, full of undesigned felicities, and often full of lovely melody." After that he wrote much verse, but little poetry.

Wordsworth revolted from the madness of the French Revolution into a rather bigoted Toryism. But, as the author remarks, he was always in the deepest sense a democrat. As Keble says, *semper a pauperum et simpliciorum partibus stabat*. And his abstraction from the world is not an abstraction from his country, for which, both in prose and poetry, he has shown a Miltonian passionateness of noble and wise affection, so that he has a full right to appeal to Milton. And with all his Toryism, as he appeals to the regicide poet, so he speaks with contempt of the sycophantic wail over the death of that honest insignificance, Louis XVI., whose murder was neither more nor less wicked than its fellows, while he reaches the summit of nobleness in his sonnet to the great negro chieftain whom Napoleon was starving to death. The sixty-four pages on Wordsworth alone would pay for buying the book.

The Humanitarian Movement is interestingly though briefly treated, as represented by those two children of London, Thomas Hood and Mrs. Browning, who had felt the full weight of the city's woe. To Tennyson there are given a hundred pages, which in one respect are even more satisfactory than those given to Wordsworth, namely, that he is easier to compass. So variously engaged in sympathy towards nature, society, history, legend, religion, science, he has not plunged into any such depths of one object as to elude a follower. The scientific accuracy of his observation of nature is noted. Moreover, he is a Lincolnshire man, a man of the fens and wolds, not of the hills and lakes and mountain torrents. And the happy landscapes of cultured England have laid the strongest hold on him, as has the ease and wealth of patrician English life. He is so scientific that he has no revolutionary ardor. Æonian change will come in due sequence, and meanwhile monarchical, aristocratic, luxurious England is enough to satisfy all reasonable wishes, and to invite to a gentle disdain of all the world besides. His coronet sits easily and naturally on his head. The author enlarges on the deep reverence, the pure warmth, and warm purity with which Tennyson regards woman. His lot, from plain notes of his verse, has been, in mother and wife, the antipodes of Byron. He reveres womanhood too much to ascribe to it the rude strength either of understanding, passion, or will which would make woman the equal of man in the outer work of the world. He is not ashamed of Christian marriage or of the Christian home. Against the female harpies — or the male — who are endeavoring to tear this to pieces, there can never be opposed any more efficacious spell than the lines with which the prince concludes his pleading, unless, indeed, it were

"Not as all other women are,
Is she who to my soul is dear."

There is a very full and very fine analysis of "In Memoriam."

In treating of Browning, the author hardly gives due weight to Mr. Stedman's gentle and tempered criticism on his formlessness and neglect of beauty, which certainly go beyond all reasonable bounds. Otherwise his paper is very satisfactory, reproducing fully Browning's hearty health and sunny faith. It is curious, but he thinks that a single reference of

Miss Caroline Fox to Wordsworth's long study of the one right word for a sonnet is largely answerable for Browning's disposition to give one word and expect the reader to supply two. What a pity he had not consented to meet us half way!

As to Browning's attitude toward religion, the author remarks that the vision of Christ has been with him an ever-growing vision; that he recognizes that in Him is the key, or there is no key.

"Browning has had no model. If we except the faintest possible trace of Shelley's influence, which, like an ethereal fragrance, haunts the pages of 'Pauline,' we may say that he shows no sign of the influence of any of the elder bards upon his style. He is unique in his rugged individuality, the subtlety of his analysis, the suggestiveness and intensity of his thought, the originality of his phrases, and, if one may use the term, the extraordinary agility of his intellect." He has given a greater body of thought than all other contemporary poets put together. He is the greatest of modern humorists in the sense of his broad, wide sympathy with everything in man. As to style, this at least he has done. Wordsworth was not ashamed of the words of prose, Browning is not ashamed of the words of vernacular prose. "He has enlarged the possibilities of English poetry by adding to it a bold, nervous, masculine vocabulary." "He has had the courage of individuality also in resisting the Agnostic tendencies of his time, and amid the dismayed and doubtful has consistently delivered a testimony of hope."

Arnold, Rossetti, Swinburne, Morris, receive slighter but adequate and appreciative treatment. He is full upon Shelley and Keats, and of course upon Scott, whose brightness, delightfulness, variety, and healthfulness, in prose and verse, are impregnable to all criticism.

The Light of the World, or *The Great Consummation*. By Sir Edwin Arnold, K. C. I. E., C. S. I., author of "The Light of Asia," etc. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 18 and 20 Astor Place. 1891. Pp. xii, 286. — The best parts of this are those which treat of the Sermon on the Mount and of the Parables. They are very fine specimens of delicate, gently developing interpretation. Of course, as his previous endeavor to set forth Buddhism Christianly had no historical value or possibility, no more has this endeavor to set forth Christianity Buddhistically. As Max Müller remarks, the many striking coincidences between Christianity and the Great Renunciation are implied in the absolute opposition of their principles. The gospel of despair and the gospel of immortal hope both teach detachment from blind appetency, from hatred, and from the shows of earth; and therefore a wide range of their precepts must be materially the same, although tending from principles and tending to conclusions wide as the universe apart.

Of course the imagination of the Magi as Buddhists transcends utterly the historical horizon of the evangelical tradition. Its Magi are real magi, Zoroastrians, worshipers of a living God, and cherishers of a Messianic anticipation. But Sir Edwin's assumption suits his purpose admirably, and its contradiction to fact and possibility agrees with the other contradictions in removing the life of Christ out of the range of reality, and thus suits it better for being æsthetically smothered in flowers, and bent into the sentimental sweetness which is so much unlike the New Testament, but, we suppose, by no means unlike the Tripitaka. Yet, as a genuine reverence pervades the whole poem, the divine subject is left calmly sublime, and more evidently divine, which certainly is

a good effect. When the exuberant flowers of an easy poetical rhetoric are all faded, the Lord, we believe, will be found not to have been greatly glorified nor grievously offended.

The removal of the life of our Lord from his actual reality is still further promoted by bringing Pilate, on his way to answer the charges of his superior, to lodge at the luxuriously appointed house of Mary Magdalen, to whom he confides a consuming remorse, fed by the perpetual presence of the Crucified before him, which there is the least possible reason to suppose that Pilate ever felt. Then, according to the church tradition, Mary Magdalen is identified with the woman who was a sinner, in complete contradiction to the requirements of the Gospels, which nowhere identify demoniacal possession with peculiar depravity. Then, to make confusion worse confounded, Mary of Magdala is identified with Mary of Bethany, on the ground of an anointing different from that in Galilee in character, circumstances, and occasion, and in all probability suggested by the latter. This anti-historical identification of the two Marys, and representation of them as having been of evil fame, seems as little consonant with the delicacy with which our Lord guarded his habitual associations as a cold repulsion would have been consonant with his divine benignity. All historical probability being thus bewildered, the fancy courses unrestrained over the evangelical narrative. Every fanciful story, like those of the Apocryphal Gospels, is heaped in as a part of the whole, however incongruous with the accredited Gospels, with the character of Christ, or with the course of his human development.

The poem turns entirely on the narrative of our Lord's life as given by Mary Magdalen to Pilate, but much more fully to one of the three Magi, the Buddhist sage who has returned to gain ampler particulars concerning the later life of the Babe to whom he and his two fellows had rendered homage a generation before. His own position (which the author takes opportunity to designate with sufficient distinctness as shared by himself) seems to differ not very widely from that of the Shin sect of Japanese Buddhism, although, of course, far more deeply colored with Christian feeling. The ascription of any attributes whatever to God, except as an illusion conceded to human feeling, is rebuked as unworthy of Him. In other words, God becomes no God, but an indeterminate Somewhat, out of which the world proceeds, though in what way corresponding to anything in it we cannot say. That is, the position is very near to what used to be called Atheistic, but what it is now fashionable to call Agnostic. Then, like the Shin sect again, a conscious heaven is admitted, but only as a station on the way to the absolute indeterminateness and passivity of Nirvana, a state which, like the being of God, may be called Something or Nothing, as it happens to strike the thought, — Nothing, by inevitable necessity, gaining the final prevalence. The eternal worth of personal distinctness, and its eternal conscious activity in the ethical coalescence of love and faith with Him who "himself is purest Act," as they are vital to Christianity and alien to Buddhism, so they seem to be, by plain implication, denied in this poem. But whatever of the gospel can be admitted consistently with omitting the foundation of the gospel is handled sweetly, though rather cloyingly, reverently, and often happily.

The poetry, though applied from without and not welling up from within, is agreeable. The poem has in it no guaranty of immortality,

but there is no reason why it may not afford much pleasure and profit to great numbers for quite a while to come. And it is so easy to read that we should advise all to read it, as a very pleasing specimen of an Apocryphal or Gnosticizing gospel of the nineteenth century.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, with an Appendix containing the Biblical Aramaic, based on the Lexicon of William Gesenius as translated by Edward Robinson. Edited by Francis Brown, D. D., with the coöperation of S. R. Driver, D. D., of Oxford, and Charles A. Briggs, D. D., of Union Theological Seminary, New York. Part I. Pp. xii, 80. 1891. 50 cents per Part. — The Being of God as Unity and Trinity. By P. H. Steenstra, D. D., Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis in the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass. Pp. vi, 269. 1891. \$1.50. — Life and Letters of Robert Browning. By Mrs. Sutherland Orr. In Two Volumes. Vol. I., pp. xii, 324. Vol. II., pp. ix, 322. 1891. \$3.00 a set.

Roberts Brothers, Boston. History of the People of Israel from the Time of Hezekiah till the Return from Babylon. By Ernest Renan, author of "The Life of Jesus," "The Future of Science," etc. Pp. xiii, 439. 1891. \$2.50. — Sermons. By Frederic Henry Hedge, D. D., LL. D., author of "Reason in Religion," "Ways of the Spirit," etc., etc. Pp. vi, 341. 1891. \$1.50.

A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. The Sermon Bible. Vol. VII. St. Luke i. to St. John iii. Pp. 413. 1891. \$1.50. For sale by De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston. — The Expositor's Bible. Edited by the Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, M. A., LL. D., editor of "The Expositor." The Gospel of St. John. By Marcus Dods, D. D. Pp. xiii, 388. 1891. \$1.50. For sale by De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston.

The Baker & Taylor Co., New York. Our Country: its Possible Future and its Present Crisis. By Rev. Josiah Strong, D. D., General Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance for the United States, New York. With an Introduction by Professor Austin Phelps, D. D. Revised Edition, based on the Census of 1890. One hundred and fortieth thousand. Pp. 275. Paper 30 cents, cloth 60 cents. From Cong. Sunday-school and Publishing Society. — Stumbling Stones removed from the Word of God. By Arthur T. Pierson. 18mo, pp. v, 82. Cloth, 50 cents. For sale by De Wolfe, Fiske & Co., Boston.

Funk & Wagnalls, New York and London. Wendell Phillips, the Agitator. By Carlos Martyn, editor of "American Reformers," and author of "John Milton," etc. With an Appendix containing three of the Orator's masterpieces, never before published in book form, namely, "The Lost Arts," "Daniel O'Connell," "The Scholar in a Republic." 12mo, pp. xi, 600. 1890. \$1.50.

Hunt & Eaton, New York; Cranston & Stowe, Cincinnati. Christian Missions in the Nineteenth Century. By Rev. Elbert S. Todd, D. D. Pp. 174. 1890. 75 cents. — Sketches of Jewish Life in the First Century. Nicodemus; or, Scenes in the Days of Our Lord. Gamaliel; or, Scenes in the Times of Saint Paul. By James Strong, S. T. D., LL. D., Professor of Exegetical Theology in Drew Theological Seminary. Pp. 141. 1891. 60 cents. — Whedon's Commentary on the Bible. Commentary on the Old Testament. Vol. II. Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. Leviticus and Numbers by Daniel Steele, D. D.; Deuteronomy, by John W. Lindsay, D. D. Pp. 526. \$2.00. — The Doctrine of a Future Life from a Scriptural, Philosophical, and Scientific Point of View, including especially a Discussion of Immortality, the Intermediate State, the Resurrection, and Final Retribution. By James Strong, S. T. D., LL. D. Pp. 128. 1891. 60 cents.

Wilbur B. Ketchum, New York. It Is Written. A Careful Study of the Gospels as to all the Words and Acts of Our Lord, and other things contained therein touching the Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament. By T. S. Bacon, D. D. Pp. viii, 107. 1891.

G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, London. Gospel Criticism and Historical Christianity. A Study of the Gospels and of the History of the Gospel Canon during the Second Century. With a Consideration of the Results of Modern Criticism. By Orello Cone, D. D. Pp. xii, 365. \$1.75.

Fleming H. Revell Company, New York and Chicago. Biblical Theology of the New Testament. By Revere Franklin Weidner, Doctor and Professor of Theology, author of "Biblical Theology of the Old Testament," etc., etc. Vol. I., Part I. The Teaching of Jesus. Part II. The Petrine Teaching. Pp. ix, 238. \$1.50. Vol. II., Part III. Paulinism. Pp. viii, 351. \$1.50.

Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. Kant's Principles of Politics, including his Essay on Perpetual Peace. A Contribution to Political Science. Edited and translated by W. Hastie, B. D., translator of Kant's Philosophy of Law, etc., etc. Pp. xlv, 148. 1891. \$1.00. For sale by Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston. — A Short History of German Literature. By James K. Hosmer, Professor of English and German Literature in Washington University, St. Louis, Mo. Revised Edition. Pp. xv, 605. 1891. \$2.00. For sale by Damrell & Upham, Boston. — The Bohlen Lectures for 1891. The Peace of the Church. By William Reed Huntington, Rector of Grace Church, New York. Pp. xiii, 239. 1891. \$1.25. For sale by Damrell & Upham, Boston. — The Authority of Holy Scripture. An Inaugural Address. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D., Union Theological Seminary, New York. Second Edition, with Preface and Appendix containing additional notes and explanations. Pp. 111. 1891. 50 cents. For sale by Damrell & Upham, Boston. — Romans Dissected. A Critical Analysis of the Epistle to the Romans. By E. D. McRealsam. Pp. iii, 95. 1891. 75 cents.

Thomas Whitaker, New York. The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter in the Light of Old Testament Criticism and the History of Religions. With an Introduction and Appendices. Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the year 1889 on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M. A., Canon of Salisbury. By Thomas Kelly Cheyne, M. A., D. D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture, Canon of Rochester. Pp. xxxviii, 517. 1891. \$4.00. — The Right Road. A Handbook for Parents and Teachers. By John W. Kramer. Pp. viii, 282. 1891. \$1.25.

The American Sunday-school Union, Philadelphia and New York. People's Commentary on the Gospel according to John. Containing the Common Version, 1611, and the Revised Version, 1881 (American Readings and Renderings), with Critical, Exegetical, and Applicative Notes and Illustrations drawn from Life and Thought in the East. By Edwin W. Rice, D. D., author of "People's Commentary on Matthew," etc., etc. Maps and Original Engravings from Photographs (by permission) of the Palestine Fund, Bonfils, Good, Bell, and others. Pp. viii, 335. 1891. \$1.25.

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W. J. Shuey, Dayton. The People's Hymnal, for use in Public and Social Worship. By Edmund S. Lorenz. Pp. 304, 55. 1890. Price, with Responsive Services, 90 cents per copy, \$72 per hundred; Hymnal, 75 cents per copy, \$60 per hundred.

Morrison I. Swift, Ashtabula, Ohio. Problems of the New Life. By Morrison I. Swift. Pp. 126. 1891. Cloth \$1.00, paper 50 cents.

C. J. Clay & Sons, Cambridge University Press Warehouse, Ave Maria Lane, London. The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges. General Editor, J. J. S. Perowne, D. D., Bishop of Worcester. The Epistles to the Thessalonians, with Introduction, Notes, and Map. By the Rev. George G. Findlay, B. A., Professor of Biblical Languages in the Wesleyan College, Headingly. Edited for the Syndics of the University Press. Pp. 183. 1891. — *ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΩΝ*. The Seventh Book of the History of Thucydides. The Text newly revised and explained, with Introduction, Summaries, Maps, and Indexes. By the Rev. Hubert Ashton Holden, M. A., LL. D., Fellow of the University of London, Editor of the "Cyropædia of Xenophon," etc., etc. Edited for the Syndics of the University Press. Pp. lxiv, 384. 1891.

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The Religious Tract Society, London; Fleming H. Revell Company, New York and Chicago, Sole Agents. God's Champion, Man's Example. A Study of the Conflict of our Divine Deliverer. By the Rev. H. A. Birks, M. A., Curate of Chigswell, Essex, late Scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge, author of "Studies in the Life of St. Peter." Pp. 160. 60 cents.

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The French Constitution of 1793. Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D., School of Political Science, Columbia College. By Thomas Gold Frost, A. M., LL. B., (*cum laude*) Seligman Fellow, Member of the Minneapolis, Minnesota, Bar. — Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. Edited by the University Faculty of Political Science of Columbia College. Vol. I., Number 2. The History of Tariff Administration in the United States from Colonial Times to the McKinley Administration Bill. By John Dean Goss, Ph. D., New York. 1891. — *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia*. No. 32. Recent Constitution-making in the United States. North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Washington. By Francis Newton Thorpe, Professor of Constitutional History, School of American History and Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. 50 cents. No. 33. Economics in Italy. By Achille Loria, Professor of Political Economy and Statistics, University of Siena. 50 cents. — *Collins Printing House, Philadelphia*. Recollections of General Grant, etc. By George W. Childs. Pp. 104. 1890. — J. N. Stearns, New York. A Review of Rev. Edward H. Jewett's "Communion Wine," and an Appeal to Christians of every Name. By John Ellis, M. D., author of "The Wine Question," etc. Pp. 32. — *Thomas Whittaker, New York*. Miracles in Nature and in Revelation, and especially the great Miracle of Our Lord's Resurrection from the Dead. By the Rev. W. D. Wilson, D. D., LL. D. Pp. 42. 1890. — Let us Anchor our Churches and make them Free. By W. S. Rainsford, D. D. Pp. 25. 1890. — *American Unitarian Association, Boston*. Different New Testament Views of Jesus. By Joseph Henry Crocker. Pp. 80. 1891. — *Scriptural Tract Repository, Boston, New York, London*. Who made the New Testament? The Rejected Books. The Council of Nice and Canon of Scripture. By H. L. Hastings. Pp. 31. — *From the New Englander and Yale Review for April, 1890*. What did the Apostle Paul mean? By John F. Weir. — *The Manufacturers' Record Co., Baltimore*. The South's Redemption from Poverty to Prosperity. By Richard H. Edmonds. Pp. 63. 1890. — S. A. Maxwell & Co., Chicago. Two Essays in Economics. By John Borden. Pp. 139. 1890. — *From the American Journal of Psychology, Vol. III., No. 3, 1890*. Recent Criminological Literature. By Arthur MacDonald, Ph. D. — *The Marigold Printing Co., Bridgeport*. Giving in One's Lifetime. By Rev. George Warner Nichols, D. D. Pp. 22. 1890. — *From the New Englander and Yale Review for March, 1890*. The Relations between Benevolent Societies and the Congregational Churches. By Rev. Edward W. Gilman, D. D. — *From the Journal of Mental Science, January, 1891 (England)*. Ethics as Applied to Criminology. By Dr. Arthur MacDonald. — *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia*. Public Health and Municipal Government. By John S. Billings, M. D., U. S. Army, Supplement to the Annals of the Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, February, 1891. Pp. 23. — *George H. Ellis, Boston*. Scientific Theology the Ground of all Liberal Religion. By Francis Ellingwood Abbot, Ph. D. Reprinted from the "Unitarian Review" of December, 1889. Pp. 21. — Prebendary Burbidge and "The Lutheran Movement." A Review and an Answer. — *Republican Press Association, Concord*. Ecclesiastical v. Civil Authority. God in the Federal Constitution, Man and Woman Out. By Parker Pillsbury. Pp. 24. 1890. — *Seishi Bunsha, Tōkyō*. Fourteenth Report of the Council of Missions cooperating with the Church of Christ in Japan. January, 1891. — *Colorado Springs, Colorado*. Colorado College Studies. Papers read before the Colorado College Scientific Society. Pp. 36. 1890. — *The Inland Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan*. Æsthetics: its Problems and Literature. By Fred N. Scott, Ph. D., Assistant Professor of Rhetoric in the University of Michigan. Pp. vii, 32. 1890.

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THE PREACHING OF THE GOSPEL.

WHAT is the ministry? What is its prime purpose? What is its essential message? It may be late in the day to ask such questions, but it can be shown that they are not superfluous. As one proof, we submit the mere fact that there is a constant impulse in the church to ask them. There is also, one would almost say, a growing diversity of answers. In this article these questions are asked for a specific reason. The proper answer to the last question, as comprehending the other two, is constantly in danger. I wish to set forth and defend the gospel.

For, of course, the Scriptural answer to the question is, the gospel. The great commission defines the ministry, its purpose, its message. "Go ye into all the world and preach the *gospel* to every creature." This word "gospel" has a definite meaning, which never varies in the Book. It is "the gospel of peace, glad tidings of good things" (Rom. x. 15); "the gospel of your salvation" (Eph. i. 13); "the gospel of the grace of God" (Acts xx. 24). The great apostle sets forth the whole relation thus: "God gave unto us the *ministry of reconciliation*, to wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not reckoning unto them their trespasses, and having put in us the *word of reconciliation*. On behalf of Christ we are therefore *ambassadors*, as though God were *entreating* through us: we *beseech* on behalf of Christ, *be ye reconciled to God*" (2 Cor. v. 19, 20). Let us try to enter into this "gospel of God" and "of Christ."

Of late years, no questions have excited a more lively interest than those involved in the coming of Christ as "the Saviour of the world" (1 John iv. 14). The facts of man's need of a Saviour,

of Christ's personality as the true and only Saviour, and of salvation by grace and not by works, have been settled in former generations, when the church specifically fought the battle on behalf of these truths. Calvin, the great theologian of the Reformation, secured a new and intelligent acceptance of the two invaluable truths emphasized by Paul and later by Augustine, and well nigh universally denied at the time of the Reformation. First, that Jesus Christ, in his redeeming work as the Saviour of men, did a real and effective work; not merely removing obstacles in the way of man's salvation, or rendering it possible or consistent for God to allow or to aid in the saving of sinners, but "obtaining eternal redemption," "bringing salvation," a genuine fact to be submitted to men's faith, that is, to the appropriating faculty by which man gets hold of invisible things. These are veritable "things of God, graciously given to us of God" (1 Cor. ii. 12). Secondly, that the bestowal of this actual salvation is not according to desert, but according to grace, it being a *bona fide* offer of the divine love to sinners equally lost and equally incapable of self-saving. This was a permanent service. In many places it needs to be emphasized to-day. God did not provide a salvation for those whom He foresaw would be fittest for and most deserving of salvation according to any human estimate, but for the undeserving, the lost. His grace abounds to the chief of sinners.

As compared with the Arminian view, the Calvinistic conception of the individual as the object of God's grace is thoroughly Scriptural. But the old Calvinism was deficient by a too narrow conception of election. Its idea of the world for which Christ died, and to which the gospel was applicable, was too contracted. This is not strange, if we consider the age and the stage of that civilization which expresses the modifying influence of the gospel upon the larger relations of humanity. The full meaning of the Fatherhood of God was not apprehended, and the brotherhood of men was an unknown idea. It was an age in which the only conception of the world possible to each nation was: We and our foes; or, We and the barbarians. In such a division of mankind, God's good things are for us, with wrath for our enemies, and unconcern for the barbarians. We have not yet fully outgrown such distinctions. The church necessarily partook of the narrowness of the nations, and in its view salvation was as partial a grant as was liberty, or learning, or wealth, or supremacy, in the view of the peoples. This intrinsically selfish conception or estimate of God's dealings was defended by, and professedly based

upon, distorted views of the Divine Sovereignty. For this no better guide was known than an inscrutable purpose, practically indistinguishable from arbitrariness, instead of the plainly revealed divine love to which all things in God are instruments and ministries. It was indeed a mighty step in advance when men were taught that they owed what they had to God in a sovereign dispensing, rather than to themselves in a meagre self-righteousness. For it humbled men, and brought them into real contact with God. But it did not do full justice to God as He is, nor to his government of the world as administered by the Son, "whom He hath appointed heir of all things." It never rose to Paul's conception of the divine love and its large freedom, as set forth in Romans xi., and in the Epistles to the Ephesians and the Colossians.

To our age belongs the settlement of the question of the applicability of a divine salvation by grace to the world. Of that world we of to-day have a larger and more sympathetic conception than any generation before us. Yet our conception of it is certainly not large enough. Of the relation of Jesus Christ to that world we are trying to get fuller knowledge. We have not yet come to have perfectly clear perceptions of its wide range, but we shall have at some time. The Holy Spirit is leading the church in its investigation of this question. It is the pivot of the most active religious thinking; it is the essential point in the religious controversies of the day; it is the guide in the exegetical work of the time; it is the purpose of the unprecedented passion of our generation to become better acquainted with the person Jesus Christ, who lived and died in the world as the Son of man and Son of God; it is the inspiration in the best, noblest, and most successful work of the church, — its carrying the light of God's love into all the dark places of the earth. Timid souls may deprecate the stir which marks this new search after truth, but souls who believe in God can only await the future with a glad confidence; for the only outcome must be, that the world shall have a better understanding of the things freely given to it of God in Him whom God sent to be its Saviour.

From more than one side, indeed, this view is still denied, disputed, discouraged. The unbelief of our day knows nothing, can know nothing, of such a drawing near of God to men as can furnish the only ground for such a mission as the word "gospel" indicates. A prevalent conception of the church discountenances the earnestness, the largeness, the pathos which are in Paul's words

the assurance of an immeasurable hope for men as men. The timidity inseparable from a one-sided theological system restrains the utterance of an invitation which shall do justice at once to the infinite love of an infinite God, and to the illimitable needs of a lost world.

The time has come when the church of Christ should give more serious consideration to that question of utmost moment to itself, Why has the preached gospel of the grace of God as yet so little power among lost men? To find the answer still, as has been so steadily done, in the general, original disinclination of men to believe it, does not suffice. The gospel counts upon this estrangement, and proposes to overcome it in every instance by its power as a promise. It is a most miserable subterfuge when a preacher can satisfy himself with preaching a gospel like this to sinners for "a witness against them." To preach it in a wholesale way, in a professed ignorance of God's design with it in any particular instance, is unworthy an intelligent preacher. The ignorance may be real, both on the part of the preacher and hearer, but it is not to their credit. It may also be true that this ignorance does not affect the responsibility of the hearer in his treatment of God's message. But that the Lord God should take advantage of that ignorance, and because of it should push claims which presuppose understanding, is an astounding view of the ethics which the Eternal practices. Nothing can more thoroughly unfit a gospel preacher for his real business than the persuasion that God sends him to do things for show, or for the mere increase of condemnation, or to furnish the Judge of all the earth with an excuse for seeming to do in right sequence what was decided upon beforehand. God has determined nothing that needs to be justified by anything less than absolute right, such right as moral creatures can consent to, a righteousness which is of the essence of love. "God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all." It is a pertinent question to be put to the church, whether the world rejects the gospel as a salvation, not merely applicable to, but intended for, the world. And it is a most important question for every preacher, who must give account of his ministry as a ministry of reconciliation, whether his hearers receive the gospel from him as a personal and in every way genuine offer of eternal life.

It is quite possible for ministers to be simply transmitters, in a decorous and edifying manner, of a system of logical ideas, which shall maintain the historical existence of the church as a reformed or super-reformed church. Who would in such cases

deny to men zealous in such occupation the name of clergymen, or cast doubt on the honesty of intention or the dignity of their efforts? But such teachers have no exclusive right, possibly they have no right at all, to the designation, ambassadors for Christ. It is quite possible to learn theology, even orthodox theology, without coming in contact with the Christ. It is also possible to teach theology without administering reconciliation. History is full of proof. May it not be feared that the world is so largely indifferent to the preached gospel because, among other things, the church still makes the difference between theology and the gospel so prominent?

The necessity of a satisfactory self-defense upon this point increases daily for ministers of the gospel. It sometimes looks as though the choice would ere long be between the justification of our mission to the world, and a being confined to a certain class of men, — such as are still driven by a selfish fear to connect their eternal hope with a man of clerical dignity, and to quiet their inward fear by submissively listening to phrases which gratify their religious feeling.

There are those who say that this choice has already come, and that many ministers have already adopted the latter alternative; hence, that in this will be found the reason why a growing proportion of what, in the sphere of the world, are the most serious, active, and wide-awake men, concern themselves so little with spiritual things as presented by the church. May their indifference not be attributed in part to the lack of earnestness on the part of the ministry in presenting an efficient salvation? Much of the gospel preached is on a low spiritual plane. Thinking men do not feel that that kind of gospel meets in them a real want.

But I do not design now formally to enter upon this problem, Why has the ordinary preaching so little effect upon the more developed intellect? It is simply submitted as a living question to the church and ministry of to-day. For while it is true that the judgment of the world in this matter is not a decisive criterion, yet the influence of the gospel, as preached, upon the world, is a criterion of the reality and value of our work as a Christian church. The Lord Jesus said: "I came not to judge the world, but to save the world." Whatever can in any degree justify the world in withdrawing from the church condemns the church. Therefore the church must always consult its past record in relation to the Word and to the world. A better understanding of that

past must serve to perfect the witness of the church of the present by simplifying its message. Improvement in the message is no uncharitable condemnation of the past. Better methods are no denial of the important work of the church throughout the ages. The changes in the past are so many that it is difficult to say now to which form of the presentation of the truth the palm must be awarded as practical influences in the salvation of the world. Each system contends for the meed of praise. The adherents of one are inclined to depreciate the effort of another. But the award becomes more and more difficult. Church history is largely a record of mutual rejections within the Christian church because of differences of opinion, and at the same time the recital of the practical, beneficent influence of these opposing views upon the moral development of men. The conclusion of history is, that where the word of God is free and accessible, and thus makes possible a life-communion with the Christ as a living Person, it is no hard task to find a working theory of religion. The practical result does not always justify our logic. Systems which were condemned as heresies by councils and synods have proved full of saving influences, by the truth still in them, when wielded by men who proceeded from a genuine love to God and men. No church was ever lost because of deficient or distorted views of theological truth, nor has any church been saved by the orthodoxy of an inherited system. No quickened church has ever allowed itself to be persuaded that the best part of its heritage was the intellectual legacy of previous generations. Nor has any earnest church ever been able to suppress the feeling of a holy call to new voyages of discovery. Nor will the true church ever be able to rest until it knows not only what is, but also what is not, in the wide revelation of God. Until it knows all, its ear will be reverently open to the thoughts of men as well as to the thoughts of God. And in the application of the will of God — ever yet limited by an incomplete understanding of that will — the church will consult no less the needs of the world as presented by itself, and the witness of the universal conscience, than the revelation contained in the Book. And the church will always find that at last only faith, that is, knowledge of God in Christ, overcomes the world.

In addition, a few questions, which are still living questions, may well be pondered by the ministry.

Does, even in our time of active thinking and freer speech, theology really keep pace with the development of the other sciences?

Are the ruling opinions, as they find utterance in the ordinary preaching, concerning God and man and their mutual relations sufficiently complete, and in full accord with the revelation in Scripture and in nature?

Does the ministry exercise enough of the calmness which befits those who have been made free by the truth, in listening to and trying to understand sound reason, as no despicable test of our conceptions of truths, admittedly held upon the authority of tradition, more or less sanctified by merely human associations?

Is the form of its labors large enough, if the gospel as a ministry of reconciliation affects the entire man and concerns the world as world?

Are the motives urged in recommending the gospel sufficiently exalted and wholly worthy both of God and man?

In brief, have ministers of Christ enough of faith in Christ to appeal simply to his right as the Christ among men, and to rest in the assurance of Christ's power as a sure, drawing force?

For there the Scriptures place the right, the reality, the seriousness, the promise of this work of the gospel ministry. "We are ambassadors for Christ."

The idea of an official representative which underlies this word is also in all the words used to designate the office of the preacher. Apostle, messenger, elder, overseer, minister, herald, are but different forms of this relation. The dispensation of grace is mediately administered. The term "ambassador" is connected with a system. "All things are of God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ. . . . God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not reckoning unto them their trespasses: *therefore* we are *ambassadors* for Christ." The gospel scheme of reconciliation proceeds from God, and is carried out by Jesus Christ his Son. He is its prime Agent, its Prophet, Priest, and King. The work of Christ as Redeemer is done on the behalf of God. In it all He came to do the Father's will. Through the whole dispensation of reconciliation, He is the representative of the Father. God *sent* his Son to men. Hence He is called in Hebrews "the Apostle, Messenger, and Highpriest of our confession." By the word *sending* He interprets the full meaning of his life among us. To the Jews who sought to kill Him, He said, "I came not of myself, the Father sent me" (John viii. 42). That word is the sufficient warrant of his truth: "He whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God" (John iii. 34). That word explains his person: "The Father that sent me is with me, He hath not

left me alone" (John viii. 29). It justifies the closest identification of himself with God: "Say ye of Him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God?" (John x. 36). It is the real contents of his revelation, and the knowledge of it is the coming salvation: "This is life eternal, that they should know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent" (John xvii. 3). By this last word, especially, we understand that the value of Jesus' mission to us is this: It declares God. In Christ we see God, hear Him, enter into dealings with Him.

Under this ambassadorship of Christ comes in the ambassadorship of the ministry. Outside of this revealed plan of salvation gospel preachers are not conceivable. In the carrying out of the scheme of reconciliation they occupy a well-defined place. Their part as workers in and with this plan is well summed up in the words of Christ: "Ye also shall bear witness" (John xv. 27). The Lord's sacerdotal prayer consists mainly of a formal and solemn transfer of his earthly mission to such men, as if it were the charge of a holy consecration in the presence of the Father: "I manifested thy name unto the men whom Thou gavest me. The words which Thou gavest me I have given unto them. As Thou didst send me into the world, even so send I them. I made known unto them thy name, and will make it known, that the love wherewith Thou lovedst me may be in them, and I in them" (John xvii. 6, 18, 22, 26).

This is the inestimable worth of the gospel ministry to the world, that as God came to it in the person of Christ, so Christ comes to it through the ministry, by which the world comes into a real contact with the Christ. This is the place of the ministry, to be the representatives of Him who calls himself the Saviour of the world. This is its work, to bring Christ to men. For this must take place before men can be brought to Christ. This is its mission, to perfect the saving work of Christ in the world.

The ministry can never have too profound a conviction of the necessity of the consciousness of this union between itself and Christ. Not as priests, but as heralds. If one cannot sincerely think of himself as in similar relation to the great need of men as the Saviour of men, he must not pretend to have a conception of, or to address, that need. Upon this point the conviction of a preacher must be clear and decided. The Christ has ascended, and is at the right hand of the Father. He comes not again in person until the judgment. He now comes by his Spirit and by men.

To these men and upon their message He promises the Spirit. Thus, between the man who has the word of reconciliation as its minister, and God the reconciler, the links are complete. The man is nothing, and yet the man is much. He is a voice, and the thought of God is back of him. He is a telephone. In the instrument is neither sound nor sense. It cannot form a syllable, much less propound an idea. As an original expresser of words it is nothing. But as a conveyer of sounds or thoughts, how much it is! How swift, how clear, how faithful as a transmitter! Such is the ideal of a gospel minister, — a man who lets God in Christ speak through him.

This was Paul's conception. His apostleship was a large office. But the essential part in it to him was the preaching. "Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel" (1 Cor. i. 17). With an unbounded enthusiasm, and with a singularly deep and simple feeling, he speaks of this privilege: "It were better for me to die than that any man should make my ground of glorying void" (1 Cor. ix. 15). Practically, he subordinated everything to it. His pastoral labors were unbounded. The care of all the churches came upon him. He, more than any other, was consulted about practical questions. He was a great organizer, a great bishop, a great teacher, but he has mainly come down to us as the great preacher. On many questions his opinions are of authoritative value, notably in church government and ethics, but on no topic has he spoken with so much force and decisiveness as on what was to him "the glorious gospel of the blessed God" (1 Tim. i. 11). His epistles are sermons rather than treatises. How full of eloquence! The gospel to be preached was his pride and love, as he had received it at first hand from the Lord Jesus in the very hour in which the beauty of the Lord and his power to save were revealed to him as the chief of sinners. How well he understood where lay the secret of its glory and force! With what fine pride he writes to the Romans: "For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ, for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." With what splendid courage he speaks to the Jewish court: "Having obtained the help that is from God, I stand witnessing how that the Christ should proclaim light both to the people and to the Gentiles" (Acts xxvi. 22, 23).

If one dwell much in that atmosphere of Paul, he can have no doubt as to what is the real work of the ministry, which gives it value and power. But one can easily get out of that atmosphere into that of ecclesiasticism. Paul's simple sense did not

rule very widely nor long in the Christian church. Opinions, ceremonies, authority, priestliness, were either added to or put in the place of the setting forth of the gospel. Then its servants soon lost faith in the mere announcement of the gospel promise to men, who were to be urged to its acceptance only by an honest manifestation of the love whence the gospel proceeded, but in which its preachers had often but little faith. So the work of the ministry became in time either a playing on men's fears through a show of hurtful power over the bodies and souls of men, or an appeal to their intellects by presenting the gospel as a system of philosophical thought. The more one reads of the uninspired writings of the early church, the more one is struck with this speedy departure from the simplicity which is in Christ, both in theological thought and in the church life.

We have fallen heir to all that. In spite of attempts at purification from time to time, and of successful restorations in some measure of the word of Christ to its real place, the tendency constantly asserts itself in a form to be carefully watched, — either the priestly assumption which puts itself between the soul and Jesus Christ, envious of the freedom which every sinner has to negotiate directly with God in Christ; or the theological assumption, distrustful of the simplicity of the saving process in which love and trust have a larger place than knowledge or reasoning; or the lordly assumption offended at the equality bestowed upon all who truly seek and yield to the Spirit's influence. The Christian church is still full of these obstructions to a really wholesome life. For they bring the gospel into contempt, and give sinners an excuse for rejecting what the church largely despises. It is a sure sign of declension when the simple preaching of the gospel cannot attract saints and sinners to the house of God, — when it must be bolstered up with other means, as æsthetics, or music, or ritual, or any variety of exercises, which please the taste of a particular community. In public worship, all things should be subordinate to the message from God. In a preacher all things must be subordinate to his sense of being a minister. In all times of quickening, therefore, the Word comes at once to the front, and the power of God is made manifest through the living preacher. Men hunger for the Word. The Word comes with power. In Paul's enumeration of the qualities of a bishop, the only one required, besides qualifications of character, is this: "He must hold fast the faithful Word, that he may be able to exhort" (Tit. i. 9). He can afford to be a failure in many respects, if he know how to

speak in the name of Jesus as the Saviour of sinners. He must be a man through whom the word of the Lord can have a free course and be glorified.

In the same manner, the ministry cannot have too high a sense of this consciousness as a test in its practical work. A regulating test of its work is a standing necessity. Ministers must constantly ask: Are we saying what we ought to say, are we accomplishing what we are sent to do? What is the gospel, is therefore never a superfluous question in relation to preaching. Not all that is gospel which rises in our hearts, or passes through our brain, or glides from our lips. Nor is that always gospel which books teach, or learned men propound, or creeds prescribe. Nor is that necessarily gospel which audiences approve or demand. Only that is gospel which issues from the Christ. He is its only authorized prophet. As Paul expresses it, it is "truth in Jesus." To him the gospel and the cross were synonymous. "The word of the Lord" is a large term, and the ministry, as a teaching office, has the range of all of it. But, considered as a preaching office, its proper subject is specifically the gospel in the Word, that is, the proclamation of God's gracious intent towards sinners. Upon this, its central truth, God relies for his influence among men, and upon it we must rely for our success as his ministers. There is a steady tendency to undervalue or to deny this. It is said, men are not fit for its offer; they must be made fit for it through the preaching of the law. Or, men do not need it; turn your efforts to the improvement of their morals. Or, it is of no use, men cannot be interested in it; you must enter the current of their prevailing thought and try to do them good in their own tendency. These are temptations of the Evil One to make preachers unfit and inefficient. It may be taken for granted that the conscience of the world is prepared for the message which Christ sends, for the Holy Ghost has come to convince the world of sin. Therefore a preacher may, must speak to that conscience in the name of Jesus Christ. The consciousness of a single transgression is a sufficient preparation for the gospel message, which is, in substance, the assurance of pardon through Christ crucified. The reliance for the benefit of preaching is to be upon that. The conception of the meaning of the cross is too generally deficient. How it grows upon one, as his own life and a wider experience of the world force upon one the necessity of inquiring more deeply into its significance! I am convinced that no theological system in which the ministry is trained to-day has yet given the promi-

nence to the cross of Christ which it deserves. I am thankful for whatever tendencies the church of our day shows of giving to the doctrine of the atonement, the relation of God in Christ to men, — the human race as a whole, — and to the universe, a more influential place in its system; but I shall not be satisfied until I see a system which makes its first postulate read, "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself," and shall from that premise deduce a doctrine of God, of the world, of men in all their relations. For only then will there be the full knowledge and acknowledgment of the effect of the cross. It may be long before we see that perfected. No preacher, therefore, need wait until he find it in a text-book of dogmatic theology. But he will find all its materials in his Bible when he has an eye for the gospel. Let him get near to the heart of Christ. "For it was the good pleasure of the Father that in Him should all the fullness dwell; and through Him to reconcile all things unto himself, having made peace through the blood of his cross" (Col. i. 19).

It may be said that to a true gospel minister Jesus Christ becomes more and more the man of his counsel, and the words spoken by his mouth the heart of the revelation by which the whole Scripture is to be interpreted; by which men, the world, the kingdom of heaven, God, must be more fully understood. Then would one be in full sense a minister of the gospel, if he spake to men only what at that given moment the Lord Christ would say for his purpose. Must a preacher, then, confine himself to the recorded words of Jesus? That depends on circumstances. If the nature of the case warrants their use as a complete statement, one need not hesitate to say yes. A gospel minister can find no more fitting terms for his message than the forms which his Master used. But while the prime need of men is identical in all ages, the needs of humanity are enlarged by time, and the questions are multiplied. To-day questions are asked which were not suggested in the time of Jesus, and for which no express answers have been left by Him. So a subsequent generation will propound questions which never enter into our minds, and for which we can leave no directions. None of the problems which relate to humanity must be thought unworthy of consideration or unadapted for solution. In the revelation of Jesus will be found the principles whose honest application will furnish sincere seekers after truth with satisfactory answers in every domain of human interest. It is one of the truest and most comforting lessons of history that the understanding of the

Lord's words has kept pace with the needs of humanity. From age to age it became the source of a steadily growing freedom, knowledge, energy, and inspiration, together with a regularly increasing knowledge of the deeper meaning of that word. The word of Jesus undermined the religion of the Greeks and Romans; it healed the moral rottenness of the first centuries; it civilized the coarse northern peoples; it liberated the darkened intellect of the Middle Ages; it accomplished the liberty and culture of modern society; it gave to our age knowledge and science; and gave to our generation the impulse to explore the unknown world which stretches out beyond us into the dim distance. If, indeed, as some fear, our generation has thrown itself into this new field with a zeal which borders on fanaticism, we may expect that its impetuosity will, after a little, be tempered by this ever-living Word. The Word will be again the test of philosophy, and furnish the solution of the interesting questions with which our day does not concern itself in vain.

It will be great gain, both to the church and the world, when the former shall always offer its honest help to the latter in the investigation of the things worth knowing which concern humanity.

To the preacher the Bible is the real text-book. It must be the spring of his knowledge, the source of his inspiration. In the seclusion of his own field he may find that independence of human influences which is a first requisite for assured knowledge of the mystery of the gospel. Let him open his mind to the influences of the Holy Spirit, which will come to him through the Word, if he honestly seek for the mind of Christ, that he may interpret that to men. Every really called preacher God makes "sufficient as a minister of a new covenant, not of the letter, but of the spirit," and where that spirit is, are both life and liberty. The cross is, in the mean time, his test and safeguard. All knowledge that brings out its power, every word that increases its effectiveness, is divinely approved and of the truth. Whatever makes the grace revealed on the tree more available for the world's sin, sorrow, and suffering may safely be owned and accepted as gospel. What men will do with it is, in a sense, of minor consideration. The preacher need not be in right relations first to men, but to the saving God and his word of salvation. Whether men hear or forbear is of infinitely less account than the question, whether God is honestly and fully represented among men in the claims which his love, as revealed in the sacrifice of Christ, eter-

nally has upon all spiritual beings. That is the tremendous question which is constantly to rest upon the conscience of every minister of the gospel, as it rested upon the soul of Paul. For he is an ambassador of Christ in the ministry of reconciliation.

Now surely this is the ministry of reconciliation, — the announcement on the behalf of Christ that the world has nothing to fear from God, but everything to hope for. The Saviour said it before his death: “*Now* is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto myself” (John xii. 31, 32). Paul has corroborated it: “He hath abolished in his flesh the enmity.”

It needs scarcely be shown how the witness of Christ confined itself almost exclusively to the revelation of his Father, in order that the world might learn to think rightly of God, and should feel and do justly as to God. In this is the largest liberty for the putting of all relevant questions, and for the submitting of all real difficulties. That this revelation thus occupies seemingly so narrow a range, is because it is this which men specially lack, and always lacked. God did not send his Christ because there was among men no knowledge of God, nor even because in them there was no consciousness of God. Paul says of the most degraded, “They knew God.” And in Athens he joins the Greeks in saying, with one of their old pagan poets: “We are of divine lineage.” But the knowledge of God in Christ, that is, of God as Christ represented Him, men lacked. They knew not that “the one God is the Father, out of whom are all things and we unto Him” (1 Cor. viii. 6). Yet that is the only true, adequate, satisfactory knowledge of God. That saving knowledge which Jesus Christ had and gave, by which, as the prophet had already said, the “servant of the Lord would justify many,” put them into right relations with God. This is the knowledge which, according to Jeremiah, is the glory of men. “Let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth me, that I am the Lord which exercise lovingkindness, judgment, and righteousness, in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord” (Jer. ix. 24). No one has greater need than an ambassador of Christ, to look into the character of God with the penetration of the Son of the Father.

The knowledge of God in Christ must also be, to the minister, the key to unlock the secret of man and human history. What humanity is, the man Christ Jesus alone can teach him. Not in its

original character, — for Jesus was more than a son of Adam ; He was the new man, — but in the divine ideal. The antithesis between the man Jesus and the man Adam teaches us what was lacking in that first man of the earthly creation. He is of the earth, earthy ; the second man is of heaven. In Adam is not yet the end of God's creation. He is only at that moment the acme of a creation in development according to a certain design, — a man capable of mental growth and fit for the communication of spiritual life, but in whom is not yet the absolute triumph of divine virtue, the invulnerability to evil. In his solitariness Adam can be neither happy nor satisfied. He is above every creature, and does not reach to God. In this respect his elevation above the creatures is his misfortune. He does not come to self-content nor to perfect communion with God. The life complement given him in Eve does not fill up his moral life. She becomes to him the occasion of a fall rather than a rise. Together they can find their way to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, but not to the tree of life. The Paradise state is of short duration, like the innocence of our childhood days. The history proves that Adam is flesh in a too significant sense than that to him can be intrusted the championship between good and evil, then already wrestling for supremacy in this creation. What that flesh means Paul teaches us, who has most fully interpreted for us the word of Jesus, "That which is born of flesh is flesh."

In that first man roots, at least in part, through the perilous bond of the flesh, the moral character of a whole race. In that race, which soon reveals the most disquieting traces of corruption, roots again, with an indissoluble connection, each personal life. This life is not only susceptible of evil, because of its original imperfection, but comes into a sinful world with the inheritance of the evil of ages, and with the hereditary capacity of multiplying sin in itself and propagating it in its generation. The problems which arise out of such a history are always too serious to be dismissed, or even to be postponed. Ministers of the gospel must not hesitate to acknowledge that they concern the character of God and the honor of his name. The feeling that God is responsible for his own creation cannot be suppressed in man by any oracular proscription. It is not the least important part of the calling of ambassadors of Christ to justify the ways of God to men, even as the Christ justified the Father.

We need not listen despairingly to the conclusions of a science which leaves Jesus Christ out of its premises, or out of the domain

of facts, when it apparently degrades our position as earthly creatures. It is not worth the while to dispute about that with its advocates. There may be much truth in the seemingly unworthy representations which arouse the indignation of many. Paul also had no high opinion of this present visible manhood when he called it "the body of our humiliation;" nor of our interior being, our nature (*φύσις*), when he says that in it we are "children of wrath;" nor of our Adamic descent and its promise, when he says that the first Adam was no more than a living soul, a being possessing only psychical life. Over against these the gospel announces a better Man, whose glorified body is the promise of an outward ennobling; by whom we become partakers of the divine nature — *φύσις*; who is to us a vivifying Spirit — *πνεῦμα*. He was the first man who could say: "I came forth from the Father: again I go unto the Father" (John xvi. 28). No, not Adam, *of* whom we are, was the end of God's creation as a rational creation, capable of the permanent indwelling of God; but the man Christ Jesus, *unto* whom we are, is the final end. He exists eternally in the divine plan as the end of the creation. "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand" (John iii. 35).

Do gospel-preachers sufficiently insist upon it that Jesus Christ will not lose the place among men which, by all the proofs which human conclusions furnish, still awaits Him? The virtual Head of humanity will be its acknowledged Head. We are ambassadors for Christ that we may secure this to Him.

The assurance of this truth is a step towards another truth which, in human speculation, lies at the other extreme. There is an indefinite feeling among men that God cannot be permanently separated from humanity. Poets, philosophers, who seek the answer to questions concerning humanity above, rather than beneath themselves, as scientists are inclined to do, often end in a relation between God and the human spirit which confounds God with man. They set men to seek God within their own limits. Let us not suspect, nor discourage, nor mock that searching. It is the distinction of ministers of the gospel to give direction to such quest and to satisfy it. As ambassadors of Christ, they must assure men that they must not only find their real manhood in Jesus, but may find God in Christ, — God not separable from humanity; God become incarnate; God living the life of humanity, and so himself furnishing the proof how these two, so far apart, can become one, and live together a true, undivided,

harmonious life, not only alongside of each other, but within each other; God entering into his creature and identifying himself with it. This is the full meaning and ultimate effect of reconciliation.

Thus Jesus Christ becomes in his person the Reconciler of God and man. His life is the active reconciliation. In that life is the perfect will of the Father perfectly carried out. As Jesus witnessed: "I do always the things that are pleasing to Him" (John viii. 29). At the same time there are in that life our human temptations, our sins, our fear, our sorrows, our death terrors; but the two so dissimilar things are there for a purpose of reconciliation. In that wonderful life, the love of the Father always subdues the self-love which is the strength of temptation. There the sins of men disappear as mists in the glow of that love-light which is always reflected from that spotless Spirit who never forgets to love supremely God and men. There fear and anguish and death-perils are overcome by a confidence which no experiences of dying can shock or diminish. "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit," completes the atonement, whose real substance is indicated in the self-surrender in Gethsemane: "Not my will, but Thine be done." The complete yielding of himself; the glorifying of the Father as his Father, under all the trying experiences of the last suffering; the perfect love to men, whose cruel maltreatment could stir in Him only a deeper pity, but no impatience or revenge, — there is the atonement. And it can never be rightly considered so much the price of the divine reconciliation as the evidence of the reconciliation wherein God in Christ was reconciling the world unto himself.

Men are ambassadors of Christ to say this out plainly. The atonement does not take place outside of God and outside of man. The Saviour, who had formerly said, "I and the Father are one," does not unjustly nor vainly appeal to the Father thus: "Glorify thy Son, that thy Son may also glorify Thee." That is the prayer fit where the great drama of the atonement reaches its climax in the garden and on the cross. The Father is in that transcendent day of mortal suffering as truly as is the Son of Man. Therefore He is, according to the Scriptures, the gift of God,¹ the Lamb of God;² not a sacrifice to God, but God's sacrifice.³ He died that day unto sin,⁴ not unto God. He lived unto God and

¹ John iii. 16; Rom. v. 8, viii. 32; 1 John iv. 9.

² John i. 29, 36.

³ 2 Cor. v. 21; Isa. liii. 7.

⁴ Rom. vi. 10. Cf. vi. 2, 11; Gal. ii. 9, vi. 14.

the Father saved Him from death.¹ Neither does the atonement take place outside of us. However unique may be Christ's humanity, his is the humanity which is truly ours by the divine purpose, by which he that is in Christ is a new man, which He, as a new creation in the Virgin Mary, unites to our human life. For in our human sphere — men were its witnesses from the beginning to the end — Jesus Christ fights again our battle and conquers, passes through our suffering, endures our death, and rises again by the power of his endless life.

This is, indeed, the sum of the gospel which men are set to preach. If one have an eye for the gospel, he will find the Book full of it, — the exaltation of the cross, and of the Lamb slain thereon, until he finds them in the very midst of the eternal throne, towards which all things are finding their way as to the true centre of the universe; the atonement, not as an afterthought of God to affect merely a small portion of his vast world, the part which has gotten out of the harmony of the whole, but as a forethought, an eternal purpose; the central idea of the eternal plan of God, out of which all things visible and invisible have proceeded; the real thread which binds together all parts of this great creation, in which God is supreme; the unity which makes men and angels members of the same family; the great aim and final end toward which all things tended from the beginning; the marvelous work of God which was the completion of the creation idea, and brought the fullness of time; the culmination of the self-revelation of God, in which the Eternal shows his innermost nature.

It is upon the largest possible conception of the reconciliation which is in God that the preaching of the gospel as the demand of faith is to be based. As an invitation, it must include the greatest sinner; as a demand, it must fit the promise. The promise comes to the race,² the demand to the individual.³ The demand is not based on law, but on the gospel.⁴ It is addressed to the faith of the heart rather than to the faith of the intellect, to trust rather than to belief. It is the voice of a father to his children: Be ye reconciled. In this demand the original ideal relation between God and men is as truly of account as the redemption wrought on the tree. The gospel assumes this original relation, which was never disowned on God's part, and this first

¹ Heb. v. 7; Luke xxiii. 43.

² Gen. iii. 15; Acts ii. 39; John iii. 16, *et al.*

³ Acts ii. 21, 38, *et al.*

⁴ Rom. x. 3-15.

bond, which was never severed. Therefore the love of God has always been manifested, and his tender mercies have always been the proof of his friendship and interest. The cross was the culmination and fulfillment of a history of grace.

Yet there took place a separation, called by such evil names as enmity, when described from the human side, and wrath, when described from the divine side. Thus in Romans v. 10: "For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled through the death of his Son;" and in John iii. 36: "He that believeth not, the wrath of God abideth upon him." This enmity on the part of man is not called out in the form of retaliation against anything that God has done. It does not, for instance, develop in man upon the discovery or sense that he has been wronged by his Maker, so that one can definitely locate its rise or specific occasion in any one's life. It appears as an innate attitude, in the form of indifference, or impatience, or distrust, or resistance, or antagonism, as called out by perceived demands which oppose the desire or will. It exists where men do not know God no less than where they are acquainted with Him; where men do not suspect that God has harmed them as where they attribute to Him all manner of evil treatment. It is universal. Without faith in God in Christ there is no real love of Him among men. Now, in what relation does the revealed wrath stand to this enmity? Men sometimes seem to think that wrath in God is his response to this estrangement of men. But not so. According to the Scriptures the response of God to human enmity is love, pity, mercy, grace. Therefore Christ could say, "Love your enemies, that ye may be the children of your Father who is in heaven." That is the perfection of the Father. The world hates God; God loves the world. The answer to the enmity of the human race is the Son of God on the cross for the human race. What, then, is wrath? Whatever it be, it is not retaliation, it is not revenge, it is not bitterness, it is not spite, it is not hatred. If it were any of these, God would be like men. We know of no response to hatred but hate; we need love to start love. God is essentially different, and can save his love in the presence of hatred. What, then, is wrath? Wrath is the indignation of love wounded, despised, spurned. Wrath is the justification of love denied, as peace is the evidence of love believed, responded to. Wrath is, therefore, not an original revelation. The first sin was met by the first promise, not by rejection. It is a subsequent revelation. It is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness

of men *who hold down the truth* in unrighteousness (Rom. i. 18). Therefore we read, "The wrath of God abideth on him that obeys not the Son" (John iii. 36). Hence reconciliation does not take away wrath, it takes away enmities. Faith takes away wrath. After the cross there is no occasion for enmity, real or apparent, but the occasions of wrath may be infinitely increased by it. The great day of wrath lies in the future. In it is the wrath of the Lamb slain for human redemption, and it is displayed in connection with a *rejected* salvation. By sin, which is the cause of this separation, whether original or repeated, God is wronged in his love, in his truth, in his righteousness, all of which are saving attributes, in which men should have had, and always should have, boundless trust.

Now, what is the reconciliation? It is evident that though the heart of God may not change in its fatherly relations towards his sinful children, the relations cannot remain the same after the breach, and that the love cannot show itself in the same way after as before sin. It may be a love of pity, but cannot be a love of approval. God may be gracious, but cannot sacrifice the rights of his righteousness and Fatherhood to human willfulness. To indicate these rights, to establish and satisfy his love, and to win back the love and confidence of his children, God sends the Son of his love. He gives Him to and identifies Him with men, by a sacrifice which only God can measure. By perfect obedience to the fatherly will, by perfect submission to such suffering as is the just and proper element of a life in which sin bears its fruit as an estranged life, He both satisfies those rights and proves that love to be essentially a reconciliation. In his person He actually reconciles God to man, for with the Son of Man, in whom men are reckoned, God is well pleased. There, then, on the cross, the original relation between God and men, which during the ages had been obscured, — buried, as it were, under the mass of human enmity, sin, and all its just results, — comes again into the light; and the cross itself is the proclamation, as it is the proof, that the love of God abides, and is an effective adjusting force in restoring men to the rights and privileges of childhood. But this is only one side of the reconciliation. To make it effective in men, they must as truly be reconciled to this reconciled God; and a minister of the gospel must make this especially clear and enforce it, as an ambassador for Christ. The reconciliation of God needs the reconciliation of man, not to make it true, but to complete it. The failure of response does not, indeed, make the

reconciliation ineffective in him who proposes it. If I have been at variance with a friend, and have become reconciled to him, his continued enmity cannot rob me of the fruits of reconciliation within myself. The sorrow and pain which he may thus give me is apart from the experience of reconciliation. Even righteous indignation at the failure of the full effect of reconciliation cannot destroy the effect in me. This is true. Yet reconciliation must of necessity strive after its full effect, for it is of the essence of love. Although, therefore, it were conceivable that all sinners should refuse to be won, and the reconciliation be effective in God only, yet God being reconciled cannot but desire the mutual removal of all distances and seek to bring men nigh. Hence the gospel demand, Be ye reconciled, which, as the apostle rightly says, takes the form of beseeching and entreaty. God takes the attitude of a suppliant, as the Scriptures so often say, stretching out his hands as one that implores, pleading tenderly, and mourning over men as one mourneth over an only son. This is because of the original relation. If God were merely a governor, a judge, a king, and had in that character provided the atonement, He would not do so. He would then publish a proclamation of pardon for as many rebels as pleased to avail themselves of it, and leave it to them, as mainly interested in it, what use they would make of his favor. But being a Father, God is as much interested in the reconciliation of men as they are, and more so; and as much interested in their reconciliation as in his own. No one understands the gospel who leaves out that paternal element, or forgets the parable of the Prodigal Son. God cannot be indifferent to the result of his love. That is impossible to a Father. Why? Because rebellious, callous children deserve so much tenderness and interest? Oh, no. But because to be a Father is to have so much love and deep concern. That is the essence of the gospel, that its tone and urgency. Therefore it abounds so in arguments of love, in words of tenderness. Therefore there is in it so large a place for the cross and a slain Son of God. The Lord Jesus has taught us, in the fifteenth chapter of Luke's Gospel, that reconciliation is as fully a need of God as it is a need of men. Hence this entreaty: Be ye reconciled. To be a true ambassador for Christ is to feel and appreciate this divine argument.

This also explains why there is in the gospel so much of the hardship of sin, the danger into which it brings men. That gives room for this peculiar argument of pleading, mingled with author-

ity to make the beseeching effective, — just such pleading as a parent uses with a child in danger, as when a child is in the upper part of a burning building: its only chance of escape is in bravely jumping down that it may be caught, but it dares not, and refuses. Who can untwist in that father's tones the entreaty, the anxiety, the command, the threatening, the indignation, the love, which blend in the demand to overcome distrust and fear, and do as it is bidden? So complex is the gospel, that by any means men might be touched and won to the complete power of the reconciliation. The real basis of that pleading is the bond between the father and the child. Men sometimes speak slightly of the gospel as a mere appeal to fear. They do not understand it, then; and the preacher greatly wrongs the gospel who gives occasion for such an understanding of its motives and appeals. It is an appeal based upon real relationships between God and men. No man ever really responds to the gospel, until he gets a perception of that. Men who only get their own consent to flee to God because it is a choice between hell and God, and they fear hell most, are not likely to find much in God. The present misery of sin, as it robs them of home, must teach them the truth and blessedness of the Father reconciled and waiting for them, with the doors of home and heart wide open. The divinely taught response to the demand of the gospel is this: "I will arise and go to my father, and say to him, I have sinned." The preached gospel must fit that confession of faith.

It needs to be emphasized to-day as the calling of the ministry. The most prevalent objection which the gospel has to sustain is always that against its fullness and freeness. One can always be allowed to say almost anything in the pulpit, so long as he will keep up and strengthen the bars which separate God from man. One can get adherents to almost any notion and speculation sooner than to that of the unconditional freedom of salvation. One can get the consent of men to any terms more easily than to the free grace of God. The offense of the cross has not yet ceased. That is what makes it a hard task to preach the gospel in its simplicity and purity, and not yield to the demand to modify it by the considerations suggested by human fear and unbelief. But it is imperative upon the ambassador for Christ to do this, and, by a constant communion with Christ in the study of the gospel, to come to the assured consciousness which enables him to say with Paul: We have the mind of Christ, — the temper, the feeling, of the blessed Lord, who was willingly nailed to

the cruel cross, because He had faith in the love of the Father as an infinite saving power. All one needs to do, then, is to let the gospel speak for itself, and trust its efficacy to that mighty Spirit who is perfecting the work of God unto the great day of God.

Chr. Van Der Veen.

GRAND RAPIDS, MICH.

SHOP-GIRLS AND THEIR WAGES.

IN discussing the question of "Shop-Girls and their Wages," I may take for granted that the general nature of the problem is sufficiently understood. Popular agitation has made most people familiar with it to an extent that enables me to dispense with a minute account of it. But I cannot rely upon general knowledge to fill out the special features of the question which deserve attention, and which must be taken up in the sequel of our discussion. The first point, therefore, to be remarked is the force of usage in fixing the business habits against which the sympathy for woman revolts.

Custom, which has always been a powerful factor in determining wages, independently of all considerations of justice, has placed the reward for woman's labor below that of man for the same work or for the same time. In some cases, at least, there may have been valid reasons for this. But whether there were or not, the effect of the custom upon economical adjustment is such that it is difficult to change it abruptly at the bidding of abstract justice. I do not say impossible, but difficult, because at any given moment the state of business in a particular firm may, for all that the public knows, be hanging on the conditions which this custom presents, and so, in that case, the attempt to demand or enforce abstract justice may take away by insolvency even that which the laborer actually has. In circumstances where woman was not self-dependent, the custom would work less injustice, and the ordinary formula of justice, namely, that there should be an equivalent exchange of services in determining wages, would be modified by the law of competition and individual freedom of action. But not to dwell upon the abstruse side of this question at present, there are numerous factors in modern life, such as the density of population and its relation to natural resources, the concentration

of property, increased facilities for monopolizing the availability of one's producing powers, due, on the one hand, to mechanical improvements, and, on the other, to social and economic solidarity of large areas of territory, and affiliating influences, which have thrown a large class of women upon their own resources, and their condition compels them to face a custom, and if not a custom, certain forces of competition, which the merchant, however he may feel about their injustice, is equally compelled to act upon; and the consequence is a great deal of friction and difficulty in finding a practical solution for a problem which seems and is, theoretically, simple enough. The problem is sufficiently defined by common opinion. This will have it that the wages of shop-girls, sewing-women, etc., are not just, or at least are subject to contingencies which are a perpetual menace to good morals. How can this difficulty be remedied? What possibility is there that woman shall receive the just remuneration for her labor that will prevent her from being placed between alternatives which make the love of life stronger than the love of virtue? This is the plainest way in which the problem can be stated, and the simple answer is: Give her just wages. But this answer is likely to ignore a whole nest of problems more serious than the one we are considering. A rational and practical solution of it, therefore, must be sought in methods which do not conflict with the forces that have hitherto made so many efforts ineffectual.

The methods which have been employed naturally divide themselves into two classes. First, those which represent an organized effort to see that shop-girls, sewing-women, and defenseless female labor in general, shall receive the wages which have been promised to them by employers, and which they have actually earned in pursuance of orders. Second, those which represent an organized effort to advance existing wages, or to prevent their reduction, and the injurious effects of competition, and, in a measure at least, to check the arbitrary power of the employer. These methods are entirely distinct in their nature, purpose, and mode of working, although professing and aiming to effect the common object of justice to a certain class of laborers. But the different degrees of success with which they have met prompts us to consider them separately, both for the sake of the interest which their history and work excite, and more especially for the light which the greater success of the first throws upon the problems of the second method.

The first class of organized efforts to see that justice is done in

the matter of wages generally, goes under some such name as "Working-women's Protective Union." The organization in Chicago is called the "Protective Agency for Women and Children." In Boston, Mass., and Buffalo, N. Y., they have the same name, the "Women's Educational and Industrial Union." But some of the organizations, as perhaps their very names would indicate, represent more functions than others; for instance, in addition to the collection of wages for which the work has been done, they may undertake industrial or educational work, or even combine with these the work of the second class of organizations defined: that of curtailing the injustice of employers who have the power to cut down wages. But it is the method and success of the first class that we wish to notice at present, and we turn to the organization in New York city, known as the "Working-women's Protective Union."

Twenty-seven years ago, in the midst of the civil war, when its evils were felt in more circles than in bereaved families, the sufferings of working-women reached a point that demanded attention. A mechanic resolved on doing something, and sought the assistance and encouragement of a newspaper editor. He had hired a hall, and announced a mass meeting to see what could be done, and desired editorial notice. His wishes were cheerfully seconded, and the meeting was held. The hall was filled with eager, anxious women, but it was only a scene of confusion, and after many hours of debating in the committee, the only remediable difficulty suggested was that of securing pay for work when done. This met a responsive echo from all who were present, and who exclaimed, as if with one voice, "Oh, if we could always get paid for our work, we could get along." Here, then, was the source of the whole complaint. Women were employed to do work, and when the employer had gotten his product he refused to pay for it, and thus secured his profits from unrequited toil. Twenty-five centuries look down upon man since Persian power endeavored to extinguish the liberties of Greece, and perished in the effort. Grecian victory was a step in the direction of maintaining human rights. Rome extended those rights with justice and liberty. Stoicism taught and Christianity realized the brotherhood of humanity, and back their teaching with eighteen centuries of history, and yet man lives upon his fellows, "the dull millions that toil for freedom at the wheel of labor;" and woman comes in, the last, except savages, to reap the benefit of that immense movement in behalf of human liberty and justice. But this is a digression.

The sentiment of the pitiful exclamation we have quoted decided the method to be pursued. It was at once seen that the problem could be solved if the wages contracted for were paid, instead of being unjustly and dishonestly withheld. The committee reported in favor of organized effort to aid the collecting of the payment of just claims by legal process. It was apparent that the complaining women were defenseless, and required only the assistance of some suitable organization which could relieve them of the expense entailed by an appeal to law. The result of the deliberations was a society pledged to this work. It has since extended its work into other fields of allied usefulness, such as the seeking of new and appropriate spheres of labor in departments not ordinarily occupied by women, and maintaining a registry by which those out of work may obtain employment. But the chief work marked out and pursued has been the securing of legal protection for working-women against fraud and imposition. The whole cost of the process is free of expense to the plaintiff. The effort is first made to ascertain whether the wages claimed are really due, and the debtor is given opportunity to settle without a civil process. If he does not, the case is taken to the courts, and the whole sum collected is paid to the plaintiff without any charges. During the first thirteen years of its existence the society prosecuted 5,000 cases of fraud, and collected \$20,797. During the twenty-five years of its existence, from 1863, when it was founded, to 1888, it had prosecuted over 12,000 cases, and collected over \$41,000, averaging nearly two cases and \$3.50 a day. The cost of the work done by the society is about \$5,000 a year, and this sum has to be paid by voluntary contributions from those whose charitable disposition interests them in the work. There have been no general discouragements to contend with, and the honest public has not withheld its sympathies. In the prosecution of unjust employers who have refused to pay the wages agreed to, the society has not been opposed by any fair-minded organizations of business, in so far as its spirit and general purposes were concerned. These facts are decisive indications of its success and usefulness.

But in connection with these observations, it is important to remark certain very significant limitations to its work, which are self-imposed. The society will have nothing to do with strikes and boycotts. It will not use its powers to favor or encourage them, and will do nothing more than give advice to those who may happen to have become involved in them. It undertakes to

settle no difficulties growing out of them, but keeps aloof from such work, and pursues mainly the one work of enforcing the terms of actual contracts between working-women and their employers.

But one other limitation the society imposes upon itself. It refuses to include the complaints of servants in its prosecutions, unless special reasons make them identical with the general policy of the organization. One of the reasons for this refusal is very interesting and significant. The society has found in its experience that nine tenths of these claims prove false, or the servant is to blame for the trouble. Besides, it considers that servants are less defenseless than sewing and working women. The first of these reasons, however, is interesting for the light it throws upon the real source of the difficulty about wages. In the employment of servants the labor is expended in the sphere of economic consumption, not production, and the employer suffers from no such contingencies as accompany the conduction of a business in production or exchange. In this, injustice is just as possible as elsewhere; but it is not as probable, unless circumstances happen to deprive the debtor of the means to pay for service, because the laws affecting the attainment of wealth are different in their operation from those which regulate the use of it. Men have not always the power to shape or control the contingencies of business, and with the fluctuations that threaten their success their minds, dominated by the all-important object of profit, are exposed to very severe temptations, and as commercial principles or practice concede considerable immunity to conscience, if they do not absolve it altogether, it is very easy for the contagion of this laxity to communicate itself to other spheres of obligation. Men who are and must be governed solely by motives of personal interest in the purchase and sale of goods, and who are accustomed to exercise within certain limits irresponsible power over the service of subordinates, will hardly resist the same motives in the purchase and sale of labor, and so will be perpetually tempted to profit as much by taking advantage of the defenseless as by outwitting their competitors. That is, in the world of business there is the law of competition to exalt motives of interest and to subordinate those of abstract justice, while in the work of consumption there is less to disturb one's calculations or to disappoint desire. Hence the temptations to injustice in the latter are less, and servants may more often be the cause of the difficulties which frequently arise, and of which they com-

plain. This difference of circumstances and conditions affecting motives will demand attention when comparing the method under consideration with that of the second class of efforts to protect laboring women. It suffices here to remark that this difference seems to have justified the society in confining its efforts to adjusting the relations between business employers and their defenseless employees; especially when the blame for difficulties in the case of servants, in the large majority of cases, is found to be in themselves.

The success of societies in protecting working-women against fraud has been steady and effectual wherever attempted, and the institution may be said to be an assured thing of the future, as a method which meets the entire sympathy and approval of the public. It is merely the sentiment of justice demanding that voluntary contracts shall be fulfilled. In this there is no difficulty in invoking support.

The Boston society, which is known as the "Woman's Educational and Industrial Union," and which sustains, among several other functions, that of the "Protective Department," reports a similar degree of success and encouragement. But, so far as I can judge from the reports, the organization and equipment of this department is not so good as that of the New York society. This is, perhaps, due to the number of other forms of work which are undertaken. There is the department of social affairs, which endeavors to give working-women suitable entertainments and library facilities; the department of moral and spiritual development, which takes charge of moral and religious instruction; the department for employment, which is a bureau of information and assistance in regard to labor; and the industrial department, which receives and disposes of all kinds of home-made goods, such as bread, pastry, and all kinds of food, fancy and decorative work. But, interesting as it would be to go into the full details of this work, it is not immediately connected with the problem we are considering. It is the nature and success of the protective work upon which we are endeavoring to place the emphasis, in order to compare it with efforts in the direction of increasing wages, as made in organizations of the second class. But, to make clear what this protective work is, and how it is done, we may take a few concrete instances from the reports of the New York and Boston societies.

A working-woman was engaged in retouching chromos, and when the employer closed business he was indebted to the lady in

the sum of twenty-three dollars. When proceedings were taken and judgment rendered against him, he pleaded poverty and disappeared. Poverty, however, did not prevent him from traveling about the country, nor from lodging at a good hotel in New York, nor from dressing richly, nor from riding in a carriage to the opera. When these things became known, the marshal greeted him in his comfortable room at the hotel, and demanded payment of the long-standing debt. Again he pleaded poverty, and asked for delay until an expected remittance should reach him. The marshal's reply was that he should put on his hat and accompany him. "Where?" asked the criminal, in amazement. "To Ludlow-Street Jail," was the brief answer. "Why, you would n't put a gentleman in such a place, would you?" asked the man. "Well," replied the marshal, "you see, a *gentleman* would n't swindle a working-woman. Come along, sir." But this was too much, and the scoundrel paid the twenty-three dollars on the spot.

The Boston society report a very interesting case. A young girl from the Canadian Provinces came all the way to Boston to secure justice, by means of the society, of which she had heard, against a theatrical manager for whom she had done some sewing. She had heard that he was to bring out a play in Boston, and besought the society's aid. As appeals to the manager's mercy and justice had been unavailing, one of the attorneys of the Union arrested him, just as he was to appear on the stage. He paid instantly, the curtain rose, and the audience never knew what had transpired behind the scenes.

If I was to narrate the fifteen thousand similar instances which have occurred in New York city alone during the last twenty-seven years, the reader would have an adequate conception of the work done and the importance of it. But I refer less to its importance and to the need of coöperation with all such endeavors than to the eminent success which these efforts have met, and to the nature of the case which makes the success so great. Those conditions may be briefly stated in the uniform judgment of society that voluntary contracts must be fulfilled. If there is no intention to fulfill them, they must not be made.

Now, when we turn to the second class of organizations, we meet with a very different set of purposes and conditions, and correspondingly different degrees of success. This second class of societies, as I have said, endeavor to control, at least to some extent, the wages which working-women ought to receive. They are often labor unions, although combining other work with

that of managing strikes, boycotts, and exerting pressure upon employers at opportune moments for increased wages, or to prevent the reduction of them. Of the number of associations organized for this purpose, and the particulars of their work, I have not learned enough to enlarge upon them. They have not been so uniformly successful as other societies, and hence have not taken their place among the historical efforts in the direction of the problem under consideration. But it will not be necessary, as perhaps we have not time to go into details. It will suffice to note a few incidents of one of them in our own midst, and to remark the difference between their results and those of the Protective Unions already described, in order to understand why those results have not been so favorable. This society was organized some years ago, and by reason of some internal quarrels went to pieces. Recently it began reorganization, and is to be composed of all working-women who desire to combine, in self-defense, against the power of employers to arbitrarily reduce wages. The specific objects of the organization, which is known as "The Working-women's Society," are thus stated: —

1. To found trade organizations in such trades where they do not exist, and to encourage and assist existing labor organizations, to the end of increasing wages and shortening hours.

2. By using all means in its power, to enforce the existing laws relating to the protection of women and children in shops and factories; and, whenever possible, promoting legislation upon the subject.

3. The abolition of tenement-house manufacture, especially in the industries of clothing and cigars.

4. To investigate and protest against all cases that are creditably brought to its notice of cruel and tyrannical treatment on the part of employers and their managers, open robbery by withholding pay, or underhand theft in imposing fines and docking wages on trivial grounds, etc.

There are several other objects enumerated, but none relevant to our discussion, except the one relating to the necessity of a central society and agitation on the subject of working-women's wages.

The objects presented here are laudable enough, as any one knowing the facts justifying them would recognize. Shop-girls and working-women require some protection against power that will defraud them fully as much as we see is done even when a definite contract is made for specified wages. The same employers

would avail themselves of all kinds of excuses to reduce wages and increase the time of labor. But while we observe that the objects of the society are laudable enough, we do not discover as readily the only means at their command for effecting those objects. Nothing is said about strikes and boycotts in the statement of the society's objects, and we have only to refer to the general experience of the Knights of Labor in such efforts to appreciate the prudence of not emphasizing such a policy, although in a system where the employer may possess power to do injustice to the laborer, there are certainly circumstances where strikes and boycotts may be the only and a legitimate mode of defense. But this can be only when the deliberate injustice of the employer can be, or has been, proved, and this it is always difficult to do. In the general character of the language quoted many would discover evidence of a sympathy with and a tendency to employ that policy, but it is not necessary to reflect reproach upon the society by inferences of that kind, when we are compelled to recognize that it is making an honest attempt to deal with manifest injustice. Above all things, we require here to be fair. Hence we allude to the relation between employer and employee, the friction between whom tends to just such difficulties as strikes, lockouts, dismissals, etc., in order to apprehend exactly what the problem and circumstances are with which we have to deal. This we must state as clearly as possible.

In the first place, the simple, well-known fact is, that thousands of shop-girls and working-women do not obtain sufficient wages to support them, while they give the whole of their available time and services to their employers, and their employers, perhaps, without spending as much exertion or time, are enabled to live in luxury, often, indeed, reaping as much for the reward of their own labor, or idleness, as the wages of their employees together. Common justice would seem to demand that the requital for labor should be better apportioned, and it is the demand for a better distribution of the product of labor that is the source of the organized movements which we are considering. But we cannot understand how this can be accomplished until we know the causes or reasons for the deficient wages of shop-girls and working-women. Every attempt at solving moral, social, and economical problems must take into account the causes of the phenomena to be explained and the evils to be remedied. Deliberate ignoring of these causes can only result in the failure of all attempts to correct the evils of which complaint is made. Hence, in examin-

ing the merits of all methods of protection and social reform, we must first know what the conditions are under which those methods labor, and see that sentiment does not usurp the function of reason in the practical solution of the problem created by them.

The causes of the defective wages under consideration are two, or are of two general classes, and they give rise to two correspondingly different methods of dealing with the question. The first cause is the peculiar competition existing between working-women and shop-girls for the wages received. The second set of causes consists in the moral and economical conditions regulating the operations of trade, and may be comprehended in the competition between capitalists, and the desire of the purchaser or consumer for cheap products. Let us examine the nature and effect of the first cause, and the method of overcoming the evils produced by it.

The competition between shop-girls and working-women presents very unequal conditions, which place some at a great disadvantage compared with others. For example, very many must supply the means of their entire support from the fruits of their labor, including board, lodging, clothing, etc. On the other hand, very many are well enough situated to require very little additional help, or perhaps none at all, and resort to labor for the sake of employing their time or increasing their income. It is their influence on the labor market, or rate of wages, that creates the whole difficulty in the first class of causes we are considering. The wages of a husband, say, will pay all the expenses of the family except the rent of the house. The wife has leisure time at command, and they find that if she can earn fifty cents a day they can maintain their present standard of living, while the wife, perhaps, could not possibly live upon the fifty cents per day. But a part of her necessities being already provided for, she consents to do the work at fifty cents a day because the practical result to her and the family is the same at that rate as if it were more under different circumstances. Again, the daughters of a family may entail expenses beyond the income of the parent or parents, or may see the opportunity for increasing their income by labor, instead of remaining in idleness and submitting to ungratified wants. They therefore accept wages that may pay the cost of their dress, while their board and lodging are provided for in the parents' income. Under these circumstances, what is obtained is so much gained for maintaining the existing status of living, or

improving it. But this class of laboring women is sufficiently large to set the standard of wages for all. They do not have to consider in their suit for wages the whole amount required for self-support, and hence consent to use the whole of their disposable time and services for the difference between what they already have and the sum required. This fixes the rate of wages for the whole class, and those who have to earn the whole of their support must accept the low rate thus fixed or receive nothing at all. It is easy to understand the moral consequences of this situation, and those who have studied the case know facts to which it is impossible to allude, or more than allude, in the present lecture. It is just as evident what the problem is to be solved. It is, What shall be done to counteract the disadvantages under which those have to labor who must earn their whole support? What method will prevent the evils of which every one is conscious?

Some would answer, that those who already have the means of support secured have no right to compete against the less fortunate, and thus drive them to the wall, and perhaps judicious moral influence might diminish the injustice incident to the selfishness which thus improves its own income at the expense of others. But it is clear that no solution of the problem can be effected along this line, because, if for no other reason, there is no means of deciding the standard of living which morally excludes the incumbent from employing his powers at labor, while, on the other hand, the morally best results for society require that every one should be directly or indirectly a producer. But even if it were possible to place either moral or physical limitations upon the right to use one's labor as he pleases, the policy which would endeavor to effect this would be productive of greater evils than those which it seeks to remedy, by placing such restrictions upon human liberty as would threaten the existing social organism with destruction, or reduce it to the chaos and tyranny of ancient despotisms. Hence efforts looking in that direction have not met with any success. But a comparatively easy solution has been applied, and has been wonderfully successful, without casting reproach upon, or interfering with, the liberty of the individual to employ his services at any rate of wages he may desire. It is the method of boarding-houses for shop-girls and working-women whose wages are not sufficient to support them. What we have to say of these will be designed to enforce the conclusion that all rational efforts should, at present at least, be expended in that direction, and not upon chimerical impossibilities.

These boarding-houses have been organized in most of the large cities of this continent. They endeavor to reduce the cost of living for the shop-girl to a sum proportioned to her wages, and so to exempt her from the temptations which are so fatal to virtue. The charges for boarding and lodging are regulated according to the amount of wages received, which, in effect, places the incumbent upon the same plane of competition as her more fortunate fellow-laborer, whose influence in better circumstances decides the rate of wages; or, if the regulations of all of them are not exactly the same, the management is designed to produce the same effect.

Of the boarding-houses in this city I need to say very little. Their number and methods are probably quite well known to all who would be interested in the subject of the present paper. But a few general facts regarding them will be useful in forming conclusions in regard to the purpose they subserve. The original home for self-supporting girls, built by the Ladies Christian Union, is located on Washington Square, and accommodates eighty-five inmates. Its success led to the establishment of branch houses for other classes not so well qualified to support themselves. There is one on Second Avenue, the Laura House, No. 120. Then another was established on Seventh Avenue for girls and salesladies, on Sixth Avenue, Fourteenth Street, and Broadway. The charge for board is only \$2 per week. The Society to Befriend Working Girls has built a home, the Primrose House, on West Thirty-third Street, where the following is the schedule of prices paid for board: —

Those earning \$1 per week pay twenty-five cents; those earning \$2 per week pay fifty cents; those earning \$3 per week pay \$1; those earning \$4 per week pay \$2; those earning \$5 per week pay \$2.50. But, when they reach the sum of \$5 per week for their wages, they are expected to look for new lodgings and board, and give place to those who are more needy.

There are numerous other homes and associations looking to the same end, and they often combine social and intellectual culture with the attainment of this more important object. But we cannot go into details.

The same kind of efforts are made in at least twenty other cities of the country. Two of the institutions in Philadelphia I visited myself, with the purpose of learning the details of their work. The first is the Home on Arch Street, 1117 and 1119, under the charge of the Young Women's Christian Association.

It combines an employment bureau and a boarding-house. It has at present nearly five hundred boarders, and is entirely self-supporting. The bill of fare is limited, so as not to tempt the inmates to go beyond their means, and seldom presents an article which cannot be had for five cents. Only about fifty of the boarders have their rooms in the association's building, and those who are entitled to be received must not be younger than fifteen years or older than twenty-five years. The charges for board and rooms are \$3 per week for those who receive \$5 or less wages, and \$3.50 for those who receive \$5 to \$6. The building is well adapted to the purpose, having a very spacious dining-hall, and being situated near the centre of business. A parlor and rooms for social entertainment are attached, and evening classes are conducted, at which the general attendance is nearly three hundred. A library of eight hundred volumes provides good reading, and every fortnight a lecture or a concert is given to take the place and to relieve from the expense of outside amusement. Last year 139,000 meals were served in the restaurant. The employment bureau in connection with the Home gives its services free. No domestic service is required of the boarders.

The second institution to which I have referred is Walton Hotel, built and supported by Mr. Wanamaker for the benefit of his own lady clerks. It is the old Tilden mansion remodeled and enlarged, and situated on the corner of Brown and North Broad streets. It is arranged to accommodate ninety to one hundred ladies. In the old part the rooms are double; in the annex, or new part, they are single, with suitable bath-rooms on each floor. In the basement there is a large lavatory, for hot or cold water, which it requires six hours to fill. In the attic a large room is used for a gymnasium, dancing-hall, and entertainments. There is also a reading-room furnished with the leading periodicals, such as "The Century," "Harper's," "Scribner's," "Peterson's Magazine," etc. For this the expenses per week, including room, board, and twelve pieces of laundry, are \$3.25.

There is, besides, the Clinton Street Home, under Episcopal patronage, and which contains fifty girls. The charge per week is \$3, including laundry. Then there is the "Temporary Home for Working Girls," which is always full. A fee for board is required, but remitted at discretion.

The same stories could be told of Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, Cincinnati, New Orleans, St. Louis, San Francisco, and other large cities. But to repeat them would only multiply details,

while the incidents already narrated give a sufficiently clear conception of both the nature and extent of the work which is done to solve the first difficulty of the problem. It will be apparent how easily this is accomplished. As indicated, it is simply the policy of placing those whose labor must constitute their entire support upon a level with those whose partial support gives them the advantage in competition. It saves liberty of action, on the one hand, and immoral temptations on the other, while it helps in both to equalize distribution, even if the labor and wages are not apportioned on the natural scale. But one of the most interesting features in the scheme is its testimony to the solidarity of the social organism, and the vicarious methods required to protect its integrity. This is apparent in the following statement of the matter. The competing power of those whose support is partly supplied has the effect of diminishing prices. But what the community gains by this is offset by the contributions of the well-to-do in order to place others upon the same level. This is recognizing the principle of abstract justice without disturbing the organism of society, and without diminishing the usefulness of those who have their whole time and powers at their disposal. But the most important characteristic which I have endeavored to make clear is the simple solution of one half of the problem, to which I think charitable endeavor should more and more direct its attention.

But this solution does not meet the difficulties presented by the second class of causes affecting the wages of working-women, because there are other sources of competition besides that of fellow-laborers, and placing all members of the class on the same level of competition with each other does not remove the influences that affect all alike. For a reduction of wages may be made throughout the whole class, and it may be made to such an extent as to affect all in the same way that the more needy shop-girls are affected by the competition which is not supplemented by charitable help. In that case the problem is not completely solved by the maintenance of such homes and societies as we have described. We must, therefore, examine the nature of the conditions against which the working-woman has to contend, and ascertain what method, if any, offers a hopeful solution of the second class of difficulties.

The second class of causes operating to affect wages is a very complex one. I stated it to be comprehensively the competition between capitalists and the arbitrary power possessed by a firm or

employer. But this will not appear so clear in this generalized form as a correct understanding of the case requires it to be. We must, therefore, resort to explanation and illustration. Now, every one understands the fact that an employer attracts custom by the cheapness of his product, other things being equal; that is, by underselling his competitor. But if the cost of his goods, expenses for carriage, insurance, rent, and so forth, be the same as those of his competitor, it is possible that he can compete with him only when the cost of labor be rated less. In that case, his power of competition will be determined by the rate of wages he pays his employees. In many cases he would get no trade at all, if he could not undersell some one else, and in all cases the total amount of wages paid enters as a factor into the problem of his competition. The more that they intrench upon profits, the less able will he be to compete; and hence the cheaper he can obtain service, the more readily he can compete. Of course if he enjoy an advantage in cheaper rents, insurance, interest, established custom, freight, etc., he will be less tempted to rely upon the factor of wages for determining his rate of profit. But if all these factors are uniform and inflexible, he naturally and inevitably resorts to a reduction, or if not a reduction, the cheapest form of wages possible, less than his competitor, in order to find a market. Now we know that the power to compete may often be determined solely by the rate of wages, and in that case it is clear that the employer must either go out of the business, or obtain a sufficiently low rate of wages to remain in it. Whenever, therefore, the integrity of his trade is conditioned by the wages he pays, and no other factor can be modified, he either avails himself of the competition existing between laborers, or decides the rate of wages which will enable him to continue in business. If the competition between laborers does not suffice to determine the rate he must pay, he must offer a rate and await its acceptance or its rejection. Now it occurs often enough under these circumstances that the interest of the laborer is identical with that of the employer. If the employer goes out of business no labor at all appears in sight. On the other hand, if his terms are accepted, some wages are better than none, and the consequence will be that almost any rate whatever is sure to meet with applicants, and it will inevitably produce its influence upon the rate in the labor market. To refuse the proffered terms is to refuse everything, and to accept them is to accept what is better than nothing. There is no intended injustice on the part of the employer, as the circumstances

are those over which he has no control. However much evil his low rate of wages may inflict, his conduct cannot be treated as an injustice. He might be willing enough to give better, but is precluded from it by the nature of the case. In such cases there is no use to organize for strikes or boycotts, as they will prove ineffectual. They cannot alter the factors of rent, interest, carriage, insurance, cost of production independently of labor, and if the competition between capitalists does not turn on these, but on the factor of wages, which more readily yields to variation, the economic conditions are the key to the problem, and not the injustice of the employers. And yet everywhere strikers and boycotters throw the whole injustice, so called, or the cause of their suffering, upon the employer. In the circumstances presented, the unreasonableness of this is apparent, because the merchant or manufacturer has no alternative. His policy is not a voluntary one. The economic conditions by which he is hampered necessitate his action. Even if his wages offered are not sufficient to provide the shop-girl or working-woman with a living, no organization can possibly raise them from the proceeds of the business, and all attempts to do so must be futile. The only solution of this aspect of the problem is the same as that which equalizes the conditions between those who compete for the labor, and that is to have homes which will provide for the difference between actual and necessary wages, unless we can find that the causes of the difficulty are other than those we have specified. Of that we shall see presently. But it must be emphasized that no organization can possibly effect a rise of wages where the continuance of the business depends solely upon modifications which can be made in wages, or the differences in the rate of wages between separate firms. We discover, therefore, that we have a very different problem from that which confronts Protective Unions, and homes for working-women who are unequally placed in the world of competition, and the ordinary methods of solving it betray their weakness because they do not recognize that it is a different problem.

But we have not stated the whole case. We shall be told that the power to compete in the market is not always determined by the factor of wages, and that, even if it is so determined, the irresponsible and unlimited power over the rate of wages is often abused. This is undoubtedly the case. Business men do not publish the cost of production, or the conditions of expense, which must be more than covered by their rate of profit in order

to carry on a paying business and to make a reasonable interest on their investment. It is very easy, then, for dishonest men, even if they could afford good wages, to pretend that unless they pay low wages they can make no profits. Granting still further that this rate of profit is dependent solely upon the factor of wages, an unscrupulous man, free from the obligation to state the condition of his business, cannot easily be disputed when he decides what rate he will pay. He can assume the position of a man who *cannot* pay more, and the public have no satisfactory data for refuting him. A very slight reduction might be necessary, say five per cent. But, availing himself of the power which necessity confers, he exercises it to a larger extent, and opposition in many cases can have only the force of conjecture upon which to base itself. And he may even use the immunity of his position to increase his rate of profits by a reduction of wages, even when he enjoys advantages enough from a difference between himself and his competitor in regard to other factors. These are instances of undoubted injustice for which the employer is to blame, and not the economic conditions. They as undoubtedly occur very often, and the sympathies of all good people must go with those who suffer from them. The victims of such injustice deserve commiseration and defense. But what shall be the method of extending them help? This is the serious problem. Shall we say, a union of all shop-girls and working-women to control a strike or boycott against such offenders? This method has been tried, and although its success has not been promising, the organizations which are endeavoring to avoid the mistakes committed by those methods, nevertheless aim to direct their action and influence so as to effect a similar pressure. But two very important questions require asking here. Do such societies know enough about the economic conditions of the employer's business to say when the injustice he inflicts is voluntary, or when it is a business necessity? Have they any means of deciding whether a reduction of wages is due to economic conditions or to the arbitrary power of the employer? It is possible that they may have in some cases; and when their knowledge is assured, the public sense of justice has not failed to sympathize with action that would otherwise be questionable. But they are often unqualified to ascertain the conditions of business success, and in cases where their demands have been conceded they may have obtained a temporary advantage, but quite as often has this concession terminated the growth of the business, which gradually succumbs to its rise elsewhere, and

nothing is gained in the end. We may say that, generally, they know too little of all the conditions of business to use this method without discrimination. They require to know as much about one case as another, and to be as free from selfish interests and the temptation to abuse their powers as those against whom they direct their action.

But the second question must be considered. Granting that their knowledge of the circumstances may sometimes be sufficient to justify their methods, the question occurs, Can this method of dictating what wages shall be, be applied so as not to attack those who are in no way to blame for the low rate of wages? How does the method discriminate between those who are compelled by economic conditions to reduce wages, and those who avail themselves of their power to reduce them unjustly? If it does not discriminate between them, it is likely to commit one injustice to balance another, or to undertake an impossibility, and so come away with the prestige of failure to weaken its influence where its claim happens to be just. The inability to distinguish between those cases determined by economic conditions and those determined by moral causes, the danger and probability that personal bias and interest on the part of uninformed working-women, or laborers generally, and the inability to apply a method to moral offenders which will not inflict injustice upon the economically helpless and unfortunate, are insuperable difficulties in every effort to exert pressure upon employers. Undoubtedly it is desirable to restrict their power to inflict injustice, but it is a question whether the methods resorted to do not inflict an equal injustice upon others, and whether arbitrary power in the hands of laborers may not be as dangerous as the same power in capitalists.

But this criticism of the methods employed to obtain living wages, to increase them, or to prevent their reduction, is not designed as a defense of business methods and unscrupulous men, nor as a condemnation of the societies described and their aims. These organizations have an object which is legitimate enough, and even if their methods are exposed to objections, they are honest endeavors to correct an admitted evil. They deserve more sympathy for that than do those who, knowing the cause of the evil, are indifferent to its correction, and hence any one who merely finds fault with those efforts without providing a better solution of the problem may be justly exposed to the suspicion of either truckling to the interests of wealth or of lacking in moral sympathy for the victims of injustice. But it is one thing to

sympathize with the ends sought by such organizations, and another to agree with their methods. What we are insisting upon here is the futility of all methods which suppose that the fault lies wholly in the power and action of the employer, and if we have made, or can make, this clear, we may successfully divert attention to certain other facts which a true solution must take into account. Public opinion too commonly assumes that the fault lies in the employer alone. This is not the case. But we must not hastily infer from this fact that the shop-girls, working-women, or laborers are to blame because the employer is not, or may not be. It is quite possible that fallibility is as much a weakness of the laborer as indifference to right is a fault of the employer. But the general mistake has been in looking for the causes of the difficulty solely in the relations between the employer and the laborer, and so in adapting remedial efforts to that supposition. But we may well insist that the weaknesses and failures of those efforts are proof that all the circumstances have not been taken into account; that the true causes have not been understood. What are those causes?

Hitherto we have considered only the economic conditions of business, and the moral character of the employer. But there is another factor too often neglected which itself is the basal one, and which determines the action and conduct of the business man. It is the readiness of the public to go where it can strike the cheapest bargains, without asking how its purchases affect the services and wages of the laborer. We all go where we can buy the most cheaply, quality of product being the same. But we never stop to ask what the conditions are which produce the cheapness, when they may be simply the reduction of wages to the laborer, or the low rate of wages. This demand on the part of the purchaser is practically the regulator of the employer's action. He must adapt himself to it or give up his business. He is not an independent unit in society, whose action can be taken alone and judged. It is only a part of the whole, and must be adjudged with the conditions which determine it. Hence we cannot lose sight in this problem of the motives and actions of purchasers, who are as much *particeps criminis*, in many cases of injustice due to low wages, as the merchant or employer. They are simply acting upon the maxim which is so often condemned in the laborer, that of doing as little work as he can for as much pay as possible. They are trying to satisfy as large a number of wants as possible with the least possible amount of money; and

the fact that the transaction is concealed under the name of dollars and cents prevents the detection of its real character, which is simply that of obtaining the largest amount of service with the least possible returns for it. They are purchasing goods and asking no questions as to the consequences to those whose services are involved in the exchange. If, instead of trying to get them at prices which are at the expense of the laborer, the shop-girl, and working-woman, they expressed and acted upon a willingness to pay full value for the services involved in the production of the goods, they would exempt themselves from all blame or share in the evil consequences of cheap prices, which fall upon the laborer.

But it will be said very justly that all this is impossible; that the only practicable rule in business must be the voluntary contract between purchaser and seller, and that no available or known means exist for reckoning, in the infinitely complex system of business, the *just* prices of goods. Hence, in pointing out the causes of the injustice to the laborer, we are not condemning the practice of getting goods as cheaply as possible, in any sense that would imply its remediability by law. We are only trying to show that the causes are deeper than ordinary methods assume, and that no solution of the problem under consideration is possible which does not reckon with those causes. It may be necessary that the demand for cheaper prices should exist, and on the other hand it may be an evil to be deprecated, and if possible corrected. But it is not necessary for the present discussion to decide this question one way or the other. It is sufficient to point out the incongruity between the desire and practice of buying goods at prices which inflict injustice upon shop-girls and working-women, and then throwing all the blame for it upon the employer. As long as we claim perfect immunity in the purchase of goods at prices that are indifferent to the rights of others, it is a very ridiculous spectacle to rise up in indignation against the merchant who has no alternative to granting our demands. This simply means that, if we are earnestly desirous of solving this question, we must ourselves be as ready to do our share in the act of justice as we insist the employer shall be. Any attempt to settle the question which disregards this fact is doomed to failure; and it is only amusing to see people straining themselves to buy goods at low prices in order to ride in ease and luxury about Central Park, and then joining societies to protest against the low wages of shop-girls. If the employer *must* give better wages, and if the pressure to compel him to do it is rational, the reform must begin

with the purchaser, or it can never be effective. For, as the pay ultimately comes from the consumer, he must give it in order that the employer may also do it. This is the whole case in a nutshell.

This fact, that the first cause of the difficulty is the conduct of the consumer and not the merchant, enables us to see very clearly why all pressure upon the merchant is misapplied, and to indicate the only method by which the problem can be solved, if it be capable of solution at all. Every solution must reckon with the true conditions of business, and with all the conditions. We have indicated how the protective union solves that produced by fraud and failure to fulfill contracts. We have indicated also how the boarding-home and cheap restaurant solves the problem of unequal conditions and competition between differently situated laborers. But the one now requiring solution is a very different one. The initial causes lie in the action of the consumer, not in that of either the employer or the laborer, and hence remedial methods must deal directly with those causes. But there are only two possible methods which can promise any relief. The first is, that the consumer or purchaser be made, or be willing, to pay higher prices for his goods, or prices which will enable the shop-girl and working-woman to obtain living wages. This, in its real meaning, is that every member of society should do his share of the world's work, and take no advantage of the wants of others to exact from them services for which an equivalent is not given in return. As moral instruction, this is, no doubt, very good, and it may not be questioned that, if consumers could be reformed by any practical method, the problem would seem easier. But when we face the matter of eliminating from the motives of life so large an amount of personal interest, and the fact that there is no absolute standard, either of living or of the cost and value of goods, we truly discover a problem which may very well strike despair into the hearts of the most optimistic. Certainly, if we wait for any solution of it by obtaining a just measure of conduct from purchasers, or a method which will enable them to consider beforehand the consequences of their bargains, we shall have waited a long time to realize Utopia, and must expect development to elicit a larger amount of infinite intelligence than past history gives us any reason to hope for. It is true that moral reformers in this direction are very much needed, and much may be accomplished by them. The results of effort towards modifying the conduct of consumers are worth working for. If men and women can be

made conscious that the consequences of inconsiderate purchases may defeat the very ends of justice which they so desire when contemplating the evils of low wages to shop-girls, they may be induced, at least to some extent, to make the personal sacrifices at this point which charity demands of them to relieve from suffering, and to prevent the evils which their inconsiderateness produces. In this connection, as indicating some consciousness of what must be done to remedy matters, it will be interesting to remark that some societies are organizing consumers' leagues, for the very purpose of realizing this end. The New York Working-women's Society has done so. But progress must be very slow in this direction unless people become practical Christians more rapidly than they have during the last eighteen centuries, and so little can be hoped for from the method which would aim to revolutionize the conduct of consumers, that we may as well look in the second direction for a method that may at least supplement this, and that will promise more immediate relief to the classes whose cause we are pleading. This, again, is the boarding-home, which will provide enough to make up for deficient wages. This system may have its faults. We shall not deny it. But, if society insists upon unrestricted liberty to make its purchases without reference to their consequences to labor, — and we would defend that liberty, — it must be asked to share its savings with those who are the innocent victims of its policy. The only way in which the consumer can make amends for his share in the injustice inflicted is to contribute at one place or in one way what he will not pay in another. If, then, we cannot appeal to his moral convictions to induce him either to pay a just price for his goods, or to contrive a method by which just prices can be determined, we may use the pity and sympathy which he feels for the shop-girl, and the indignation which he rather inconsistently expresses against the employer, to obtain by charity what he will not pay in the price of goods. In some way he must be called upon to balance the inequalities of life, and he may choose whether he will do it by reforming the methods of business, or by voluntary contributions to those whose services and low wages have come as a blessing to him.

This, however, it will be observed, is the solution which charity proposes, and charity is no ultimate solution of any problem. The French proverb well says that "charity creates half the misery it relieves, and cannot relieve half the misery it creates." Contributions from the community, voluntary or otherwise, may

equalize the fortunes of different classes of working-women and shop-girls who compete with each other on unequal terms, and they may enable those who get less than living wages to supply their necessary wants, *but they do not prevent the influence of that competition which affects all classes alike, and which tends to reduce the actual wages obtained, and to increase the demand for charitable assistance.* This competition is that which comes from the growth of population. This may be more rapid than the means of subsistence, and in proportion as it is so, pressure is exerted to diminish the dividends of production. This simply means that the competition which ultimately determines the rate of wages comes from the ratio between population and natural resources, the availability of labor remaining constant or proportional. Now, natural resources and their fertility do not increase. They may not be cultivated to the full extent of their capacity, but there is no increase in them with the growth of population. There may be greater production, but this is not a creation of original resources. On the contrary, it is rather a partial consumption or destruction of them. But, this aside, the increase of population, when resources remain constant, only multiplies the number of those among whom a given amount can be distributed, and the dividends must proportionally decrease. This is the principle to be recognized in the labor problem at large, and we have only to specialize it to see its application to working-women and shop-girls. The amount of labor for them is ultimately a fixed quantity, and if the number of competitors for it is increased the dividends must be smaller; that is, their wages must decrease. Now, if their necessary wants at a given period are partly supplied from outside help, the force of this competition will fall upon the wages thus received, and create the necessity of either lowering the standard of living or of supplying the whole of it from the funds of charity. This means that the methods of assistance we have discussed can be no more than partial solutions of the problem, or temporary aids in the alleviation of suffering. They do not strike at the root of the difficulty, and no method can do so which does not grapple with the problem of population. All efforts at improving the wages of labor which do not reckon with this question are doomed to failure. There is no use to indulge in sentimental optimism on this matter. The laws of nature do not wait upon human wishes, but fall with terrible vengeance upon all who ignore them; and while we do well to mitigate by temporary expedients the evils incident to the struggle for exist-

ence, we must expect no ultimate solution of our problem except by a method which will put limitations upon that fearful factor in human life. If we would realize the ideal result which is evidently involved in the sympathy for those who suffer evil or injustice, we must first remove the cause of them. This cause is the increase of population. As long as this condition is not removed, the evils of which all complain must either remain or multiply. Boarding-homes and protective unions are good and commendable, but they do not solve the problem. They only postpone the final penalty for ignoring the question of population, the most tremendous moral question the human race will ever be called upon to consider. I am not able to present a method of solving the problem with this matter of population in view, but it is important in concluding this paper to learn where the ultimate solution lies, in order to avoid misplacing confidence in methods which are only makeshifts, good enough to appease our sympathies for suffering, but not to remove the causes of it. We can only ameliorate evil, but cannot prevent it, by the methods we have discussed, and there is no use to shut our eyes to the seriousness of the conditions created by increasing population. Shrieks of madness at capital will not amend matters, unjust as the influences may be which come from the power it confers. Pressure has to be exerted somewhere in order to keep population within the limits of natural resources, and it is only a misfortune that this pressure cannot be more evenly distributed. But as the outcry against capital is most vigorously supported by those who are either ignorant of the conditions of life or deficient in self-control, the policy of nature is hardly censurable if its severity is applied where its influence is most needed. Of course, these remarks apply to the whole labor movement at large, so that the problem of wages for working-women and shop-girls is only one case in the larger question, and can press for solution only along the lines of the general subject. But it shows how every consideration of it brings up against the final barriers to the solution of the problem, unless we reckon with the matter of population. The struggle for existence must play havoc with human morals as long as there are no limitations to its influence. Moralization begins where a limit is imposed upon that struggle, or where there is no perpetual encroachment upon the higher aspirations and achievements of the individual. But the measures which will effect this limitation must be either very drastic, or exhibit greater moral power and earnestness than anything history yet presents. The task here is a herculean one,

and might well appall the most courageous. But it is vain to expect any diminution of the pain and suffering due to the competition for the dividends of production as long as the encroachment of population upon natural resources increases the struggle for existence. Protective unions and boarding-homes will do a good work, but they will not meet the difficulties presented by increasing population; and if we are to make anything like progress in solving the problem, we may as well see what it is, and open our eyes to the conditions that call for very serious reflection. As we approach the abysses of this question, the outlook is not an optimistic one. And, with Schiller, —

“Wer erfreute sich des Lebens
Der in seine Leiden blickt.”

Still, if only the majority of humanity could be made to see the nature of the problem, the moral earnestness which has done so much might be made available for effective work far in advance of present achievements. But it requires to direct its efficiency upon a point which is wholly unconsidered in ethics, and only mentioned in economics.

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THE EDUCATION OF THE INDIANS.

UNDER date of May 4, 1493, so soon after the discovery of America, Pope Alexander VI. obligated Ferdinand and Isabella to furnish Christian education to the Indians in the newly discovered countries, by sending out to them wise and godly men as teachers.¹

During the following year Isabella “directed that great care should be taken in the religious instruction of the Indians.” When Philip III. of Spain made a grant of New Mexico, in 1602, to Don Juan de Oñate, and allowed him “200 soldiers, horses, cattle, merchandise, and agricultural implements,” he ordered that “six priests, with a full complement of books, ornaments, and church accoutrements,” should accompany the colonists, for the Christianization of the natives. And when, in 1626–27, Cardinal Richelieu inaugurated the magnificent scheme of “The One Hun-

¹ “Deum tinentes, doctos, peritos et expertos ad instruendum incolas et habitores prefatos in Fide Catholica, et in bonis moribus inbuendum,” etc.

dred Associates" to take possession, for France and the church, of the entire territory from Florida to the Arctic, and from Newfoundland to the heads of the St. Lawrence, he incorporated this article into the charter: "For every new settlement, at least three ecclesiastics must be provided." In 1588 a society was formed in England for introducing Christianity among the North American Indians, to which Sir Walter Raleigh contributed £100, which is thought to be the first donation in England for foreign Christian missions of the Protestant type. Drake says that "nearly all the royal charters and patents issued for British North America were ostensibly for Christianizing of the Indians."¹ A remark of the eminent John Smith, of the Virginia Colony, would imply that a selection of the colonists was made with reference to this missionary work, for he says: "Much they blamed me for not converting the savages, when those they sent me were little better, if not worse."

It may be said, in a general way, that zeal for the church and its extension in the New World characterized those very early schemes for emigration and colonization, yet with a general failure.

Major Amos Stoddard, our first governor of the Upper Louisiana, qualified to speak from an exceptional experience, and after a hundred years of colonial evangelization, says: "The Indians are what they were when America was first discovered by the Spaniards, except those who have had any considerable intercourse with the whites, which has invariably tended to debase and corrupt them."²

Congress often made liberal appropriations for Indian education; and in compensation for lands acquired from them by purchase and removal, the government often had wise forecast, and stipulated that the money to be paid to the Indians should be retained in the hands of the government, and certain portions of its income be devoted to educational purposes.

Thus \$30,000 was conditioned, out of the income of the Indian lands sold in Georgia, to be devoted to school purposes annually among the tribes removed to the Indian Territory. This allowed more money annually, *per capita*, among the Cherokees, than any State in the Union raised for the education of its white children. This statement was promulgated by missionary officials for that

¹ Drake's *Indians*, book ii. p. 112.

² *Sketches, Historical and Descriptive, of Louisiana*, by Major Amos Stoddard, p. 410.

field, to the credit of missionary success, and it was thus left to the impression that the Cherokees had advanced so far in the line of civilization and of education as to exceed the whites in appropriations for educational work. This was not fully fact, since this amount of appropriation was an enforced payment for such purposes, and reluctantly made under an old compact with government. When I was among them in 1880, there was much of manœuvre and struggle to alienate this investment for general purposes. At the time of the above-named visit, the "Five Nations" had been the pet beneficiaries of the government for sixty years, and yet six sevenths of their dwellings were log-houses, huts, shanties, and caves.

Dartmouth College had an Indian school incorporated into its foundation, but it was largely in name, and its pupils were few. When the great constitutional question for the existence of that college was about to be tried, President Wheelock wished to make a show of Indian pupils, and he went over the Canada border to borrow some for his purpose. When crossing the Connecticut, they came in sight of the college building, and it looked so like a fort, and was so suggestive of a prison, and they had withal so many suspicions of the treachery of the whites, that they plunged into the river and struck out for the Canadian shore and forests. President Wheelock called in vain for their return. He, however, had illustrated the motto of the college: *Vox clamantis in deserto*.

But Webster gained the case for the college all the same. The first brick building on the grounds of Harvard was called the Indian College, built by English funds, and was designed for the accommodation of twenty young red men; but, says Mr. Ellis, "the attempt was earnestly made, and carried through its various stages, with but slender and wholly unsatisfactory results."¹

In 1675 one Indian was made a bachelor of arts at Harvard College; yet the coincidence is singular, and somewhat an index of our treatment of the race, that the same year the General Court ordered that "hereafter no person shall harbor or entertain an Indian." Bancroft says that no pains were spared to teach them to read and write, and in a short time a larger proportion of the Massachusetts Indians could do so than the inhabitants of Russia in our day. This was in 1675.²

¹ *The Red Man and the White Man*, by George E. Ellis, pp. 25, 26. Little, Brown & Co. Boston, 1882.

² Bancroft's *History of the United States*, ii. 94.

In 1778 the Delaware treaty contemplated an Indian State, saying: "It is further agreed on between the contracting parties . . . to invite any other tribes who have been friends to the interests of the United States to join the present confederation and to form a State, whereof the Delaware nation shall be the head and have a representation in Congress."¹

This august and benevolent scheme contrasts painfully with the present pitiable remnant of the Delawares, who in 1885 were scattered among eight or ten agencies, and numbered seventy-eight souls, mostly on the Red River in the Indian Territory. In 1819 John Johnson, Indian Agent for Ohio, reports: "The Delawares were once very numerous and powerful, but many disastrous wars with the whites reduced them to a mere handful. . . . They are more opposed to the gospel and the whites than any other Indians with whom I am acquainted. . . . Their peculiar aversion to having white people for neighbors induced them to remove to the westward." There may have been an anticipation of such an Indian State when the first measures were taken that have resulted in forming the Indian Territory. After the Louisiana purchase in 1803, a Congressional act in 1804 provided for the removal of the Indians on the east of the Mississippi River to territory on the west of it, and the five great tribes or "nations" were finally located in it. Possibly the labored, suggestive, and more or less seminal report of John C. Calhoun in 1818 had such a scheme in view, when he proposed two large reservations west of the Mississippi, on which all the Indians could be gathered, — one in the northern and one in the southern section of our vast and unoccupied domain. Only one was formed, and now is this Indian Territory, in which are gathered about forty of the old tribes, or the remnants of them, and original hopes and plans perished. The semblance only is left, like the gold-colored chrysalis of the butterfly after the living occupant has burst it and gone.

When James I. granted the patent for Nova Scotia, in 1621, he speaks of the countries "either inhabited or occupied by unbelievers, whom to convert to the Christian faith is a duty of great importance to the glory of God." In the charter of Massachusetts Bay, 1628, it is enjoined on the colonists to live such godly and moral lives as "may win and invite the natives of the country to the knowledge and obedience of the only true God and Saviour of mankind and the Christian faith, which in our royal

¹ *Laws of the United States*, Duane, ii. 304.

intention and the adventurers' free profession is the principal end of this Plantation." To this end Cradock, the governor of the Bay Colony, enjoins it on Endicott, the head officer, in these words: "We trust you will not be unmindful of the main end of your Plantation by endeavoring to bring the Indians to the knowledge of the Gospel; . . . that you have a diligent and watchful eye over our own people, that they live unblamable and without reproof; . . . and also to endeavor to get some of their children to train up to reading, and consequently to religion, whilst they are young; herein, to young or old, to omit no good opportunity that may tend to bring them out of that woful state and condition they now are in." So in the charter of Charles II. to William Penn, in 1681, we read of the "commendable desire to reduce the savage natives by gentle and just manners to the love of civil society and the Christian religion." In general it may be said that these good purposes and plans for the education and elevation of the Indian in civil and religious life pervaded the colonial grants and instructions as an animating and even leading principle.

Results here force themselves painfully on our attention, in contrast, in a record of stupendous failures.

If any State should show good results in Indian civilization, it is certainly Massachusetts, where the object has secured so much thought and sympathy and labor and money, and where the two races were for so long time intermingled or were in juxtaposition. The last exhaustive and itemized report on the Indians in this State was made to the legislature in 1861, by which it appears that there remained within the Commonwealth the shreds of ten bands, yet showing nowhere one drop of pure Indian blood in their 1,600 people. They had no rights at the polls, were quite intemperate, immoral, unambitious, and during the preceding ten years had received state charities to the amount of \$29,964.37, not including school money.¹ And if an old Indian cornfield yet remain under the cultivation of the aborigines between Plymouth Rock and the Rocky Mountains, it must be at the extreme western point to which the intrusion and cupidity of the whites have not yet attained. The mortifying declaration of the "Edinburgh Review" stands uncontradicted as to the assimilation and civilization of the aborigines: "It has been tried by the French, it has been tried by the English, and it has been tried by the Americans, and in every case the natives have been swept away by war, dis-

#2 per
Indians

¹ *Massachusetts Senate Document 96, 1861.*

ease, and famine, and the whites have exhibited a frightful mixture of all the vices of civilized and savage life.”¹

With a steady failure as a whole, for 250 years, to perpetuate the Indian tribes, and to civilize, educate, and Christianize them ; with but a humiliating success in engrafting on the Indian stock the industries of the whites ; with a progressive and almost total extinction of Indian titles and absorption of Indian lands westward to the Mississippi ; and with the same white unfriendliness in the civilization and settlements on the borders of the Indian belt and reservations, we are confronted with the question, What next ?

Mr. Dawes is reported as saying that “what has been done in the past is of no use except to teach us that something different is needed in the future.” We seem as yet to have made progress in the theories and practice of Indian improvement only on the agnostic side.

Our forecast, therefore, for the aborigines of North America is not only not fascinating or encouraging, but is rather shadowed over by dark omens. We cannot forget the hopes and plans and the various arduous works of the 250 years, and the practical failure of them all. We would have more heart for the future if we had united our forces to native, aboriginal forces, and produced one statesman who could grasp the condition of the red man, and rise to the emergency of his race or make an occasion for their uplifting. We have had scarce a half dozen like Red Jacket or Black Hawk, Tecumseh or Ouray, and even these few were no product of white labor. Mental drill has done but little work for the Indian.

A very able—and perhaps the best historical disquisition on the red man, as it is one of the latest, is by George E. Ellis, who sums up the opinions of the observers and students on this theme by saying that “the consenting opinions and judgment of the very large majority of men of actual knowledge and practical experience of the mature Indians is, that they cannot be civilized.”²

This summary of Dr. Ellis continues : “There is in the heredity and the organization and birth-type of an Indian, in his tissues and fibre, in his elementary make-up, in his aptitudes, limitations, disabilities, proclivities, and drift of nature, a constitution which

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, vol. lxxxii. No. 165, p. 243.

² *The Red Man and the White Man*, by George E. Ellis, pp. 495, 496, 594. Boston, 1882.

assigns him to savageism, and bars his transformation to a civilized state. In these respects he has qualities inherent, congenital, ineradicable, answering to those respectively of stock animals in the field and wild animals in the jungle; qualities like those which are specific and distinctive between fruit and forest trees, wild shrubs and berries, which lose their flavor under cultivation."

Dr. Ellis with much frankness and fullness states the dissent of an important minority, and for himself says: "Any hopeful work in the civilization of the Indians must satisfy itself with effecting the results with the third generation from the present full-grown stock; and that we must be content with accepting fragments, degrees, and stages of full civilization as all that we are likely ever to realize in those of Indian blood."¹

In his "Life on the Frontier," Major J. S. Campion says: "That there is a radical mental difference between the races is as certain as that there are physical ones. . . . The Apache cannot be developed into a civilized man; he must give place to him. His extinction is justified by the inevitable logic of the fitness of things." "Every country has, perhaps, had its true wild man, — tribes incapable of civilization; some countries have them yet."²

General Custer is more pronounced even than Major Campion: "Study him, fight him, civilize him if you can, he remains still the object of your curiosity, a type of man peculiar and undefined, subjecting himself to no known laws of civilization, contending determinedly against all efforts to win him from his chosen mode of life. He stands in a group of nations solitary and reserved, seeking alliance with none, mistrusting and opposing the advances of all. Civilization may and should do much for him, but it can never civilize him. . . . He cannot be himself and be civilized; he fades away and dies. Cultivation such as the white man would give him deprives him of his identity. Education, strange as it may appear, seems to weaken rather than strengthen his intellect. . . . My firm conviction, based upon an intimate and thorough analysis of the habits, traits of character, and natural instinct of the Indian, and supported by the almost unanimous opinion of all persons who have made the Indian problem a study, and have studied it, not from a distance, but in immediate contact with all the facts bearing thereupon, is that the Indian cannot

¹ *The Red Man and the White Man*, p. 614.

² *Life on the Frontier*, by Major J. S. Campion, p. 355, *et seq.* London edition. 1878.

be elevated to that great level where he can be induced to adopt any policy or mode of life varying from those to which he has ever been accustomed, by any method of teaching, argument, reasoning, or coaxing which is not preceded and followed closely in reserve by a superior physical force. In other words, the Indian is capable of recognizing no controlling influence but that of stern, arbitrary power.”¹

However hard and discouraging the sentiments now quoted may seem, it must be said that as a general thing they express the views and feelings of the people beyond the Mississippi, if not beyond the Alleghanies. That is to say, they express the sentiments of the larger part of the people of the country. Government in the United States is the voice of the people, and, to the extent now indicated, the people have decided against the Indian.

The opinions of the army are probably fairly embodied in what we have quoted from Major Campion and General Custer. But the army is in necessary antagonism to the Indian, is naturally adapted to develop their most offensive qualities, and bring to light the discouraging features. Cavalry and artillery and rifles are not the best fitted means to bring out the elements of civilization in a savage race, nor are they eminent means of grace to bring them into a Christian state. The law of an army is mainly that of force, and bayonets will not push a beastly rabble up into first-class citizenship. A total dissent must be entered against the general's dictum that “no controlling influence but that of stern, arbitrary power” will avail in handling the Indian race. Too much of colonial and pioneer and frontier history is to the contrary. There have been Indian patriots and statesmen and warriors who have held their ground to the last, and died nobly, and won laurels that will not fade. Such were Pontiac and Tecumseh. “Peace hath her victories,” and by them the great fields of civilization have been won. And it is no bold thing to say that the American Indian has not had a fair chance to take on civilization. Their very success has made them offensive. Indian farming is a good theory with the whites, if it be afar off. The Calhoun treaty of 1819 recognized the Cherokees as “persons of industry and capable of managing their property with discretion.” But that was in the wilds of interior Georgia, into which white interests had not advanced. Then, as

¹ *My Life on the Plains*, by General G. A. Custer, U. S. A., pp. 11, 16, 102, et seq. 1876.

always, smoke from the white man's cabin was a signal for that of the wigwam to disappear.

Of course the extinction of the Indian race is possible. There are more extinct than extant peoples on the earth. How many of those named by Herodotus and Rollin and Gibbon can now be identified with any living nation? How many of the forty provincial conquests of Great Britain will escape absorption and maintain their identity and have a final autonomy? In this regard the Thirteen Colonies are a rare exception, if not solitary, among the English-speaking people in general. The type of modern civilization is not advanced enough to bring up a nation as we bring up children from infancy to rounded individual and independent manhood. But it is neither fair nor just to say that the thing cannot be done with these low-grade nations. Custer, Champion, and a semi-barbarous white portion can only say that we are not capable of doing it. But far be it from us to say that American institutions cannot make a fair citizen of an Indian, or that our divine system of religion cannot bring Christians out of wigwams. The word of Isaiah should be heeded by some workmen discouraged in Indian civilization: "Look unto the rock whence ye are hewn, and to the hole of the pit whence ye are digged." Men of English blood should not be disheartened over the very low grade of our aborigines. The rather they should read such authors as Sharon Turner and Lingard on the Anglo-Saxon, to see from what miserable stuff of Adam and humanity the English and American nations of to-day have been developed. Before the Revolution, and not long before, this entry was made in one of the records of Plymouth County, in Massachusetts, by one of her most learned citizens, and a justice of the peace:—

"Jenauary y^e 14 day 1742 biniamin tupper came to my hous to ceep Scool." There was then no public school system, and this Benjamin Tupper went from house to house and taught reading, writing, and spelling in the due proportion of each family, with board at forty cents a week. With such low beginnings, whose evidence is on the record of Squire Fearing, who would dare hope for the grand school system and eminent popular scholarship of which that county may well be proud to-day?

Something remains to be said of what the government is doing at Carlisle and Hampton. Since 1879, three hundred and forty-nine Indian boys and girls have been sent out from Hampton, educated after their manner. Generally favorable reports have come back from them, and they have accomplished as much civil-

izing and educating work as could be expected of them, or their circumstances would permit. They have withstood the trials of a surrounding uncivilization much better than many give them credit for. Lapses to blanket life and low wilderness living have been rare. When they have been able to find work and put in practice their school education, they have made a fair success.

What impresses us at first view, with reference to the government schools, is their total inadequacy to meet the demands of the Indian problem before the government. Of the 245,000 aborigines in our country, one fifth of them, or fifty thousand, may be reckoned as of school age. If it were possible, it is a great undertaking, and quite impracticable, to separate them from their homes and settle and support them in government institutions of learning. All success now achieved in this line we rejoice over, but cannot regard it as sample or first fruit of the harvest we covet. The theory of the future life of these educated Indians is impracticable. Says the Report of Carlisle for 1886: "The government is not attempting by means of its schools to prepare Indian youth to live in the midst of barbarism. Attempts in that direction have never been a success, and probably never will be. . . . The direction of all Indian educational work should be toward preparing Indians to live in civilization." In the same connection, the Report suggests that "every State have schools, and these schools be made introductory to civilized contact, and so in time all Indian children grow into a knowledge of and desire for American citizenship." So savagery is to be exhausted and extinguished by depriving the parents of their children, to be educated into a Christian civilization, and they never more to be seen by their parents!

Hence the singularly high standard for Indian education. It is proposed to follow the present two terms of five years each with a post-graduate course, "that all should go out into the schools of the land and measure themselves with their white brothers and sisters, thus making ready to compete with them for the prizes in life. . . . If the youth of the tribe are sent into our already organized public school systems, and from these encouraged to associate and to join in their interests with the nation at large, tribal socialisms, with all their perplexing clogs and expense to the government, will soon merge and disappear in the body politic of the country."

Thus in a generation or two, as the children are brought East to school, and their parents die off, the reservations will become

vacated, and what is now Indian country will be peopled by white settlers. Gradually the races will be blended by this mixture of the young Indians, educated in our common schools, and the populace will show all shadings from red to white by intermarriage, as to an extent now beyond the Mississippi. Every one will judge for himself of the probability or possibility of this solution of the Indian problem.

Much that is practical is learned at these two government schools, but how this knowledge is to be turned to account by these young Indians when they leave school is evidently a perplexing question. A return to the reservations is to an enforced idleness, since there is little call on them for employment in their trades and chosen callings, studied at Hampton and Carlisle. It is well urged that to settle down to life work on the reservations will consolidate and perpetuate tribal relations and the perpetuity of clans, which it is the wise policy of the government to change into holdings in severalty and homes, as in the agricultural and mechanical communities of white men. Here they will advance by the slow laws of civilization — never much to be hurried as in mechanical affairs — into citizenship and the common privileges and comforts of the poorer classes in the nineteenth century. If it comes to this, as apparently the government intends it shall, the present system of education in these schools may show a deficiency. The aims and grades may prove to have been too high and too ambitious. The pupils cannot do the mental work which the pupils can do in the tenth generation of the children from the Jamestown and Plymouth colonists. The laws of heredity must be recognized and have play, or nature will veto success. An ardent philanthropy must go at a slow pace, and not outrun nature. It is generally agreed, by outside observers about our mission, intellectual, and mechanical schools for the Indians, that we have marked too high for their attainments. Eliot had missed in judgment and aim when he led his Natick pupils and communicants to discuss the questions: "When Christ arose, whence came his soul?" "Our little children have not sinned: when they die, whither do they go?" "When such die as never heard of Christ, where do they go?" "Why did not God give all men good hearts?" "Since God is all-powerful, why did not God kill the Devil, that made men so bad?" Andover and the Supreme Court are still struggling over such questions. More sensible was the Scotch Society which sent over the Rev. John Brainard to teach the Indians secular and religious truths, and introduced

“ spinning schools ” in Pennsylvania, and unfolded the mysteries of preparing flax. The first generation may not be expected to get much beyond the plough, foreplane, anvil, cooking-stoves, and sewing-needles.

We would not pass an absolute judgment on the policy of bringing these Indian children East for literary instruction, and an induction into the principles and practices of American civilization. Yet we cannot but regret the waste force expended at Carlisle and Hampton. The several branches of labor, religious, literary, mechanical, and agricultural, at Hampton, are expended on 120 Indians at an annual cost of about \$20,000, not reckoning in the interest on about \$500,000 joint outlay and foundation for Indians and negroes. The power of the institution for the Indians for the time being does not go beyond these 120. The influences radiating far and wide from a school, academy, or college, as in one of the States, is lost beyond the area and limit of the 120. It can be seen, on reflection, how different it would be if the funds and the teachers were subdivided, and the schools were located centrally among the parents and families of the boys and girls, who would mingle with their friends daily or frequently. What was done at the school would be looked upon from a wide region, and its teachings would thus be disseminated indefinitely, and be constantly and practically discussed in the wigwams and around the camp-fires. New ideas and modes of living would break in over that eternal sameness of Indian existence. Any changes wrought in the children or in their habits of life would be observed. The mystery of tools and the conveniences they would introduce into their families would be opened up with surprise, and with some imitations and adoptions. The theoretic, with its formulas and emblems, would be exchanged for a practical application among the tepees and rude shelters of old homes. The parents would have a living illustration of clean and decently clad boys and girls. The reformation, elevation, and civilization of a tribe would begin and be obvious with the first day of the school. Of course there would be hindrances, difficulties, and some impossibilities, as in Massachusetts, from the dim outlines, and hard struggles to establish the district system, and all the way through the grades of the grammar and high to the normal school. Every pappoose will not be insured to become a baby saint, in scholarship, morals, and citizenship, by playing in sight of the Indian school, but all this will be made more possible and hopeful for him.

But the wide power and unconscious influence over the region of a literary institution living, working, and growing in it, needs not to be unfolded to further details. All this, be it more or less, with many admitted drawbacks, is lost to the Indian masses when it is pent up two thousand miles away.

Moreover, the perils and anxieties of the return of the pupils are obviated by this. The critical period, as is well known, is when the pupil, educated, elevated, and nobly ambitious, returns to the wigwam. The new contrast between the two parties is bold, and often quite to mutual repulsion. Under the change suggested they would have grown unconsciously and mutually into the new relation, and the tribe is already far advanced on the upward grade. True, the Carlisle theory implies that its graduates will not return to the reservation. "Why should they be remanded to such trial and failure?" "The government is not attempting by means of its schools to prepare Indian youth to live in the midst of barbarism. Attempts in that direction have never been a success, and probably never will be. The direction of all Indian educational work should be toward preparing Indians to live in civilization." ¹

But this is an impossible theory when the Indian population is 250,000, those of school age 50,000, and all to be removed for education and unreturnable. Nor, according to the Report of 1881, is this separate schooling system very hopeful. This theory of Hampton and Carlisle contemplates the removal of all the children from Indian life and surroundings to new homes and the elevated civilization of the whites, never to return to the surroundings of Indian life. This theory of Indian education and elevation is totally impracticable, if not chimerical.

The remark of Indian Commissioner Kalb, of 1874, would seem, therefore, to be still in full force: "The true, permanent scheme for the management and instruction of the whole body of Indians within the control of the government is yet to be created." ²

William Barrows.

¹ Report for 1886.

² *The Indian Question*, 1874, p. 99.

RECENT PROGRESS IN BALLOT REFORM.

WHEN the first ballot reform act was passed by the legislature of Victoria, in 1856, no one could have foreseen the rapid stride of the plan to remove, so far as possible, corruption from the vicinity of the polls. The agitation of the question in Australia had extended over several years previous to the enactment of the law. William Nicholson, the man to whom credit is due for having the act passed, was the hero of the day. He went to England in 1857, and preached the gospel of ballot reform. The agitation prevailed in several of the Australian provinces simultaneously. The real father of the system was Francis Dutton, a member of the South Australian legislature, who, after several years of unremitting agitation, had it adopted in South Australia in 1858. New South Wales and other Australian states rapidly followed. England herself, after a long struggle against the Anglo-Saxon's dislike both of change and of secrecy, adopted it in 1872,—at first tentatively, then more and more completely, till now it governs all elections in England and Wales, and practically in Scotland and Ireland also. Canada has joined the ranks, as have Belgium and Luxemburg; and some features of the system are employed in France, Italy, Hungary, Greece, and Austria.

The system has never been abandoned when once tried. In Australia whatever opposition existed has wholly ceased. Both parties in England refuse to abandon it, and yet it sometimes causes strange surprises. In some districts in England, in which it is impossible to hold a Conservative meeting without Radical interference, the Conservative candidates are returned by large majorities. The voters shout themselves hoarse at the Radical meetings; but when the day of the election comes they go to the polls and (unknown to the Radical leaders) vote for the Conservative candidates. Rather than be ostracized and maltreated by their comrades, the workingmen join hands with the Radicals before election, but vote as they choose at the polling booths. This illustrates the way in which the system has caused many surprises in every country; and, at the same time, it shows how useless it is for politicians to attempt to calculate beforehand whether or not the measure will benefit their particular party.

The system was first tried in the United States in Connecticut and Montana, in the October elections of 1889. Montana was

then a Territory, but it was admitted as a State on the 8th of the following November. The success of the plan in the October elections was still more marked at the elections held in those two States in November, when they were also joined by the States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island. In Montana the ballots are printed at the public expense, — that being the title of the act. What is known as the blanket ballot, or one ballot containing the names of all the candidates, is used; and the voter marks a cross opposite each name to be voted for, or at the head of a group of party candidates. A polling booth is allowed for every fifty voters, or a fraction thereof; and the voter shall not remain in the booth longer than five minutes, if the other booths are occupied. Political workers are not allowed to come within twenty-five feet of the polling places.

The law of Connecticut is a very short one. It provides for the use of official envelopes, which may not be marked for identification in any way. The voter can obtain at the booth "ballots of any political party he may desire;" but they must be printed on official paper, and the envelopes must be indorsed by the officials. Three minutes is the limit allowed in a booth, and workers are not allowed within one hundred feet of the polls. The State does not print the ballots, but they are provided by those most directly interested. Although Connecticut led all the other States of New England in adopting the secret ballot, yet even this measure, crude as it is, and hardly up to the standard of the Australian system, had a rough road in its passage through the legislature: the governor vetoed one of the bills, and it was only after a compromise that the final bill became a law.

In the adoption of the genuine Australian plan, Massachusetts was the pioneer of all the States. Upon the blanket ballot the names of candidates for each office were arranged under the designation of the office in alphabetical order, according to surnames. There were left at the end of the list of candidates for each different office as many blank spaces as there were persons to be elected to such office, in which the voter could insert the name of any person, not printed on the ballot, for whom he desired to vote. The ballots were so printed as to give to each voter a clear opportunity to designate by a cross, in a sufficient margin at the right of the name of each candidate, his choice of candidates and his answer to the questions submitted; and on the ballot might be printed such words as would aid the voter to do this, as "Vote for One," "Vote for Three," "Yes," "No," and

the like. No voter was allowed to keep a booth more than ten minutes, nor more than five minutes in case the other booths were in use. Voters who were not able to read and write were allowed assistance. The law did not prevent party workers from following the voters to and from the polling place and pressing them with solicitations; but this defect has been removed, and several amendments have been made which tend to make the law work more smoothly in the future. Rhode Island, the fourth member of the group of pioneer States in 1889, made provisions similar to those in the law of Massachusetts. The law of Rhode Island, however, is much more brief than that of Massachusetts. Five minutes is the extreme limit allowed for the voter to occupy a booth. Following the original law of Massachusetts, Rhode Island also made no restrictions upon workers at the polls.

So great was the success of ballot reform in 1889 that nine new States adopted the plan in 1890. These were Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin, or an aggregate of thirteen States in all which voted under the system only one year after it was first tried in the United States. The law of Indiana adopts the blanket ballot, and requires the voter to mark a cross beside each name, or at the head of a group of party candidates. The mark is made, not with a pencil, but with a stamp. If the certificate of nomination of any state convention shall request that the figure or device selected by such convention be used to designate the candidates of such party on the ballots for all elections throughout the State, such figure or device shall be so used until changed by request of a subsequent state convention of the same party. Such device may be the figure of a star, an eagle, a plough, or some such appropriate symbol; but the coat-of-arms or seal of the State or of the United States, the national flag, or any other emblem common to the people at large, shall not be used as such device. If any elector shall show his ballot to any other person after he has marked it, such ballot shall not be deposited in the ballot-box. No one is allowed within fifty feet of the polling places. Maryland also provided a stamp for marking individual names or a group at the head of a ticket nominated by any political party. An unsuccessful attempt was made to provide that an unofficial ballot, printed on paper of a different color from the official ballot, may be taken into the polling room by the voter, marked in advance, to assist him in marking the official ballot. This amendment was copied from the bill then pending in the legislature of New York.

Minnesota voted under a strict law requiring blanket ballots, and forbidding the use of any other kind. A cross designated the candidates to be voted for, which might be placed opposite each name, or at the head of a group of party candidates; but no restriction was made as to the time for occupying a booth. Missouri furnished a blanket-ballot law, with the provision that the voter should strike out all the names for which he did not wish to vote. The law required a blanket ballot.

The law of New York had the distinguishing feature of allowing a paster ballot, which any one could bring in his pocket and place over whatever official tickets were offered to him. This was the worst of several features in the very crude law which was first tried at the November election in 1890. As the law for New York was only enacted after several vetoes by the governor, and as it has attracted universal attention, the amendments made in 1891, under which the coming election will be held, are worthy of treatment at greater length.

The new law makes it more difficult hereafter to make independent nominations. The number of signers required to a certificate placing in nomination an independent candidate for a state office is increased from one thousand to three thousand; for a division less than the State but greater than a county, or for a county or a city, the number is increased from two hundred and fifty to five hundred. For an Assembly district the number of signers must be two hundred and fifty instead of one hundred, and the same provision is made for school commissioner districts, which were omitted entirely last year. When the nomination is for an office to be filled by voters in the city and county of New York, or the county of Kings, or the city of Brooklyn, six hundred signatures will be required instead of three hundred, and for parts of said cities and counties two hundred and fifty instead of one hundred. The following clause is also added, to prevent confusion of names: "The signers of a certificate made according to the provisions of this section shall not designate as the political or other name selected by them the name of any organized political party, without using in connection therewith some other word or words to distinguish the name selected by them from such party name; nor shall they use any word or designation indicating that such name is that of any regular party or political organization."

The county clerks are directed to publish at least six days before election the list of nominations "twice" in each daily news-

paper selected by them, instead of "daily." If there be no daily newspaper in the county, one publication only shall be made in each weekly newspaper. The section relating to the submission of constitutional amendments is considerably amplified by giving more explicit directions regarding the procedure. If any such amendment or proposition is to be submitted at a special election, notices of it must be given the same as at a general election; as many ballot-boxes to be provided as there are amendments to be voted upon; official ballots to be printed at the expense of counties and municipalities, whose officers are required to furnish them; and the votes to be canvassed by the county canvassers at the same time with the votes of the next succeeding general election.

The amendments relating to official ballots are evidently also intended to make the canvass of the independent candidate more difficult than under the original act. Provision was at first made that no names should be placed upon an independent ticket, except the names specified in the certificate of nomination, without the approval of the persons designated and appointed in said certificate, such approval to be made at least twelve days before election. The amendment applies this also to the person whose name is used by providing that the name of a person nominated in the regular way shall not be placed on an independent ticket "when such person shall have given notice at least fifteen days before election, to the officer with whom his original certificate of nomination was filed, by a writing signed and duly acknowledged, that he does not wish his name placed upon such a ticket." Independent certificates, another section of the law provides, must be filed for state offices, and offices in districts larger than a county, with the secretary of state, not less than fifteen days before election; and for local offices, with the county clerk, not less than twelve days before election. As a regular candidate can forbid the use of his name up to within fifteen days before election, it will be somewhat difficult to fill out independent tickets with regular nominations hereafter. Another amendment provides that independent candidates shall not require their names to be printed on more than one kind of ballot. It will be remembered that at this year's charter election some independent candidates had two and even three tickets in the field. The disputed question of how to fold ballots is settled at last by an amendment providing that they may be folded "crosswise by bringing the bottom of the ballot up to the perforated line, and then in the middle lengthwise."

Another change provides that the county clerk, or other officer charged with the duty of printing ballots, is directed to print but one hundred instead of two hundred ballots for every fifty voters, or fraction of fifty voters, in a district. Twelve sample ballots must also be provided for each election district, of the same form and size as the official ballots, but printed on paper of a different color and without the stub numbers. A record of the number of ballots furnished must also be kept and preserved for one year. And it is further provided that divisions or alterations of election districts must be made on or before August 1st, instead of September 1st, and that each election district shall contain not more than four hundred voters instead of three hundred. Not more than one polling place can hereafter be in the same room. The clause requiring the ballot clerks, or a ballot clerk and an inspector, to write their initials on the stub of each of the ballots is repealed. In its place, the amendment gives the ballot clerks the right to instruct the voter how to fold his ballot, and to illustrate by folding the sample ballots in his presence. A most important amendment is the one providing that the inspectors shall not receive a ballot from a voter unless each ballot presented to him shall, when delivered to them, be folded so that the inside is concealed and the indorsement and number visible. The provision that no person shall occupy one booth less than three minutes is stricken out. The ten-minute limit remains, however.

It is provided that the statement of the disposition made of the ballots required to be made out by the inspectors is to be filed with the county clerk or other officer in charge of the printing of the ballots. The sealed package containing the unused and spoiled ballots is also to be taken to such officer, and after the official canvass must be burned. The section relating to the canvass of the vote by the inspectors is amended so that, in case a ballot or paster appears to be marked for identification, it shall be attached to the certificate of canvass with a statement embodying the grounds on which the validity of such ballot is questioned. The county canvassers shall also canvass them separately. Such ballots shall be counted in estimating the result, but the canvass may be reviewed by mandamus proceedings. All such ballots shall be preserved for at least one year, or until the questions raised have been settled. The marking of a ballot for identification by an election officer is made a misdemeanor, punishable, as are the other offenses enumerated in the section, by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than six months nor more than one year.

No voter can mark his ballot, or do any act with the intent that it may be identified as the one cast by him. The same provision is made regarding a paster ballot, and it is provided that such ballots so marked for identification shall be void and of no effect.

By one of the new sections referring to town and village officers, and excluding them from some of the provisions of the general act, it is provided that nominations may be made in the regular way by representatives of parties which polled one per cent. of the vote at the last preceding fall election. Some changes are made regarding the form of town ballots. Excise commissioners are hereafter to be voted for on separate ballots. The number of booths to be provided for at such elections shall be one for every fifty votes polled at the last preceding village or town election. Ballot clerks shall not serve at town or village elections.

This form of the bill was not satisfactory to those who had at heart the best interests of ballot reform. Their attempt to secure the blanket ballot, instead of the paster ballot, did not succeed; but rather than to have no amendments at all to what was certainly a crude law — that of 1890 — they accepted this bill. After it had reached the governor, a number of protests were made, more particularly against limiting independent candidates to one ballot, and the amendment authorizing candidates of the regular parties to file caveats forbidding the printing of their names on the ballots of independent candidates. But the bill became a law with these provisions. The good provisions of the law of 1890 are retained, forbidding the presence of workers within one hundred feet of the polls, and throwing more than the ordinary safeguards around the custody of ballots that have been spoiled; but the bad provision, requiring ballot clerks to place their initials on the ballots, still remains.

The ballot reform law enacted by New Jersey, and used for the first time in 1890, did not provide for a blanket ballot, but allowed each political party a paster ballot, after the manner of the law in New York. The law also allowed the official ballots, printed and distributed at the public expense, to be obtained five days in advance of the election by any one who might apply for them. This gave the politicians the power to place tickets in the hands of their followers outside of the polling places; and it was a very undesirable feature, although the politicians are not allowed to follow the voters within one hundred feet of the polling places. As in Connecticut, official envelopes are used, which can be obtained only at the polling places and on election day. The fact is,

that the ballot reform laws in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey were passed, and in the case of New York amended, by the enemies of the full and complete Australian system.

The law in Tennessee was modeled somewhat upon that of New Jersey; but a blanket ballot is used, upon which the voter must cross the names to be voted for. The law of Washington gives the blanket ballot, which must be marked with a cross at the head of the party group, in a way similar to that adopted by Massachusetts. Wisconsin has followed Washington and Massachusetts in these respects; but the voter is allowed to remain ten minutes in the booth in case the other booths are not occupied.

We have thus seen that, down to 1891, thirteen States had adopted the Australian system of voting, although some of them had made such wide deviations from the original law that they could hardly be named in the list. In November of the present year, thirteen more States will be added to the list, making twenty-six in all which will use the Australian system at the coming election. The thirteen States which will try the law for the first time in 1891 are Arkansas, California, Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The latter State adopted the system while it was still a Territory; but as it has recently been admitted into the Union it will hold its first election under this system as a State, in November.

Arkansas has all the general features of the Australian ballot system. The blanket ballot is used, but the voter erases all names for which he does not wish to vote. Delaware has a modified Australian system of voting, something like the one followed by New York. The cross is stamped, and not marked. Workers are allowed within thirty feet of the polls. The law of Massachusetts has been adopted by Illinois with only slight variations. More latitude is allowed, however, in regard to the marking of ballots. By some accident, that provision in the bill which was intended to protect voters from the importunities of "workers" in the immediate vicinity of the polls was omitted when the bill became a law. New Hampshire and California also follow the law of Massachusetts as to the blanket ballot, and in every other important respect.

A radically different law is now in force in Pennsylvania. While the blanket ballot is required, and while the voter must mark his candidates with an \times , yet there are some peculiar features that are worthy of mention. Workers can approach close

to the polls, but no person within the voting-room is allowed to electioneer for any candidate. A voter declaring his disability may have the assistance of any voter he wishes in the booth. The law of Vermont, which took effect January 1, 1891, is in all essential respects similar to the Massachusetts and Rhode Island laws, and the other most desirable laws thus far enacted. It provides for the single blanket ballot. The voters are to indicate their choice by making an \times after the names of the candidates for whom they wish to vote. There is no provision forbidding electioneering within the immediate vicinity of the polling places, but it is forbidden to interfere with or endeavor to induce any voter to vote for any particular candidate inside the polling place.

The law of Michigan is *sui generis*. Like the law of Connecticut, it requires that all ballots shall be uniform in size and appearance, with no distinguishing mark upon the outside. Each party can, however, have a vignette or device of its own choosing placed at the head of its list of candidates upon the face of the ballot. Ballots are furnished in advance of the election. They are distributed, as in Connecticut and New Jersey, in and out of the polling places on election day. Spoiled ballots are destroyed. Workers are allowed within one hundred feet of the polls.

Nebraska enacted an Australian ballot law in March, 1891. The several candidates for each office are named alphabetically, together with the political party each represents, under a caption stating that office. The direction "Vote for One," is also given; and the voter does this by marking an \times in ink opposite the name of the candidate of his choice. Illiterate voters may be assisted by one or two of the election officers. Workers can approach no nearer to the polls than twelve feet.

Ohio has the blanket ballot, with the names of the candidates of each party arranged in vertical columns, and not across the ballot as in the case of Nebraska. Each column is headed with the name of the party, and a pictorial device to assist the illiterate voter. The Republican ticket has an eagle; the Democratic, a rooster; the Prohibition, a rose; and the People's, a plough. The voter marks an \times before the name of the party for whose candidates he wishes to vote; but if he marks thus, and also marks individual candidates of another party, the latter will be counted, together with those of his own party not affected by his independent marks,—the intent of the voter being carefully studied. Any voter desiring assistance can have it from two judges of election belonging to different political parties.

The new law of Oregon provides for official ballots to be printed by the State. The names are arranged, as in Nebraska, all candidates for an office being grouped under a heading stating that office. Voters erase all names for which they do not wish to vote. Assistance may be given by two of the judges. Workers can approach to within six feet of the ballot-boxes and ten feet of the polling booths.

West Virginia qualifies its ballot law of 1891 with these words: "The voter shall be left free to vote by either open, sealed, or secret ballot, as he may elect, otherwise the mode and manner of voting shall be as herein prescribed." Then follow provisions requiring a non-partisan Board of Ballot Commissioners in each county to provide printed ballots on which the names of the candidates of each party are printed in columns, under the name of the party, as is the case in Ohio. The voter shall strike out, with ink, the party tickets or the individual candidates for which he does not wish to vote. The poll clerks may assist the illiterate voter by preparing such a ballot as he wishes to vote. Outsiders are not allowed to come within sixty feet of the ballot-boxes or the booths.

To recapitulate: we find that twenty-six of the States of the Union will vote under some form of the Australian system in November, 1891. This leaves only eighteen States which have not made a great advance in the reform within the past three years. The eighteen are: Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. Progress, however, has been made in Iowa, although ballot reform laws were defeated in that State in 1891. The new constitution just adopted by Kentucky provides that all elections by the people shall be by secret official ballot, furnished by public authority to the voters at the polls, and marked by each voter in private at the polls, and then and there deposited. The General Assembly is given power to make the necessary laws for carrying this provision into effect, and it will probably do so next winter. Maine, it should be stated, has enacted the full Australian ballot, similar to the law of Massachusetts; but the first election under its provisions will not take place till September, 1892.

Thus we observe that nearly two thirds of the States of the Union have now the Australian ballot, although in four or five of them the laws are not as complete a copy as they might be; and

that three other States will probably have this form of ballot within the coming year. The outlook is, that the reform cannot long be delayed in the fifteen States that have, thus far, made no move toward its adoption.

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CONSERVATIVE APOLOGETICS.

CAN Apologetics be anything but conservative — of faith? Certainly. It may try to save the old arguments; that is, it is capable of being antiquated. I am afraid the idea of such an office is ridiculous. As though one at this late day should object to rifles because he carried a smooth-bore at Gettysburg; or to smokeless powder because he likes to hide his argument in a cloud; or as though young Swift, running to warn people of some Johnstown flood, were besought by old Slowfoot not to run him out of breath. But Swift is not racing a deluge in order to keep Slowfoot in company, hard as it is for poor old Slowfoot to see how this can be. Yet I have often thought that the best service one can do his neighbors, under this "government of the people, by the people" and their notions, is to let himself appear a little absurd. It does n't hurt so much worse than a drubbing, as any one may know who will calmly submit to being thought behind the times.

And so, while I am not going to say over again that Dr. Paley meant well, and has only to be translated into modern technicalities to show himself a sound thinker, I attempt a more audacious task: to set over against two most admired phases of modern apologetics two of the least admired, because I think the old two are better.

That notion of the most enlightened apologists which wins heartiest assent from the most enlightened readers is that we can best make out the existence of God by identifying him as the Indweller who is at bottom of everything that gets itself done in the universe, and who, because he is Spirit, is force, cause, order, purpose. The Divine Immanence is the phrase to swear by, to solve all the cosmic mysteries with, or that promises to do this on the sole condition that you just sit and gaze at them through it. Nearly all the modern respectabilities have tried the method and report that it works. They have even attempted to tell what

they saw ; but one needs to get used to looking through this phrase before he can see what others' eyes see by its weird help.

There is no doubt, though, about the merit of those who offer to explain things by Spirit. If our day, to quote familiar instances, boasts any James Martineau, convincing as he is acute, and high-souled as a major prophet ; if we have any gracious John Fiske, whose " Idea of God " or " Destiny of Man " it is a kind of discourtesy to dispute ; if any Francis Abbot, who has stuck unbelieving nominalism as full of refutations as a St. Sebastian is of arrows, or a pin-cushion of pins ; if any Jacob Schurman, type of the accomplished young professor, whose statements are modest as science, and as assured, — these, one and all, inevitably tell us that matter is eternal, and force is God. And how reverent and how rich their thought is ! Yes, and how bald and irrational they make the opposite idea appear ! If that immanence which constitutes all efficiency divine is not the real immanence, what chance is there for any other sort ? Is it *con-cursus* ? Is natural force natural, and God merely its conserver ? Why, if it comes to that, a force which *exists* needs no conserver ; physics, with its law of conservation, will look after that. If physics, then, will assent to this, that the Eternal, the Self-existent, is himself the protean-convertible, spiritual essence of all efficiency in the world, we ought to be thankful that the physicist says it, for that settles things in these days against all gain-saying ; that is to say, until one finds that the physicists, like the Plymouth Brethren, have each and all their several inspirations to interpret the Nature-Bible in infallible, but, alas ! contradictory senses.

It is " deistic," I know, and that is the end of all respect for any opinion in these days of profoundly religious and profoundly pantheistic conceptions ; it is deistic, and, what is worse in a Calvinist, it is inconsistent, to demur to this thorough-going doctrine of divine immanence. I say it is inconsistent for a Calvinist ; and I have the fear of Professor Allen before my eyes. Some one is bound to throw his " Continuity " at me. But pray let him tell whether it is not the Calvinist, the theologian who believes not only in individual election but in effectual calling, that ought to feel quite at his ease with the like control of Deity over material things. And is it not your anti-Augustinian, — not to put too fine a point on it, is it not your Arminian, your thorough stickler for the autonomy of human wills, — is it not he that ought to draw back from every hint that all efficiency in things is

God's own acting? Inconsistent as I confess that it is for a Calvinist to demur to the identification of God with force, deistic as it looks into the bargain, shameful as it has been accounted ever since Carlyle laughed his horse-laugh at the "absentee Deity" who looked on to "see the world go," — still a good many things stand in the way of accepting the ultra-religious view of nature. Of them all, these two : —

I do not see what particular reason there is for believing that the theory is true. It is stated over and again with the confidence of a self-evident truth; and I often mourn because I am too dull to catch the unexpressed reason for holding it true. I know that the reasons for self-evident truths cannot be stated, and that one's development is away down if he has not risen to the level of self-evident truths. But that is the plight this paper will once and again show that its writer is in. I own it; I cannot see why to acknowledge the mystery of force and to hold the immanence of God is all the same as saying that God does everything in nature.

The other objection is, that no one has ever yet made out the correlation of physical and mental energy. You cannot convert a blow, or a shock of electricity, or a touch of genial sunlight, into an idea. Nor can you convert a volition into a vibration of nerves or a contraction of muscles. Until this "great gulf fixed" between the realms of matter and mind is bridged by some cantilever contrivance run out from one shore or the other, let whoever will try to leap it: I do not dare; I seem now to be recognizably somewhere, *et j'y reste*.

Now, instead of that grand notion that God does everything because He is the life of everything that lives, and the motor of all that moves, I have the audacity to believe that He is the First Cause, in the bald, hard, hateful "deistic" sense. It comes in the end to this, that God is true cause; but, to begin with, let us discard all talk of cause, as metaphysics; and let us, never without fear of the physicist, who will have us take his theistic interpretation of things or none at all, — let us speak of what no one can deny in the name of science; to wit, matter and motion. I have already declined with thanks the idea that matter and motion squarely tell us of God. It is not very rash to allege that science cannot give us the Maker's name. But it can refuse to say anything against Him; and this sphinx of a world, when pressed hard for an answer, can deny every other conjecture about its source, and leave us shut up to this one, that motion, and

matter too, had an origin, absolutely an origin, in a being not yet known as God, which (or by courtesy who) is himself neither matter nor motion. The process of exclusion is a legitimate and a conclusive one, if it be quite clear that nothing is excluded which ought to stay, and no hypothesis ignorantly or deceitfully overlooked. In the present case, the process need not be a long one; always providing its steps are not neglected by my fellow-traveler merely because they are few and short. If he leaps them, he will have to go back and pick his way again, or else go his own road.

It is accepted for fact, is it not, that the existing state of things has come around as a sequent upon an indefinitely long process of changes, the general character of which has been progress from simplicity toward complexity. Let the word be allowed: the world is a product of Evolution. The word suggests a synthetic process, a progress; but we are constantly compelled to think backward, and analyze evolution. And so we find ourselves tracing the cosmic motions, through which the existing state of facts came about, back, back, back, — how far back? Is there any point short of original simplicity at which thought will or ought to pause? Complexity after simplicity means simplicity before complexity. If not, why not? But original simplicity, — if we may for a moment turn over an idea which is self-contradictory, — original simplicity, to which evolution forces us back, is a state of things before which there was no motion at all; for any motion would have been but a first step in the indefinitely long process which has issued in what is before our eyes. It is axiomatic, I believe, in physics, that bodies at rest do not spontaneously begin to move. Evolution, the undeniable process of the cosmos, forces us back, back, back still to a point when a Mover who was not the universe moved the universe. That would make him the Architect of materials which had existed from eternity.

But a state of original simplicity, antedated by no motion at all, is unthinkable. Absolute simplicity is a denial of every quality that can be thought of, unless mere existence be a quality. But existence, too, must be denied! to matter in a state of simplicity. Always with the fear of the physicist before my eyes, — of the physicist who will hear to no one's speculation unless it is his own, — frightened as I am to say it, it nevertheless seems plain to my dullness that motion is essential to essential properties of matter. For instance, unless there was a date before

which there was neither the "stress" of particles toward each other which we call attraction, nor the stress of particles away from each other which we call repulsion, and which offers itself to sensation under the guise of heat, — unless before that fancied date molecules were neither pushed nor pulled either toward or from each other, then there never was a date before which extension and density, the properties external and internal which are indispensable to the existence of matter in mass, were not due to motion. Until one has reason to affirm that mass may exist without any attraction or repulsion to give it the dimensions it has, — until then it is safe to say that motion is essential to the existence of matter. Why, then, it follows that if God were Architect, He was also out-and-out Creator. It follows that, if original simplicity is original impossibility, then a being not the universe brought the universe forth, and made it with properties, made it something this side of absolutely simple.

There is another way of looking at the same case. Every measurable change requires measurable time. Every definite state of things permits only a corresponding duration of the process which brought that state of things about. Geologists assume this, and try to measure for us the periods which the earth demands. Whether they measure accurately or not, it is certain that the process which has led up to the present condition of the globe must be regarded as measurable. It is not more certain that a tree or a man just fifty years old cannot possibly have lived a day longer, than that the world cannot have been "going on" any longer than the time indicated by the results before our eyes. If the process had been going on from eternity, this present stage in it ought to have existed indefinitely in the past. Eternity furnished time enough. And any state of things as far in the future as the world shall last ought to be present to-day, that is, if the world has reached its existing state by a process of changes from eternity. In other words, there is no right time in all eternity for any definite state of things. Every moment in all eternity is the wrong moment for that which now is. Or, in yet other words, the notion of the production of a definite state of things by an eternal series of changes is self-contradictory.

It does not help matters to put the theory of cycles in the place of the theory of an eternal series of progressive changes. It is all one whether we say that eternal progress is the law, or that limited progress, followed by destruction, is the law. This set of changes called a cycle is as definite, that is as limited, a thing as

any single phenomenon, and equally involves some proportion between stages of the process and the time required to effect them.

But the suggestion of cycles brings to view another objection to the eternal preëxistence of matter and change, namely, the incessant and enormous dissipation of energy which attends the history of any or all the orbs of heaven. Let us say that the end of this cycle is a collapse of a system, say the solar system. Its collapse, if so untechnical a term is allowable for the ultimate fall of the planets into the sun, the catastrophe of the present cycle, would be the beginning of a new cycle. But after the incalculable loss of heat which has taken place during the course of the extant cycle, how much smaller the size of the nebula with which the next cycle will begin, and how much shorter its history! Briefer still that of the next, and of the next, until it seems certain as anything involved in so tremendous a theory can be, that after "a time, times, and half a time" the material of our system will be dead as the moon, because its energy is exhausted. But if the system had been one of a series from eternity, its energy in the past must have been infinite; and if infinite, it could never be exhausted. It would seem that, once more, the notion of a series from eternity is self-contradictory. Not the less so when we reflect that a cycle which existed an eternity ago must have had at command an infinite store of energy, and that in such a case not all its energy could ever be dissipated. In other words, that eternally ancient cycle could have no successor, would be the present cycle, that is, no cycle at all; so that the theory of cycles resolves into the theory of one long progress from eternity.

Little as I can pretend to know about these matters, I know some have imagined that the energy of the known physical universe is not lost to it, because they suppose the ether to be limited, so that the flying energy gets turned back into the interstellar spaces which we know about, and is focused somewhere. But if any one can give a reason for supposing that the hypothetical ether which conveys light and heat from orb to orb has any limits, what is that reason? Or, if any one knows a reason to believe that somewhere in the spaces about us there is a focus in which is gathered all the heat ever radiated from all the suns, or that it is focused in a good many such points-no-point, where is that terrific furnace? or what is the reason it gives no sign, if it is anywhere?

It would seem that there is a Creator, of whom we are shut up to saying that, whatever He (or It) is, He is not the universe, not

the substance of it, nor the energy of it, but just the originator of it; and that if He be its conservator, this must be learned in some other way than from any known need which nature has for support.

Now the argument I have withstood is not novel, but it has the support of the men who teach the new age. Neither is the next position which I must antagonize novel; but it, too, is a favorite apologetic in our day, and, like the one already contested, it sets aside some ancient arguments of greater worth, according to my foolhardy opinion.

This other lofty argument for the existence of God is, that no argument is needed, nor indeed worth much, because his existence is a first truth, a rational intuition, a logical *prius* of all other knowledge. Thus God, it is said by many of our standard thinkers, may be intuited as infinite Being correlative to finite; as absolute Being correlative to dependent; as creative Reason guaranteeing the veracity of human reason; as holy Lawgiver, recognized in the very idea of law. It is another of those cases in which to raise an objection is a shame to the objector. He as good as disclaims insight into the spiritual things which our apostles say they can see and are willing to talk of among "the perfect." But my eyes are dull, at all events so myopic that objections are all I see whenever I look for the self-evident existence of God.

I cannot see how a first truth, a self-evident reality, can be capable of analysis, or of demonstration by any logically prior idea. Now the idea of God is highly complex, at all events. It can be resolved into its elements; these elements can be singly tested; if they bear the test, they can be synthetized; and, when harmoniously synthetized, they must be shown to stand for a Being that exists. Unless this is a total misconception, then the idea of God may perhaps be inferred from intuitions, but certainly is not itself intuited.

Suppose two ideas so correlated that the conception of either one logically necessitates that of the other; neither, then, has logical priority. The one first in the mind is the one from which the other is logically deduced. So far forth, then, as the idea of God is a logical correlate of other ideas already in the mind, I think we must say that it is logically dependent on the ideas to which it is temporally sequent.

Again, knowledge of an object may involve the idea, without involving the existence, of another object. That the second

really exists can be inferred from the first only when the first is known to be in its very nature inseparable from the second. For example: knowledge of an object limited in extension logically involves the idea, but not the occupancy, of unlimited extension. On the other hand, an object limited in duration certifies the existence of some being, unlimited in duration, to which its own existence is due; but does it not remain to be proved that the universe is not itself the eternal, self-existent, absolute Being? Of course, after insisting upon the old cosmological argument, I believe nothing of the sort; but I believe the universe had its creator, because this can be proved, not because it is self-evident.

Again, knowledge of the divine existence rests upon the very ideas which it is said to support. For example: the trustworthiness of human logic is already taken for granted when it is argued that its trustworthiness requires the existence of creative Reason as its guarantee; otherwise, how do we know that we are right in our argument so far? Or, if it be replied that the existence of God is a first truth, not a fact assured by argument, then the competence of the human reason to recognize one first truth intuitively is assumed; but if one, why only this one? Or, when we are bidden to notice that the very words "right" and "duty" are meaningless without a supreme Lawgiver whose nature is the standard of right, and whose requirements are the rule of duty, I cannot help asking, if the idea of right and duty is not intrinsically valid, whether it can be known that right is real in the case of God, or duty an actuality when imposed by his will. We may be indulging fancies when we ascribe moral quality to a Supreme Person, if we may be mistaken in ascribing it to subordinate persons.

In other words, unless somebody can show that the validity of human reason and the reality of moral difference are not primary beliefs and first truths, then to say that they require the idea of God as their logical *prius* is to say that a first truth must lie back of a first truth; but no one will say it. The knowledge of God's existence rests on intuitions, is not their support.

And here are some intuitions from which that existence may be inferred. The perspicacious reader may see clean through them to something they build upon; but I must at least give him the chance, for they seem primary to me. To wit: that there is a difference between right and wrong, and that right is something obligatory and wrong something inadmissible. Not, of course, that we know intuitively what the right thing is, nor that it is duty to do everything which is right; but that in any case the thing which is antithetic to wrong, whether the right be action or inac-

tion, is indisputably duty. For instance, again, there is an intuition of difference in the lovable and the unlovely; of unlikeness between the beautiful and the ugly, between the trustworthy and the untrustworthy. Not that love, æsthetic sensibility, or faith knows what its proper object is in every case; but that these faculties as surely imply the existence of their correlative as hunger implies the reality of food. Of course, it is experience which is the occasion of knowing what stands over against the yearning for food; and it is experience of how God satisfies the lofty faculties just instanced which alone makes plain what they want: but experience gave the faculty its opportunity of knowledge; it did not create the faculty, nor furnish the certainty of its cognition.

There is in this curious human recognition of moral and divine realities, which sense cannot furnish nor the mind doubt while they meet its wants, — there is here an explanation of the firmness with which monotheism holds its own when once implanted in the mind of a developed people. Christendom might be half persuaded that there is no God at all, but there would be no persuading it of many gods. Monotheism is the irresistible response of our higher faculties to the idea of perfection. Once conceived, this idea alone represents God. It is only an all-perfect Being that satisfies the wants of our moral, affectional, æsthetic, and pistic capacities (if a horrible adjective may be allowed); and so, when one hears that this or that perfection exists, he has to assign it to his perfect Deity. It is a felt breach in this normal process which makes the worship of any less than an all-perfect Being so revolting. And we refuse to believe in minor divinities, for these would divide the glories which are essential to God.

But I must not wander. Against the lordly claim that men can know they have a God without any proof for it, this humble tenet is more defensible: We know we need a God, and our need is the soul's physiological appetency which cannot be in grotesque contradiction to the physiological wants of the body; these are met, and that must be. It is a plodding way, the conservative way of apologetics. It will satisfy none that have found a path through "the trackless air." It is slow as well as lowly plodding here: but if one trips he can hardly catch so bad a fall; and if he keeps his footing he will reach the goal the angels look upon, and saintly men deservy, when they will, — the reality of the true God.

E. H. Johnson.

EDITORIAL.

THE NEW YORK PRESBYTERY AND PROFESSOR BRIGGS.

THE Presbytery of New York met on Monday, the 4th instant, and received the report of the committee appointed last May to prosecute Professor C. A. Briggs. Before the report was presented, one of its members offered a substitute for it in the form of the following resolution : —

“Whereas, the Presbytery of New York, at its meeting in May last, on account of utterances contained in an inaugural address, delivered January 20, 1891, appointed a committee to formulate charges against the author of that address, the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D. D. ; and whereas, since that action was taken, the accused has supplemented these utterances by responding to certain categorical questions ; therefore

“*Resolved*, That the Presbytery, without pronouncing on the sufficiency of these later declarations to cover all the points concerning which the accused has been called in question, and with hearty appreciation of the faithful labors of our committee, deems it expedient to arrest judicial proceedings, and hereby discharges the committee from further consideration of the case.”

Action upon this amendment was postponed until after the reading of the report of the prosecuting committee. Then it was debated, and, after an unsuccessful attempt to amend it by the insertion of a censure of Professor Briggs, was voted down, sixty-two members voting for it (of whom fifty were ministers) and sixty-four (of whom forty-four were ministers) voting against it.

The report of the committee was then adopted. We have printed this elsewhere, in the belief that our readers will be glad to have its full text.

We do not purpose discussing the justice of the charges preferred by the committee. We could not do so without repeating what we said in our number of last February about the essential harmony of the views expressed in the “Inaugural” with the evangelical conception of Christianity. Two of the assertions incidentally made by the committee seem to us deserving of comment. One is the claim that Professor Briggs deserves to be tried and punished for expressing opinions which a large part of the Presbyterian Church do not like : “The erroneous and ill-advised utterances of Dr. Briggs, in the Inaugural Address, have seriously disturbed the peace of the church, and led to a situation full of difficulty and complication. . . . Yet, for the reasons above given, we have determined not to include this grave offense against the peace of the church in the list of formal charges.”

Professor Briggs cannot be supposed to have foreseen, when he delivered his Inaugural, the excitement it would cause. Nevertheless he is, according to the committee, ecclesiastically more blameworthy than he

would be if the address had been received with universal favor. Therefore one of the standards by which a Presbyterian minister must be tried is the popularity within the Presbyterian Church which his public utterances have. Again, in the first charge, it is said that "the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Rev. Charles A. Briggs . . . with teaching doctrines which conflict irreconcilably with, and are contrary to, the cardinal doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures, and contained in the standards of the Presbyterian Church, — that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice."

To call the doctrine which treats of Scripture the "cardinal doctrine" is equivalent to saying that a correct belief about the Bible is of more importance than a correct belief about God or Christ. Only a fraction of "the Presbyterian Church of the United States" would, we suspect, accept the opinion ascribed to it by the prosecuting committee, and alleged as a reason for the judicial action taken by the Presbytery on its behalf. These two utterances of the report suggest partisanship, and lessen the moral weight of the action of the majority in adopting it.

Professor Briggs and his friends have, we think, good reason to rejoice at the failure of the motion to dismiss his case. That motion did not imply approval of the "Inaugural," but was coupled with a subsequent expression of Dr. Briggs's theological views, the answers to "categorical questions" put to him in his sick-room last summer by several of the directors of Union Seminary. If the motion had passed, the party opposed to Dr. Briggs in the Presbytery would probably have claimed that, inasmuch as the trial had been abandoned because of this later expression of opinion, Dr. Briggs's future utterances should harmonize with a strict construction of it. To such a claim Dr. Briggs could not, of course, have consistently yielded, and yet it would have had enough of reasonableness to make refusal to submit to it to some extent injurious to his influence. Besides, the prosecution gives Professor Briggs the best possible opportunity of effectively addressing the Presbyterian Church. This he must desire above all things. He has undertaken to dislodge certain errors from the Presbyterian mind, counting the cost of the undertaking, doubtless, and hoping to carry it through. He has made a good beginning, but the larger part of the work is yet undone. He is doubtless bent on carrying it forward, and desires nothing so much as favorable circumstances for doing so. These are now given him. An immense audience is to be gathered to hear him. The antecedents of the trial, and the place in which it is held, make it certain that the reports of it will be read through the length and breadth of the land. The dramatic interest attaching to a trial will draw a more careful attention to Professor Briggs's defense than would be given to his books by any who are not close students of the Bible. And what he has to say for himself will be said in behalf of his doctrines. He is charged with

holding and inculcating ideas which are anti-Biblical and anti-Presbyterian, and he can only successfully defend himself by showing that his ideas are Biblical and Presbyterian.

Professor Briggs will have a great advantage in the attitude in which the prosecution places him. He speaks under compulsion. He is obliged to attack anew the errors which it is his mission to fight, and therefore the suspicion of arrogance and disputatiousness cannot attach to his words. Self-respect and respect for the ministry require him to use all the resources of his great learning in making the attack.

To be sure, the Presbyterian public, when listening to Professor Briggs, will remember that the *primâ facie* judgment of a majority of his Presbytery is against him. But the smallness of the majority, and the signs of party spirit shown by its representatives, will take from this fact much of its moral weight. Indeed, the unwillingness of the American mind to recognize ecclesiastical authority in regard to doctrine is so great, it may be doubted whether one defending his views before a closely divided church tribunal will not have from the beginning the sympathy of most of the audience.

The fact that the Presbyterian Church is now revising its standards cannot but add greatly to the effectiveness of Dr. Briggs's utterance. He will be able to say: The charges brought against me are framed upon the assumption that I am held to the letter of the Westminster Confession. For example, the article describing the Scriptures is so minutely interpreted as to make its assertions about the externalities of the sacred books a part of the creed of the church, and binding upon its ministry. Yet the Presbyterian Church of America has, by undertaking to revise its articles, said that they are not in all their details the standard of its belief. Dr. Briggs may adopt language lately used by A. Taylor Innes of Scotland, one of the foremost canonical writers and lawyers of the Presbyterian Church, about the proposition to try Professor Bruce and Professor Dods: when the Confession is under revision, the church cannot either constitutionally or honestly find a man guilty on a libel for merely deviating from its Confession; it cannot, whether the deviation be on one point or along the whole line. For the one point may be precisely the point which is to be revised out.

Showing that the action of the prosecutors is absurd will not, indeed, be equivalent to showing that the views of Professor Briggs are right. But it will be helpful in securing fair consideration to such arguments as are advanced for those views. The disputant in a public debate, who seems to the audience to have been unjustly treated by his antagonist, has an important advantage. Whatever, then, the immediate issue of the trial, it cannot but have immense influence in helping the Presbyterian Church to true views of the Bible; to discrimination between divine revelation and its record.

One may find help in realizing the aspect which this event will wear to

the next generation by reverting to one in many details its counterpart, — the trial of Albert Barnes. Charges were brought against Mr. Barnes before the Second Presbytery of Philadelphia, on the ground of doctrinal views expressed in the latter's commentary on the Romans. The charges were these : —

“ 1. Teaching that all sin consists in voluntary action.

2. That Adam (before and after his fall) was ignorant of his moral relations to such a degree that he did not know the consequences of his sin would or should reach any further than to his natural death.

3. That unregenerate men are able to keep the commandments and convert themselves to God.

4. That faith is an act of the mind, and not a principle, and is itself imputed for righteousness.

5. Denying that God entered into covenant with Adam, constituting him a federal or covenant head, and representative to all his natural descendants.

6. Denying that the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity.

7. Denying that mankind are guilty, that is, liable to punishment, on account of the sin of Adam.

8. Denying that Christ suffered the proper penalty of the law as the vicarious substitute of his people, and thus took away legally their sins and purchased pardon.

9. Denying that the righteousness, that is, the active obedience of Christ to the law, is imputed to his people for their justification, so that they are righteous in the eye of the law, and therefore justified.

10. Teaching, in opposition to the Standards, that justification is simply pardon.”

Dr. Junkins, in a letter to Mr. Barnes informing him that the above charges were about to be preferred, said : “ Most conscientiously do I believe that you have fallen into dangerous error. I feel that your doctrine shakes the foundation of my personal hopes for eternity. If it be true, then I cannot ‘ read my title clear to mansions in the skies.’ ”

Mr. Barnes was tried upon the charges, some of which, it should be said, he strenuously claimed misrepresented his opinions, and was acquitted. His prosecutor appealed to the Synod of Philadelphia, and was sustained, Mr. Barnes being suspended by the Synod from the ministry. Mr. Barnes appealed to the General Assembly. After an exciting discussion, the appeal was sustained by a vote of one hundred and thirty-four to ninety-six. The decision of the Synod was then reversed by a vote of one hundred and forty-five to seventy-eight.

Dr. Junkins's religious hope endured the strain put upon it by Mr. Barnes's doctrine, and he has long enjoyed the heavenly mansion, the title-deeds of which he so carefully guarded. And there are probably few Presbyterians to whom the attempt to depose such a man as Albert Barnes from the ministry, for holding the views attributed to him, does

not seem absurd. Will there be more who, fifty years hence, will approve the attempt to remove Charles A. Briggs from the Presbyterian ministry for believing that the Scriptures contain historical errors, that men may find God through the church and the reason, and that the righteous are not miraculously made perfect at death?

Since the above was written, a rumor has come to us that after the presentation of Professor Briggs's reply to the charges of the prosecuting committee, a motion will be made to abandon the trial. Should this motion be made and passed, Dr. Briggs would, of course, be triumphantly acquitted, the charges being declared groundless. So the Presbytery of New York would promptly illustrate the service it rendered the accused in voting down the resolution to suspend proceedings, in consideration of his "answers to categorical questions," and putting him on trial for the sentiments expressed in the "Inaugural."

THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: A BISHOP'S CHARGE TO HIS CLERGY.

THE conflict of theological and ecclesiastical opinion is sharper for the moment in the Presbyterian and Episcopal denominations than in the Congregational body. In other forms the same issue is joined as that which so lately disturbed the Foreign Missionary Society and one of the theological seminaries of the Congregationalists. It is an issue concerning the breadth of liberty to which preachers and teachers are entitled. In the case of the Congregationalists, the beliefs in question pertained to eschatology. With the Presbyterians, they pertain chiefly to the authority and inspiration of the Bible. With the Episcopalians, they pertain partly to doctrine, including the doctrine of inspiration, and also to polity, especially as regards the Episcopate. The real issue, however, in all these bodies, is one and the same. It is not a struggle for victory, nor merely for defense, but a struggle for liberty. The right to hold or to reject certain opinions, without loss of fellowship, is demanded. Inquiry and debate are urgent as to the lines within which all may stand. The roominess of the denomination is in question rather than the relative strength or orthodoxy or churchmanship of any party. The process, involving more or less that is acrimonious and belligerent, is really a sifting of traditional Christianity to distinguish the essentials on which all must agree from that which is secondary or temporary. The debate, in a word, is on the question, What is Christianity? In another editorial we note the progress of the struggle among the Presbyterians as it is brought conspicuously before the public in the proceedings in the case of Professor Briggs. In this article we call attention to the charge of Bishop Potter at the recent convention of the Diocese of New York, in which he treats at length and clearly the questions on which parties are somewhat divided in the Episcopal Church. The positions he takes are of great importance at the present juncture, as he is bishop of the largest

diocese in the country, and both officially and personally is widely influential. The majority of the House of Bishops will not be likely to take different positions.

The principal topics are the authority of the Bible and the grounds of the Episcopate. Incidentally, certain other matters are considered, which we notice in passing. The bishop reminds those who clamor for ecclesiastical trial and censure in the case of brethren whose opinions or practices are disapproved, that it is of little consequence whether the ecclesiastical machinery is set in motion or not, for, he says: —

“When a diocesan court has done its utmost to punish an offender, it is only a diocesan court after all. What is heterodoxy to-day in one jurisdiction may be pronounced by some other court in another to be orthodoxy to-morrow; and until the church provides some ultimate court of appeal in matters of faith and order, diocesan decisions upon either point will absolutely determine nothing.”

It may be surprising to some who have supposed that the Episcopal Church has a very definite authority over its clergy, and a system of regulations which controls the whole body, to find that the dioceses are so independent of each other in respect to doctrines and practices. The Episcopal Church is not nearly so well provided as the Presbyterian in one respect, namely, the search for heresy. The scattered dioceses are decidedly inferior for that purpose to the ascending grades of presbytery, synod, and general assembly.

The bishop makes an observation which disturbs the common impression that there is a decorum, a respect, a dignity of demeanor, cultivated by the Episcopal clergy which has become with all of them a second nature. When speaking of the right of remonstrance, which had been exercised recently, he took occasion to employ a tone of paternal reproof: —

“Palsied be the hand that would seek to rob even the feeblest of us of it! But when it is invoked, it would be well, as I think you will agree with me, that it should be so employed as at least to seem to recognize the simplest laws of courtesy. . . . I am not, I think it will be owned, a stickler for official prerogatives, and I fancy there are very few persons in the Episcopal office who are accustomed to treat such questions with more profound indifference, — an indifference which I have lately had occasion to apprehend has led some persons to suppose that they need not consider the ordinary and reasonable civilities of either personal or official intercourse. It is the first time, I apprehend, in the history of the church, that a bishop has come to know of the contents of a communication addressed exclusively to himself by finding it in the columns of a newspaper; and it will be the only time, I hope, in the history of the church, that a bishop’s only information of such a communication shall be of so irresponsible a nature. Indeed, I cannot suppose that any clergyman, or any body of clergymen, could otherwise than very hastily imagine that a bishop could consent to take notice of a document authenticated to him not only by no responsible signature, but by no signature whatever.

‘I find it sometimes easier,’ said a great French archbishop, ‘to make my clergy proficient in theology than in filial and fraternal courtesy.’ I am glad to believe, dear brethren, that in these latter graces no one of us would willingly be deficient.”

We cannot refrain from noticing also, in passing, a very neat turn the bishop made upon those who had objected to the participation in public services of certain persons not belonging to the Episcopal Church, the reference probably being to Dr. Lyman Abbott and others who spoke in Dr. Rainsford’s church last spring. The bishop reminds his hearers that there is as much reason for excluding Greeks, Armenians, and Old Catholics, and that if the law should be invoked in one direction it must be in the other. The priests of the Greek and Russian churches have not been ordained according to the Canons of the Episcopal Church, yet some of them have not only preached, but also performed acts of sacerdotal function, and used other prayers than those prescribed by the Book of Common Prayer : —

“I do not see how, under a rigid rule of construction, the conclusion can be avoided that these most charitable invitations were in direct contravention of the plain prohibitions of Canon 14 of Title I., and also of Section 1 of Canon 22 of the same title. And it must be obvious, if the penal machinery of the church is to be set in operation for the punishment of one class of offenses under the canons above referred to, it cannot stop this side of its application to another and (in one aspect of them) more flagrant set of offenses under the same canons, simply because they who have invoked the canon do not wish it to punish offenders with whom they themselves happen to be in sympathy.”

But we must pass on to that which is of chief importance in the charge. The inspiration and authority of the Bible are treated in a catholic spirit, and room is made for the freest investigations of an honest and reverent criticism. It is pointed out that no doctrine concerning inspiration has ever been laid down by the church. The church has never taken the position that the Bible contains no human element, nor that it contains no divine element. The Bible contains both elements, and any bishop, priest, or deacon has the right to inquire how the two elements may be distinguished, and to avail himself of every adequate aid in the conduct of such an inquiry. It is shown that such discriminations have been made from the first ; that Clement and Anselm treated the seven days of creation as an allegory and not history ; that Irenæus thought the Temptation should not be taken historically ; that Gregory, Chrysostom, and others dealt freely with the precepts of the Old Testament ; that the patristic theory of inspiration made it illumination rather than miraculous communication which rendered the writer independent of historical tradition ; that the church repudiated the Montanist conception of inspiration according to which the inspired man speaks as the passive instrument of the Spirit ; and that metaphors which describe the Holy Spirit as acting upon a man “like a flute-player breathing into his

flute, or a plectrum striking a lyre," have always had a suspicion attaching to their use of heresy. The central truths of the Bible the church has always taught with authority : namely, the Fatherhood of God, the person and work of Jesus Christ, the redemption of all mankind, the origin and purpose of human life. But there are other truths which are deductions from the central truths, and in respect to which the church gives a remarkable freedom to individual opinion, — such truths as the mode of the relation of the divine and human nature in Christ, or freewill, or predestination, or the method of the Atonement, or the nature of the inspiration of Holy Scripture. Bishop Potter quotes at length, and with approval, from the authors of "*Lux Mundi*," of whom he speaks as "the small but courageous and reverent group of men." He not merely contends for the right of such men to pursue their investigations, but emphasizes the great service they are rendering : —

"Nay more, it needs I think with much plainness to be said that those who are striving, with a loyalty to Catholic tradition and with a tenderness and reverence for Holy Scripture which is only greater than their tenderness and consideration for their fellow-believers, to find a basis of reconciliation between historic criticism and the inherited faith of the church, are doing a work for which they greatly deserve to be had in lasting and grateful remembrance. The want of our time, we are told, is for something which, amid the vagueness, the uncertainty, the contradictoriness of the thousand voices which assail us, shall speak with definiteness. Yes, it is, but it is no less, nay, even more, I think, something which shall speak with discrimination."

This is a noble vindication of the Christian scholar and of his liberty within the church. The same note will soon be sounded in all the denominations, although in the very same month in the very same city the leading scholar of another religious body was brought to trial on the charge of having denied the verbal inspiration and literal accuracy of every part of the Bible. But the scholars will not be driven out. Their opinions may or may not be accepted, but their liberty will be secured and their service valued. And when historical criticism is generally welcomed, the incubus of untenable theories of inspiration will no longer be resting on the church as a burden too heavy to be borne.

The most important part of the charge, to the members of the Episcopal communion, is that which pertains to the Episcopate itself. Bishop Potter contends for the right of any one to deny direct apostolic succession, and yet to hold any office in the church. For his own part, he believes that the Episcopate was established by the apostles ; that the threefold order of the ministry is divinely sanctioned. He thinks it is to be regretted that any man called to the high and sacred office of bishop does not see its sanctions and trace its authority along these lines. Nevertheless, another theory has been held by some of the most venerated bishops of the American and Anglican churches, and liberty to hold it cannot be denied. It is the theory of Lightfoot, Hatch, and others, that

the Episcopate developed by the force of circumstances, and was not a matter of specific divine purpose and institution ; that it is necessary to the completeness, but not to the existence, of the church ; to its well-being, but not absolutely to its being, and therefore that churches having only the twofold order of presbyters and deacons are real and true churches of Christ.¹ In this connection, Bishop Potter expresses emphatic disapproval of the methods employed to defeat the election of Phillips Brooks as bishop : —

“The effort which we have lately seen in this church to defeat the confirmation of an eminent presbyter elected to the Episcopate, and to defeat it by methods which, in the judgment of all decent people, ought to redound to the lasting dishonor of those who employ them, was an effort ostensibly to compass that defeat on grounds of theological unsoundness, but really, so far as it had any respectable championship, because the individual concerned did not happen to hold a prevalent view of the apostolic succession.”

Such utterances will go far to bring the parties within the Episcopal Church to a mutual recognition of liberty of opinion in matters ecclesiastical, and possibly to abate somewhat the arrogance of pretension which sometimes accompanies belief in the apostolic succession.

Those, in any religious communion, who stand on the platform of a broad liberty in matters of opinion and historical criticism, will agree heartily with Bishop Potter in what he says of the advantage which comes from making room for difference of opinion in the church : —

“It is a very natural instinct of human nature, and it has been, alas ! a very preëminent distinction of people who have supremely arrogated to themselves the title of theologians, to crush out opinions that, upon whatever question, do not happen to accord with their own. But it is an instinct as ignoble as it is common, and, more than that, it is one the triumph of which would be scarcely less fatal to the true life and growth of the church than the widest prevalence of error. In a body which, while, as we rejoice to believe, under divine guidance and inspiration, is still made up of very frail and faulty members, led by very fallible and often very imperfectly formed guides, no graver or more perilous situation could come to pass than that in which the due proportion of the faith and the due balance of opposite aspects of the one truth were no longer maintained by the differing and sometimes apparently dissonant voices of its teachers. The moment that we have affirmed the one truth, we are bound to affirm that there are, and rightly ought to be, various standpoints from which to look at it. There are those to whom, constitutionally, such a statement is intolerable ; but that does not alter the fact. And, because it is the fact, the church's duty in our time is clear. We want defenders of the

¹ An interesting illustration of this perfectly legitimate mode of reasoning is found in the apology of Pamphilus for Origen, who had declared that the stars are animate and rational beings. Pamphilus argues that since some have held the luminaries of heaven to be animate and rational creatures, while others regard them as spiritless bodies, no one may call another a heretic for holding either view, for there is no open tradition on the subject, and even ecclesiastics have thought diversely of it. This citation from the Fathers might have been added to those introduced into the bishop's charge.

church's liberty, as well as of the church's orthodoxy. . . . There is a divine doctrine, but let us take care that in defining it we do not make it narrower than Christ himself has made it."

PRESIDENT PATTON'S RECOVERED ADDRESS ON FUTURE PROBATION — WITH BRIEF ANNOTATIONS.

THE following address appears to have been originally delivered in March, 1887, while President Patton was a Professor in Princeton Theological Seminary, upon request of the members of the religious society of Princeton College, and is now resuscitated and reproduced by the New York "Evangelist" from the notes of two reporters who were present at the meeting. We are not disposed to take account of the motive of the "Evangelist" in introducing this address as a make-weight in the controversy now raging around Professor Briggs. The efforts of our genial contemporary in times past to look down upon the heresy of a Christian probation have given us no little amusement. And we have not been surprised to find that, under the pressure of recent events, the utterances of our contemporary should have reached the yet loftier tone of thankfulness that whatever heresies it may now be called upon to support, it cannot be charged with having fallen to the level of that theological publican. Still we have no quarrel with our friend, the editor of the "Evangelist," for these past aberrations, or for his tactics in the present controversy, so long as he maintains the good fight which he is now carrying on in behalf of theological freedom and progress.

We reprint the address quite apart from the polemical uses to which it is now being put. Indeed, we wish that it had been printed when delivered, rather than now brought to the public notice, chiefly for its incidental reference to the theory of progressive sanctification after death. It would then have taken its place at once in the discussion of the question of human destiny. It will take its place now after a little, for the discussion is by no means ended. The address throws a clear side light upon the theological and practical bearings of the theory of a Christian probation. It is a candid statement of what, in the opinion of the speaker, is and is not involved in the "Andover Theory," and also it is an equally candid statement of the alternative which, in the opinion of the speaker, must be held in its place. It is for this reason that we reprint the address, and follow it with brief annotations.

It is hardly necessary to call the attention of our readers to the fact that it is, as President Patton characterizes it, "an imperfect stenographic report of an extemporaneous talk." We do not understand, however, that the substantial correctness of the report is called in question. The only correction which President Patton makes, according to the report of an interview, is as follows: "There is only one sentence that can be construed as implying belief in incomplete sanctification at

death, but any intelligent reader will see that I am describing the doctrine of purgatory, and not expressing my own views. A simple change of a period to a colon is sufficient to make this clear." We will indicate the desired change in punctuation in the reprint of the address.

I was told that if I should speak on the subject of Future Probation, I would perhaps do good to some who are reasoning the question in the light of offering themselves to Foreign Missions. The question, as I understand it, is the question of the Andover controversy. Our own faith is sometimes established by means of such controversies. The fact that the matter is now before the public is a good thing. It is only due to ourselves and the men interested, that we should understand and appreciate what Andover believes, and not recklessly accuse her of holding what she does not hold. We should form our judgments on an understanding of *the exact limitations of the views entertained*. It is not a doctrine of Purgatory — we understand that. [The period which follows "We understand that" is to be changed to a colon.] We continually see men going into the other world imperfect; they must be imperfect when they reach there, and need some time for restoration or change. They don't hold to the doctrine of Restoration, nor to this hope for all, "when every winter shall change to spring." They deny that they have any sympathy with this doctrine. It is not a doctrine identical with belief in the "eternal hope;" they don't believe that there will be chances indefinitely prolonged in the future; they deny it. The Judgment at least constitutes a crisis in the lives of all souls. Again, they don't believe in future probation for *all men*. Those who hear the gospel in this world will not have a chance there; those who do not hear it now, or have had no opportunity here, will have some chance in the future. No man will be rejected at the Judgment who has not had this opportunity; that is their statement. Several things are to be asked:

First, Is it true? There are also questions subsidiary which may be asked: —

(a) Whether this doctrine as held compromises other doctrines?

(b) Whether, in holding it, a man by logical consequence puts in jeopardy any other doctrine?

Perhaps I am wrong, but I am pretty sure that there is no doctrine that is put in jeopardy by the simple affirmation of this belief; neither the doctrine of sanctification, justification, final and irrevocable retribution, etc. This is not necessarily evidence in its favor, but to abate the violence of the doctrine. [?]

Some doctrines are bad simply because of their correlations, by virtue of the fact that they affect other doctrines. Even if a man held this, he might still hold those other articles of belief.

Second, Whether, in view of this doctrine, it will be prejudicial to the interests of foreign missions?

This is a very important question, and this has been raised into prominence in the controversy. There is a division into two distinct ideas to be made: —

1. How this doctrine would affect the individual going as a missionary.

2. How it would affect the zeal of the community, upon whom the missionary relies for support. There are two distinct questions to be asked: —

(a) Suppose an individual to offer himself as a missionary, would the simple fact that he held to a personal hope of a future probation for the heathen in any way mar his influence or usefulness, and prejudice him in the perform-

ance of his duties? Subject to correction, it seems to me that a man might go into the field entertaining this view, and yet preach Jesus Christ just as earnestly, with all his might, and during all his life, to the heathen, as though he held the church view. Suppose he held that the heathen have another opportunity to hear of Christ: suppose he was to go and preach to them this Jesus, he would preach the same gospel then as now; there would be no change as to what he would preach, but as to motive: if he fails, he will preach to them in the future life. That is untrue; when I preach to them they cease to be heathen, and they are out of this controversy altogether. There is no more comfort to be taken, or excuse to be pleaded, or lack of zeal for preaching abroad, than for preaching here in New Jersey.

The question does not affect the Princeton people, nor does it affect the people living in Calcutta who have heard the gospel; they cease to come under this category; the only possible effect would be that they might say to them: "You have heard of Christ, and if you reject Him you are a great deal worse than your fathers and grandfathers and great-grandfathers before you. But there is no hope that you may get another chance in the next world." It would not affect his zeal, but it might put him in a position of conciliation to those people to whom he is preaching; it does not paralyze his missionary zeal abroad.

(b) What would be the influence of this doctrine at home? I am very careful how I listen to this class of remarks; there are persons who believe in the premillennial appearing of our Lord in person upon the earth. I am not so foolish as to be one of them. But that does not cut off the nose of Foreign Missions, for many grand and good missionaries have been premillennialists. It may, however, change their character. You must go round the world and sound the trumpet call of the gospel, but this does not prevent but rather stimulates the preaching to the heathen.

People say that the motive to missionary effort is the command of Christ, the present guilt of sin, the sense of neighborhood and fraternity, and love for Christ; yet I believe, if the Christian church should come practically to a belief that the heathen world will have an opportunity of hearing the gospel in a more economical way (hear it by preachers who do not need large salaries, our expensive Board of Foreign Missions located at 23 Centre Street, New York, and a great evangelistic system with immense cost, and a foreign debt of \$100,000), — when the church gets hold of the idea that we can evangelize heathen *when they are dead*, you might preach to them until the crack of doom, and you would not send out many more missionaries into the field.

The fundamental question is: Is this doctrine true? Those who advocate it do so on two grounds. The first is one of mere inference, it is *à priori*. The second is Scriptural, and is based on two or three passages of Scripture which are exceedingly doubtful and cannot sustain their position.

The first passage is about the sin against the Holy Ghost, which shall not be forgiven, "neither in this world nor in that which is to come." Note their argument: One sin you cannot get forgiven in the next world, then there are some sins which you *can* get forgiven in the next world. "The mind plays around loosely," as Matthew Arnold would say, on this passage, and enlarges on it, as a literary man would be wont to do; but it is only a strong emphasis.

The next passage, found in 1 Peter iii. 19, is, "By which he went and

preached unto the spirits in prison." It is a very doubtful passage, doubtful whether it is intended to mean that He went where his Spirit was severed from his body at his crucifixion : your Greek men can tell you.

They say that if you interpret this according to the requirements of the Greek grammar and lexicon, that is all it does mean. But observe, suppose He did go, it does not prove that you and I are going to do it ; there may not now be spirits in prison as at that time. This is their Scriptural basis.

But we cannot build a great doctrine on two passages of such doubtful import. The *à priori* grounds are what they really build upon ; they cite these passages, but their reasoning is *à priori* ; it is like the doctrine of purgatory, which has its foundation in tradition. Their purgatory is first made, and then these passages are adduced to sustain it. They get their doctrine first, and then hunt out texts to prove it. Their whole doctrine is : Jesus Christ died for the world ; no one can be saved unless he believes on Him ; therefore, since this is true, all the world must have a chance to believe. But infants die without consent [?], and so do the heathen ; therefore, etc. That is their whole argument. There are two or three things to be said. What right have they to say that no man can be saved without belief in Christ ? People piously believe that infants can be saved, although they do not have a chance to believe in Christ ; so, many hope that Socrates and Plato will be saved.

But there is nothing in Scripture to warrant that I must go and preach to Plato, that he may be saved. Suppose we grant their premise, we piously hope that infants and some heathen will be saved by the Spirit of God, working when and where He will, without the need of an objective presentation of the gospel. What right have they to say that all the heathen will have an opportunity of believing in Jesus Christ ? Simply this, the sentiment and conscience of some people revolt against the idea of the everlasting destruction of the heathen ; they don't want to believe it. Neither do I. But it is not a question of what we want, but a question as to whether it is true ; whether the Scriptures, on the whole, show that the heathen have some opportunity of believing in Christ. The Scripture is pretty clear on this point. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, puts it plainly that they are condemned because they have sinned. They perished without law, not having any law. It is clear from the general trend that the gospel was preached to the world because it was in peril. They would not have been in peril, if it was only a question of postponement.

This life, it is implied, is a season of great crisis, and death fixes our destiny forever. The Andover view, besides laboring under the difficulty of being purely inferential, being based on two passages of Scripture of doubtful import, is (a) opposed to the general trend of the apostolic preaching, and to the direct teaching of the New Testament in making the death of Christ absolutely necessary to man's salvation ; and (b) they have a law in their own nature, and therefore are without excuse.

Again, it is an extra-Biblical doctrine. They don't pretend to get it out of the Bible. Then it cannot bind our conscience, and if extra-Biblical you see where it will finally land you. You can introduce one new doctrine, why not two ? Some people hold that this life is projected forward into the future world. Why not as rational, then, to believe in Purgatory as in this doctrine ? for both are based on the same grounds ; both are the fruit of inferences. Its tendency is back to the old doctrine of the Church of Rome, which

allows [us to believe] what we think to be true, and then justify it on the basis of Scripture, which we hunt up afterwards. It is hazardous, therefore, to believe in it. The Bible is our one rule of faith and practice. I understand that there are some of you who are contemplating the missionary work. Don't let this doctrine interfere with your zeal, or slacken your anxiety with reference to the fate of the heathen. I remember a sermon by Dr. Shedd, of Union Theological Seminary, in which he said that the real basis of Foreign Missions is our belief in their eternal destruction. Let us not permit sentiment to paralyze our hearts; and if there are those here who have made a personal profession of their faith in Jesus Christ, let them be careful how they allow this hope with reference to the heathen to encroach upon their own life, and become a hope with reference to themselves, so that, if we slight opportunities here, it may be compensated for hereafter. Even these men at Andover, who hold to future probation for the heathen, do not believe this. The safe position, justified by the church, is the old position that men are perishing for lack of knowledge, and that men cannot be saved unless they believe on Jesus Christ, and "how shall they believe in Him, of whom they have not heard, and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent? as it is written, How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace, and bring glad tidings of good things."

We cannot expect to see them in the future life except they hear the gospel and believe. Our own Confession of Faith, which some think very straitlaced, does not hold out that hope, although it does say that "the heathen cannot be saved by framing their lives according to the light of nature."

(1.) "I was told that if I should speak on the subject of Future Probation, I would perhaps do good to some who are reasoning the question in the light of offering themselves to Foreign Missions. The question, as I understand it, is the question of the Andover controversy."

It is not to be wondered at that the minds of those who were "offering themselves to Foreign Missions" should have been exercised about the methods of God's dealing with the heathen. Whether they have any probation or not, and if they have, what it is, is no more an Andover than a Princeton question. It goes wherever men are brought, especially through their consecrations, face to face with the realities of human destiny, and allow themselves to think.

(2.) "It is only due to ourselves and the men interested, that we should understand and appreciate what Andover believes, and not recklessly accuse her of holding what she does not hold. We should form our judgments on an understanding of *the exact limitations of the views entertained.*"

If our theological opponents within our own ranks could have been persuaded to take this position, the "controversy" would have been much simplified in the interest of truth, and would also have been relieved of much personal bitterness. Doubtless the tenacity with which the opposite course was adhered to contributed not a little to the gradual change in public religious sentiment, and in bringing about a final verdict favorable to Andover, but the principle here laid down is the only principle according to which theological controversies can be fairly carried on.

(3.) "Whether this doctrine as held compromises other doctrines? Perhaps I am wrong, but I am pretty sure that there is no doctrine that is put in jeopardy by the simple affirmation of this belief; neither the doctrine of sanctification, justification, final and irrevocable retribution, etc."

It has always been the contention of those who have held the theory of a Christian probation, that it strengthened and intensified all the doctrines of grace. It has been insisted that Christianity suffered continual harm by the method of playing fast and loose with these doctrines, now falling back to the plane of law, and now rising to the plane of grace.

(4.) "Suppose an individual to offer himself as a missionary, would the simple fact that he held to a personal hope of a future probation for the heathen in any way mar his influence or usefulness, and prejudice him in the performance of his duties? Subject to correction, it seems to me that a man might go into the field entertaining this view, and yet preach Jesus Christ just as earnestly, with all his might, and during all his life, to the heathen, as though he held the church view. . . . It would not affect his zeal, but it might put him in a position of conciliation to those people to whom he is preaching; it does not paralyze his missionary zeal abroad."

We emphasize the conciliatory attitude of the missionary to heathen peoples in respect to their ancestors which is here suggested. Nothing seems more terrible to us than the absolute thoughtlessness and insensibility of the majority of Christian people to the relation of the countless dead to Christianity. What are we in this moment of time, or within the Christian generations, to the human race which lies buried under the drift of the ages! The better heathen mind is sensitive to the fate of the dead, not only through natural affection, but through the influence of the family system which is a part of most pagan religions. It was a revelation to us of the intensity of this feeling for the dead, as we listened to the touching words spoken in personal conversation by Dr. Neesima on his last visit to this country, as he referred to the relief which the theory of a Christian probation gave to his own mind concerning the dead of his own race.

(5.) "What would be the influence of this doctrine at home? I am very careful how I listen to this class of remarks," — intimating in what immediately follows that, like the premillennial theory, it would not cut the nerve of missions, but then adding: "People say that the motive to missionary effort is the command of Christ, the present guilt of sin, the sense of neighborhood and fraternity, and love for Christ; yet I believe, if the Christian church should come practically to a belief that the heathen world will have an opportunity of hearing the gospel in a more economical way (hear it by preachers who do not need large salaries, our expensive Board of Foreign Missions located at 23 Centre Street, and a great evangelistic system with immense cost, and a foreign debt of \$100,000), — when the church gets hold of the idea that we can evangelize the heathen *when they are dead*, you might preach to them till the crack of doom, and you would not send out many more missionaries into the field."

How is it that a belief, which does not quench missionary zeal in the field, should render the churches utterly indifferent? What a picture is here drawn of the low state of religious motive in the churches! If the opinion here expressed is true to the fact, shame on the churches, and shame on those who have trained the churches in the motives to missions. It is difficult to read this passage with seriousness, apart from its inconsistency with what has gone before.

(6.) "The fundamental question is: Is this doctrine true? Those who advocate it do so on two grounds. The first is one of mere inference, it is *à priori*. The second is Scriptural, and is based on two or three passages of Scripture which are exceedingly doubtful and cannot sustain their position."

The Scriptural passages which are referred to in the sentences immediately following must mean something. Words spoken by Christ, or of Him, are not so barren of meaning as the slighting interpretation here given them would imply. Neither are they foreign to the spirit or method of Christianity. The presumption from the New Testament is in favor of the interpretation which unbiased commentators have with singular unanimity given them. It is assumed that the burden of proof rests upon the theory of a Christian probation for all men; whereas it is the opposite theory that death precludes the knowledge of Christ, and therefore the Christian motive to salvation, which is alien to the whole current of thought as it comes through the gospel narratives and the life and doctrine of the early church. As we have elsewhere remarked:¹—

"The burden of proof rests with those who affirm the universal decisiveness of this life, irrespective of the knowledge of Christ and his redemption. For if this be a doctrine of Holy Scripture we must expect it to be clearly, positively, and continuously taught. It is inconceivable that such a doctrine should be left to inference or implication. But upon examination no such proof as ought to be expected appears. Not more than five or six passages have been adduced by the advocates of the dogma, and these have been shown to be irrelevant. Scarcely a passage quoted in favor of the dogma of the universal decisiveness of this life has the support of intelligent Biblical scholarship. On the other hand, we should naturally expect that the theory of the knowledge of Christ hereafter, for those who have not known Him here, would be taught by implication, rather than by direct and constant affirmation, by incidental reference to a fact, as in 1st Peter, rather than through current exhortation. There was no reason why this theory should have been brought to the front. It was not needed in the preaching of the gospel to those who were hearing the gospel, and it had not been denied. There was no heresy of a limited Christianity to combat, and therefore it had not then as now an apologetic value."

Inferential faith, too, has its rights, we are to remember. In some respects it is stronger than faith based on proof texts, for these are subject to "doubtful" interpretations. Inferential faith gives us the dogma of the salvation of infants. There is not a single plain word of Scrip-

¹ *Andover Review*, March, 1888, p. 305.

ture for it. We believe it simply because it is impossible to believe the contrary dogma of the damnation of infants and retain our belief in the revealed character of God. By what right of logic does one limit the reach of inferential faith, and exclude the heathen from the possibility of the gracious mercy of God?

(7.) "What right have they to say that no man can be saved without belief in Christ? People piously believe that infants can be saved, although they do not have a chance to believe in Christ; so many hope that Socrates and Plato will be saved. . . . Suppose we grant their premise, we piously hope that infants and some heathen will be saved by the Spirit of God, working when and where He will, without the need of an objective presentation of the gospel."

What is the common ground of salvation on which infants *and* Socrates and Plato are saved? If there is no common ground, how far does the principle on which infants are saved work up into the race, and how far does the principle on which Socrates and Plato are saved work down into the race? And if either or both principles produce any appreciable effect, why say, in conclusion, that "we cannot expect to see them (the heathen) in the future life except they hear the gospel and believe"? Why fall back upon "the safe position, justified by the church, that men are perishing for lack of knowledge, and that men cannot be saved unless they believe on Jesus Christ"? The simple explanation of this inconsistency is, that the church has come to believe so profoundly in the necessity and power of *motives* drawn from the life and passion of Christ, and to base its hopes for the salvation of the race so completely upon the presentation of Christ, that one unconsciously comes round to the practical exhortation with which President Patton concludes, even though it be at the expense of logic. When, as in the present case, one flings out the challenge: "What right have they to say that no man can be saved without belief in Christ"? and then goes on to argue for a salvation "without the need of an objective presentation of the gospel," we are always prepared to find such an one concluding by shutting up the heathen to faith, and then arguing for missions — "How shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard?"

Let it be said, however, once for all, that the question of the possibility or impossibility of the salvation of *any* apart from the knowledge of and belief in Christ is a very unimportant question in its practical bearings. The real question is, Will men be saved, are they being saved — the many, not the few — without the presentation of the motives of the gospel?

But, to return to the argument of President Patton, what is the ground on which he rejects the hope of the presentation of the gospel to all men? What is the alternative which he proposes?

(8.) "What right have they to say that all the heathen will have an opportunity of believing in Jesus Christ? Simply this, the sentiment and conscience

of some people revolt against the idea of the everlasting destruction of the heathen ; they don't want to believe it. Neither do I. But it is not a question of what we want, but a question as to whether it is true ; whether the Scriptures, on the whole, show that the heathen have some opportunity of believing in Christ."

Yes, that is the question, What, on the whole, is the outcome of Scripture in regard to the reach of Christianity? The growing consciousness of the church against the dogma of the universal damnation of the heathen is to be respected. Unless we believe that the Spirit no longer guides the church into the truth, we must give due weight to the Christian sentiment of the nineteenth century. Still we agree with President Patton in accepting the teachings of the Bible as a whole as decisive. And, as we have already said, we believe that the Christianity of the Bible points to a Christian opportunity for the race. Christianity lifts the race to the plane of grace.

The alternative to this conception is clearly intimated in the words just quoted, and also in the allusion which follows to the sermon by Dr. Shedd, "in which he said that the real basis of foreign missions is our belief in the eternal destruction" (of the heathen). This view runs back into the awful dilemma in which the Westminster Confession leaves the heathen world: "The heathen cannot be saved by framing their lives according to the light of nature." Neither "can they be saved unless they believe on Jesus Christ." But "how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard, and how shall they hear without a preacher, and how shall they preach except they be sent?" The heathen are thus shut up to the mercy of the church rather than to the mercy of God, — a conclusion which affords, as Dr. Shedd has said, a basis for the appeal for foreign missions, but a conclusion which has as yet afforded very little relief to the heathen. Doubtless some who manage and support our missionary organizations still hold to this conclusion. But we judge from the discussions in the American Board that the majority of those who reject the hope of the possibility of the future knowledge of Christ, as a motive to repentance and faith, have come to accept what is known as the essential Christ theory, which though entirely lacking in force and grip of motive, is free from the unwarranted inhumanity of the Westminster conclusion.

We will simply remark, as we turn from this interesting address, that we should suppose that the impression produced by it upon the minds of the Princeton students' would have been, that there was no reason in itself why the theory of a Christian probation for the heathen should not be accepted, and that, in view of the alternative proposed, there was every reason why it should be accepted.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST THE REV. CHARLES A. BRIGGS, D. D.¹

Report of the Committee of Prosecution, with Charges and Specifications submitted to the Presbytery of New York, October 5, 1891, by the Committee of Prosecution.

COMMITTEE OF PROSECUTION. — George W. F. Birch, D. D., Joseph J. Lampe, D. D., Robert F. Sample, D. D., John J. Stevenson, John J. McCook.

NEW YORK, October 5, 1891.

TO THE PRESBYTERY OF NEW YORK :

The Committee of Prosecution in the case of Dr. Briggs, appointed in compliance with Section 11 of the Book of Discipline, at the meeting of Presbytery in May last, report as follows : —

Inasmuch as four of their number were absent in the performance of their duties as commissioners at the session of the General Assembly held at Detroit, and as Dr. Briggs had sailed for Europe, to be absent until autumn, they made a report of progress at the meeting of Presbytery in June, indicating their intention of presenting the charges and specifications at the meeting of Presbytery in October.

The Committee have decided to base charges and specifications upon what is contained in Dr. Briggs' inaugural address alone. Their reasons for adopting this course are as follows : —

I. By direction of the Presbytery, the inaugural address was the original subject of inquiry by the Committee of Presbytery appointed on April 13, 1891, and it was upon the report of that committee that a judicial investigation was instituted.

II. Because of the recent publication of the inaugural address. In this way any objection which might be made, under the limitation of Section 117 of the Book of Discipline, as to the length of time which has elapsed since the publication of earlier works, has been avoided.

III. Because the inaugural address may be regarded as the most deliberate and emphatic expression of Dr. Briggs's doctrine, and therefore representing most fairly his position with respect to those doctrines upon which the charges and specifications are based. Since the inaugural address was first delivered and published, it has been widely criticised, but in spite of these criticisms a second edition has been published, in which all the doctrines set forth in the first edition are presented without modification, being rather reaffirmed and emphasized in a preface and in an appendix.

IV. Because of the vital importance of the doctrines with which the inaugural address deals.

V. Because the address was delivered as an introduction to a course of lectures on Biblical theology, and is therefore to be taken as a formal

¹ The full text of the charges against Dr. Briggs, with the exception of the Scriptural citations (the references only being given), is printed in the *Review* for the benefit of our readers in following the trial before the New York Presbytery, November 4, 1891. Should proceedings be discontinued, it may still be of value for reference. — ED.

declaration of the Professor's attitude with respect to some of the more important subjects in his new department.

It has been decided by your committee that it is neither necessary nor advisable to embrace in the list of charges all the doctrinal errors contained in the inaugural address, and, while its teachings respecting miracles, the original condition of man, the nature of sin, race redemption, and Dr. Briggs's scheme of Biblical theology in general, are not in harmony with the Scriptures, and are calculated to weaken confidence in the Word of God, and to encourage presumption on the clemency and long-suffering of God, yet in order that we may avoid an undue extension of the trial, and the confusion of thought that might follow an attempt to compass all the errors contained in said address, we have deemed it best to confine attention to a few departures from the teachings of the Scriptures which are fundamental to the entire discussion.

Furthermore, your committee is not unmindful of the fact that the erroneous and ill-advised utterances of Dr. Briggs in the inaugural address have seriously disturbed the peace of the church and led to a situation full of difficulty and complication, and have produced such widespread uneasiness and agitation throughout the church as to cause sixty-three presbyteries to overture the General Assembly with reference to the same; yet for the reasons above given we have determined not to include this grave offense against the peace of the church in the list of formal charges.

The committee present the following charges and specifications, which, in compliance with the provisions of Section 10 of the Book of Discipline, it becomes their duty to prosecute in the name and by the authority of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.

CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS.

CHARGE I.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Reverend Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a minister of the Presbyterian Church, and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching doctrines which conflict irreconcilably with and are contrary to the cardinal doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures and contained in the Standards of the Presbyterian Church, that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice.

These hurtful errors, striking at the vitals of religion, and contrary to the regulations and practice of the Presbyterian Church, were promulgated in an inaugural address which Dr. Briggs delivered at the Union Theological Seminary in the city of New York, January 20, 1891, on the occasion of his induction into the Edward Robinson Chair of Biblical Theology, which address has, with Dr. Briggs's approval, been published and extensively circulated, and republished in a second edition with a preface and an appendix.

SPECIFICATION I.

Dr. Briggs declares that "there are historically three great fountains of divine authority, — the Bible, the Church, and the Reason," — thus making the Church and the Reason each to be an independent and sufficient fountain of divine authority.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Page 25: "The majority of Christians from the apostolic age have found God through the church. Martyrs and saints, fathers and schoolmen, the profoundest intellects, the saintliest lives, have had this experience."

Page 26: "Nevertheless, the church is a seat of divine authority, and the multitudes of pious souls in the present and the past have not been mistaken in their experience when they have found God in the church."

Page 26: "Another means used by God to make himself known is the forms of the Reason, using Reason in a broad sense to embrace the metaphysical categories, the conscience and the religious feeling. Here, in the Holy of Holies of human nature, God presents himself to those who seek Him."

Page 28: "We have examined the Church and the Reason as seats of divine authority in an introduction to our theme, the *Authority of the Scriptures*, because they open our eyes to see mistakes that are common to the three departments. Protestant Christianity builds its faith and life on the divine authority contained in the Scriptures, and too often depreciates the Church and the Reason."

Page 86: "But preferring to use my limited time in opposing the depreciation of the Church and the Reason, too often characteristic of Protestants; and in an effort briefly to state, as a fact of history, that these are sources of divine authority."

These declarations are contrary to the Scripture: Isa. viii. 20; Ps. cxix. 96; Gal. i. 8, 9; Matt. iv. 4, 7, 10; Matt. v. 19; Matt. vii. 24; Matt. xxii. 29, 31, 36, 40; Mark vii. 7, 13; Acts vii. 38; Acts xvii. 11; 1 Pet. iv. 11; 1 John v. 10; Luke i. 3, 4; 2 Pet. i. 19, 21; Gal. iii. 8 to 16; John v. 39; Deut. iv. 2; Deut. xii. 32; Rev. xxii. 19; Jer. xxiii. 22; Jer. viii. 8, 9; Rom. iii. 2; Acts xviii. 28.

These declarations are contrary to our standards, Confession of Faith: Chap. I., Secs. I., II., VIII., X.:—

I. Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence, do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God as to leave men inexcusable, yet they are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God, and of his will, which is necessary unto salvation; therefore it pleased the Lord, at sundry times and in divers manners, to reveal himself, and to declare that his will unto his church; and afterwards, for the better preserving and propagating of the truth, and for the more sure establishment and comfort of the church against the corruption of the flesh, and the malice of Satan and of the world, to commit the same wholly unto writing; which maketh the Holy Scripture to be most necessary, those former ways of God's revealing his will unto his people being now ceased.

II. Under the name of Holy Scripture, or the word of God written, are now contained all the books of the Old and New Testament, which are these:—

OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Genesis.
Exodus.
Leviticus.
Numbers.
Deuteronomy.

Joshua.
Judges.
Ruth.
I. Samuel.
II. Samuel.

I. Kings.
II. Kings.
I. Chronicles.
II. Chronicles.
Ezra.

Nehemiah.	Jeremiah.	Jonah.
Esther.	Lamentations.	Micah.
Job.	Ezekiel.	Nahum.
Psalms.	Daniel.	Habakkuk.
Proverbs.	Hosea.	Zephaniah.
Ecclesiastes.	Joel.	Haggai.
The Song of Songs.	Amos.	Zechariah.
Isaiah.	Obadiah.	Malachi.

OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

The Gospels according to	Galatians.	The Epistle to the He-
Matthew.	Ephesians.	brews.
Mark.	Philippians.	The Epistle of James.
Luke.	Colossians.	The first and second Epis-
John.	Thessalonians, I.	tles of Peter.
The Acts of the Apostles.	Thessalonians, II.	The first, second, and third
Paul's Epistles to the Ro-	To Timothy, I.	Epistles of John.
mans.	To Timothy, II.	The Epistle of Jude.
Corinthians, I.	To Titus.	The Revelation.
Corinthians, II.	To Philemon.	

All which are given by inspiration of God, to be the rule of faith and life.

VIII. The Old Testament in Hebrew (which was the native language of the people of God of old) and the New Testament in Greek (which at the time of the writing of it was most generally known to the nations), being immediately inspired by God, and by his singular care and providence kept pure in all ages, are therefore authentical; so as in all controversies of religion the church is finally to appeal unto them. But because these original tongues are not known to all the people of God who have right unto and interest in the Scriptures, and are commanded in the fear of God to read and search them, therefore they are to be translated into the vulgar language of every nation unto which they come, that, the word of God dwelling plentifully in all, they may worship Him in an acceptable manner, and through patience and comfort of the Scriptures may have hope.

X. The Supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture.

Larger Catechism, 2 and 3 : —

Q. 2. How doth it appear that there is a God?

A. The very light of nature in man, and the works of God, declare plainly that there is a God; but his word and Spirit only, do sufficiently and effectually reveal Him unto men for their salvation.

Q. 3. What is the word of God?

A. The holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the word of God, the only rule of faith and obedience.

Shorter Catechism, 2 : —

Q. 2. What rule hath God given to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy Him?

A. The word of God, which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy Him.

SPECIFICATION II.

Dr. Briggs affirms that, in the case of some, the Holy Scriptures are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and his will which is necessary unto salvation, even though they strive never so hard; and that such persons, setting aside the supreme authority of the word of God, can obtain that saving knowledge of Him through the church.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Page 25: "But what shall we say of a modern like Newman, who could not reach certainty, striving never so hard, through the Bible or the Reason, but who did find divine authority in the institutions of the church?"

Page 28: "Spurgeon is an example of the average modern Evangelical who holds the Protestant position, and assails the Church and Reason in the interest of the authority of Scripture. But the average opinion of the Christian world would not assign him a higher place in the kingdom of God than Martineau or Newman."

These declarations are contrary to the Scripture: 2 Tim. iii. 15-17; James i. 18; Eph. ii. 20; Ps. cxix. 105, 130; Luke xvi. 31; John xiv. 6; John xx. 31; 2 Tim. i. 9, 10; 2 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Thess. ii. 13; John vi. 45.

These declarations are contrary to our standards: Confession of Faith, Chap. I., Secs. I., V., VI., VII.: —

I. Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence, do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God as to leave men inexcusable, yet they are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and of his will which is necessary unto salvation; therefore it pleased the Lord, at sundry times and in divers manners, to reveal himself, and to declare that his will unto his church; and afterwards, for the better preserving and propagating of the truth, and for the more sure establishment and comfort of the church against the corruption of the flesh, and the malice of Satan and of the world, to commit the same wholly unto writing, which maketh the Holy Scripture to be most necessary; those former ways of God's revealing his will unto his people being now ceased.

V. We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the church to an high and reverent esteem for the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts.

VI. The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men. Nevertheless we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be neces-

sary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the word; and that there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of the church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be observed.

VII. All things in Scripture are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear unto all; yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed, for salvation, are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them.

SPECIFICATION III.

Dr. Briggs affirms that some (such as James Martineau, who denies the doctrines of the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection of the Body, the personality of the Holy Ghost, who rejects the miracles of the Bible and denies the truth of the Gospel narratives, as well as most of the theology of the Epistles), to whom the Holy Scripture is not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and of his will which is necessary unto salvation, may turn from the supreme authority of the word of God and find that knowledge of Him through the Reason.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Page 27: "Martineau could not find divine authority in the church or the Bible, but he did find God enthroned in his own soul. There are those who would refuse these Rationalists a place in the company of the faithful. But they forget that the essential thing is to find God and divine certainty, and if these men have found God without the mediation of Church and Bible, Church and Bible are means and not ends; they are avenues to God, but are not God. We regret that these Rationalists depreciate the means of grace so essential to most of us, but we are warned lest we commit a similar error and depreciate the Reason and the Christian consciousness."

Page 28: "Spurgeon is an example of the average modern Evangelical, who holds the Protestant position, and assails the Church and Reason in the interest of the authority of Scripture. But the average opinion of the Christian world would not assign him a higher place in the kingdom of God than Martineau or Newman. May we not conclude, on the whole, that these three representative Christians of our time, living in or near the world's metropolis, have, each in his way, found God and rested on his divine authority."

These declarations are contrary to the Scripture: 1 John v. 10; John xiv. 6; Acts iv. 12; Acts viii. 32-35; Acts x. 43; 1 Cor. ii. 13, 14; Eph. ii. 20; Romans xvi. 25, 26; James i. 18; Matt. xxii. 29; 1 Cor. i. 19-21.

These declarations are contrary to our standards; Confession of Faith, Chap. I., Secs. I., V., VI., VII.:—

I. Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence, do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God as to leave men inexcusable, yet they are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and of his will which is necessary unto salvation; therefore it pleased the Lord, at sundry times and in divers manners, to reveal

himself, and to declare that his will unto his church; and afterwards, for the better preserving and propagating of the truth, and for the more sure establishment and comfort of the church against the corruption of the flesh, and the malice of Satan and of the world, to commit the same wholly unto writing, which maketh the Holy Scripture to be most necessary; those former ways of God's revealing his will unto his people being now ceased.

V. We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the church to an high and reverent esteem for the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts.

VI. The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men. Nevertheless we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the word; and that there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of the church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be observed.

VII. All things in Scripture are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear unto all; yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed, for salvation, are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them.

SPECIFICATION IV.

Dr. Briggs asserts that the temperaments and environments of men determine which of the three ways of access to God they may pursue.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Page 28: "May we not conclude, on the whole, that these three representative Christians of our time, living in or near the world's metropolis, have, each in his way, found God and rested on divine authority? May we not learn from them not to depreciate any of the means whereby God makes himself known to men? Men are influenced by their temperaments and environments which of the three ways of access to God they may pursue."

This statement is contrary to the Scripture: 1 Pet. i. 23, 25; 1 Gal. i. 8, 9; John xiv. 6.

This statement is contrary to our standards: Confession of Faith, Chap. I., Secs. I., VI.:—

I. Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence, do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God as to leave men inexcusable, yet they are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and of his will which is necessary unto salvation; therefore it pleased the Lord, at sundry times and in divers manners, to reveal himself, and to declare that his will unto his church; and afterwards, for the better preserving and propagating of the truth, and for the more sure establishment and comfort of the church against the corruption of the flesh, and the malice of Satan and of the world, to commit the same wholly unto writing, which maketh the Holy Scripture to be most necessary; those former ways of God's revealing his will unto his people being now ceased.

VI. The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men. Nevertheless we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the word; and that there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of the church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be observed.

SPECIFICATION V.

Dr. Briggs makes statements in regard to the Holy Scriptures which cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of the true and full inspiration of those Scriptures as the "Word of God written."

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Page 30: "The Bible, as a book, is paper, print, and binding — nothing more. It is entitled to reverent handling for the sake of its holy contents, because it contains the divine word of redemption for man, and not for any other reason whatever."

Page 31: "There is nothing divine in the text, — in its letters, words, or clauses. There are those who hold that thought and language are as inseparable as body and soul. But language is rather the dress of thought. A master of many languages readily clothes the same thought in half a dozen different languages. The same thought in the Bible itself is dressed in different literary styles, and the thought of the one is as authoritative as the other. The divine authority is not in the style or in the words, but in the concept, and so the divine power of the Bible may be transferred into any human language. The divine authority contained in the Scriptures speaks as powerfully in English as in Greek, in Choctaw as in Aramaic, in Chinese as in Hebrew. We force our way through the language and the letter, the grammar and the style, to the inner substance of the thought, for there, if at all, we shall find God."

Page 34: "It is not a pleasant task to point out errors in the sacred Scriptures. Nevertheless, historical criticism finds them, and we must meet the issue, whether they destroy the authority of the Bible or not."

Pages 35, 36: "I shall venture to affirm that, so far as I can see, there are errors in the Scriptures that no one has been able to explain

away ; and the theory that they were not in the original text is sheer assumption, upon which no mind can rest with certainty. If such errors destroy the authority of the Bible, it is already destroyed for historians. Men cannot shut their eyes to truth and fact. But on what authority do these theologians drive men from the Bible by this theory of inerrancy ? The Bible itself nowhere makes this claim. The creeds of the church nowhere sanction it. It is a ghost of modern evangelicalism to frighten children. The Bible has maintained its authority with the best scholars of our time, who with open minds have been willing to recognize any error that might be pointed out by historical criticism, for these errors are all in the circumstantial and not in the essentials ; they are in the human setting, not in the precious jewel itself ; they are found in that section of the Bible that theologians commonly account for from the providential superintendence of the mind of the author, as distinguished from divine revelation itself. It may be that this providential superintendence gives infallible guidance in every particular ; and it may be that it differs but little, if at all, from the providential superintendence of the fathers and schoolmen and theologians of the Christian church. It is not important for our purpose that we should decide this question. If we should abandon the whole field of providential superintendence so far as inspiration and divine authority are concerned, and limit divine inspiration and authority to the essential contents of the Bible, to its religion, faith, and morals, we would still have ample room to seek divine authority where alone it is essential, or even important, in the teaching that guides our devotions, our thinking, and our conduct."

Page 95 : " I have not taken a brief to prove the errancy of Scripture. Conservative men should hesitate before they force the critics in self-defense to make a catalogue of errors in the Bible. It is not my place to distinguish between the essential and the non-essential contents of the Bible. The errors are in the only texts we have, and every one is forced to recognize them."

These statements are contrary to the Scriptures : Heb. i. 1, 2 ; Acts i. 16 ; Acts iii. 18 ; 1 Cor. ii. 13 ; 2 Pet. i. 20, 21 ; 2 Tim. iii. 16 ; Rom. ix. 17 ; Mark xii. 36 ; Acts vii. 38 ; Acts xxviii. 25 ; 2 Sam. xxiii. 2 ; Ps. xix. 7 ; Ps. cxix. 142, 160 ; Dan. x. 21 ; Num. xxiii. 19 ; Luke i. 1-4 ; John xvii. 17 ; Rom. xv. 3, 4 ; 1 Thess. ii. 13 ; Matt. vi. 17-19 ; Heb. xii. 27 ; Gal. iii. 16 ; John x. 34-36 ; Isa. viii. 20 ; 1 Pet. i. 23, 25 ; Acts xxiv. 14.

These statements are contrary to our standards : Confession of Faith, Chap. I., Secs. I., II., IV., V., VIII., IX. ; Chap. XIV., Sec. II. : —

I. Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence, do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God as to leave men inexcusable, yet they are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and of his will which is necessary unto salvation ; therefore it pleased the Lord, at sundry times and in divers manners, to reveal himself, and to declare that his will unto his church ; and afterwards, for the better preserving and propagating of the truth, and for the more sure establishment and comfort of the church against the corruption of the flesh, and the malice of Satan and of the world, to commit the same wholly unto writing ; which maketh the Holy Scripture to be most necessary ; those former ways of God's revealing his will unto his people being now ceased.

II. Under the name of Holy Scripture, or the word of God written,

are now contained all the books of the Old and New Testament, which are these : —

Of the Old Testament.

Genesis.	II. Chronicles.	Daniel.
Exodus.	Ezra.	Hosea.
Leviticus.	Nehemiah.	Joel.
Numbers.	Esther.	Amos.
Deuteronomy.	Job.	Obadiah.
Joshua.	Psalms.	Jonah.
Judges.	Proverbs.	Micah.
Ruth.	Ecclesiastes.	Nahum.
I. Samuel.	The Song of Songs.	Habakkuk.
II. Samuel.	Isaiah.	Zephaniah.
I. Kings.	Jeremiah.	Haggai.
II. Kings.	Lamentations.	Zechariah.
I. Chronicles.	Ezekiel.	Malachi.

Of the New Testament.

The Gospels according to Matthew.	Galatians.	The Epistle to the Hebrews.
Mark.	Ephesians.	The Epistle of James.
Luke.	Philippians.	The first and second Epistles of Peter.
John.	Colossians.	The first, second, and third Epistles of John.
The Acts of the Apostles.	Thessalonians I.	The Epistle of Jude.
Paul's Epistle to the Romans.	Thessalonians II.	The Revelation.
Corinthians I.	To Timothy I.	
Corinthians II.	To Timothy II.	
	To Titus.	
	To Philemon.	

All which are given by inspiration of God, to be the rule of faith and life.

IV. The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the word of God.

V. We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the church to an high and reverent esteem for the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts.

VIII. The Old Testament in Hebrew (which was the native language of the people of God of old), and the New Testament in Greek (which at the time of the writing of it was most generally known to the nations), being immediately inspired by God, and by his singular care and providence kept pure in all ages, are therefore authenticall; so as in all controversies of religion the church is finally to appeal unto them. But because these original tongues are not known to all the people of God who have right unto and interest in the Scriptures, and are commanded in the fear of God to read and search them, therefore they are to be translated into

the vulgar language of every nation unto which they come, that the word of God dwelling plentifully in all, they may worship Him in an acceptable manner, and through patience and comfort of the Scriptures may have hope.

IX. The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself; and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it may be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly.

CHAP. XIV. SEC. II. By this faith a Christian believeth to be true whatsoever is revealed in the word, for the authority of God himself speaking therein; and acteth differently upon that which each particular passage thereof containeth; yielding obedience to the commands, trembling at the threatenings, and embracing the promises of God for this life, and that which is to come. But the principal acts of saving faith are, accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life, by virtue of the covenant of grace.

SPECIFICATION VI.

Dr. Briggs asserts that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch, and that Isaiah is not the author of half of the book which bears his name.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Page 33: "It may be regarded as the certain result of the science of the higher criticism that Moses did not write the Pentateuch."

Page 33: "Isaiah did not write half of the book that bears his name."

These statements are contrary to Scripture: Ex. xxiv. 3, 4; Num. xxxiii. 2; Deut. xxxi. 9, 22; Josh. i. 7, 8; Josh. viii. 31; 1 Kings ii. 3; 2 Kings xxi. 8; Ezra iii. 2, 6; Ezra vi. 18; Neh. i. 7, 8; Neh. viii. 1, 14, 15; Neh. x. 29-39; Neh. xiii. 1; 1 Chron. vi. 49; Dan. ix. 11, 13; Matt. xix. 7, 9; Mark vii. 10; Luke xxiv. 27, 44; Luke xx. 28, 37; John i. 45; John v. 45-47; John vii. 19, 23; Romans x. 19; Acts iii. 22; Acts vii. 37, 38; Acts xv. 21; Matt. xii. 17, 18; Luke iii. 4; Luke iv. 17, 18; John xii. 38, 41; Rom. x. 16, 20.

These statements are contrary to our standards: Confession of Faith, Chap. I., Secs. VIII., IX.:—

VIII. The Old Testament in Hebrew (which was the native language of the people of God of old), and the New Testament in Greek (which at the time of the writing of it was most generally known to the nations), being immediately inspired by God, and by his singular care and providence kept pure in all ages, are therefore authentic; so as in all controversies of religion the church is finally to appeal unto them. But because these original tongues are not known to all the people of God who have right unto and interest in the Scriptures, and are commanded in the fear of God to read and search them, therefore they are to be translated into the vulgar language of every nation unto which they come, that, the word of God dwelling plentifully in all, they may worship Him in an acceptable manner, and through patience and comfort of the Scriptures may have hope.

IX. The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself; and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it may be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly.

SPECIFICATION VII.

Dr. Briggs teaches that predictive prophecy has been reversed by history, and that much of it has not and never can be fulfilled.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Page 38: "Another barrier to the Bible has been the interpretation put upon *Predictive Prophecy*, making it a sort of history before the time, and looking anxiously for the fulfillment of the details of Biblical prediction. Kuenen has shown that if we insist upon the fulfillment of the details of the predictive prophecy of the Old Testament, many of these predictions have been reversed by history; and the great body of the Messianic prediction has not only never been fulfilled, but cannot now be fulfilled, for the reason that its own time has passed forever."

These statements are contrary to the Scriptures: Ps. cv. 8; Matt. ii. 5, 6, 17, 18, 23; Matt. v. 17, 18; Matt. xxi. 4, 5; Matt. xxiv. 15; Dan. xii. 11; Matt. iii. 3; Matt. xxvi. 54, 56; Matt. xxvii. 9, 35; Mark xv. 28; Luke iv. 21; Luke xvi. 17; Luke xviii. 31; Luke xxi. 22; Luke xxiv. 26, 27, 44; John xviii. 32; John xix. 24; John xii. 16; 1 Pet. i. 10, 11; Acts iii. 18; 2 Pet. i. 19.

These statements are contrary to our standards: Confession of Faith, Chap I., Secs. IV., V. :—

IV. The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the word of God.

V. We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the church to an high and reverent esteem for the Holy Scripture; and the heavenly-ness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts.

Shorter Catechism, 4 :—

Q. 4. *What is GOD?*

A. God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.

CHARGE II.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America charges the Reverend Charles A. Briggs, D. D., being a minister of the Presbyterian Church and a member of the Presbytery of New York, with teaching a doctrine of the character, state, and sanctification of believers after death, which irreconcilably conflicts with and is contrary to the Holy Scriptures and the standards of the Presbyterian Church.

SPECIFICATION.

In the said inaugural address, delivered, published, extensively circulated, and republished as above described, Dr. Briggs teaches as follows :—

INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

Pages 53, 54, 55: "Another fault of Protestant theology is in its limitation of the process of redemption to this world, and its neglect of those vast periods of time which have elapsed for most men in the middle state between death and the resurrection. The Roman Catholic Church is firmer here, though it smears the Biblical doctrine with not a few hurtful errors. The reaction against this limitation, as seen in the theory of second probation, is not surprising. I do not find this doctrine in the Bible, but I do find in the Bible the doctrine of a middle state of conscious higher life in the communion with Christ and the multitude of the departed of all ages; and of the necessity of entire sanctification, in order that the work of redemption may be completed. There is no authority in the Scriptures, or in the creeds of Christendom, for the doctrine of immediate sanctification at death. The only sanctification known to experience, to Christian orthodoxy, and to the Bible is progressive sanctification. Progressive sanctification after death is the doctrine of the Bible and the church; and it is of vast importance in our times that we should understand it, and live in accordance with it. The bugbear of a judgment immediately after death, and the illusion of a magical transformation in the dying hour, should be banished from the world. They are conceits derived from the Ethnic religions, and without basis in the Bible or Christian experience as expressed in the symbols of the church. The former makes death a terror to the best of men, the latter makes human life and experience of no effect; and both cut the nerves of Christian activity and striving after sanctification. Renouncing them as hurtful, unchristian errors, we look with hope and joy for the continuation of the processes of grace and the wonders of redemption in the company of the blessed, to which the faithful are all hastening."

Inaugural Address, Appendix, second edition, pages 107, 108: "Sanctification has two sides, — a negative and a positive, — mortification and vivification; the former is manward, the latter is Godward. Believers who enter the middle state enter guiltless; they are pardoned and justified; they are mantled in the blood and righteousness of Christ; and nothing will be able to separate them from his love. They are also delivered from all temptations such as spring from without, from the world and the devil. They are encircled with influences for good such as they have never enjoyed before. But they are still the same persons, with all the gifts and graces, and also the same habits of mind, disposition, and temper, they had when they left the world. Death destroys the body. It does not change the moral and religious nature of man. It is unpsychological and unethical to suppose that the character of the disembodied spirit will all be changed in the moment of death. It is the Manichean heresy to hold that sin belongs to the physical organization and is laid aside with the body. If this were so, how can any of our race carry their evil natures with them into the middle state and incur the punishment of their sins? The eternal punishment of a man, whose evil nature has been stripped from him by death and left in the grave, is an absurdity. The Plymouth Brethren hold that there are two natures in the redeemed, — the old man and the new. In accordance with such a theory, the old man might be cast off at death. But this is only a more subtle kind of Manicheism, which has ever been regarded as heretical. Sin, as our Saviour teaches, has its source in the heart, — in the higher

and immortal part of man. It is the work of sanctification to overcome sin in the higher nature."

This doctrine is contrary to the Scripture : John i. 29 ; Luke xvi. 22, 26 ; 2 Cor. v. 1-10 ; Matt. xxvi. 41 ; 1 John iii. 2, 9, 10 ; 1 Tim. iv. 7, 8 ; Rev. iii. 4, 5 ; Rev. vii. 9, 13, 14 ; Rev. xiv. 13 ; Rev. xix. 8 ; Heb. xii. 23 ; Eph. v. 26, 27 ; 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52 ; 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17 ; Eph. iii. 15, 16.

This doctrine is contrary to our standards : Confession of Faith, Chap. XXXII., Sec. I. : —

I. The bodies of men after death return to dust, and see corruption ; but their souls (which neither die nor sleep), having an immortal subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them. The souls of the righteous, being then made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies : and the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day. Besides these two places for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture acknowledgeth none.

Larger Catechism, 86 : —

Q. 86. What is the communion in glory with Christ, which the members of the invisible church enjoy immediately after death ?

A. The communion in glory with Christ, which the members of the invisible church enjoy immediately after death, is in that their souls are then made perfect in holiness, and received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies, which even in death continue united to Christ, and rest in their graves as in their beds, till at the last day they be again united to their souls. Whereas the souls of the wicked are at their death cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness ; and their bodies kept in their graves as in their prisons, until the resurrection and judgment of the great day.

Shorter Catechism, 37 : —

Q. 37. What benefit do believers receive from Christ at their death ?

A. The souls of believers are at their death made perfect in holiness, and do immediately pass into glory ; and their bodies, being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the resurrection.

Your Committee recommend that, in compliance with the provisions of section 19 of the Book of Discipline, a copy of the charges and specifications be now served upon Dr. Briggs, and that a citation, signed in the name of the Presbytery by the moderator or clerk, be personally served upon Dr. Briggs, citing him to appear and plead to said charges and specifications at an early day.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

In behalf of the Committee,

G. W. F. BIRCH, *Chairman.*

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Fleming H. Revell Company, New York and Chicago. Three Gates on a Side, and other Sermons. By Charles H. Parkhurst, D. D., Pastor of the Madison Square Church, New York; Author of "The Blind Man's Creed," etc., etc. Pp. 271. \$1.25.

Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. The Poetry of Tennyson. By Henry Van Dyke. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. Pp. xviii, 370. 1891. \$2.00. — Poems of Sidney Lanier. Edited by his Wife. With a Memorial by William Hayes Ward. New Edition. Pp. xli, 260. 1891. \$2.00. — Held Fast for England. A Tale of the Siege of Gibraltar (1779-1783). By G. A. Henty, author of "The Dash for Khartoum," etc., etc. Illustrated by Gordon Browne. Pp. 353. 1891. \$1.50. — The Dash for Khartoum. A Tale of the Nile Expedition. By G. A. Henty, author of "Redskin and Cow-Boy," "By Right of Conquest," etc., etc. With ten page Illustrations, by Joseph Nash, R. I. and John Schoenberg. Pp. 382. 1891. \$1.50. — The Pilots of Pomona. A Story of the Orkney Islands. By Robert Leighton. With eight page Illustrations by John Leighton. Pp. 352. 1891. \$1.50. — Elements of Syriac Grammar, by an Inductive Method. By Robert Dick Wilson, Ph. D., Professor of Old Testament Languages and History in the Western Theological Seminary, Alleghany, Pa. Pp. viii, 209. 1891. — Introductory Syriac Method and Manual. By Robert Dick Wilson, Ph. D. Pp. viii, 160. 1891. — The Life and Times of Nicolò Machiavelli. By Professor Pasquale Villari, author of "The Life and Times of Savonarola," etc. Translated by Madame Linda Villari. A New Edition. (Augmented by the Author, revised by the Translator.) Illustrated. Vol. I., pp. xxxvi, 550. Vol. II., pp. xii, 597. 1891. \$10.00 two vols.

Thomas Whittaker, New York. The Church of England in Nova Scotia and the Tory Clergy of the Revolution. By Arthur Wentworth Eaton, B. A., Presbyter of the Diocese of New York. Pp. xiv, 320. 1891. \$1.50.

The Craig Press, Chicago. Gambling; or, Fortuna, her Temple and Shrine. The True Philosophy and Ethics of Gambling. By James Harold Romain. Pp. 230. 1891. Cloth, \$1.00.

PAMPHLETS. — *Berkeley, California.* A Guide to the Literature of Æsthetics. By Charles Mills Gayley, Professor of the English Language and Literature in the University of California, and Fred Newton Scott, Ph. D., Assistant Professor of English in the University of Michigan. Supplement to the Report of the Secretary of the Board of Regents, University of California. Pp. 116. Sent by Library of University of California on receipt of five cents. 1890. — *Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York.* Easter Gleams. By Lucy Larcom. Pp. 45. 1890. 75 cents. — *Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, Boston and Chicago.* Easter Voices. A Carol Service for Easter. By M. C. Hazard. Musical Editor, John W. Tufts. Pp. 16, Supplement 4. 1890. 5 cents, 100 copies, \$4.00. The Easter Service. 1. For the Use of Congregations, Colleges, Schools, and Academies for Public Worship. By the Rev. George H. Hubbard. Pp. 10. 100 copies, \$2.50. — *The Salem Press, Salem.* Ancestry of Calvin Guild, Margaret Taft, James Humphreys, and Rebecca Covell Martin, including over one hundred surnames. 1620-1890. By Howard Redwood Guild, Member of the New England Hist. Gen. Soc., etc., etc. Pp. 42. Copies can be had, postpaid, of H. R. Guild, 147 Benefit Street, Providence, R. I. — *University Press, Cambridge.* Remarks on the New Historical School. By Mellen Chamberlain. Reprinted from the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society. 1890. — *Philadelphia.* Publications of the University of Pennsylvania. Political Economy and Public Law Series. Edmund J. James, Ph. D., Editor. No. 8. The Federal Constitution of Switzerland. Translated by Edmund J. James, Ph. D., Professor in the University of Pennsylvania. Pp. 46. 1890. 50 cents. For sale by Porter & Coates, Philadelphia. — The Cradle of the

Semites. Two Papers read before the Philadelphia Oriental Club. I. By Daniel G. Brinton, M. D., Professor of American Archæology and Linguistics in the University of Pennsylvania. II. A Reply by Morris Jastrow, Jr., Ph. D., Professor of Arabic and Assistant Librarian in the University of Pennsylvania. Pp. 26. 1890. — *H. F. Brownson, Detroit, Michigan.* The Religion of Ancient Craft Masonry. Pp. 55. 1890. — *Ginn & Company, Boston.* Q. Curti Rufi Historiarum Alexandri Magni Macedonis. Libri III. et IV. The First Two extant Books of Quintius Curtius. For Sight Reading. Edited by Harold N. Fowler. With an Introduction on Reading at Sight, by James B. Greenough. Pp. xiii, 96. 1890. — *Librairie Fischbacher, Paris.* Les Droits et les Torts de la Papauté en les Devoirs des Protestants envers leurs Frères Catholiques Romains. Par E. Petavel-Olliff, Docteur en Théologie. Pp. 74. 1890. — *Patterson & White, Philadelphia.* Luxilla. A Romance. By George E. Miller. Pp. 79. 1890. — *Fleming H. Revell Company, New York and Chicago.* How Josh Worked up a Concept. By Josh, Senior. Pp. 8. 5 cents ; 25 cents per dozen.

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THE BIBLICAL CONDITIONS OF SALVATION.

EVERY creed and every philosophy has asked this as the first question of its catechism, "What is the chief end of man?" and its answer, whether of epicureanism and pleasure, or of stoicism and virtue, or of Christianity and sacrifice, condemns it or approves it. I will not delay to ask what are the various answers that have been given to this question by various philosophies or religions, but simply what are the answers given in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, for we may be sure that the writers of these Scriptures, whether we call them inspired or not, had a special genius to teach the world what is the meaning of the word *duty*.

The Old Testament gives just one answer to the question, "Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle?" and that answer is given in the 15th Psalm, and everywhere else in the Jewish Scriptures. "He that walketh uprightly and worketh righteousness, and speaketh the truth in his heart;" or again, in the 24th Psalm, when the question is asked: "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place?" the same answer is given in other words: "He that hath clean hands and a pure heart, who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully. He shall receive the blessing from the Lord, and righteousness from the God of his salvation." This condition of life, salvation, takes all the forms of duty known to the Hebrew world. It appears as the essence of the Ten Commandments. Honor your God and your parents, do no theft, no adultery, no murder, no false swearing, and you shall live; you shall have the favor of Jehovah. This is the whole condition.

The most remarkable exposition of practical ethics in the Old Testament is found in the wonderful eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel, a chapter which is without equal in literature in the emphasis and passion with which it represents God as appealing to man's own conscience to justify his moral government of the world. Notice what is the condition of life. A man must be just; must do that which is lawful and right; must worship no idols; must not be guilty of adultery, oppression, or usury; must have given bread to the hungry, and clothed the naked; must have judged justly between man and man, and dealt truly; "He is just, he shall surely live, saith Jehovah God." He begets a son who is a robber, a shedder of blood, an oppressor, a usurer: "Shall he then live? He shall not live; he hath done all these abominations; he shall surely die." And he begets a son that sees his father's sins, and considers, that does not oppress any nor withhold the pledge, nor spoil by violence, but gives bread to the hungry and clothes the naked: "he shall not die for the iniquity of his father; he shall surely live." Here we have the great doctrine of individuality, of personal responsibility, announced as against that doctrine which degrades the individual will and responsibility, and saves or condemns races or families in the mass, — the doctrine, I may say, of a national church.

But this is not all. This admirable prophet goes on still farther to develop the conditions of life by giving the same life to the oppressor or murderer who repents which he gives to the righteous man. "If the wicked turn from all his sins," and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, he shall not die. All his transgressions that he hath committed, they shall not be mentioned unto him, in his righteousness that he hath done he shall live." And "when the righteous turneth away from his righteousness," "and doeth according to all the abominations of the wicked," "all his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned: in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die." It is the simple doctrine of righteousness, of duty, of individual responsibility. "The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die;" and there is all the emphasis which either the English or the Hebrew can put on that word *it*, which locates responsibility on the individual soul, and gives to *it* the free choice, unconstrained by parentage or by previous character, whether it will now, and for itself, choose righteousness and live, or choose sin and die. The condition, I say, is pure, simple duty to God and man, with nothing more than reformation

for the wicked, no expiation of the past, no sacrifices, no atonement, nothing but simple righteousness, or, for the guilty, reformation and righteousness.

Now this is, I say, substantially the teaching of the whole Old Testament. There are sacrifices, but they are a part of a ritual of free offering, or of taxes for the support of the priesthood, or of public confession of sin, that enter very little into the ethical constitution of the Old Testament. The one condition of life, according to the Hebrew Scriptures, is righteousness. "What doth the Lord require of thee, O man," says the prophet Micah, "but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" He offers an argument to show that it is not sacrifice, but righteousness, that is the sole condition of the divine favor, a positive — something more than a negative — morality.

Very frequently in the New Testament we find the same condition of salvation. John the Baptist said to those who came to ask him what they should do to escape the wrath to come: "Exact no more than that which is appointed you;" "Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely;" "He that hath two coats, let him impart to him that hath none." It is the Old Testament doctrine of righteousness and mercy. James's doctrine of what is "pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father" is precisely the same, — "to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world." If we now read the Gospels and the Sermon on the Mount, we shall find that they are chiefly taken up with a development and amplification of the same doctrine of righteousness, showing how it must be "fulfilled," that is, filled fuller than the ordinary Jews filled it with love and spiritual power. We sometimes hear morality, as a ground of salvation, spoken of in depreciatory terms; but call it righteousness; let it be the positive morality which goes further than not doing an injustice; let it include a heart of mercy, and it is the one condition of salvation known to the Old Testament and to at least half of the New. If there is any truth in the natural conscience of man, or in the Hebrew Scriptures, or in the Sermon on the Mount, the righteous man, the man who seeks seriously, earnestly after righteousness, Jew or Gentile, Christian, pagan, or skeptic, will be saved. Such is the teaching of the Bible from Moses to Jesus.

But how great a word that *righteousness* is we may find out when we consider what other forms the answer takes to the question, "What must I do to be saved?" It takes the form of

repentance. As we have already seen, Ezekiel makes that the condition in the case of the unrighteous man: "If the wicked will *turn* from all his sins, and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live; he shall not die." The New Testament makes much of the same condition, makes it often the sole condition of salvation. In our Lord's last interview with his disciples, after his resurrection, as narrated by Luke, He ended his address to them by telling them that "thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day: and that *repentance* and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations." Accordingly, the one word of Peter's sermon on the day of Pentecost, or when he healed the lame man by the gate Beautiful, was, "Repent ye, therefore, and be converted" (conversion meaning reformation), "that your sins may be blotted out." And Paul ends his sermon on Mars' Hill with the same lesson, that God "now commandeth all men everywhere to *repent*; because he has appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness." Here the repentance and the righteousness go together. By a hearty repentance and converting, the righteousness, which was the condition of salvation, is recovered.

Another form which the condition of salvation takes in the New Testament is faith, sometimes faith in God, and sometimes faith in Jesus Christ. We find it formulated in Paul's answer to the jailer's question, "What must I do to be saved?" "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." And Paul says again: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." "Without faith," says the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "no man can please God." "He that believeth on him," says John's Gospel, "is not condemned." The doctrine of salvation by faith, or believing, is characteristic of the apostles Paul and John, rather than of the other writers of the New Testament.

This faith, this believing, is not to be looked on as a new and peculiar condition of salvation, which narrows and limits the condition given in the Old Testament; it rather refines and spiritualizes it. It must be judged by its opposite, which is *works*; and works is not righteousness, real righteousness, but ritual or formal righteousness, righteousness supposed to be acquired by birth, or by strictness of worship, or by exact correctness of belief. It was salvation by orthodoxy and going to church. But as works

was outward, so faith was inward, of the heart. It was not a very definite word, but it meant heart religion, accepting, believing in the heart Christ's teaching, which fulfilled the law by abrogating its form and filling it full of spirit, and which bade the weary heart believe that God was good, and would save the soul that tried to please Him from the heart. Faith was heart religion as against form religion; the spirit, and not the letter; the religion, says Paul, that Abraham had before he was circumcised, when he simply "believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness," so that he became the father, not of the circumcised Jews alone, but of all who believe. It was the same Paul that kept talking *faith*, that, I might almost say, introduced the word into the Christian vocabulary, who also said, "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink," — not outside, formal regularity, — "but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost," and who also said that faith itself is only an inferior expression of love: "and now abideth faith, hope, love; and the greatest of these is love."

This condition of salvation by faith in Jesus Christ, which has been made the corner-stone of Protestantism, and which so, perhaps, has received with us disproportionate attention, may profitably receive a somewhat fuller study.

Faith, or belief, is hardly referred to in the Old Testament as a special virtue or condition of life, and when it is used it is generally faithfulness rather than faith that is praised. When we come to the life of Christ as reported by Matthew, Mark, and Luke, we are struck by the fact that our Lord frequently required those who sought healing from his hand to believe that He could do it. The words *faith* and *believe* are used chiefly in connection with miracles, to indicate an assurance that the miracle will be performed. Faith is here used almost exactly in the sense in which we now speak of faith cures. There is scarcely an exception in the three Synoptic Gospels. The exceptions are the mentions of "these little ones which believe in me" (Matt. xviii. 6); the command, "Repent ye, and believe in the gospel" (Mark i. 15); the scoff of the Jews, "Let him come down, and we will believe in him;" and we are told that the publicans and harlots believed in Him. That is about all, if we except the later addition of Mark, which contains the words: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that disbelieveth shall be condemned." In these few passages we find the words *faith* and *believe* used to those who accept Jesus Christ as the Messiah.

The first stage in the use of the words is to apply them to the assurance that Jesus Christ can and will perform certain miraculous acts desired; the second is the belief and confession that He is the Messiah. The prominence of the idea of belief in these simple senses is very peculiar and new in the history of religion, but it does not seem to be made a new condition of salvation to take the place of the Old Testament conditions, much less of the conditions laid down by Christ in his discourses, which are those of spiritualized and positive, active, self-sacrificing righteousness.

Passing John's Gospel, which is a much later book, we come to the use of the term by the Apostle Paul. Paul was not a hearer of Jesus. He says distinctly that he learned nothing from the disciples who were the authorized witnesses and reporters of our Lord's teachings. He knew Christ's teachings in a general way, but imperfectly and unsympathetically, until he had the miraculous vision on the road to Damascus. At Damascus he could have got very little instruction. He says he got none from any of the disciples. They were ignorant men, none of them learned in the Scriptures or given to theological thinking. Jesus was not a rabbi, like Gamaliel, and never taught them, so far as we know, except very briefly, after his resurrection, how to accommodate the Jewish to the Christian dispensation and make the transition from the one to the other. But that was something that had to be done; and it had to be done by Paul, with no help from Peter or James, who could not have done it. So Paul went into Arabia, or was in retirement in Damascus, for three years. There he must have studied the Old Testament with an intensity we can hardly conceive. In this time he had to get his bearings and learn what Christianity meant. Peter never thoroughly learned it. He had not learned it a dozen years after the resurrection, and then the vision of the clean and the unclean beasts and the call to Cornelius did not fairly teach him. But Paul then learned it, and when he had finished this theological course he went, after a fortnight's visit to Peter, from whom he got nothing new, on his missionary tours, and it was fourteen years before he again visited Jerusalem and saw any of the apostles. He tells us that they had not a thing to teach him; indeed, it is clear that he taught them, and not they him.

Now what was it he learned? What did his study teach him was the connecting link between the Old and the New dispensations? He found it in the word *faith*. He had learned from Christ that the value of the Law was in its essence, not its ceremonial; that the Law was not to be annulled, but enlarged spirit-

ually, fulfilled. That, he saw, would make Christianity a world religion, and not a race religion. But this new Christianity he rightly saw, and we must believe that he saw it under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, must be founded on and connected with the old revelation. He found, I say, this nexus in the word *faith*, which the apostles and our Lord had used chiefly of miracles, but which Paul used chiefly of the relationship to Christ of those who believe in Him. We can seem to see him studying the Scriptures, and he comes across the passage which says that "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness." "What," he would exclaim in delight, "was he counted righteous, justified, then, before he had been circumcised, when he had received no seal of the covenant, when he was no Jew, but like any other Gentile? Then anybody else can be so justified, Jew or Gentile, and Jesus was right in disparaging ritual. And how was he justified? By *faith*, by believing God, nothing else, — so simple, so easy, so open to all the world." This passage and this thought so impressed Paul that it became his favorite Scripture, the key to all his theology, the bridge by which he passed over from Judaism to Christianity, the evidence he relied on to show that Christianity has a Biblical right to exist, that Christianity is in the Jewish Scriptures.

Now Paul's argument was a sound one. He does not twist the passage, nor use it rabbinically, as passages are often unscientifically quoted and applied in the New Testament. It was a fair deduction from the text, that salvation is outside of ritual, and that it is free to all the world.

He found another passage, less pertinent, but yet useful, that became also a favorite with him. It is that passage in Habakkuk which says that "the just shall live by his faith." The word in the Hebrew rather means faithfulness than faith, and St. Paul makes all he can out of it; but the word *faith*, or *believe*, is not a frequent one in the Old Testament as referring to a religious exercise, and Paul quotes four passages which contain the word. I only wonder he did not quote the passage from Jonah, which says that the people of Nineveh "believed in God," as that is one which gives salvation as a reward for belief. But the passage, "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness," and the other passage, "The just shall live by his faith," were especially pivotal to his new theology of Christianity, because they combined the two words *just* and *faith*, *believe* and *righteousness*, or justification. From these two passages, the key to

Paul's theology and the Christian theology, we get the two words *faith* and *justification*. And so St. Paul, in his two theological epistles, Romans and Galatians, develops out of these two Old Testament passages the New Testament doctrine of justification by faith. Out of the Old Testament Paul gets the doctrine that belief in God is the ground of justification, and not obedience to ritual law; and this he translates into the terms of Christianity, and gives us justification by believing in Jesus Christ. For *God* he substitutes generally, but not always, *Jesus Christ*.

Having thus tried to make clear how Paul got his doctrine of justification by faith in Christ, which was so dimly set forth in the teaching of Jesus, as given by the synoptists, and hardly used except of candidates for miraculous cures, though very strikingly characteristic of them, we now ask, what did Paul mean by faith?

Of course he could not have meant merely intellectual assent to the biographical facts about Jesus, his Messiahship, resurrection, etc., for St. James has made that clear in his epistle, in which he refers to St. Paul by name, and his doctrine of faith, and wittily and shrewdly remarks that the devils believe and tremble. In this same passage about Paul's theology we may note in passing that James quotes from Paul the latter's favorite passage about Abraham's believing God, and shows that Abraham's intellectual faith was not counted for righteousness, but his works which wrought with his faith.

Yet this is not quite a fair statement. Paul was as near right as James. In Paul's day the Messiahship of Jesus was not generally admitted. We may say that nobody admitted it who was not willing to be known as an obedient disciple. When the intellectual faith was confessed, that confession was the best evidence of discipleship. It is not true now, but it was substantially true then, that "if thou shalt confess with thy mouth Jesus as Lord, and shalt believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." There is no more definite statement in all Paul's writings of the saving virtue of faith, and this faith is purely intellectual in form; but it is combined with confession, a confession whose logical outcome was martyrdom. In those days nobody called himself a believer who did not mean by that that he accepted the whole body of Christ's teachings, and was a disciple. The intellectual assent of faith implied the spiritual life, the "works" of James, the "faith" of our Lord.

Now we must first get the meaning of faith by connecting it

with the passage in Genesis, out of which Paul drew his doctrine. That was faith in *God*. Paul's faith in *Christ* must have been substantially the same as Abraham's faith in God, and Habakkuk's faith or faithfulness by which the just live. That was not intellectual, it was trustful. It meant accepting God's word as true, and his law as master. It was discipleship of God, being led by him out of Chaldea, through Canaan, trusting his word for his seed, and living in obedience* to Him. That was faith, and substantially that Paul must have meant when he transferred the word to the believer's relation to Jesus Christ. This is the use of the word in the Epistle to the Hebrews, in which the word *faith*, or *believe*, is always used in this general sense, and not in the specific sense in which Paul so often speaks of faith in Christ's blood or death.

Further, we get a clearer idea of what Paul meant by faith, if we keep in mind his own contrast. His chief contention is that we are not saved by the works of the law. The opposite to the works of the law, or formal righteousness, is faith, which must be heart righteousness, the kind of righteousness that Jesus was all the time inculcating. If we will only hold this contrast in mind, and ask what is the opposite to being saved by forms, by rites, by circumcision, by orthodoxy, by birth, we shall find that it must be substantially that which is in the heart. I cannot stop to develop this thought farther, but it is a point of cardinal importance in settling what the faith was, or its essential nature, considered philosophically, which Paul taught. It must have been, at the bottom, heart religion. It must have been what Paul meant when, near the end of his epistle in which he most fully develops his doctrine of justification by faith, he says that "the kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. For he that herein serveth Christ is pleasing to God." Serving Christ, then, in righteousness, peace, and joy, is substantially the same thing as faith, and is the opposite to strictness in eating and drinking and ritual works. Paul's whole argument requires that faith with Him shall be discipleship of Christ in heart righteousness.

But this does not fully exhaust the meaning of St. Paul in his use of the word *faith*. He is, I say, more specific than I have indicated, and more specific than any other writer, even than John. James, we have said, expressly argues that righteousness is the best part of faith, and Peter, in his epistle, makes little of faith, substituting hope for it as the term which best represents the Christian's attitude to his Master.

Faith, according to Paul in the Galatians and Romans, had a special relation to Jesus. This was developed as follows: In the Synoptic Gospels the Jews are said to have believed or not believed in John the Baptist; that is, some believed, and others did not, that he was a real teacher come from God, whose warnings were to be obeyed. In the same way some believed in Christ, that is, accepted his teachings and his claims as true, and took Him for Master. That is what is meant in the Synoptic Gospels in the few cases in which the word is used, by believing in Christ. St. Paul does all this and somewhat more. He taught that he was to believe in Jesus Christ as teacher, but also as providing a death for his salvation. He lives "by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me."

Perhaps the clearest expression of this is Romans iii. 24, 25: "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God set forth to be a propitiation, through faith, by his blood, to show his righteousness, because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God." Here we have the figure of Redemption used, as if a slave were purchased; then of propitiation, as if an angry tyrant were placated; and then the mention of Christ's blood, as if Christ's death were an important condition; and then the whole apprehended by faith in this Christ and his blood. But it is curious to notice that this faith in Christ was just the same thing as faith in the Father; for after Paul has developed his great central thought which follows, of the relation of the doctrine of justification by faith to Abraham's being justified by faith in God, he sums it up with the statement that our faith will be reckoned to us for righteousness, as well as was Abraham's, if we "believe in him that raised Jesus our Lord from the dead." Here the belief is in the Father, but it is evidently the same thing as belief in the Son. Christ's death was spoken of as something important and essential in our faith, essential because through it came resurrection and eternal life; but Paul nowhere develops the thought that Christ's death was a sacrifice offered for our sins. In one case, very incidentally, He is compared to the Passover offering (1 Cor. v. 7), which was not a sin offering, and in one other passage, equally incidentally, where we are told to walk in love, we are told that Christ loved us, and gave himself up for us, an offering and sacrifice to God for an odor of sweet smell (Eph. v. 2).

It is curious, considering how much modern theology makes of Christ's death as a sacrifice, that Paul makes so little, or nothing,

of that thought, not so much as he does of *our* being a sacrifice to God. But he made faith in the whole of Christ's history, and especially in his bloody death and resurrection, the essential evidence that we accept the heart religion, which he taught, the world religion, which does not rest in ordinances, but in salvation freely offered and attested by Him who came from God, who died and rose again, and who was anticipated in the Old Testament, being witnessed to, says Paul, "by the Law," when it says that Abraham was justified by faith, and "by the prophets," when Habakkuk says that "the just shall live by his faith," the two passages which connect justification with faith.

But Paul's doctrine of faith he did not make a condition of salvation supreme over essential and spiritualized heart righteousness. After devoting most of the Epistle to the Galatians to proving that the gospel was a gospel of faith as against forms, he sums it up by saying that what avails is "neither circumcision nor uncircumcision, but faith that worketh by *love*," and that the freedom of our faith is not to be an occasion to the flesh, but that the whole law is fulfilled in one word, even this, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (v. 13, 14); and his hymn to love as superior to faith and hope is the very creed of Christendom.

Now a word as to the teaching of the Gospel of John as to belief in Christ and its necessity. This Gospel is full of it. It is stated scores of times that belief in Christ is necessary to salvation. This makes a striking, an amazing contrast to the Synoptic Gospels. Take a single passage from the third chapter: "Even so must the Son of man be lifted up: that whosoever *believeth* may in him have eternal life. For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever *believeth* in him should not perish, but have eternal life." "He that believeth on him is not judged: but he that believeth not hath been judged, because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten Son of God." This belief is the acceptance of Christ as Saviour, Teacher, Master, rather than as sacrifice. The book of John presents very difficult problems, from its contrast with the other Gospels. I cannot but think that the Synoptic Gospels present the more verbally accurate view of Christ's teachings, while the book of John, written forty or fifty years after his death, gives rather an idealizing view of his teaching, such as it would appear when interpreted by the new light which the Holy Spirit had given the church during that time, and especially in the teaching of the Apostle Paul, who had first brought into prominence the doctrine of faith.

We may consider for a moment more the doctrine of faith as a condition of salvation, as treated in that other theological book, the Epistle to the Hebrews. The purpose of that epistle is not to teach the doctrine of faith, but to teach the superior dignity of Christianity as contrasted with Judaism, and of Christ as compared with Moses and Aaron. It was the aim of the author, as it was of Paul, to show that Christianity has its roots in the Old Testament; and for him the crucial passage is not that which teaches that Abraham was justified by faith, but the Psalmist's prophecy which records the oath of God, "Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek;" and he shows that this was a different, more universal, and spiritual order than that of Aaron. His chosen passage requires him somewhat to develop the thought that Jesus must be a priest, and so must and did offer up "prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto God," as his sacrifice, by which sufferings he became the author of eternal salvation (v. 3-9). He also offered up himself. The purpose of this offering is not discriminated by the author of Hebrews. Sometimes it seems to be a sin offering (vii. 37; ix. 13); at other times it is the covenant offering (ix. 19); but whatever it is, it is less an offering for justification than it is for sanctification: "By which will we have been *sanctified* through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all" (x. 10). "For by one offering he hath *perfected* forever them that are sanctified" (x. 14). "The blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified" (x. 29) [a covenant offering]. It is after this long development of the thought growing out of the quotation, "Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek," that the author tells his readers not to sink back into perdition, but to be of those that have faith unto the saving of the soul, faith thus being the condition of salvation; and he proceeds in the magnificent eleventh chapter, which redeems some tortuosities in the preceding chapters, to show how it was their faith that saved the old worthies. But he does not, as might be expected, develop how their faith prefigures Christian faith, but rather how their faith and endurance should encourage us. With him faith is pretty much the same as patience, as with Peter it is pretty much the same as hope. He does not at all develop it as a condition of salvation.

As a conclusion of our study we find that faith is used loosely, freely, as indicating first the faith which secures miraculous healing; second, the faith which accepts Jesus Christ as the revealer

of a heart religion ; third, the faith most intensely realized in believing that Christ's death and resurrection assure our victory over death and our eternal life. But it always easily runs into hope and patience, and especially love.

But this brings us to the final and most philosophical statement of what is the Biblical condition of salvation. Paul learned from his Master that love is central to righteousness, or repentance, or faith. That was Jesus Christ's peculiar lesson. Some one asked Jesus : "What is the chief command of the law ?" He replied : "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." Again, He put it on the human side alone, in the words of the golden rule : "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them," a rule for the positive search after the loving things you can do, — not a mere negative rule that avoids doing your neighbor ill, like that of Isocrates : "Do not to others the things that make you angry when others do them to you ;" nor that of the Rabbi Hillel : "Whatsoever is hateful to you, do not to another ;" nor the simple negative rule of Confucius. It is the active, positive, searching love which seeks whom it can help, the general, all embracing love, which finds a neighbor, not in family alone, but in strangers and enemies ; that great love for God and all men, which has been called "love to Being in general." This is in the *heart* with faith ; this underlies all the righteousness of the Old Testament, for it includes mercy as well as justice.

Here we reach the bottom answer to the question : "Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle ?" the final answer given by the nation which had the greatest genius of all nations for studying duty ; the nation which originated the two highest forms of religion known, Judaism and Christianity ; the answer given by its chief sage and teacher, Jesus, whether we can call Him man, or God in man. The whole world has found no higher or deeper answer. It is through this "faith that worketh by *love*," and thus "purifieth the heart," that the heart must be renewed and the man born again. Righteousness, which is also repentance ; which is more than that, faith ; which is more than that, love, — this righteousness is the one final and conclusive Biblical condition of salvation.

William Hayes Ward.

THE HALO OF INDUSTRIAL IDLENESS.

CERTAIN persons defend capital, when anybody speaks of the injustice to the many of the present holding of capital, as if capital itself had been attacked. This is the logical fallacy of appearing to disprove one point by disproving another one. In this instance the fallacy moves as follows: "You say that the possession of capital by non-producing persons works detrimentally; but do not those to whom the capital is loaned produce more, having it, than they could by any manner of exertion produce without it, and are they not therefore better off, as well as society at large, whose general product has been increased by the capital they have thus borrowed and used? Then capital is a benefaction, and the owners of it are benefactors, though themselves, as individuals, unproductive." Thus the defense of a drone class of capital-holders supported by society.

Be it first observed that no reflecting person thinks of questioning the importance of capital in production; working people, the bulk of them, do not think of questioning it. But here is the logical breach: Given the capital, is not the burden of all workers augmented because they have to support a body of people for letting them use it? Of course capital is a benefaction, but it does not follow from this that the owners of capital are benefactors. The fallacy arises from confounding capital with its owners. There are several possible cases. Both the owner and his capital may be useful, that is to say, when he is himself a producer, and when his capital is at the same time used productively; secondly, his capital may be useful, — when, for example, it is loaned to some one who uses it productively, — and he may be the opposite of useful, that is, when he not only does not produce, but when he squanders uselessly what is paid him by others for the privilege of producing with his capital; or, lastly, his capital and he together may be useless, as when he himself is an idler, and his capital is loaned to people who use it unproductively, though they secure to him the return of its equivalent.

The idea of capital and that of its owner must be dissociated, if there is to be any clearness or progress in political economy. Capital performs its function in increasing production through being capital, and through being applied and managed by capable persons, not at all by belonging to this man or that. The mere function of ownership is a sinecure, and yet the rewards for

ownership are absolutely enormous, and, all things thrown in the scale, greater than the remuneration for producing the things that keep the race alive and society going. Evidently the vindication of capital, which needed no vindication, is no vindication of a drone class of capital-holders. The capital would be as productive and useful without them; the capital would also be there for use without them. The alternative is not, as assumed, no capital if no non-producing owners of capital, but capital without the drag of non-producing owners, and a working society that would have, as return for its labor of social production and support, all that is now turned over to those who do nothing. If the latter class, instead of being drones living at the expense of the former, were obliged to become productive, the general social income would be increased by the amount they produced.

Here I must explain that I use the term "social production" to fix the mind upon the sum total of production and the whole effort involved in it, for the purpose of indicating that all persons really contributing to this sum are taxed to support non-working owners. To bring into existence all that is needed to support society for a year, a certain number of people have to expend a given quota of time and energy. The fact that the capital-owning drones are permitted to sit down before this whole product, which they have moved no finger to aid in creating, and to consume great portions of it, makes the quota of time and energy required for the workers to create it just so much the greater, as time and energy are taken to create what the drones consume. Now this burden of extra labor is diffused over the whole corps of workers; all have to work harder and longer for what they get in consequence of it.

As political economy treats the matter, this sum appears to come out of nobody, seems to be simply there, and no one is deprived or harmed by having it go to the idle. But would it not go to some one else if it did not go to the capitalist? And does it not always come out of the total product? Then those who create this total product are deprived and harmed by its loss. Accepting what we are accustomed to see, political economy finds ingenious explanations and excuses why it is so; it is not yet sufficiently developed as a science to interest itself whether there are reasons why it should not be so.

The burden is diffused over all portions of society that produce, though it may not be equally diffused. The *entrepreneur* must work harder to get enough to live up to his standard of life,

because he must turn so much of his product over to the owner of capital; he cannot pay the wages he might if such a proportion of his product were not in that manner disposed of, and the laborers therefore have less.

But one of the most important effects of capital-holding by drones is that by them the standard of life of the *entrepreneurs*, and all those of the upper class who are in any way actively engaged in production, is raised. The socially supported idle class takes the lead in establishing the vogue. Those who can live on their income without work are regarded as occupying a high social plane, and for this reason what they take the whim to do or have is copied. They have leisure to invent and import numerous varieties of embellishments and luxuries, and a considerable portion of them have no inclination to do anything else. These refinements and super-refinements, then, take their places as necessities for the people who desire to move in the best set, or on its level of expenditure. This reacts in various ways upon the workers. We have seen that it is they who are compelled to create all these luxuries, and to prepare and serve them to the idle with consummate elaboration; by raising the standard, the effect is carried farther. In an earlier paper we spoke of uncertainty as the great bane of business. "It is not only that I must support my family now, but that I must try to so conduct my affairs that I may be able to support it twenty-five years from now," we quoted the business-man as saying. Now, this high and complex and advancing standard of life, resulting so much from the evolution of luxury as the function of unproductive capital-holders, vastly increases the difficulty and uncertainty. The larger the expenses of a family each year, the heavier, other things equal, the strain on the head of it, the greater consequently the difficulties and uncertainty of his situation. The fund that he can apply to his business, and reserve for business emergencies, is less, and he is therefore more amenable to failure in close times and crises.

Of course the inference from what has preceded is that society should not support a class of drones. But a difficulty seems to be found in the fact that these non-producing owners are thought generally to confer a favor by keeping out of active production, in which they are pretty sure to fail, having no fitness or training, deranging general business and annihilating capital in the experiment. It is charged that our need is not of more business men, but of fewer; that our men of affairs stay at their posts too long,

making it harder for the younger men to obtain a footing, and rendering business severer for all new-comers by keeping competition high.

The first of these difficulties might be serious, if the unfitted capitalists were to be called on to attempt the productive manipulation of their property. But this does not follow. There exists no reason why an untrained and untried man should be allowed to essay the control of large means for industrial purposes, and there are the best reasons why he should not be allowed to do it. This stricture holds not only of those who own the capital that they employ, but even more vitally of those who venture the capital borrowed of others. To meet the trite question, "Has not a man the right to do what he wills with his own?" it is needed only that we recall a previous premise of these very questioners, — the value to society of capital. We agreed that production is more ample through its use. If, then, capital is annihilated, not the owner alone suffers, but those others who might, by use of it, have produced more valuable articles for their own and social consumption, and the consumers at large suffer because they have less to consume. Therefore, when an owner destroys his capital, as he does by putting it in an industrial plant that yields no return, or a disproportionately small return, he injures the community as well as himself, and this the community has a right to deprecate, and if possible prevent. It was undoubtedly very far from his will to destroy the capital, but he willed to take grave chances, and these chances it was his duty to minimize by the best previous training, and it was the duty of the community to see that he minimized them by not permitting him to make the venture without the highest preparation.

This principle is daily neglected, and with a consequent heavy proportion of failures in business. Twenty years ago, a man who was out of debt, and drawing a salary that supported his family in medium comfort, conceived the idea of building a business block. It cost several times more than his estimate; the builders took advantage of his ignorance of materials and cheated him; and at length he came to a stop, with a heavy debt and the block unfinished. There is still litigation over this structure. Many of the creditors lost money, and the projector of it lost everything he had, chief of which was his peace of mind for twenty years. He could not educate his children, nor give them any personal attention, being always close pushed to keep his importunate creditors at bay while he reserved enough from his constant

labor to live. He borrowed of his personal friends to appease his creditors, and then could not pay these latter debts. The sum of discomfort that this one man, who was perfectly honest, well-meaning, and industrious to a fault, was able to bring upon himself and fifty or sixty others directly, to say nothing of the derangement that he effected in the business community where he launched his venture, is not to be estimated. The commercial highway is strewn with such failures, which are the quite inevitable consequence of a business chaos that allows any one to undertake anything he is disposed to undertake without the least preparation or proven qualification. As a physician is educated in the principles and practice of medicine, the business novice ought to pass through a similar apprenticeship in business methods, required by the community for self-protection and for his protection.

The second charge noted, that there are already too many business men, and that the older ones hold on too long, — that, therefore, if the present non-producing capitalists entered active production they would do great mischief by making the struggle still harder, — opens a radical question. According to the theory of business as now conducted, and also according to its practice, nearly everything is overdone. One store or one manufactory thrives at the expense of another, or by getting people to buy more than they ought to buy. Consider retail trade: there are so many stores dealing in the same class of goods that owners and clerks in many of them have nothing to do half or a third of the time. Success means getting trade from competitors; “running them out,” as the phrase is, if possible. In manufacturing, there are so many shops making the same articles that some or all of them usually shut down a part of the year. They bid for one another’s trade, and, if one thrives more, some other or all thrive less; or the alternative phenomenon occurs, — people are induced to buy who will have difficulty to sell; who will have to pay a class of men to wheedle and hypnotize others to buy of them, whose final victims, the consumers, will have what they do not need, and what they may be seriously embarrassed to pay for. Following out these effects, the whole genius of the method is to make people live above their incomes, and to bring them to failure and sorrow.

Light is shed by this analysis on financial crises and what some call over-production. Manufacturers do their utmost to get a large quantity of their goods into the stock of the wholesalers;

the wholesalers have an army of skilled specialists in selling going about the country from one year's end to another, using every real and imaginary inducement to persuade the retailers to fill up with their wares, quite callous to the thought of the dead stock these wares may prove to be ; and the retailers, as they needs must to keep afloat, apply their genius to tempting displays of articles to the public, who, thus allured, buy and buy until they are bankrupt, and the series of failures constituting a panic sets in. No effort is spared by the retail, wholesale, and manufacturing sections of trade and industry to work up a glut. This is their most cherished art and purpose, although, of course, they do not desire the climax, from selling more than the buyers can stand, to come. Why, then, do they urge the buyers on to that climax? Economists have had much to say about the difficulty of calculating the markets as the cause of panics. Quite as accurate a statement of the cause is that the various grades of sellers do not estimate correctly the point where the buyers they are forcing their goods upon will be unable to pay ; and if they do see this point, their passion for selling is so strong that they cannot restrain themselves from overstepping it. When the sellers all along the line, from the producer to the shopkeeper, have stimulated the purchasing power of one another and of the public until it is exhausted, purchasing becomes slack, and the large houses, which had provided themselves with goods for increasing sales, begin to collapse. The error lies in this over-stimulation, but it seems inherent in the business system of getting trade away from rivals.

From the point of view of this business method, there are apparently too many stores and factories ; and if the older and established business men retired earlier, the field would be freer and fairer for others. The situation would be better for a few, and mainly for those few connected with the firms from which the heads resigned. Whatever gain there is from the early retirement of successful business conductors accrues from the fact that they have been too largely monopolizing the profits of the firm, or have been too autocratic in refusing scope to the genius of under-men, or both. In a change of management, those to lose would be the monopolizing conductors, since their incomes would fall ; but this would be proper enough, for their accumulated wealth would enable them to live fittingly without further profits.

But on the side of business itself, the new managers might be inferior, and cause the business to decay or fail. Some plant would be sacrificed, and the labor expended in organizing the

business would be partially lost. A successfully working business corps is not organized without time and intelligence and effort. But since it is usually easier to continue a successful business than to construct one, decadence would probably not often follow the change we are contemplating. Where it did so, the effects, measured by the standard of general loss and gain, would not be so bad as might appear; for as one house went down, some rival firm would obtain its vanishing trade and come up. But certainly, where the retirement of experienced captains occasions such a disruption and transference of business, it cannot be considered an advantage, save as the conductors of the new business belong to other families than those of the retiring captains, when the double delectation of making one fortune and inheriting another will not fall to the same person. There are also some objections to retirement by sale. If some one purchases the business of an extensive and prosperous manager, paying his own money, the case is not improved, for the buyer already had enough to retire on, as well as the one who sells. Suppose he purchases with money borrowed of others: he either has skill in the business acquired through practice of it with some other firm, or he has no acquired skill. In the latter case the chances are on the side of failure, bringing disaster to himself and his supporters; in the former, by undertaking the new business he withdraws his energy and skill from another place which may not prosper without him.

Summing up, then, the earlier retirement of the successful leaders of trade and industry is hardly a clear desideratum, even upon ordinary trade principles. A very few gain, and some will certainly lose. Competition is not reduced, for the new will compete with each other as hotly as if the old had remained for them to contend against.

But the further drift of these details is that energy and experience cannot so easily be spared from business. From the point of view of business antagonism, it might be greatly to my advantage if the entire plant of my most able business adversary were consumed by fire and he died; but it would probably be a misfortune to the public to have his talent and energy removed, as it certainly would be to have his capital destroyed. Intelligence and energy are less dispensable than material capital, and they create material capital and get the fullest utility from it. If we look at the matter from the viewing point of production instead of the private interest of a very limited number of persons, it may be wholly unfortunate if the more experienced leaders give up their posts early.

This is the parent error, that we neither view nor conduct business with reference to production, with the end in mind to create the most with the available brains and labor. What manufacturers, tradespeople, and carriers primarily aim at is to get the most they can, each for himself ; and it is safe to say of the majority that the idea of production as an end never crosses their minds at all. If a company can enlarge its profits by limiting its production, it does so, though the comforts and necessities of all society but themselves are diminished in consequence. Now, of course, if business is a game of getting all you can away from your confrères, and the best man is the one getting the most away and honestly creating the least, then every player who retires does confer a boon on the rest, — excepting when it happens that he by chance is positively producing as well as getting away, and producing more than the idle men, or those merely getting away, can produce in his place. For at the basis of the whole process, however falsely conducted, production remains fundamental, since the manipulators would have nothing to manipulate if some were not creating things for them.

We need not long argue the self-evident, that the genius of business — using the term to include manufacturing and commerce — is to get the most one can from the rest.¹ Consider advertising : each firm is trying to suck the others' blood. Consider the number of persons who live by Board of Trade methods : the question is, how much real production can be conceded to this entire fraternity. Listen to the following : —

“Chicago Wheat. A lively day on the Board of Trade. May drops seven cents in a few hours ; Bloom holding out against the crowd.

“CHICAGO, April 4. — There was another sensational feature in the wheat deal on 'change to-day. The crowd has been kept on the ragged edge for weeks, waiting for the final stroke of the great bull clique, which was to put the selling price for May contracts up to \$1.90. Instead of a corner the trade is treated to a collapse. So it looks now. The developments to-day were remarkable, and may lead to anything but the expected end of the deal.

“May started 1½ cents higher this morning. There was nothing unusual in that after the drop of four cents Wednesday. Leopold Bloom, said to be loaded with nearly 2,000,000 bushels of wheat

¹ See the writer's “Unfair Burdens on Real Production,” *The Andover Review*, February, 1890.

for May, was a buyer. He was encouraged a little at first by those who only the day before were charged with trying to shake him out. The shorts thought their time had come, and they bought also. May started at $97\frac{1}{4}$ cents, and went flying to $99\frac{1}{4}$ cents.

"When Bloom bid for 200,000 bushels there was a jump to $99\frac{3}{4}$ cents. Then the original bull clique let go some wheat. Hutchinson sold in all the futures. The reaction was quick and decisive. Half a dozen brokers of the Fairbank syndicate sold at every fraction on the break. When 96 cents was reached, Baker put out wheat with the rest. The shorts, who were not filled before, held their sacks open. Down went May from $99\frac{3}{4}$ to 98, to 97, to 96, to 95.

"Will Bloom unload and run? This was the leading question. Such an action would have put fancy future at 90 cents in a breath. What did Bloom do? He had already margined his May to 90 cents. He stood on his holdings. He did more. It was stated that he walked into a commission house on the ground floor of the Board of Trade with nothing less than an armful of bonds, aggregating \$500,000. This was for additional margins. Down went May to 94 cents, then to 93, nearly seven cents from the top.

"The situation then was that the original clique was out of the way. The short interest in May wheat filled up, and one big 'tailer,' who attempted to follow the clique, was left with a great load to carry and no one to help him. Ninety per cent. of the trade regard Bloom's holding as a soft mark, and claim that there is no hope for him against the crowd and the natural situation. The other ten per cent. are dubious. They say the apparent discomfiture of Bloom is part of the original scheme, and that traders will be falling over each other to get May wheat at \$1.05, or \$1.10 perhaps, before the end of the week."¹

This is superb. Everything depends on Bloom. Will Bloom unload? Enough people to work a large woolen mill run to and fro, mad with excitement, while the great Bloom makes up his mind. This is business. This little army lifting up its eyes to Bloom might be at work. But they call this work. And if controlling wealth is work, they are great workers, for assuredly they do control no inconsiderable part of the country's wealth. And we have but to note the way they live to determine whether they control it at any profit to themselves. It was reported that during

¹ Newspaper report, April 4, 1889.

the wheat deals of August, 1891, the veteran speculator Hutchinson "earned," by industry and attention to business, \$500,000. We may go through business and show that, in the purpose of those who engage in it, actual production is secondary, where it receives any thought whatever.

Realizing this, our inquiry is simplified. The withdrawal from business of non-producing manipulators is an advantage, provided other manipulators do not step in to take their places. One of the great problems of business is to take out of it the element of manipulation. The withdrawal of a real producer will, under right conditions of production, be invariably an injury. But the conditions of production are not now right, for a great producer may, with all the appearance of deserving it, retain for himself vastly more of the general product than he creates. This is when a leader of industry does not give his subordinates their share of the product. It is not usually called manipulation, because until lately it has been considered not only legal but moral; but, defining business manipulation as getting that which one does not create, without incurring the penalty of the law, — stealing being the same thing so done as to incur the penalty of the law, — it is manipulation, although somewhat disguised. Now there are cases where a business may be so well organized in the hands of one man that his retirement, and perhaps even the breaking up of the business, may be a good thing. A less capable manager might be compelled to relax some of the burdens on the assistants, and, while making the invested capital show less in the form of clear profits, might, by his very incompetence for last exactions, occasion increased comfort and happiness in the lives of all his employees. Another application of the principle is that the positive destruction of capital may sometimes be beneficial. For example, great destruction of railroad property may give thousands of idle or semi-idle men work, supplying them in due measure with the necessities of life. Of course it is a great loss to the railroad company, but the company can lose without suffering, while the men cannot lie idle without starving. This is an expensive way of obtaining such a degree of equity in distribution that one class may merely live, for it is making the working class pay twice over in labor for what they have; but they would rather do this than starve, though the fact that portions of them are often forced to this extremity shows well that the employing class would leave them to starve on any other terms. Before the property was destroyed, the company had more wealth to disburse to laborers than afterwards,

but it would not let any of this wealth go until a further service had been exacted of the laborers.

In proposing to retire the successful capitalists sooner, it is tacitly recognized that the reward conferred upon them by society is greater than the services they have rendered to it, and that, if they continue active, the disproportionateness of the reward to service will increase. The sense of equity in observers says they have already enough, they should step aside and give others a chance; and this is the more true because the reward increases in rising ratio as one's capital and connections grow. A manufacturer said to me, "I spent fifteen years of hard labor organizing and establishing my business, and now the money flows in from all sides." During the next fifteen years this producer will probably receive a reward a dozen times greater than all the labor of his life fairly entitles him to. In the upper atmosphere of production, distribution is not proportioned with equity. But the remedy is certainly not, if the well being of society is regarded, to withdraw the producer from production because his reward is too high, to stop him from doing what somebody must do because his pay is too large, but to fix his reward more equitably, to cut down his wages.

We have traced this thought through for the light it throws on the original question, the question whether non-producing capitalists, the present drones, should be required to enter the life of action, adding many more to the already crowded field. If they go in to produce with a reward not too great, the answer is now simple enough. So long as they receive an income, they are bound to be down among those whose toil produces income, helping.

Morrison I. Swift.

RAVENNA, OHIO.

THREE CRITICS: MR. HOWELLS, MR. MOORE, AND MR. WILDE.¹

OF the new books in English that have fallen into my hands during 1891, the three that have interested me most are Mr. W. D.

¹ *Criticism and Fiction.* By W. D. Howells. Harper and Brothers. 1891.
Impressions and Opinions. By George Moore. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1891.

Intentions. By Oscar Wilde. Dodd, Mead & Company. 1891.

Howells's "Criticism and Fiction," Mr. Moore's "Impressions," and Mr. Wilde's "Intentions." They bear strong resemblance to one another. They are alike in being collections of short pieces, published from time to time in current periodicals, and expressing opinions with which the ordinary reader has become, by hearsay or by actual knowledge, somewhat familiar. They are alike in being, not poems or novels or plays, — not, in short, the kind of work usually styled creative, — but critical essays, parasitical, as distinguished from strictly original work. They are alike, too, in that popular opinion allows a certain degree of opprobrium to rest upon their authors. The newspapers jest, properly enough, on Mr. Howells's extreme proclivity for realism; occasionally they even — improperly — sneer at it. In America, at least, Mr. Wilde is as often referred to unceremoniously by his first name as his last, and the impression of the majority is to the effect that intellectually he deserves scarcely more respect than the most empty-headed of dandies. Mr. Moore's name is not so familiar to us, but those who know it at all are apt to associate it with somewhat scandalous novels, or with articles that trumpet the fame of some hitherto unknown author, or with random items in the papers to the effect that, in the columns of So-and-So, Mr. Moore, the brilliant young novelist, has made a violent attack on This-and-That. But in spite of whatever prejudicial associations of this sort one may quite casually and innocently have acquired concerning these three writers, the candid reader will find in their books much that is pleasant and instructive. More than that: from the work of men so totally different in their essential characteristics, he may obtain a singularly complete idea of the most important aspects of modern criticism. But this implies a rough analysis of the three books before us.

To judge "Impressions" fairly, one must first frankly rid himself of some surface irritation. Mr. Moore's inveterate habit of throwing all possible emphasis on the pronoun of the first person, his frequent swagger, his reckless grammar, and his indecorous heedlessness in many matters that deserve accuracy, are all displeasing. It is hard to keep one's temper when he insists on telling us what he said to Turgueneff, and not what Turgueneff said to him; when he habitually prefixes his "I told you so" to each account of a dramatic success or failure; or when he asserts complacently his ignorance of facts about which the nearest book of reference would inform him. Such faults we easily pardon in one writing in headlong haste, to meet an immediate exigency.

They are not so easily passed over in a volume of collected essays, in which, more than in books of any other sort, it is safe to assume that the writer works with entire leisure, and with the advantage of adequate previous criticism. Unessential faults, however, the earnest reader can bear with. Why should such trifles of detail spoil his real pleasure? For in books, as in life, minor faults are often the inseparable concomitants of major virtues. The honest man may be blunt even to rudeness, or the sensitive man unbearably fastidious. With defects that spring from virtue these frailties of Mr. Moore's, as we shall see, may be charitably classed.

What strikes first the reader of Mr. Moore's criticism is its refreshing provinciality. It is not the parochialism of a small city or a small clique, but the provincialism of Paris and a part of London. In this he betrays his foreign life and training, and illustrates the trend of his genius. His criticism observes strict historical and geographical limits: it is not concerned with Greek art or the Roman decadence, nor does it make capital of those continued references to the renaissance, or the fundamental unity of the arts, which it is now the fashion, following Mr. Pater, to introduce with a specious languor into the criticism of any subject. It is not concerned with that scholar's will-o'-the-wisp, comparative literature; not, in short, with aught but what passes in Paris or in the Anglo-French circles in London for current coin. To the wider if vaguer movements of contemporary literature, Mr. Moore turns a deaf ear. He can write ardently about the Théâtre Libre in Paris without a single hint of her younger and healthier sister at Berlin,—healthier, in that around her seem to cling more noble and more human ambitions. Russia, indeed, he knows through the novels of Tolstoi and Turgueneff, and whatever else has been reproduced in French. Ibsen, in spite of his enthusiasm, he quite fails to understand, treating his characters as if they were French, and forgetting that in not one of Ibsen's plays could the action be imagined as going on outside of Scandinavian or Anglo-Saxon surroundings. To the current movements in America, in Italy, in Spain, and in Germany he never so much as alludes. Germany, indeed, is to him a land still barbarous, and in literature capable only of "Faust," lexicons, and fairy stories.

We have in Mr. Moore's criticism, then, provinciality pure and simple, and a literary interest geographically as limited as if it reached only from Boston to Portland. But it is just this cir-

cumscription of interest that, particularly in the Latin races, has been productive of such splendid results in literature, and Mr. Moore is so thoroughly French in his style and his sympathies that one would be puzzled to find the Anglo-Saxon in him. He has nothing of the Englishman's reserve, nothing of his strict holding to models and ideals, of his grim, deductive following out of alleged established truth. In its place we find that supple and vivacious curiosity, that never resting desire to see or hear some new thing, which dignifies and vitalizes French interest in all artistic matters, and, behind this real desire to be amused in whatever ways art will amuse one, a deeper feeling that literature is often (not always) a serious instrument for the propagation of vital truths. Mr. Moore's work, indeed, is not unlike that which we associate with the "Figaro." His style has all the "Figaro's" pert jauntiness, its abruptness, and seeming incoherence, and, with them, its admirable sense of just how far one can go in the development of any idea; he has its frankness of expression, its familiarity, its odd Latin way of wearing its heart on its sleeve. This single quality of individuality is Mr. Moore's redeeming virtue. I cannot discover that he has any theory about literature, except that what interests and moves him is, *ipso facto*, interesting and moving. Such liberality of taste, even within the limits we have pointed out, is not a common quality: even when found, it is too often evanescent. But while it lasts — this healthy equipoise of taste and appetite — it is worthy of sincere admiration. We in America especially, who are in literature by far too much inclined to feed on the prehistoric or the exotic rather than on what is, so to speak, the daily bread of literature, may gain a zest from Mr. Moore's example. His taste is discriminating but heartily sympathetic, and, as a rule, carries the reader with it. Naturally he thinks Balzac the novelist one should read first and cling to longest, but he nevertheless appreciates Turgueneff and Zola, while in Verlaine he finds a singular note of distinction. Nowhere is he persistently immoderate; everywhere he gives natural expression to his distinct individuality, — an individuality unpedantic and as yet unsundered to the guidance of any system of æsthetics save that which is instinctive in him.

Sharply distinct from that individual criticism which, good or bad, forms the basis of Mr. Moore's "Impressions," is the theoretical criticism which we find demonstrated and illustrated in Mr. Oscar Wilde's "Intentions." Before we can discuss this theory, however, we are again forced to pass through a tedious

process of acclimatization, for in Mr. Wilde's book we find ourselves at first in a strange country, a "Wonderland" like Alice's, where the truth appears through its logical opposite. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that Mr. Wilde's only medium of communication is the paradox, — and a kind of paradox which strongly recalls his Irish origin. Where another advances by logical steps, slowly leading the reader to the comprehension of something he has not known before, at no point perplexing or confusing him, Mr. Wilde chooses another course. His first object is to bewilder. What he states is the exact opposite of the accepted truth. One's eyes grow large with wonder, or one smiles with an easy contempt and declines to give further time to the discussion of a thesis so ridiculous. On the very first page, for instance, of the dialogue, half Platonic, half after Renan, on "The Decay of Lying," we find this: "Enjoy nature! I am glad to say that I have entirely lost that faculty. . . . My own experience is that the more we study Art, the less we care for Nature. What Art reveals to us is Nature's lack of design, her curious crudities, her extraordinary monotony, her absolutely unfinished condition." A statement at first thought so astonishing and almost revolting as this is shortly followed by others scarcely less surprising. Many a man, says Mr. Wilde, who might have made a good artist, is spoiled by falling into careless habits of accuracy. It is far easier to do a thing than to talk about it. Action, he declares, is something blind, "dependent on external influences, and moved by an impulse of whose nature it is unconscious. It is incomplete in its essence, because limited by accident, and ignorant of its direction, being always at variance with its aim. Its basis is the lack of imagination. It is the last resource of those who do not know how to dream." Statements like these, seemingly so flippant, prejudice the casual reader against Mr. Wilde, especially when his style is so florid that he might almost be accused of following up Irish bulls with Irish blarney. But such faults of taste and of style, disagreeable as they are, I do not hesitate to call unessential. Mr. Wilde is best when, quitting the extravagant paradox and its luscious development, he writes plain prose. But, after all, that is neither here nor there. We do not care so much how an author writes at his worst, provided that, like Mr. Wilde, he has after all something important or interesting to tell us. In this case it is the author's theory of art, or more particularly his theory of literature, that arrests our attention and holds it throughout. Here, as we have said, Mr. Moore differs widely from his two contemporaries. He

follows his own strong bent, without seeing the necessity for a system of ethics or of æsthetics. But Mr. Wilde and Mr. Howells have both built theories for themselves. Each system is the exact opposite of the other: if brought before the general reader's tribunal of common sense, each will, I think, be found right, and each wrong. Both are thoroughly interesting.

Mr. Wilde's main thesis is that the decay of the art of lying accounts for the commonplace character of our contemporary literature. Where older authors have given us fiction for facts, those of to-day give us fact for fiction. They pore studiously over books, and shamelessly work up their subjects. As a result, we have historical novels like German treatises, realistic novels like the reports of a statistical society, and poems bolstered up with footnotes. Thus many who have in them the making of splendid liars fall finally back on personal reminiscences, and feel the need of corroborating their facts. Nor are foreign literatures better off. M. de Maupassant tears away the veil from life, and makes it ridiculous and ineffective. M. Zola aims at nothing else but the reconstruction of life from "human documents," — of low life, with vices and virtues equally commonplace and uninteresting. M. Bourget displays a fine subtlety in analyses of human nature, forgetting that at bottom we are all alike, and need not to be reminded of it. There are, of course, a few exceptions: Meredith, for instance, who has by deliberate choice made himself a romanticist, following the model of Balzac, who created life and disdained to copy it. But, as a rule, the modern authors are all in the wrong. They choose the wrong subject-matter; they give it the wrong treatment. Art is something very different from what they suppose. It lies outside of our lives, and scarcely touches them, — a land of pure beauty, where nature has little or no part. For nature and art are antipathetic: it was nature that gave Wordsworth "Martha Ray" and "Peter Bell;" it was art that gave him the ode and the fine sonnets.

To be sure, life and art have certain relations. "Art begins with abstract decoration, with purely imaginative and pleasurable work, dealing with what is unreal and non-existent. This is the first stage. Then life becomes fascinated with this new wonder, and asks to be admitted into the charmed circle. Art takes life as part of her rough material, re-creates it, and re-fashions it in fresh forms; is absolutely indifferent to fact; invents, imagines, dreams; and keeps between herself and reality the impenetrable barrier of beautiful style, of decorative or ideal treatment. The

third stage is when life gets the upper hand, and drives art into the wilderness. This is the true decadence, and it is from this that we are now suffering." What better historical instance can we have than the English drama? The miracle plays were abstract and theological: life scarcely entered into them. "But with the Elizabethan era the drama took on a language full of resonant music and sweet rhythm, made stately by solemn cadence, or made delicate by fanciful rhyme, jeweled with wonderful words, and enriched with lofty diction. She clothed her children in strange raiment and gave them masks, and at her bidding the antique world rose from its marble tomb. A new Cæsar stalked through the streets of risen Rome, and with purple sail and fluted oars another Cleopatra passed up the river to Antioch. Old myth and legend and dream took shape and substance. History was entirely rewritten, and there was hardly one of the dramatists who did not recognize that the object of art is not simple truth, but complex beauty. In this they were perfectly right. Art itself is really a form of exaggeration; and selection, which is the very spirit of art, is nothing more than an intensified mode of over-emphasis."

Art, then, according to Mr. Wilde, is the artist's lie, his deliberate feigning of what is unreal. Life gives the artist the clue which he follows, the stuff on which he in modeling bestows the beauty that charms for an hour, a lifetime, or forever. Life, the truth, the reality; art, the lie, the unreality, — this is Mr. Wilde's thesis, so brilliantly defended by him. And why not? Is not this "feigning" of the artist indubitably at the very foundations of all branches of literature, — historically, I mean? And are not we, impassioned for that shadow of reality which incites all the better workmen of to-day, at home or abroad, — are not we drifting away from one great side of art, that which is least concerned with life? "The literary spirit, in its full grace and vivacity," says Sainte-Beuve, "consists in being able to interest one's self in that which is delicately pleasing in reading, in that which is otherwise useless for one, in that which is of no practical service in the eyes of the vulgar, in that which pleads no positive cause, in that which is only the ornament, the flower, the immortal superfluity, of society and of life." "Literature," he says elsewhere, "implies leisure, curiosity, disinterestedness, a breadth of taste, even caprice." In this conception of literature Mr. Wilde and Sainte-Beuve agree. And why should we not agree with them? Why should we not take literature as it is?

It is and always has been a kind of ballet, as it were, a continual whirling and posing, with dainty music and softly colored lights, and all that is graceful and charming. But if literature is this, is it always this, this and nothing else? To such a question Mr. Howells answers in his "Criticism and Fiction."

The section of Mr. Howells's book which deals with criticism is not the most interesting part of it. On that subject he has already made declaration of his faith that critics are often prejudiced and uninformed persons, who write in unsigned articles more bitterly than they would dare to do over their names. But he has said this with more acerbity of manner than is customary with him; and, by way of rejoinder, some conspicuous critics of the press, forgetting the dignity of their calling, have bombarded him with somewhat offensive epithets. The controversy does not concern us here. Those in America who are most thoroughly interested in literature recognize Mr. Howells as a man of letters with unusually broad scholarship and wide experience, whose opinions, especially on matters of contemporary literature, though often stated with some extravagance, are uniformly worth consideration. It is the "fiction" part of the little volume which is valuable. In it the author thrusts aside, once for all, the theory which in Mr. Wilde we have just found admirable, — that of art for art's sake. "To spin a yarn for the yarn's sake, that is an ideal worthy of a nineteenth century Englishman, doting in forgetfulness of the English masters, and groveling in ignorance of the Continental masters; but wholly impossible to an American of Mr. Henry James's modernity. To him it must seem like the lies swapped between men after the ladies have left the table, and they are sinking deeper and deeper into their cups and growing dimmer and dimmer behind their cigars." We have, then, a fundamental opposition. Mr. Wilde laments that the art of the imagination, the art of lying, is decaying. Mr. Howells rejoices that from lies men turn to truth; that from the works of the pure imagination, or of those touched with the mania of emotional romanticism, — from Scott, with his mediæval ideals, from Thackeray, the caricaturist, — the main current of our contemporary literature turns in the direction first pointed out by Miss Austen. She was "the first and the last of the English novelists to treat material with entire truthfulness." After her, by fault of the mania for romanticism, the art of fiction visibly declined in England, as on the Continent, until recently there have sprung up in several countries men who have made friends again with nature

and the truth, who write of what they see about them, taking the utmost care that their own fancy shall not color or heighten or in any sense idealize — any further than lies necessarily embodied in human nature — the common stuff of life. The art which is the willing lie these men disdain: their duty is to render account of the life about them “with simplicity, naturalness, and honesty.” Of such an art not only the critics, but all men in whom humanity dwells, are competent judges. They “need not cast about for the instruction of some who profess to know better, and who browbeat wholesome common sense into the self-distrust that ends in sophistication,” even though “they have been taught to compare what they see and what they read, not with the things they have observed and known, but with the things that some other artist or writer has done.” The whole basis of criticism is changing. “The time is coming, I hope, when each new author, each new artist, will be considered, not in his proportion to any other author or artist, but in his relation to the human nature, known to us all, which it is his privilege, his high duty, to interpret.”

I have let Mr. Howells speak for himself, because the earnestness and good sense of his words cannot fail to carry with them conviction, though they bear in themselves the seed for an opposition equally earnest and equally just. We have, then, three typical critics, the first a free lance in letters, with booty and pleasure throughout the district of his foray; the second and third, dogmatic knights on either side of the silver-golden shield. To change the figure into one which has a real similarity, the æsthetics of literature are not unlike those of eating and drinking. He who is wise will, with Mr. Moore, show a hearty zest for what comes to his table; like Mr. Howells, he will find most pleasure in fare which is simple and natural; and, like Mr. Wilde, he will not disdain, at the proper time, a dainty dish.

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THE fact of the current discussion as to education is quite as important as are the conclusions of the discussion. So long as the purposes, methods, and principles of education are debated, so long will education be a winning cause. When the purposes of education have become fixed, its methods settled, and its principles immovably laid down, then education has approached its period of senility and decline. Educational satisfaction leads to educational stupefaction, and stupefaction is akin to death.

The discussion attending the elimination, or rather the enlargement of the old education, has been an intrinsic good. The results of the discussion have already proved themselves to be also a good. The old education has gone. It has gone never to come back. One parts with it as with an old friend. It did noble service for American boys and men. It had the essential elements of the finest and most precious training. It was not rich in the affluence of knowledge, but it taught men to think. To think is always better than to know. It was deficient in culture, but it impressed scholars with the value of hard work, and inspired them to do hard work. It did not make character beautiful or charming, but it gave to character rugged strength. It did not promote an easy intellectual facility, but it did foster a large individuality. It did not specially sharpen the intuitive faculty, but it disciplined the faculties of research and of judgment. Yet it did not conceive of the mind merely as a storehouse for treasuring truths, it also conceived of it as a tool, machine for doing a certain work, for producing certain effects. It rather disciplined than enriched. It made rather great men than great gentlemen.

An education of such qualities and results is not to be treated with criticism either general or harsh. Its adaptiveness to its conditions, its inclusiveness of the scholarship of its period, its worthiness of results, are to be commended. Yet that it has rendered excellent service is not a sufficient reason for continuing it, and its merit in the past gives no evidence for believing but that a system of greater merit may be found in the present or future. But whatever was the value of the old education, and it was great, that education cannot return. The necessary conditions are against it. The old education included the studies represent-

ing the chief knowledges of its time. But these fields of knowledge were narrow. The limits were quickly reached. The last twenty-five years have seen a vast enlargement of the domain of scholarship. The college catalogues witness to the enlargement. Even the increasing bulkiness of these catalogues is significant. Compare the catalogue of the current year with the catalogue of the year 1866-67, and it is made evident that courses in almost every one of the great departments are offered, which no less than a quarter of a century ago were not thought of, or which, had they been thought of, no teacher could have been found able to teach, or, which, if a teacher able to teach could have been found, no pupil desiring such instruction could have been discovered. Vast has been the increase of knowledge in mathematics in its relation to physics, and physics in the realm of electricity has become a subject of momentous discoveries. Biology has opened the doors of life to the ordinary student. Chemistry, through many departments, has increased and enriched its relationships. Philosophy has absolutely changed its point of view of studying metaphysical problems, and has many fold enlarged its field of observation. Philosophy has become psychological, and has ceased to be purely ontological. Political economy has broadened into social science, with the rise of the terribly serious sociological problems of our generation. History has also revolutionized its methods, and its study has been made at once more comprehensive and more minute in subject as well as more scientific in method. The modern languages have assumed a very large place in the curriculum. Even the ancient languages of Latin and Greek are spreading their literatures before the ordinary reader in a richness and variety formerly known only to the pedantic recluse. Thus through every department of study has this enlargement gone. The college offers this increasing number of studies to the student because the knowledges of the world have also increased. It is also true that the increasing number of studies has farther resulted in the enlargement of the field of knowledge. So long as the college has to do with knowledge, so long must it seek to offer to its students an opportunity for knowledge; and the wider and deeper becomes knowledge itself, the more various its fields, the more adequate must become the facilities provided by the colleges for its pursuit. The best way to prevent this constant growth in the curriculum is to stop the growth of knowledge. The best way to stop the growth of knowledge is to make all men fools. So long as men

observe and think, so long will there be an enlargement of the course of study. The college as the fostering mother of the sciences and literature cannot but nourish every scholarly interest which the Zeit-Geist lays in her lap. It is the age, not the college, which is to be held responsible for the elective system; it is the age, not the college, which is to be held responsible for the vast increase in the number of the courses of study. When humanity is enlarging its stores of knowledge and of culture, the colleges can either recognize or refuse to recognize this enlarging. If they refuse to recognize it, they are committing suicide, and indeed they ought to die; if they recognize this enlarging, they feel the consequent duty of enlarging their facilities in a proportionate degree.

But this increase in the number of studies does not carry with it an obligation on the part of every student to increase the number of studies which he himself pursues. His individual powers are as limited as were his fathers'. He cannot triple or double his hours of work. The question is, therefore, pressed upon every college as to the methods it will permit the student to employ in availing himself of the increasing intellectual wealth of humanity. Different colleges offer different answers. The general answer is represented in the elective system. This general answer covers specific and varying answers, embodying the extent to which the elective system is carried. The system may be either partially or it may be completely elective. It may not begin till the Senior, it may begin with the Freshman year; it may cover only one study of the Senior year, it may embrace every study of the curriculum of the four years.

The importance of the elective system is in proportion to its extent. If a student can elect only one study of one year, it is of no serious consequence if he make a wrong choice. If he elect each study of each year, wrong choices debase his whole collegiate career. It is to be said that the elections made by students at Harvard — the college that is the notable representative of the elective system — are remarkably wise. Though, I may be permitted to say, they do not seem to me to be as wise as to many Harvard professors, yet I am free to confess that they are wiser than *a priori* reasoning would lead me to think. The two perils belonging to these elections are haphazardness and narrowness. The student is in danger of making his elective system no system at all, choosing courses he likes, or courses that are "soft," or courses in which high marks are usually given. His haphazard-

ness might result in the second peril suggested, narrowness, for he might elect his studies from one subject or two on the ground that he can pursue them with little labor. But usually haphazardness indicates a large variety of choices: a course in mathematics, a course in Greek, two courses in French, three in science, etc. Such a variety is indeed hardly greater than the old education, with such patches of improvements as certain colleges have tried to lay on it, offers; but such variety represents intellectual dissipation. It lacks that thoroughness of intellectual discipline which the old and genuine education did give; it also lacks that richness of culture which the new education provides. Students who graduate, having pursued such desultory and disconnected subjects, and in such superficiality as this desultoriness necessitates, have not received from their college what they ought. College has been to them neither an inspiration, nor an enrichment, nor an education.

A second peril of the elective system is narrowness. This peril shows itself in the student choosing all his studies from the Freshman year on with too direct reference to his profession. He thinks he will become a doctor; and at once on entrance he elects chemistry, zoölogy, and allied subjects; he thinks that civil engineering will be his calling, and the demands of the prospective calling point out to him mathematics and physics as his studies. A boy of eighteen beginning to study directly for his profession and pursuing the study for the following seven years tends to become a narrow, one-sided specialist. It results in a specialism which is so special as to defeat its own purpose. For no man is a worthy specialist who is only a specialist. Of course the studies directly preparatory for the professions differ in their breadth. The college studies which best fit one for the practice of law are history, philosophy, social science; and history, philosophy, and social science are much broader than chemistry and zoölogy, or than mathematics and physics. Likewise the studies which the man intending to become an editor or a clergyman chooses are broad. It is, therefore, to be acknowledged that the danger of narrowness in the elective system is not so great as at first thought it might seem to be, and is less also than the danger of ill-regulated choices.

With the desire of having the advantages of the elective system, and also in the hope of avoiding its perils, Adelbert College of Western Reserve University has adopted a unique course. It is unique. All its elements are found in other colleges, but all in

no one. Like the method at Johns Hopkins, it is a group system, but unlike the method at Johns Hopkins, the groups are not solid, each student is allowed to take one or more studies outside his group, "free electives." Like the method at Bryn Mawr, each student has certain free electives, but unlike the method at Bryn Mawr, the group system does not take effect till the beginning of the Junior year, and certain studies are still prescribed. The reasons for these discriminations are not far to seek. To place the group system at the beginning of the course and to continue it, results in and presupposes that the college makes specialists. Most students are not able to choose their life's work at the beginning of the Freshman year; it were not well to make so early a choice, even were they able. Most students too, candidates for the Bachelor's degree, should receive instruction in Latin and Greek by college methods and by college teachers, which not a few would not receive did the group system begin with the Freshman year. Further: free electives are allowed to a slight extent to permit the student to attain knowledge of subjects outside his group. This freedom is designed to remove the fear of narrowness. The group system as a system is designed to direct the attention of the student toward his work in life, and toward the general method of preparation for doing this work. The special studies which constitute this method and which compose a group are subsidiary to the method and to the group. The aim of his college course is presented as more immediate, the method for securing this aim is presented as more comprehensive and more compact, than is possible under any other system. The peril of ill-regulated choice is lessened. The peril of narrowness in choice is not increased. Through the combination of the prescribed courses of the first two years, and of the group system with the free electives of the last two years, a college graduate should be able to know enough about many things to deserve to be called liberally educated, and yet should not know so little about all things as to merit the charge of being superficial. His education is at once broad and thorough. He is prepared to become a specialist. He is not unprepared for being a man.

It is not unfitting to draw out in detail the elements of this unique course. All studies other than those prescribed in the Junior year and Senior are divided into "groups," nine in number. This division is wide: Classical group, Mathematical-physical, Chemical-biological, Physical-chemical, Teutonic, Ro-

mance, English, Historical-political, and Philosophical. The elements of each group together with those devoted to each are represented in this table:—

I. Classical Group :

{	Latin, 3 hours a week, four half-years.
{	Greek, “ “ “ “

II. Mathematical-Physical Group :

{	Mathematics, 3 hours a week, three half-years.
{	Physics, “ “ “ “
{	Chemistry, “ “ one half-year.
{	English Literature, 3 hours a week, one half-year.

III. Chemical-Biological Group :

{	Chemistry, 3 hours a week, three half-years.
{	Biology, “ “ “ “
{	Geology, “ “ one half-year.
{	English Literature, 3 hours a week, one half-year.

IV. Physical-Chemical Group :

{	Physics, 3 hours a week, three half-years.
{	Chemistry, 3 hours a week, three half years.
{	Mathematics, 3 hours a week, one half-year.
{	English Literature, 3 hours a week, one half-year.

V. Teutonic Group :

{	German, 3 hours a week, four half-years.
{	Anglo-Saxon, 3 hours a week, one half-year.
{	English Literature, 3 hours a week, two half-years.
{	Italian, 3 hours a week, one half-year.

VI. Romance Group :

{	French, 3 hours a week, three half-years.
{	Italian, “ “ two “
{	Spanish, “ “ “ “
{	Anglo-Saxon, 3 hours a week, one half-year.

VII. English Group :

{	English Literature, 3 hours a week, three half-years.
{	Anglo-Saxon, “ “ one half-year.
{	Rhetoric, “ “ two half-years.
{	Latin, “ “ “ “

VIII. Historical-Political Group :

{	American Political History since 1783	{	Each 3 hours a week, two
{	English Constitutional History	}	half years (alternate years).
{	Modern European History and Politics	{	Each 3 hours a week, one
{	since 1789. Anthropology and In-	}	half year (alternate years).
{	ternational Law		
{	American Colonial History. English	{	Each 3 hours a week, one
{	Political History since 1760	}	half year (alternate years).

IX. Philosophical Group :

Philosophy,	3 hours a week,	four half-years.
Ethics,	" "	two half-years.
Politics,	" "	one half-year.
Anthropology	{	Each 3 hours a week one half-year (alternate years).
International Law		

At the close of his Sophomore year each student indicates his choice of one of these groups. The group which he chooses forms the basis of his work for the two remaining years. As his course continues, he devotes an increasing proportion of his time to the studies of his group. In the first semester of the Junior year, ten hours of the sixteen which are demanded of each student each week are "prescribed," and six belong to the studies of his group. In the second semester the "prescribed" work is lessened by three hours to seven, the group still represents six hours, and the student has the opportunity of taking one three-hour course from all those offered. In both semesters of the Senior year the "prescribed" work is still further reduced, consisting of only four hours, six hours are devoted to each group, and the student chooses also studies representing six hours from all the courses provided.

This system embodies the prolonged reflection of a faculty, whose members have been trained at a dozen colleges and universities in this country and abroad. It is significant that this system was adopted by this faculty of thirteen gentlemen of diverse antecedents by a hearty and unanimous vote. Such an adoption may be interpreted as furnishing a ground of hope for its usefulness in Adelbert College of Western Reserve University at Cleveland.

Charles F. Thwing.

ADELBERT COLLEGE, CLEVELAND, OHIO.

A WORD IN BEHALF OF EUDÆMONISM.

IN the September number of this "Review" appeared an article by the Rev. Chauncey B. Brewster, entitled "The Challenge of Life." In many respects the paper is so good that at first glance criticism seems ungracious; nevertheless, with its chief contention I experience much discontent. The first part consists of a lucid and interesting exposition of the pessimistic philosophy of Von

Hartmann ; the latter and critical part is concerned with pessimism only indirectly. It is primarily an argument against all forms of hedonism, eudæmonism, if not regarded as a phase of hedonism, being plainly included within the sweep of condemnation. Pessimism, we are told, is challenging life ; how shall the challenge be met ? The scornful voice in the poet's breast has leaped to the rostrum, and, no longer "still" and "small," now shouts to the world, —

"Thou art so full of misery,
Were it not better not to be ?"

The gage of battle has been thrown down ; who shall take it up ? Mr. Brewster is ready with reply. Certainly not any hedonism, nor eudæmonism, he makes haste to respond.

To much that he urges in support of this proposition it would seem that Christian thinkers must needs assent. Egoistic hedonism must assuredly be ruled out. No selfish pleasure will suffice for divine offspring ; no immediate satisfaction to the moral agent will meet human need in this

"World of incompleteness, sorrow swift
And consolation laggard."

No happiness, in fact, low enough to own the force of gravitation, and belonging to earth rather than to the universe. So, likewise, when he passes to "pleasure of a nobler sort," and considers "universalistic hedonism," and the happiness of all as the end of life, one cannot but follow. We are forced to agree with him ; in so far, that is, as earthly horizons limit the view. Mill's experience, to which he alludes, was not singular. The materials of a stable edifice of general happiness do not appear to exist on this planet. Such are the flaws in even our best materials, and such the imperfection of our best construction, that the edifice of society can be supported, and kept in even tolerable condition, only by the painful toil and the vicarious suffering of a large portion of the community. If existence is to be vindicated on the arena of this world, it is to be feared the champion of pessimism will ultimately bear down all opposition, and ride victorious over the field.

But the author of the paper under review leaps from these positions to very high, and, as I must think, very remote ground indeed. He says (*italics mine*) : "It is not upon the low ground of *any* happiness, *howsoever* or *whensoever*, now or hereafter, that life is to be vindicated against pessimistic questioning and despair.

Our stand must be taken upon the lofty position of a moral life, to which all else is subordinated, embracing *moral ends to which both pain and pleasure are means*. When duty is placed upon her throne, the realm of life is secure. *When virtue for its own sake is recognized in its due precedence, as end of life*, then, despite all failure otherwise, the end remains unmoved, and life is vindicated.”¹ There is so much noble sentiment in this passage that the philosophy beneath the drapery is more or less disguised. With only practical ethics in mind, many of us will feel, as strongly perhaps as Mr. Brewster, that true living consists not so much in nice calculations as to the conditions of highest happiness, as in trustful, loyal obedience to divine instincts, those heavenly finger-posts of the soul; and especially in the new birth, the reversing of the common selfish order within, and the substitution of centrifugal for centripetal forces; in

. . . “good deeds

Wrought for good’s sake, mindless of heaven or hell;”

in launching one’s bark fearlessly on the great stream of the divine purpose. But how is one to justify such a course to the reason? This is the real question that faces us, a philosophical rather than a practical one; and it is, in the last analysis, the real challenge which pessimism brings to life. Let it not be supposed that it can be ignored safely in our day. When reason has developed sufficiently to sit in judgment over the soul’s instincts, it must also find a way to justify them, or it will not be long in disowning their authority. How is self-forgetfulness to be justified to reason?

The natural answer would seem to be, by convincing it, either by argument or by pointing to the love and wisdom of God, that self-forgetfulness is the only way to largest life and truest well-being, at once for the individual and for his fellows; that, to borrow from Confucius, “so kindly hath He [God] suited our duty to our interests that obedience to his will is happiness to ourselves.” Mr. Brewster, however, is either indisposed to defer much to the demands of reason, or thinks it can be satisfied in another and better way. Self-forgetfulness is sound policy; obedience to conscience and surrender to the divine life is the true and only course, he would have us believe, because thus we shall attain to virtue; and virtue is the final goal of life, beyond and above any kind of happiness whatever. Indeed, happiness is

¹ *Andover Review*, September, 1891, p. 246.

entirely incidental, except so far as it shares with pain the honor of promoting virtue. In my eyes, I must confess, virtue so defined, stripped of every suggestion of subservience to blessedness, wears an unlovely aspect. It seems arbitrary and forbidding. Man is exhorted to climb a towering mountain, heeding not weariness, nor cold, nor painful bruises. And he is to press on up to the wind-swept summit, not for the sake of the prospect, not for the uplift of soul and the moving of divine impulses within him as the majestic white giant of the range looks him gravely in the face, or the charming sun-wooded, half cloud-screened valley draws aside the veil from her loveliness — not from the drawing of any such magnets is he to clamber on, for these are varieties of happiness. On the contrary, he is to pursue the toilsome ascent solely that he may be up. And if at the top, fog or snow-choked atmosphere shut him in remorselessly, denying him every delight and chilling him to the marrow, he is to be quite superior to such an outcome, and by all means to consider his undertaking a success. For he will still know that he is very high up, — his barometer will tell him that, — and to be high up is what he was made for. And this remote and abstract conception is urged upon us as the true counterweight at the bar of reason for the very concrete ills and stern facts of pessimism!

The issue joined in this discussion is the old one between the formal and the vital view of divine things. Is there in the skies a standard of form and order which is the ultimate fact in all life, men being created in order to conform to it, very much as, according to certain Rabbis, the Hebrew people were chosen for the sole purpose of keeping the Sabbath? And is the Most High, or possibly some order of things behind the Deity, a Martinet, — in view of the dark and wide fact of suffering it may be that the name Procrustus would be more apt, — insisting upon conformity to rule at whatever cost? Or, on the other hand, is well-being, the life and blessedness of God, the final fact, the end to which ultimately all facts and all standards and laws contribute? And are these latter but the necessary conditions of a child of the Infinite's development into such well-being, the means by which, in connection with the human instincts which answer to them, the All-Father leads his children along ways of life, from weakness to strength, from selfishness to love, toward the goal of mature sonship and a large divine fellowship, that is, a large sharing in the divine life and in its fruitage, the divine blessedness? Is there a system for which beings are made, or do all systems

exist for the benefit of beings? Was man made for the Sabbath, or the Sabbath for man?

Those of us who choose the second of these alternatives, and believe that life is a larger word than order, are not justly to be called epicureans, nor even utilitarians. We are no advocates of a refined selfishness, of a religion which is but greed springing from earthly marts to celestial streets. We hold, indeed, that the highest and widest blessedness of which beings are capable is the end of existence, and believe that every man may, and should, and as a matter of fact does, consciously or unconsciously, intelligently or the contrary, seek his own happiness; but we maintain most earnestly that the higher forms of happiness are not to be reached by any selfish method, however honored by time or sanctioned by ecclesiasticism. They are to be reached only through that with which they are practically synonymous, the utmost well-being of the whole nature, and this in turn only through surrender to the divine life, through learning of Him who "emptied himself" and "poured out his soul unto death" in doing the will of God; that is, through full faith in that loving Power which has made mankind an organism, the parts finding their highest well-being in self-forgetful service of the whole, and the whole prospering only as the parts have largest and most joyous life.

With such a faith the eudæmonistic position would seem to be secure against pessimistic attacks. It does not appear how it can be carried till this, its great redoubt, is destroyed, this intelligent, far-seeing faith that, without blinking a single stern fact of existence, lays hold upon the God of love. Can such a faith be maintained? What Christian doubts it? Let us see.

Pessimism's indictment of life is concisely stated in a quotation which Mr. Brewster makes from an anonymous writer of that school. It runs: "In the eudæmonistic point of view, it [the world] is worse than no world, because the path whereon the *logos* strides from victory to victory is a path of suffering to the creature." This has the air of a strong argument, because, strictly construed, the premise laid down is true. God does work out his ends through the suffering of the creature. Nevertheless, the argument is very inconclusive. It *suggests* what is not proved, and cannot be proved, namely, (1) that the victory is the part — the true lion's share — of the *logos*, and (2) the suffering the part, or share, of the creature. But what if the picture which for eighteen centuries Christianity has held before the eyes of men be true, and the infinite life did manifestly fellowship with the creature in

suffering in old Judæa? what if that fellowship is a constant fact, and the Lamb has, of a truth, been "slain from the foundation of the world"? and what if immortality is fact, not illusion, and in the fullness of the mature life hereafter, the child is to share with the parent in triumph and position? What if Paul has co-ordinated facts correctly when he tells us that we suffer with the *logos*, "that we may also be glorified with him"? Then, I take it, the major premise falls to the ground, and it is not true that a world of suffering to the creature is worse than no world.

It is not easy to see why Mr. Brewster should make so little of the large fact of immortality. In any other problem the introduction of a new factor, especially one approaching infinity, would invalidate all previous calculations; why should it be otherwise in the problem of human life? No doubt it would be difficult to find a school in the land in which the boys would not vote by a considerable majority that studious life was unprofitable, *viewed from the standpoint of the value of learning during the school period*, and that, in fact, it is "better not to be" a scholar. No doubt, also, the foundation of Versailles or of Windsor Castle would be considered ill-made enough, if regarded not as a foundation but as a dwelling. We perpetually underestimate the enormous change of vital perspective wrought by the fact of immortality. What does the Apostle Paul think now of his perils and sufferings in the first century of our era? Conceding that this far from novel consideration does not solve the problem of man's trouble, I insist that it does shrink it wonderfully. The problem remains, doubtless; but it is shorn of its terrors. It is no longer despotic. I do not know why there should be non-punitive suffering in even this brief, infancy period, this larva stage, of man's long life; just as I do not see why the birth and infancy of the body are attended with pain. I do not understand why Omnipotence could not have so conditioned these individualized and semi-detached portions of itself which we know as men and women, that they should have developed spiritually toward the spiritual ideal as freely and joyously as a healthy child develops toward the physical ideal. But if we cannot see into the heart of reason and love of this diminished problem, we Christians, at any rate, have good ground for believing in the reality of such a gracious inner fact. We see not the solution; but we see Jesus, and see Him winning perfection through sufferings.¹ That is, we have a supreme object lesson in the real necessity and truly gracious character of a fact which

¹ Heb. ii. 10.

to our present understanding is incomprehensible; and it is sufficient. So long as men see in the Man of Nazareth at once a comrade sharing their "sharpest pang" and "bitterest tear," and the incarnation *par excellence*, a special manifestation of the Deity, so long will they not lose heart; so long they will find it possible to believe where they cannot see. to believe, —

"although no tongue can prove,
That every cloud that spreads above
And veileth love, itself is love."

Mr. Brewster, however, though in a few strong sentences he sets forth the mystery of pain, is seemingly unwilling that it should remain mystery until the radiance of another world pierces it through and through. He finds the end and justification of pain in sacrifice. Surely this is applying to a difficult fact an inexplicable explication. Men are to suffer and lose in order that they may undergo more loss and suffering! How differently, and, as I must think, how much more reasonably, does Ruskin write! He says: "Sacrifice of all our strength, or life, or happiness to others, though it may be needed, and though all brave creatures hold their lives in their hand, to be given, when such need comes, as frankly as a soldier gives his life in battle, is always a mournful and momentary necessity, not the fulfillment of the continuous law of being."¹ In justice to Mr. Brewster it should be said that he seems to be conscious of an end beyond sacrifice itself, an end in which I fully believe. He speaks (*italics mine*) of the "*blessedness of sacrifice*," and declares that "self-devotion may glorify life and *bless* it, as no enlightened self-interest ever could,"² and he quotes approvingly from James Hinton a passage in which "*joy and gladness*" are spoken of as ultimate facts of existence. But blessedness, joy, and gladness, of course, are forms of happiness, and to happiness, "howsoever or whensoever," our author is pledged to show no favor. So much for the sane optimism of intelligent, wide-visioned faith, a faith which I believe to be always attainable by keeping in view the twin facts of divine fellowship in suffering and human fellowship in the victories of the *logos*. The shock of arms between such optimism and advancing pessimism I view with no quakings of heart whatever.

As to the alternate way of justifying holiness in the face of mental questioning and pessimistic challenge, I am unable to

¹ *Ethics of the Dust*, sec. 6.

² *Andover Review*, September, 1891, p. 245.

share Mr. Brewster's confidence. I do not believe that "the realm of life is secure" "when duty is placed upon her throne," after duty has been divested of the fair robes of reasonableness, and clad in the garb of an arbitrary despot. Despotism is by no means the most stable form of government in this nineteenth century. Substantially the proposition is, by means of the moral instincts, and after these have been carefully stripped of all reasonableness, to bring and to hold men to a standard of being imposed upon them on grounds absolutely inscrutable. To my mind the success of such a scheme would itself be failure. Let men be satisfied that their dream of final blessedness is an empty one; that happiness is, and must always be, entirely secondary and incidental, and on the same level with pain as a minister to formal rightness, and I strongly suspect they will fail to distinguish between the system to which they have been brought and a modified pessimism. Mr. Brewster may talk about taking higher ground; men in general will consider it a surrender of the field, and something very like the despair of pessimism will settle down upon them.

What instinct is more ineradicable, more phoenix-like, than the instinct of happiness? The tenacity with which the mind holds on to hope, its aspect on the side of the future, is proverbial. Its death is despair, with which even the instinct of self-preservation loses its power. To say that this universal prompting is often, or generally, rude and unenlightened, reaching after crude and inferior objects, and rebelliously acting on finite intelligence instead of confiding in infinite wisdom and love, is simply to say that it is human. But to say that it is radically false and misleading is to impeach not so much man as his Maker; to declare that the Holy One leads men on to the ends of existence by cheating them, — just the contention, by the way, of the non-Christian theists in the matter of gospel miracles.

Mr. Brewster sees no legitimate place for sacrifice in hedonism, and under hedonism, of which itself I make no defense, he evidently means to include eudæmonism. "Its altruism," he says, "is of a mild type that does not imprudently waste itself, nor suicidally throw itself away in absolute self-devotion." If the emphasis in this sentence is on the words "imprudently" and "suicidally," it will stand, of course. Eudæmonism looks upon all unreason as blemish; but aside from these two words, the statement seems to me clearly at variance with the facts. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews was plainly of quite another

opinion ; for he tells us that it was for the *joy* set before him that Jesus endured the cross ;¹ and this is no isolated passage. It is one of the prominent recurring ideas in the epistle that the Christ won great things for himself through struggle and suffering, a fact which his followers should recognize for their own encouragement and guidance. The thought of blessedness as the end and fruitage of righteousness runs through the Scriptures from cover to cover, from Sinai to Calvary, from the time when the servile Hebrews were bidden to honor father and mother that their days might be long, to that night when the Christ took leave of his disciples with words of deepest spiritual import, explaining that these things were spoken to them that his *joy* might remain in them, and that their "*joy might be full.*"²

"It is not the thought of happiness," Mr. Brewster thinks, "that elicit the highest notes, or stirs the deepest chords, in human nature." Is it, then, the thought of abstract virtue, virtue unalloyed with "any happiness, howsoever or whensoever"? I am persuaded to the contrary. Let us imagine a man under the influence of such a thought. He has a conception of abstract rightness, but finds little or no pleasure in the well-being of others, no happiness in giving the rein to love, no blessedness in God-like doing and being. Is it easy to think of that man as a volunteer in any forlorn hope of humanity, a good soldier in that small but noble army of the world's redeemers, who bear men's burdens and carry their griefs? There will be little moral action by such a man, I suspect, until abstract virtue is reinforced by something that appeals to his emotional nature ; and, all kinds of happiness being ruled out, that something would seem necessarily to be force, the rod of the Moral Governor of the universe. Then, indeed, there may be morality of a hard type, but how inferior in beauty and power, and in range of achievement, to that of him who sees beyond Gethsemane and Calvary the daybreak of the resurrection morning, the ecstatic faces of friends, and the thrilled and quickened spirits of generations yet to be!

William Forbes Cooley.

SHORT HILLS, N. J.

¹ Heb. xii. 2.

² John xv. 11.

P. S. TO A MONIST.

ONE of the able writers to whom my article on "Conservative Apologetics" made respectful reference asks me what a dualist can do with that "other" which is not God. There is no deeper, no higher, no nearer question. For almost all leaders of modern thought who cherish belief in God are laying for it an essentially monistic, which for them is an essentially pantheistic, basis. If they do not identify the All with the One in respect of substance, they certainly credit Him with all the energy and life there is. This is a sort of dynamical pantheism, and logically should end in complete identification of substance with God. For what is force apart from substance, or substance apart from force? If the energy to which things owe all their cognizability and all their qualities be divine, why, then, it is plain that the essence in which these qualities inhere is divine, too. I do not now raise any objection to this conclusion, but would show how it is that a dualist of extreme type, one who regards God as absolutely creator, can find a place in the universe for that "other" which is no God.

I admit, to begin with, all the distressing antinomies which agnostics and pantheists detect in any idea of us men concerning a personal Infinite. Here are specimens to show how far it seems necessary for candor to go:—

For the Infinite to create something not himself is to do a self-contradictory, intrinsically impossible thing, since the Infinite must be the all-inclusive. To boundless Intelligence eternity must be an ever-present Now, for otherwise knowledge is in part contingent upon the succession of phenomena, and yet phenomenal succession is real, and not to know it as such is to be ignorant of the entire history of the universe. Again, unless God is heartless, an unconscious Buddha, an Epicurean's blissful, insensible deity, then He is the victim of disagreeable peculiarities and doings in human beings; or, what is just as paradoxical, He depends on their lovable qualities and acts for all the pleasure He can take in these. It must even be admitted that God cannot be infinite morally except by including all moral qualities, good and bad; which would mean that He can have moral infinitude only at cost of having no morals at all. If there are any other embarrassments for belief in the Christian's God, as there are embarrassments spread in our path by the serene humor of the pantheist, or by the nipping ingenuity of the agnostic, we should

be ready to admit their existence in advance. It is not likely that they can be more formidable than these specimen stumbling-blocks already acknowledged as logically inevitable.

But it would seem not illegitimate to suggest as to all these, and as to all their like : —

1. The Infinite is essentially inscrutable, except to itself. This is the agnostic's fundamental principle. But this very principle forbids him to insist that there is any real contradiction where finite intelligence finds an antinomy. Since it would be unreasonable for finite intelligence to expect to understand the Infinite, therefore it is unreasonable for it to regard its logical perplexities as refutations of all partial knowledge. Agnosticism thus supplies its own refutation. It is not thoroughgoing enough. For one, I utterly disavow all ability to infer what the infinite attributes of God lead Him to do. The *a priori* process is illegitimate, because impracticable, in theology ; why, then, should I concede that the agnostic has made out a case against theology in this discredited, irrational way ?

2. If the *a priori* method is baffled by the incomprehensibility of the Infinite, it does not at all follow that the *a posteriori* method may not give some trustworthy intimation as to the Being who is either the Maker of all, or himself the All. Physical science rejects deductions which will not bear the test of induction. If we have *a priori* and *a posteriori* reasons for distrusting the *a priori* method of studying a given subject, it does not at all follow that observation may not lead up to some real knowledge about that very matter. It is, or ought to be, but a commonplace of Apologetics that, whereas we do not and cannot have any evidence that a being entirely unconditioned, hence unrelated, exists, we do have some evidence for the existence of a Divine Being, and all of it tells that He exists just so far as it tells what sort of Being He is. A relation which reveals a Being reveals an attribute.

3. That we need not be disturbed by antinomies involved in the idea of the metaphysically infinite is clear to those who are ready to admit that the Creator accepted limitations in the very act of creating. His powers were not diminished, but their exercise was restrained. He could not make something not himself without shutting himself out from being so much of the universe, and from doing whatever so much of the universe does. This is plainest of all in respect of human wills. Our wills are our own, or they are not wills. They are even against God's will, and He

put this portentous possibility upon himself when He willed to create other wills. But to accept limitations is to come within reach of human cognizance, as agnosticism itself admits.

4. A still more thorough riddance of agnostic, which are here pantheistic, perplexities is secured when we fully face the fact that God is not necessarily infinite in every respect. He cannot be infinite in all respects. He is infinite in every excellence. Perfection, not infinitude, is the determining characteristic of the true God. If so, then each of the antinomies which logic finds in the idea of bare infiniteness concerns only an imaginary being, not God. For instance, his perfect excellence does not require that all substance should be included in his; it rather forbids this by exalting Him above matter. It does not insist that He must know eternity as Now; for the future has not gone by, and the past is not yet to come, and perfect knowledge can neither know the unreal as real, nor unknow realities. Perfection does not require that God should be unmoved by the widely various, the ever varying, states of human beings; it requires that He have a sensibility appropriate to them, each and all. Perfection does not involve making human wills free and not free at the same time. God need not undertake to force men to be free, not even to be freely innocent while they voluntarily abandon innocence. Perfection, precisely perfection, forbids God to attempt anything so absurd as a self-contradictory thing. We may easily enough see how an infinitely excellent God may fitly create rational and free beings to be his own companions, and to find in Him their highest good; and this, too, although it is confessedly beyond us to guess how this was altogether wise and well when it was certain to result in alienation from himself and in the wretchedness of sin. But we do not need to guess out the solutions of his problems; it is enough if we can reasonably believe that solutions unimaginable by us are satisfactory to Him. And surely the divine perfection brings to an end the metaphysical perplexity of a being who loses moral goodness in moral infinitude, for the fact is that his only moral infiniteness is the infiniteness of moral excellence.

Curt as these replies may seem, they are perhaps long enough as a postscript to another article, and long enough, I trust, to be intelligible for those who take interest in these problems.

E. H. Johnson.

EDITORIAL.

SHORT PASTORATES FROM THE SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW.

It is not difficult to notice that there is at present a prevailing unrest among ministers. The thought of remaining for a period of years at work in one place seems to be unattractive. There is many a Congregational church that is under the itinerant system to a greater degree than the neighboring Methodist church is: the pastoral terms are shorter, and there is a dispiriting interregnum between them. It is very often the case that ministers in such a church, instead of being pastors, are to all intents only chaplains, or at most evangelists. And it is a not less serious matter that, so far as the social life of the community is concerned, they have the little share of one who has but lately come, and is soon, it may be expected, to go away. There are many towns and villages where the minister is looked upon as securing the benefits of the organized life, without touching its burdens and responsibilities. In that larger proportion of life, even of Christian life, which goes on apart from direct church associations, the minister is too often a passing visitor, enjoying no confidences, and consciously without influence. In a time when it is beginning to be realized that one of the greatest openings before Christianity lies in the way of social citizenship, it cannot be right that Christian ministers have so rarely given hostages to fortune, and become pledged and naturalized members of the community in which they live.

It may be admitted at once that the old kind of pastoral authority has passed away, perhaps to no one's special regret. And yet the minister of the past wielded a power that may well be envied by the new generation. He knew his flock, and called them by name. He was known of them. They associated the thought of him with all the marked events of their individual and common existence. The minister's influence was in many respects narrow, but it was a social influence. If it was narrow, the reason was that life itself was under close limits. He compassed the life of his community; he participated in all of it, from year to year, even to children's children.

The pastoral activity which has taken the place of this is freer but less forceful. Preaching is more interesting, more inspiring; but it is more distant. Pastoral visitation has lost the old religious intensity that it had when the minister catechised from house to house; and there seems to be much doubt among young ministers, at least, how to make this part of their work most useful. The ministry is conscious of change, conscious of new occasions and new duties, sensible of the fact that there are widening opportunities; and hence the unrest we have noticed is a sign of promise. The difficulty is in the way this unrest expresses itself, in sending men hither and thither in search of the larger possibilities,

when the whole lesson of the theology, as well as of the sociology, of the present, is that these possibilities are to be found close at hand. It is to be feared that the ministry may make the old mistake — doubly dangerous now — of thinking that they must go far afield and find broad lands, in order to gain the richer harvests. It is the depth of soil that counts.

The people of the churches are coming, often unconsciously to themselves, into a new kind of life, something more varied, more eventful, more interesting, than they have lived before. The popularizing of education, it may even be said of culture; the increase of comforts; the development of the feeling of humanity which comes from intercourse with the distant world; and above all, the vague sense of coming changes, — these influences are giving a larger horizon to the simplest walks of life. The social movement does not exist merely where it is being discussed, or where it is visibly at work. It is in the air. And people nearly everywhere are waiting to know what is the bearing of Christian faith upon the new hopes that are abroad among men. They are as yet uncertain whether the church has a mission to the whole of life, or only to a fraction of it. At bottom, their question is whether Christianity is set for the redemption of individuals, or for the redemption of the world.

In the face of this longing for nobler truth, and with it a willingness for nobler action, it is too often the case that the minister, the only guide as to higher things the people have, sees an opportunity, but sees it elsewhere. From the social point of view, a large proportion of the ministers of the present leave their work when they have but just made a fair beginning. Many a man, convinced that his parish furnished him too slight an opportunity, might find a call to a fresher and more devoted ministry, without change of location, in the signs of the times, and in the strivings among his people for a larger life and for a better relation with humanity.

The next great revival is going to be in the direction of social Christianity. Under its impulses, the best men will go into places now considered slight in opportunity. They will dispel the notion that the more extensive field necessarily allows of a man's doing the more in his day and generation. Instead of touching many people on a single side of their nature, these men will take a few, and influence them deeply through the whole range of life. We cannot but believe that such men, when they come, will introduce another era in Christian history. They will be discoverers. They will open up new avenues to the church at large, until it shall be more nearly coterminous with the kingdom of God.

For one thing, the ministry of the future will need to show explicitly how the religious motive expresses itself in the different spheres of life. The art of living the Christian's life in these modern days is the most intricate of all arts, and yet the present state of instruction in the art is

to a large extent as if a teacher of sculpture should confine himself to the history and possibilities of sculpture, and never enter with his pupils into the handling of the clay. The ministry of the future will, we think, give more effort toward showing how religion adjusts itself to the other elements of the better life; thus bringing out the essential harmony of all good things, showing that nothing which makes men truer and nobler is foreign to Christianity, and making it clear that Christianity condemns only what is false and absurd in the nature of things.

Let us also hope that in the future there may be brought out more than ever the Christian possibilities of art and music, of education, of refined social intercourse. Why should not the church hold before its people everywhere that ideal of cultured manhood and womanhood toward which it is already working in the Christian college? There would thus be new means through which Christian people could be established and confirmed in their faith in spiritual things. There would be new means of approaching on some other side of the higher nature those who are not first of all appealed to by the more direct ministry of religion. There would be the possibility, with this broader programme, of getting Christian principles registered in the public life of communities and of the nation.

It may perhaps be suggested that the minister of the future will stick closer to his text than has been done in this present instance. To this it must be said that the main object has been to offer some considerations as to what the social point of view is; feeling that when that point of view is justly apprehended, any further discussion is almost unnecessary. In the light of such considerations as those which have been presented, and of the feelings which come from the progress of social Christianity, we are convinced that there are coming to be entirely different standards for measuring the opportunity furnished by fields for ministers' work. The lines of activity which seem to be indicated for the religious leaders of the coming generations cannot be undertaken except through influences moving slowly and profoundly. Social Christianity demands of any who would be its apostles a close, continued intimacy of knowledge and sympathy with those whom they would help. There are of course other points of view from which the question of short pastorates may rightly be looked at, but from the social point of view it is hard to see how there can be any such thing.

THE ACQUITTAL OF PROFESSOR BRIGGS.

THE Presbytery of New York, at its meeting of November 4th, after hearing Professor Briggs's reply to the charges of its prosecuting committee, dismissed the proceedings against him by a vote of ninety-four to thirty-nine. In view of the failure of the motion to dismiss the case, made and urged by the friends of the accused at the October meeting of

the Presbytery, the size of the majority must be taken as showing a strong reaction in Dr. Briggs's favor.

An important cause of the reaction was, no doubt, the calm, luminous, and incisive "Response" of Dr. Briggs. This, while not avowedly defensive nor explanatory, was perhaps more effective in removing prejudice and misunderstanding than a defensive and explanatory address would have been. It was professedly and in essential content a criticism of the charges of the prosecuting committee, made in the exercise of the right of the accused to file objections to the sufficiency of the charges in form and in legal effect. Incidentally, however, two of the utterances of the Inaugural declared by the committee to be heretical were cleared of misinterpretation and tested by the Presbyterian standards. This, no doubt, gave relief to some minds. Dr. Briggs's demonstration of the insufficiency of the prosecuting committee's charges and specifications must have helped many towards the conclusion reached by the Presbytery. For it was both natural and kind to attribute the committee's failure to make triable charges, not to its mental incompetency, but to the lack of material at its command.

The prosecuting committee will appeal to the General Assembly. It is very doubtful whether the Assembly will entertain the appeal. True, the Moderator of the Presbytery has decided that the committee is "an original party in the case." But excellent Presbyterian authority can be cited for the opinion, which seems to us supported by common sense, that a committee appointed by the Presbytery, having no powers except those given it by the Presbytery, cannot be an original party as against that body with a right of appeal from its decisions.

Dr. Briggs's opponents have, however, another string to their bow. Some thirty members of the Presbytery have announced their intention of making a complaint to the Synod of irregularity in the proceedings of acquittal. Presbyterian law doubtless gives the right of such complaint to a dissatisfied minority. Whether the Synod will sustain it, and require the Presbytery to try Dr. Briggs again, is, of course, doubtful. As the Synod does not meet until October, 1892, and as its decision, whatever its nature, will probably be followed by an appeal to the General Assembly of June, 1893, it seems unlikely that disciplinary proceedings against Professor Briggs will be resumed. The strength of the revision party in the church warrants this prediction. Dr. Briggs has in all probability secure standing as a Presbyterian minister.

This probably means that the Presbyterian Church will not hereafter require of its ministers and teachers profession of belief in the infallibility of the Bible. Dr. Briggs's refusing to make such profession was the real ground of the attack upon him. He admitted that he had found historical mistakes in the Scriptures, and claimed that the church cannot give the sacred writings the careful study necessary to the faithful use of them without coming upon such errors. This admission, it was said, was

a violation of the promise made by him at his ordination to be loyal to the system of truth embodied in the Westminster symbols. A cardinal doctrine of that system is that which presents the Bible as "the only infallible rule of faith and practice." This implies, it is said, the correctness of all the affirmations of the Bible, whatever their nature may be. Therefore, a Presbyterian minister who acknowledges that he has found historical errors in the Scriptures should be deposed from the ministry. The offensiveness of the critical positions taken by Professor Briggs was owing to their supposed contrariety to Biblical affirmations. He subjected himself to discipline, it was urged, in saying that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, and that Isaiah was the author of only half the book which bears his name, because the Bible refers to Moses as the author of the Pentateuch, and prefixes to quotations from both halves of Isaiah the name of that prophet. His opponents say that one who says that the facts of the Bible contradict these or any other affirmations "reviles and discredits the Word of God" (to borrow a description of Dr. Briggs's conduct used in the General Assembly last summer by a member of the prosecuting committee of the New York Presbytery), and is unfit to be a Presbyterian minister.

Professor Briggs maintained that loyalty to the Presbyterian doctrine about Scripture does *not* imply assent to all the historical statements of the Bible; that, on the contrary, one may heartily accept the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as "the only infallible rule of faith and practice," while conceding that it contains such errors. This position he maintained firmly at his trial, asserting it and vigorously defending it in his address to the Presbytery. His acquittal, therefore, if it be, as is altogether likely, the end of the attempt to discipline him, amounts to a declaration from the Presbyterian Church that it does not regard the religious authority of the Bible as necessarily excluding from it all human imperfection.

Professor Briggs will have done great service to Presbyterianism, and to the whole Protestant church, in securing this. The greatness of the service rendered, and the cost of it, may well cause any faults in the manner of defending the truth to be soon forgotten.

In justice to Dr. Briggs's opponents, it should be said that his Inaugural was unnecessarily aggressive in tone. It was also unwisely discursive. The sections treating of the religious office of the reason and of the state of the righteous after death marred the unity of the discourse, and invited misunderstanding by the meagreness which limitations of time made necessary. And the latter of these was so worded as to misrepresent Dr. Briggs's opinion. When the author said, "The bugbear of a judgment immediately after death, and the illusion of a magical transformation in the dying hour, should be banished from the world. . . . The former makes death a terror to the best of men. The latter makes human life and experience of no effect, and both cut the nerves

of Christian activity and striving after sanctification. Renouncing them as hurtful, unchristian errors," etc., he seemed to believe that life in the middle state would work such a moral change as is denied to it in these words of the "Response to the Charges:" "If any insinuation had been made that I had taught that the redeemed enter the middle state guilty and sinful, this could easily have been refuted." If a man at death enters into a state in which he is sinless and free from guilt, and assured of being so forever, is he not, then, subjected to a judgment? What can "judgment at death" be but deciding that one is in this moral condition, and assigning him to a fit environment? Why, then, is the doctrine of such a judgment to be called a "bugbear," "a hurtful and unchristian error"? Of course, Dr. Briggs's doctrine of "Progressive Sanctification" did not change between the delivery of the Inaugural and the reading of the "Response to the Charges." But the description and commendation of it in the former were given in heated rhetoric. These faults of the Inaugural, however, are of little importance when compared with its high merits, and the misunderstanding they have caused has not kept either the Presbytery or the public from seeing the real issue. By raising this, and manfully fighting it through, Dr. Briggs has earned the gratitude of all intelligent students of the Bible.

[SUNDAY-SCHOOL INSTRUCTION.

THERE has been some discussion of late concerning the relation and proportions which should be maintained between the didactic and hortatory elements in Sunday-school instruction, — one party urging that the chief end of the Sunday-school is to teach religious truth; the other insisting that the constant aim should be to quicken the conscience and to move the will. Perhaps, as is so often the case in such discussions, there is really less difference of opinion upon the main question than appears upon the surface, less, it may be, than the disputants themselves suppose. All will doubtless admit that the final aim of all teaching is to secure correctness and completeness of life, and without doubt all will admit, also, that in religion, as in other practical matters, this can be secured only by wise and comprehensive instruction. The distinction which is sometimes made between the ideals and aims of the Sunday-school and of the day-school is more apparent than real. They both exist for the same reason, — to make wise and good men and women; and their methods and ideals must submit to the same tests, — are they fitted to attain this end? The difference is in the text-book used, the department of truth which is studied, and, because this truth lies nearer the heart of things, the more conscious and constant recognition of its direct bearing upon conduct. Knowledge which does not make life better and fuller is a very barren thing, and life which does not draw its nutriment from sound knowledge is always feeble, and is liable to become false and

mischievous. The Sunday-school must not shrink from the question which we are constantly applying to the secular schools: Is it doing all that we ought to expect of it in fitting its pupils for the serious work of life? Nor is this question fully answered when it is shown that it is very entertaining and attractive, nor even when it appears that it leads most of the children to connect themselves with the church; for the end is to secure a sound and real life, and not a passing pleasure, or a formal relation.

Now, to gain this end, there must not simply be a modicum of sound instruction, but a maximum. Teaching should receive the same emphasis which it receives in the day-school. If truth is the nutriment of life, then life must be fed freely, and all the truth must be taught which can be received and appropriated. Perhaps it is unnecessary to say this; it would certainly involve a waste of time to delay to prove it. The very name of the Sunday-school, the story of its origin, and the history of its successful and useful life, show that the reason for its existence is that it may lead the children to right living by teaching them religious truth. Under any conditions it would lose its power if it should forget this. There are, however, some reasons in the present condition of society and of thought, why systematic and comprehensive Sunday-school instruction is especially imperative. It may be well to note two or three of these reasons.

One is in the state of unrest and transition through which the religious thought of the age is passing. The gravest questions are pressing for an answer, — questions which relate to the source of religious authority, to the power of religion to maintain itself, and to its power and its right to control men's lives, and to rule human society. Can the church answer these questions? Can it retain its old convictions and ideals, and continue to persuade men to accept them, or can it modify these convictions and ideals to meet new light and new demands, and still prove its right to confidence and leadership? Such questions cannot be avoided, and they must be answered in the light of truth. If the church thrusts them aside, and ignores, or rebukes, or exhorts those who urge them, it will surely lose the respect of thinking men. If it renders careless and superficial answers, it will gain distrust and contempt. Zeal which is not according to knowledge is fanaticism, and the more ardent it is, the wilder it becomes. It is a hard lesson to learn, not fully mastered yet, though taught in many bitter experiences, that truth is the only implement which zeal can use with the hope of benefiting men, or even with ordinary safety. But truth is gained only by much hard study, and by systematic and unwearied teaching. If the children who are in our Sunday-schools to-day are to solve aright the problems which will be before them and their generation, they must know all that can possibly be taught them of the Scriptures and of religious truth. The outcome will be a sad one if religious ignorance is permitted to meet

skeptical learning. Nothing could be sadder, unless, perchance, both parties should prove to be ignorant. This demand for faithful and comprehensive teaching does not mean, however, that all the doubts and questions which criticism starts shall be brought into the Sunday-school and be discussed before young children. Sunday-school instruction, like all teaching, must be sensible and progressive. It should be positive, in the sense that truth is taught rather than error exposed. It should expound the substance of Scripture rather than show its defenses or contend with its opponents. Men are recognizing more and more clearly that religion must stand or fall by its own inherent power, or weakness, and that it can neither be defended nor destroyed from without. The power of Biblical religion to maintain itself during the next fifty years, to receive and to appropriate new light, to adjust itself to new conditions, and to enlarge its ministries, depends, in very large degree, upon the amount of exact and systematic knowledge which the next generation has of the contents of the Bible.

But this necessity is reinforced by the fact that, aside from such instruction as may be given in Christian homes, the children of the present age are absolutely dependent for Biblical and directly religious knowledge upon the Sunday-school, or upon such means as the church provides for them. The day-schools are making less and less provision for this kind of teaching, and it requires no prophetic vision to see that our public schools cannot soon, if they can ever, return to the old method of giving to the Christian Scriptures and their doctrines an important place in their courses of instruction. It is probably undesirable that they should attempt to return to their old ways, with our heterogeneous population, with its various and conflicting views. We can neither trust the teachers to impart such instruction as is needed, nor can we force the children to receive it. But this may prove to be a blessing and not a misfortune, if the church and its Sunday-school can do the work for which they are best fitted, and to which they are called. It is a humiliating confession when Christian people and Christian ministers say that unless the public schools teach ethics, and the fundamentals of religion, the children will grow up ignorant of these things. If church and mission Sunday-schools were doing their duty, no such danger would threaten us. A comprehensive, systematic course of instruction, constant pressure to secure regularity of attendance, wise and firm superintendence, and frequent examinations would make such schools yield far more than can possibly be secured from the public schools by any amount of clamoring for religious teaching or services in their courses. If it be said that this is ideal and impracticable, the answer is that it is practicable because it is ideal; it recognizes the central idea of the Sunday-school, makes it the controlling force, and gives it freedom and breadth of movement. It is not claimed that every school can secure at once perfect teachers or perfect methods, but only that it can at once lay hold of a high ideal,

and steadily aim to reach it. The objection that to throw this emphasis upon instruction will make the Sunday-school a less effective means of grace is like saying that careful instruction in political economy will check the growth of good citizenship, or that vigorous teaching of the art of war will make a cadet less patriotic.

The purpose of this paper is not to answer, but to start, the question whether the present method of Sunday-school instruction meets the ideal of the Sunday-school and the real needs of its students as well as they should be met. With this method we are all familiar. It involves the choice of about fifty short selections from the Scripture to form the basis of a year's instruction. These are chosen ostensibly because they form good points of departure for direct appeals to the conscience and the will. They do not always lack unity of thought or progress in knowledge, but when these are present they are subordinate and incidental. These paragraphs are taken from their connections, printed with brief notes, and with pictures and hymns and tunes, and, in this form, put into the hands of teachers and pupils. Sunday-school teaching is thus made easy, but is it made fruitful in broad, sound knowledge, — the stuff of which character and devotion are made?

We are informed that the committee charged with making a selection of lessons for the next period of seven years recently held a meeting in New York, at which representatives of those who prepare and publish lesson-helps presented certain requests. Among these was the request that the "selections should not exceed twelve verses each." Nothing could better illustrate the limitations and tendencies of this system. It shows the inevitable dominance of lesson-helps and lesson-helpers. Doubtless such limits increase the ease and the profits of such writers and publishers. It would show inexcusable simplicity, however, to ask the question, Will such a limit increase the children's knowledge of the Scriptures? It would exclude the 51st, the 90th, and the 91st Psalms, the Parable of the Talents, and the Parable of the Prodigal Son. Indeed, it would probably make it necessary to reject or to break into fragments a large majority of the most significant and instructive sections of the Bible. But this only suggests and illustrates disadvantages which necessarily attach to this system. Are there advantages, which cannot be secured by any other system, which more than balance these?

THE NINTH YEAR OF THE "ANDOVER REVIEW."

THE Editors of the "Review" take occasion to call the attention of its friends, as it enters upon its ninth year, to the field which it now occupies, and to the circumstances which may be expected to enlarge its scope and influence. The more descriptive part of what is here said is for the use of our readers, who may wish to familiarize others with the character of the "Review."

Eight years ago, when the "Review" was established, there had been for some time a manifest, and to many minds a painful, separation between ordinary theological and religious opinion and the more serious thought which was beginning to find expression in the current literature. Theology had put away its dogmatic tone, but it was not speaking with persuasion; and religion, though busy in the work of the churches, was not applying itself to the problems which were vexing society. The "Review" began its work, as one among various forces which were designed to recover theological thought and religious energy to the peculiar service demanded by the time. From the beginning its aim was positive, though comprehensive and catholic. It was started under a clear and well-defined policy. And the method according to which the "Review" was organized was such as seemed best fitted to carry out the intention of its founders. Its pages were arranged not only for the publication of contributed or solicited articles, but also for continuous editorial discussion, and for departments which might illustrate the progress gained in the new development and application of Christianity. It was also published monthly, — a marked innovation upon the custom which had assigned theological and religious discussion to the form of the quarterly.

The controversy which arose over some of the editorial utterances of the "Review" was doubtless incidental to the conditions to which we have referred. It was not invited by the editors; it was not shunned by them. It was accepted as a liability of any honest and effective criticism of religious opinions and methods which had lost much of their original reality and force, a liability which was not to be evaded by reticence or by unworthy concession. And now that the controversy, so far as related to Andover Theological Seminary and the Congregational churches, is substantially over, we deem it a matter of congratulation on the part of all, that the future is open, without embarrassing compromises, for the broad, candid, and earnest application of the principles of theological and religious progress.

The "Andover Review" was not established as an institutional or denominational organ. The settlement, therefore, of local difficulties does not fulfill its end, but serves rather to give enlargement and freedom to its original design. That design was to make it a fit representative of catholic and progressive Christianity. We believe that it has maintained this position with increasing breadth. Its contributors are from among all who are in sympathy with the principles which it represents, without distinction of sectarian beliefs and politics. Its editorial outlook is toward matters of common interest and concern in the religious and social conditions of to-day.

While reviews and magazines are being multiplied, the "Andover Review" retains the field which it occupied at the beginning. As far as known to the editors, nothing has come in to supplant it, or to render it less necessary; and it duplicates the work of no other publication. It

is distinguished from purely critical journals, whether Biblical, historical, or philosophical, by its endeavor to interpret the results of the best scholarship alike to ministers and laymen. It is distinguished from the popular monthlies which treat incidentally of social and ethical questions, by its treatment of the same questions from the religious point of view.

The subject matter of the "Review" is embraced under four general departments:—

1. THEOLOGICAL.

Articles are in preparation upon the Person of Christ, in the light of recent discussions, upon some of the Social and Ethical Aspects of Redemption, upon the Recasting of Creeds, as in the revision of the Westminster Confession, and upon several subjects designed to illustrate the Method and Progress of Biblical Criticism, especially of the Old Testament.

2. RELIGIOUS.

In this department special attention will be given the coming year to Biblical instruction in the Sunday-school, to the Liturgical Service of the Churches, to the enlargement and expansion of methods of Christian work, and to Missionary Problems. Mr. Starbuck will add to his graphic review of missionary operations a series of articles upon questions of vital concern in the Conduct of Missions.

3. SOCIOLOGICAL.

The "Review" has already given a large space to the treatment of social subjects, but it now has increased facilities for work in this department, through the increase of its staff of contributors, through the enlargement of social study in the Seminary, and through the establishment of the Andover House in Boston to promote the specific ends of Social Christianity. Mr. Robert A. Woods, the Head of the Andover House, will report upon the work of the House and of similar institutions.

4. EDUCATIONAL AND LITERARY.

The "Review" does not profess to be an educational or literary journal, but it finds occasion in every number to deal with some of the present moral aspects of education and literature. During the year articles have appeared from some of the foremost educators of the country, and literary articles have been supplemented by Professor Hardy's delightful papers on "Letters and Life."

We give, subject to slight changes, the

CONTENTS OF THE JANUARY NUMBER.

THE GREAT LOVE. A study in theology founded upon the First Epistle of John. By Rev. Christian Van Der Veen, D. D. Dr. Van Der Veen is the author of the "powerful article" (so characterized by the reviewers) upon "The Preaching of the Gospel," in the November number of the "Review." No writer has a more direct approach to the heart of theology.

THE MEDIATING FUNCTION OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTER TO-DAY. By the Rev. Dr. Philip S. Moxom. A paper of exceeding timeliness, showing the new responsibility of the minister in his relation to society.

CHANGES IN ELEMENTARY EDUCATION PROPOSED BY THE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE PRESIDENTS OF NEW ENGLAND. By Professor D. C. Wells. The changes proposed affect the mental training of the child from ten to fourteen. The article is of interest to all parents and teachers.

THE APPRENTICE SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. By Lieutenant A. V. Wadhams. Lieutenant Wadhams discusses the grave question of providing fit material for the new navy from the point of view of an officer intent upon the *morale* of his profession.

THE EXPANSION OF THE LOCAL CHURCH. By Rev. A. E. Dunning, D. D. A topic which is awakening great interest in England, and which is becoming of practical concern to the churches of this country. Dr. Dunning was among the first to agitate the subject, and to show its practicability.

MISSIONARY PROBLEMS IN THE TURKISH EMPIRE. By Rev. C. C. Starbuck. Mr. Starbuck writes from personal sources of knowledge of some of the most pressing problems in connection with the missions of the American churches in Turkey.

EDITORIALS.

The Place of the Teaching of Jesus in the Christian Revelation.

Social Christianity, illustrated by the "Andover House Association."

The Theological Restiveness of Ultra Conservatism.

The New Type of Prison Officials, with Special Reference to the late Colonel Gardner Tufts.

DEPARTMENT OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

The Rabbinical Education of Paul, by Rev. S. Weyler.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES. By Mr. Robert A. Woods.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The "Review" is now offered at \$2.00, one half the regular price, to all Theological Students, to all Home and Foreign Missionaries, and to all Christian Associations and Charitable Organizations for their Reading Rooms. We apprise our readers of this fact, in the hope that some may add to their own subscription one or more names to be placed upon the list of special rates.

THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS IN THE ANDOVER CASES.

WE publish in this number of the "Review," from copy taken directly from the originals, and corrected in proof by the same standards, the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in the Andover cases, together with the dissenting opinion of CHIEF JUSTICE FIELD. The manuscript giving the judgment of the Court is in the handwriting of MR. JUSTICE KNOWLTON, and bears his name. It is understood to have been concurred in by JUSTICES ALLEN, HOLMES, MORTON, LATHROP, and BARKER.

We are keeping, it is believed, entirely within the bounds of truth and fact, when we affirm that no other result than that which has now been reached could command so general an approval. On the one hand, the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice will be claimed to show that the cases involved questions respecting which there might fairly be differences of judgment; on the other, the large number of his associates who concur in the decision gives to it a peculiar weight of authority and impression of finality. Probably some on each side of the controversy would have been glad if the court had given an opinion on other disputed points than those which are decided; but perhaps the general good will be more promoted by a result which concludes the contest, and at the same time leaves the participants free to indulge in many of their own cherished theories.¹ The visitors are vindicated

¹ It leaves, for instance, our friends of the *Congregationalist* free to remark: "Whether or not Professor Smyth has conformed in his teaching to the creed he has promised to maintain, is a question not touched upon [directly?] by the court. That question is still in abeyance in the public mind." It does not, however, leave them equally free to say: "This decision does not imply that Professor Smyth did not have a fair hearing before them [the visitors]. . . . He had in effect the same hearing which he would have had if the Trustees had appeared." These statements are defective. The court says: "On questions so difficult that the members of the board of visitors were divided in opinion at the close of the hearing, we cannot say in the present case that a different result might not have been reached if the trustees had been heard." That cannot be called, in any complete and impartial sense, "a fair hearing," or "the same hearing," which deliberately excluded a rightful presentation of the case which might have changed the result.

Nor is the *Congregationalist* any longer free to say: "The only decision affecting Professor Smyth on that matter [namely, conformity to the creed] is the moral one involved in the fact that the visitors sustained the complaint made by the prosecutors against him." The court affirms by necessary implication that the trustees are "primarily responsible for the affairs of the seminary," and subsequently, by explicit declaration, that "the power and duty to remove a professor who teaches doctrines contrary to the statutes is in the trustees." It also states that the visitors "were divided in opinion" in their finding. The "moral" decision, therefore, is this (adding to the statement of the court simply facts of public record or otherwise indisputable, particu-

as respects their legal existence, while their powers are more carefully defined and their methods of procedure strictly limited; the trustees are justified in their contention for their administrative rights, while, within determinate limits, a supervisory power is accredited to the other board; the professors, though still subject to the authority of the visitors, can no longer be directly and summarily dealt with, but only through processes which secure ample opportunities for a fair appreciation of their work and their claims. The seminary remains intact on its original basis, and at the same time is freer than ever before to adjust itself to its work. On the whole, we believe that all parties will find increasing satisfaction in the result, and that it marks, therefore, a new and important stage in the history of the seminary, and will not be without influence on other institutions of sacred learning and in the wide fields of religious thought and life.

The decision of the court respecting the legality of the board of visitors is so compact in its reasoning that we may fail to appreciate its argumentative force. If we rightly apprehend it, the question is approached with a degree of hesitation, and is met, however decisively, with an appreciation of its difficulty. It is essentially a federal question; though we suspect that any desire to treat it as such will be forestalled, both by the just weight of authority which belongs to the tribunal before which it has been argued and the unanimity of the bench, and also by the particularly the fact that the trustees, under their official responsibility, pronounced a formal and recorded decision in the case of Professor Smyth [see *Andover Review*, vol. viii. pp. 72-80] : —

For Professor Smyth :

Pres. Julius H. Seelye, D. D., LL. D.
 Rev. Daniel T. Fiske, D. D.
 Edward Taylor, Esq.
 Rev. C. F. P. Bancroft, Ph. D.
 Thomas H. Russell, Esq.
 Hon. Joseph S. Ropes.
 Rev. Alexander McKenzie, D. D.
 Rev. William H. Willcox, D. D., LL. D.
 Hon. Robert R. Bishop.
 Pres. Franklin Carter, LL. D.
 Alpheus H. Hardy, Esq.
 Rev. James G. Vose, D. D.
 Hon. Horace Fairbanks.

Against Professor Smyth :

Rev. William T. Eustis, D. D.
 Hon. Joshua N. Marshall.
 Rev. J. W. Wellman, D. D.

We should also, perhaps, recall, as related to the "moral" result, the further fact, that the decision of the visitors, at the same meeting, upon precisely the same evidence, was four times reversed. The only question, therefore, would seem to be, supposing that attention be directed solely to the action of the visitors, whether four subsequent decisions by the same body, at the same meeting, on the same evidence, equal in "moral" weight one antecedent decision; unless, indeed, it be, what "moral" weight is there anyway in an absurdity?

tical removal — through the limitation put by the further action of the court upon the proceedings of the supervisory board — of the more serious exposures to collision. The court appears to hold that the theological institution in Phillips Academy is sufficiently cognate to the purpose of the original founders to come under the charter, yet that it is also sufficiently distinct to admit of a separate supervision of such professorships in it as may be founded under this stipulation. The influence of such a decision must be to emphasize, in administration, the relative independence of the seminary, as this has hitherto been maintained.

The remainder of the decision deals at length, and with marked clearness and cogency of reasoning, with the question of visitatorial procedure. For the first time in American law, this subject has been thoroughly and judicially expounded. That the visitors should have mistaken their course is not so much to be wondered at when looked at from this point of view. They seem to have treated it mainly as a matter of statutory prescription, and to have overlooked the relation of these statutes to earlier precedents and practices, and, above all, to the principles on which those usages rest. The more thorough examination of the subject conducted abroad by Judge Bishop and others, together with a more careful scrutiny of the Andover statutes and the history of legal training and practice in this country, put the proper construction of the prescribed duties of the board of visitors in a new light. When once discovered, it was easy to see that the historical requirements were clearly and wholly in the line of essential justice and of common sense. The simple principle that the agents of a corporation should not be liable to removal without notice to the corporation, that the responsible management of an institution should not unawares be deprived of those through whom it conducts its affairs, will commend itself to the general judgment. We cannot but express some modest surprise that a jurist so learned and accomplished as our admirable Chief Justice, and so capable of the ingenious and penetrating reasoning displayed in his dissenting opinion, should affirm that because Professor Smyth's case was ably and thoroughly argued, both *pro* and *contra*, by the respective counsel, the trustees had no claim to be heard, unless it was absolutely necessary, "as a strict matter of law," that they should be thus represented in order that the visitors might take jurisdiction. Waiving for the moment what the law requires, there is clearly an injustice, of which it would seem that the court must take cognizance, in holding the trustees to strict responsibility for the management of the seminary, and at the same time subjecting them to the entire removal of their agents without opportunity so much as to remonstrate. The mill must work, and the management be held accountable if it does not, yet at any moment, without notice, another power can withdraw every hand they have engaged to run it.

Happily, according to the researches of counsel and the opinion of the court, this is not the law of visitation. This proceeds upon the theory

that in all dealings with the agents the management is dealt with, and must be made a party in the proceedings.

We have heard of but one objection to the application of this principle in the Andover case. This is, that the powers and duties of the visitors are completely defined in the Founders' statutes (Associate and Additional), and that the court should have limited its examination to these instruments. To this there are two replies. These statutes were drawn up at a time when the English visitatorial system was more familiar than in later times. The colonial practice still survived. There was far less statute law than now, and more recurrence to the precedents and principles of English practice. The general scheme, and to a noticeable degree the diction, of the Andover statutes of visitation, are ultimately dependent upon these English traditions. Any just interpretation of them requires an acquaintance with, and use of, these traditions. The other reply rests upon the explicit testimony of the statutes. These recognize that the original union by which the seminary was formed was "upon visitatorial principles," and affirm that the perpetual union, which seven years later was effected, "shall be established upon visitatorial principles, to continue, as the sun and moon, forever." What these "visitatorial principles" were, can only be determined from the antecedent history of visitation. They are now definitely and fully set forth in the opinion of the court, and in the elaborate briefs of counsel, which thus become valuable additions to American legal literature.¹

It is with especial gratification that we meet in the opinion of the court that constant recurrence to fundamental justice which is a shining virtue of Massachusetts and other eminent judicial opinions, and which seems never more appropriate than in dealing with statutes which close their enumeration of the power and duties of the visitors they establish with these impressive words: "and in general to see that our true intentions, as expressed in these our statutes, be faithfully executed, always administering justice impartially, and exercising the functions of their office in the fear of God, according to the said statutes, the Constitution of this Seminary, and the Laws of the Land." The court again and again recalls and applies in its reasonings what must be recognized as just and right. Such a method of interpretation is a precedent and a

¹ At the final hearing before the full bench, October 14 and 15, 1890, printed briefs were submitted by Hon. Charles Theodore Russell, Professor Theodore W. Dwight, LL. D., and Professor Simeon E. Baldwin, of counsel for Professor Smyth; also a joint brief signed by Professor John C. Gray, George O. Shattuck, Esq., and Hon. Robert R. Bishop, counsel for the Trustees; also a joint brief signed by Hon. E. Rockwood Hoar, LL. D., Asa French, Esq., and Arthur H. Wellman, Esq., counsel for the Visitors. Arguments were made by Messrs. Russell, Dwight, Baldwin, Gray, Shattuck, Hoar, French, and Wellman, all of which, with the exception of Judge French's and Mr. Wellman's, were subsequently printed for the court when the case was re-submitted, September 1, 1891.

virtual instruction to every visitor, and to every trustee and professor, enjoining that in dealing with the seminary creed, which is a part of the statutes, he should recognize these same principles of fairness and righteousness. It is neither right nor just to construe a creed as one would a military order, or an emperor's rescript, or a note of hand; to deal with it as a disciplinary code rather than as a statement of principles; as a chapter of the Koran, and not as an interpretative transcript from the book of life. Such a method — the one we are controverting — is unjust to the progressive men who helped to form the seminary creed, and it is fatal to the bright hopes which they cherished of the work the seminary was to do through the coming generations. We are not suggesting or favoring any lax construction of its articles, any loose and immoral apprehension of its obligations. We are simply maintaining, as we have done from the beginning, the rights of all who construe it or subscribe to it, to the full scope and free and normal development of its living principles.

Enough has been said to show how unwarrantable is the statement that the Andover cases have been decided upon a mere legal technicality. A decision of the fundamental question, whether or not the visitatorial system established at Andover is legally valid, is no technical matter. The reaffirmation of the principles which determine the nature and methods of visitation, and the application of these principles to the statutory provisions at Andover, express authoritatively legal opinions and judgments which go beyond the form to the substance of the law. Nor, as we have seen, is the decision without suggestion as to the proper interpretation of the Andover creed. It should be remembered that the creed is a part of the statutes. How has the court construed these statutes? The editors of this "Review" could ask for no surer vindication, upon what are called the merits of the case, than to have the validity of their interpretation of the Andover creed determined by the principles and methods which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has followed in its interpretation of the statutes of which this creed is a part.

Ex uno disce omnes.

The decision has been widely welcomed in the interest of Christian liberty. We accept the omen, not forgetting the words of one of the noblest of the early fathers of the church when he says that by this liberty "a man is more tested," nor losing sight of the apostle's word, of which he reminds us, that "as free we should use our freedom as bondservants of God."

OPINION OF THE COURT.

EGBERT C. SMYTH, Appellant, *v.* THE VISITORS OF THE THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION IN ANDOVER.

THE TRUSTEES OF PHILLIPS ACADEMY *v.* THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OTHERS.

KNOWLTON, J. The Theological Institution in Phillips Academy in Andover has a peculiar organization. In 1778 the academy was founded by Samuel Phillips and John Phillips, "for the purpose of instructing

youth, not only in English and Latin grammar, writing, arithmetic, and those sciences wherein they are commonly taught, but more especially to learn the great end and real business of living," and was placed under the control of a board of trustees. In 1780 this board was incorporated by an act of the State of Massachusetts Bay as "The Trustees of Phillips Academy," with a view to accomplish more successfully the purpose of the original founders. The act provides that these trustees "and their successors shall be the true and sole visitors, trustees, and governors of the said Phillips Academy in perpetual succession forever," and gives them power to make such laws, orders, and rules as to them seem best. They are authorized to receive gifts, and to hold them "on such terms and under such provisions and limitations as may be expressed in any deed or instrument of conveyance to them made," provided that the condition of the grant or donation does not require them "to act in any respect counter to the design of the first grantors or of any prior donation." Prov. St. 1780, c. 15; 5 Prov. Laws (State ed.), 1418. By the last will of John Phillips, proved and allowed on April 18, 1795, one third of the residue of his property was given to the trustees of Phillips Academy, "for the benefit more especially of charitable scholars;" and it was provided that those who expected to become clergymen might be assisted in the study of divinity by "some eminent Calvinistic minister of the gospel." By the Statute of 1807, c. 22, the corporation is authorized to hold, "for the purpose of the theological institution, and in furtherance of the designs of the pious founders and benefactors of said academy," real and personal estate, the income of which is "to be always applied to said objects, agreeably to the will of the donors, if consistent with the original design of the founders of the said academy." Afterwards, in the same year, Phœbe Phillips and others established and endowed "a public theological institution in Phillips Academy," on the condition that it "be accepted by the trustees aforesaid, and that it be forever conducted and governed by them and their successors in conformity to" certain "general principles and regulations" which they unitedly adopted as the constitution of the institution. Under this constitution and the preceding legislative act of the same year the theological institution became a department of Phillips Academy, the management and control of which were in the corporation, under regulations or statutes which were set out at length in the instrument creating it. The trustees were charged with the duty of conducting the institution in conformity with the wishes of the donors as expressed in these regulations, and elaborate provisions were made prescribing methods of management. At the same time, certain visitatorial powers were reserved to the founders in Article 32 of the instrument, which is as follows: "Notwithstanding this seminary is placed by this constitution under the immediate care and government of the Trustees of Phillips Academy, it is always to be understood, and it is hereby expressly declared, that every founder of a professorship, scholarship, or any other living whatever in this institution, will have the exclusive right of prescribing the regulations and statutes to be observed by the said trustees in conducting the concerns of the same, said regulations and statutes being always consistent with the principles and objects of this institution; and also the right, for the term of his life, of appointing in the original deed or grant such local visitor or visitors as he may think proper, and to endow him or them with all visitatorial powers and authorities necessary to secure and enforce due observance

and execution of his said regulations and statutes." This was the original foundation of the theological institution in Phillips Academy.

In 1808, Moses Brown and others gave a fund of forty thousand dollars to the corporation, the income of which is to be applied to the maintenance of two professors in the theological institution, and by certain elaborately drawn instruments they prescribed the terms on which the gifts were made, and the manner in which they were to be used. These gifts were accepted by the trustees, and the regulations for the management of them are entitled "The Statutes of the Associate Foundation in the Theological Institution in Andover," or "The Associate Statutes." In May, 1808, in pursuance of a power reserved by them in the original constitution, the original founders, Phœbe Phillips and others, by additional regulations, brought the original statutes into conformity with the associate statutes in all important particulars.

In general character the statutes of the associate foundation differ but little from the original statutes. They leave the whole management and control of the theological institution in the board of trustees, who constitute the corporation, and who hold the property, subject only to a visitatorial power in the board of visitors, whose general duty is to visit the corporation and see that the trustees manage the institution in conformity with the statutes, and if errors or abuses are discovered, to correct them; and subject also to a right and duty on the part of the visitors to take original supervisory action in two or three matters in the management, as in the examination of professors prior to their inauguration, and in the approving or negating the election of a professor by the trustees, and in appointing a standing committee to ascertain the qualifications of applicants for admission to the seminary.

The first part of Article 12 of the Associate Statutes is as follows: "That the trust aforesaid may be always executed agreeably to the true intent of this our foundation, and that we may effectually guard the same in all future time against all perversion, or the smallest avoidance of our true design as herein expressed; we, the aforesaid founders, do hereby constitute a board of visitors to be, as in our place and stead, the guardians, overseers, and protectors of this our foundation in manner as is expressed in the following provisions," etc. By Article 20 it is provided, that "the power and duties of the board of visitors thus constituted and organized shall be as follows, namely: to visit the foundation once in every year, and at other times when regularly called thereto; to inquire into the state of this our fund, and the management of this foundation, with respect both to professors and students; to determine, interpret, and explain the statutes of this foundation in all cases brought before them in their judicial capacity; to redress grievances, both with respect to professors and students; to hear appeals from decisions of the board of trustees, and to remedy upon complaint duly exhibited, in behalf of the said professors or students; to review and reverse any censure passed by said trustees upon any professor or student on this foundation; to declare void all rules and regulations made by the said trustees relative to this foundation which may be inconsistent with the original statutes thereof; to take care that the duties of every professor on this foundation be intelligibly and faithfully discharged, and to admonish or remove him either for misbehavior, heterodoxy, incapacity, or neglect of the duties of his office; to examine into the proficiency of the students, and to admonish, suspend, or deprive any student for negligence, contumacy,

or any heinous crime committed against the laws of God or the statutes of this foundation; and, in general, to see that our true intentions expressed in these our statutes be faithfully executed; always administering justice impartially, and exercising the functions of their office in the fear of God, according to the said statutes, the constitution of this seminary, and the laws of the land."

The powers and duties of the trustees in regard to the affairs of the corporation remain as prescribed by the original act of incorporation and the amendatory act, and by the original constitution of the theological institution, except so far as they are abridged or modified by the associate statutes.

We have before us two cases, — one the appeal of Egbert C. Smyth from the decree of the visitors of the theological institution in Andover, removing him from his office as Brown Professor of Ecclesiastical History, the other a bill in equity, brought by the Trustees of Phillips Academy against the Attorney-General and others, asking for the determination and instruction of the court in regard to the validity of the above-mentioned decree of the visitors.

It is contended by the appellant in the former case, and by the plaintiff in the latter case, that the provision for a board of visitors in the associate statutes is inconsistent with the act of incorporation of the Trustees of Phillips Academy, and invalid, and that the Statute of 1823, c. 250, incorporating the board of visitors, is unconstitutional and void. We are of opinion that this contention is not well founded. While by the original act the trustees are constituted the sole visitors of the corporation, we think it is not inconsistent with the design of the founders of the academy that they should accept and manage, under the authority of a legislative act, donations for a different but kindred purpose, and should permit supervision of their conduct in this department by a board of visitors appointed by the donors. The validity of these statutes, and of the act incorporating the board of visitors, seems to have been settled by adjudications of this court. *Phillips Academy v. King*, 12 Mass. 546; *Murdock*, appellant, 7 Pick. 303; *Murdock v. Phillips Academy*, 12 Pick. 243.

At the hearing before the board of visitors on the complaint of J. W. Wellman and others against Egbert C. Smyth and others, professors in the theological seminary in Andover, the trustees applied for leave to appear and be heard as a party, and their application was rejected. Again in this court the trustees have asked to be heard in that suit; and they contend that the decree of the visitors should be set aside because it was made without hearing them, and they make a like contention and argument in their suit in equity. The question which they present involves an inquiry into the nature of visitatorial proceedings in general, and into the relations of the visitors to the managing board of the corporation under the statutes of the founders of the theological institution in Phillips Academy. The nature of the duties of visitors of educational or charitable institutions is to some extent implied in the name which these officers bear. They are to visit the corporation. They are to go where it is and see it and its representatives face to face. 2 Kent Com. (13th ed.) 302; *The King v. Bishop of Ely*, 1 Wm. Bl. 82; *Eden v. Foster*, 2 P. Wms. 325. Their visitation is for the purpose of inquiring into its condition and ascertaining whether it is properly or improperly managed, and whether in all respects it is conducted according to the principles of its foundation.

A visitation may be general or special; and under most English foundations, to protect the managing board from too frequent interference, a general visitation can only take place at the expiration of a certain interval, as one, three, five, or ten years. Following this theory the Andover statutes prescribe that general visitations shall be once in a year. Associate Statutes, Art. 20. A special visitation may be made at any time at the request of the governing body, or of any one claiming a grievance against it, and who, on that account, has a right to promote the office of the visitors. When special duties are imposed on the board of visitors by the founder, the visitors may perform them at such times as required by the statutes which confer their authority. Ordinarily at a special visitation the managing body of the institution is necessarily a formal party before the visitors, because the visitation proceeds on a formal application by the managers, or by some one asking relief against them. When questions arise at a general visitation, whatever the form of the proceedings, the real party whose conduct is on trial is the managing board by reason of whose act or omission the institution is alleged to have gone astray. Although the visitors are not a court, in the performance of some of their duties they act judicially, and they must be governed by the will of the founder as expressed in his statutes. It is a fundamental principle of all judicial proceedings that one whose conduct is called in question shall be heard in his defence, and this principle is as important in its application to the managing board of a charitable corporation whose acts or omissions are under investigation by a board of visitors as to an individual charged with the commission of a crime. *Murdock*, appellant, 7 Pick. 353; *Murdock v. Phillips Academy*, 12 Pick. 243. It is inconceivable that a board of visitors intending to be governed by principles of justice should for a moment think of refusing the managing body a hearing in a case where the proceedings are directly against it to set aside its action. But it should not be forgotten that almost everything which comes within the jurisdiction of a board of visitors acting under their general visitatorial power involves a trial of the managing board, and the jurisdiction of the visitors to deal with the agents or servants or individual beneficiaries of the institution is, ordinarily, merely incidental to their jurisdiction over the institution itself as represented by its managing officers. If by the statutes they are given express authority to act in a visitatorial capacity in regard to an agent their action may no less directly affect the institution itself. The form of the proceeding is immaterial; if the visitors are in fact seeking to revise the action of the managers by virtue of their supervisory power the managers should have an opportunity to be heard.

So far as the industry of counsel on either side has furnished us with authorities we have found nothing to indicate that visitations of educational or charitable institutions under foundations like that which we are considering have ever been had without notice to the managing board. In some relations, under the ecclesiastical system in England, the bishop has visitatorial power of a different kind, which we need not consider; but in institutions like the theological department of Phillips Academy the right of the managing board to be heard before the visitors in every proceeding affecting the corporation seems to have been always assumed. In *The King v. Bishop of Ely*, 2 T. R. 290, 336, 338, 345, in considering the question whether a visitor acted in his official capacity, Ashhurst, J. said: "But even supposing that this matter was within the Bishop's

visitatorial authority, yet he has not acted in the character of a visitor. The exercise of a visitor's power in a case like the present is a judicial act, and a judge cannot determine without hearing the parties concerned. So that, even if he had the right to exercise such a power, he should have done it in a formal manner and should at least have convened the parties interested to give them an opportunity of making a defence." Buller, J. used the following language: "His proceedings therefore have not even the show of a visitation; for, whenever that is intended, the parties whose conduct or whose rights are objected to should be heard, or at least convened before him, and have an opportunity of being heard; but, in the present instance this ceremony was totally omitted." Grose, J. said: "Neither did he himself conceive that he was acting as visitor; his acts show that he was not; and he acted without giving notice to the persons on whom he was judging." Not only is this language applicable in terms to the governing board of a corporation whose conduct is called in question, but the facts of that case show that the judges had reference to the governing board of Peterhouse College, to whose action the controversy related. In those cases under royal charters where the visitatorial power is in the King, visitatorial proceedings in regard to the management of the affairs of the corporation have been conducted before the Lord Chancellor, who has observed the same rules as to bringing before him all parties interested as in ordinary cases in chancery; and every reason that exists in any case why parties interested in a proceeding should have a right to be heard applies in cases like the present.

The counsel for the trustees asserted at the argument that it had been the universal practice in England for visitors to give notice and an opportunity of being heard to the managing body before making a decree affecting the management of an eleemosynary institution, and they offered to present affidavits showing the result of extended researches in regard to the subject; but, the respondents objecting, and the facts not being regularly before us as evidence, we have considered only such cases as appear in the reports or come within general historical knowledge. These indicate that the practice in England has been as contended by the trustees. *Phillips v. Bury*, 2 T. R. 346; *S. C.* 1 Ld. Raym. 5; *The King v. Bishop of Ely*, 2 T. R. 290; *Attorney General v. Dixie*, 13 Ves. 519; *Attorney General v. Earl of Clarendon*, 17 Ves. 491.

It cannot be maintained that the visitors are the corporation that holds the property and is primarily responsible for the affairs of the seminary, or that they sufficiently represent the corporation when sitting as judges. They are incorporated as a separate board, and are the judicial department of the theological institution. They are not supposed to be familiar with the details of the business of the principal corporation, nor to understand the practical effect of many things in its management. They do not represent the corporation as an administrative board, and at a hearing in regard to the management of its affairs they would ordinarily need the aid of facts, suggestions, and arguments, which the managers alone could properly present. Besides, while they act as judges they are not in a position to defend ardently and vigorously acts of the corporation which might be unjustly and vigorously attacked by others.

It is a mistake to treat a proceeding before the visitors to remove five of the professors of an institution like the Theological Seminary at Andover as a suit against the professors alone. If they are wrongly there,

the trustees should have removed them. The proceedings look to a change which would be likely to concern very deeply the interests of the seminary. Can it be said that the officers of the corporation who have been charged with its management in the past and who will be held responsible for its condition in the future are not interested in a matter so vitally affecting it? Shall the officers of the corporation in such a case be forced to keep silence and trust to professors whose opinions or teachings are criticised to protect the interests of the corporation? Suppose a learned professor with mistaken self respect should refuse to defend himself at all under accusations in regard to the character of his teachings, must the trustees run the risk of losing his valuable services for want of a proper presentation of the truth at the hearing before the visitors? Even if he is willing to do what he can in his own defence, shall the managing body of the corporation be refused an opportunity of presenting in their own way considerations which they deem vital to the welfare of their institution, which the professor might overlook, or present but feebly?

The statutes of the theological seminary at Andover are of a character to emphasize the considerations which are generally applicable in cases of this kind. Article 14 of the original statutes of the seminary is as follows: "Every professor in this institution shall be under the immediate inspection of the said trustees, and by them removed agreeably to the will of his founder for gross neglect of duty, scandalous immorality, mental incapacity, or any other just and sufficient cause." Under the associate statutes this article is left in full force. *Murdock*, appellant, 7 Pick. 353; *Murdock v. Phillips Academy*, 12 Pick. 243. Except in the appointment of a standing committee to ascertain the qualifications of applicants for the advantages of the seminary, and in the revision of the action of the trustees in the election of professors, the powers and duties of the board of visitors, as prescribed in Article 20 above quoted, are strictly visitatorial, and the provisions of the original act of incorporation of Phillips Academy, and of the additional act of 1807, and of the original constitution of the theological institution primarily put upon the trustees the entire responsibility for the management of the seminary. The associate statutes are engrafted upon the original statutes and the acts of the legislature, and are to be considered with them. The power and duty to remove a professor who teaches doctrines contrary to the statutes is in the trustees, and if they see fit not to remove one who is charged with teaching erroneously, the visitors may take original proceedings for that purpose. But we are of opinion that in such a case the statutes require that the trustees should be heard, if they desire, as they would be on an appeal from their own order of removal or refusal to remove in proceedings before themselves. In the present case the trustees were not heard before the visitors, although they made a formal application for leave to become a party at the trial. The action of the visitors in this particular is subject to revision by the justices of this court who are expressly given authority under Article 25 of the associate statutes to set aside any decree which they deem contrary to the statutes, or beyond the just limits of the power of the visitors. By Article 20 the visitors are required to administer justice impartially, and exercise the functions of their office "according to the said statutes, the constitution of this seminary, and the laws of the land." We do not intimate that the visitors, in determining questions before them, are to be held to all the rules and formalities which would be observed by a court

of law under similar circumstances, nor that their action can ordinarily be revised by a court in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the statutes, unless it so affects a charity that a court of equity ought to interfere under its jurisdiction for the protection of trusts. But where a principle essential to a fair and proper adjudication of the rights of parties is disregarded in deciding a question, their action under statutes like those before us is invalid.

On questions so difficult that the members of the board of visitors were divided in opinion at the close of the hearing, we cannot say in the present case that a different result might not have been reached if the trustees had been heard. In this view of the subject it becomes unnecessary to consider many of the questions which were argued before us. The mistake of the visitors seems to have been in failing to appreciate that their functions in this hearing were merely visitatorial, and that they could not, as an administrative body, represent the interests and present the cause of the corporation whose conduct was on trial before them.

For these reasons we are of opinion that the action of the visitors was not in accordance with the statutes which they were trying to maintain, and that their decree must be set aside.

From the views already expressed it follows that the record of the board of visitors should be amended as requested by the appellant in the eighth particular of his suggestions for the diminution of the record, so as to show the proceedings in reference to the application of the board of trustees to appear and be heard before the visitors.

The application of the trustees of Phillips Academy to be heard before us as a party in the original suit having been granted, their bill in equity is dismissed without prejudice.

Decrees accordingly.

DISSENTING OPINION.

FIELD, C. J. I dissent from that part of the opinion of the court which holds that the decree of the visitors should be set aside on the ground that the trustees as a corporation was not formally made a party to the proceedings before the visitors. It is immaterial whether or not the application of the trustees to be permitted to appear as a party be a part of the record of the visitors, because this record, even if the application of the trustees is excluded from it, does not show that the trustees as a corporation was cited to appear, or did appear, in the proceedings. It is abundantly evident that Professor Smyth, as well as the complainants, was represented before the visitors by learned counsel, and that both the prosecution and the defence were conducted with great thoroughness and ability, so that justice does not require that the decree be set aside on the ground that the trustees were not made a party unless, as a strict matter of law, it was indispensably necessary to make them a party in order that the visitors might acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter of the complaint. Professor Smyth in the complaint was charged with heterodoxy, if he was charged with anything that could justify the decree. It is conceded by the majority of the court that the visitors had original jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint. The visitors have been made a corporation by the Statute of January 17, 1824, and by that Statute are empowered to "do and perform all acts and things required of them by" the statutes of the founders, and this court by the same statute is authorized "to declare null and void any decree or sen-

tence of the visitors " which may be considered " contrary to the statutes of the founders and beyond the just limits of the power prescribed to them thereby." Both the visitors and this court are acting under this special Statute. The question is whether there is anything in the associate statutes of the founders of the theological institution subject to which Professor Smyth holds his office that in a proceeding of this kind absolutely requires the trustees to be made a party.

In considering this, it is necessary to inquire particularly into the power and duties of the visitors under the associate statutes. The Act of Massachusetts Bay, passed October 4, 1780, incorporating the trustees of Phillips Academy in Andover, made its trustees the sole visitors, and prescribed that the number of the trustees should not be more than thirteen nor less than seven ; that the principal instructor for the time being should be one of them ; that a major part should be laymen and respectable freeholders, and also that a major part should consist of men not inhabitants of the town where the seminary was situated. No religious or theological test of any kind was prescribed as a qualification for the office of trustee.

By the original statutes of Phœbe Phillips and others who were the founders of the Theological Institution in Phillips Academy, and by the associate statutes of Moses Brown, William Bartlet, and John Norris, and by the additional statutes of the original founders, an entirely new visitatorial scheme was established for the theological institution. The associate statutes, subject to which Professor Smyth holds his office of Brown Professor of Ecclesiastical History, prescribed a creed of theological doctrine to be taught in the institution, and required every professor on the associate foundation, " after a careful examination by the visitors with reference to his religious principles," to publicly make and subscribe a solemn declaration of his faith in Divine Revelation, and in the fundamental and distinguishing doctrines of the Gospel as expressed in the following creed," etc., and then follows a long and carefully prepared creed.

Art. III. is as follows : " The preceding Creed and Declaration shall be repeated by every professor on this foundation at the expiration of every successive period of five years ; and no man shall be continued a professor on said foundation who shall not continue to approve himself a man of sound and orthodox principles in divinity agreeably to the aforesaid Creed." The professors are to be chosen by the trustees, and the " choice presented to the visitors for their approbation," and, " if this choice be negatived, another election shall in like manner be presented, and, *toties quoties*, till an election be made which shall be approved by the visitors." Art. VI.

Art. XII. is as follows : " That the trust aforesaid may be always executed, agreeably to the true intent of this our foundation, and that we may effectually guard the same in all future time against all perversion or the smallest avoidance of our true design, as herein expressed, We, the aforesaid founders, do hereby constitute a board of visitors to be as in our place and stead the guardians, overseers, and protectors of this our foundation. . . . And it is farther expressly provided, that the perpetual board of visitors first herein named shall consist of two clergymen and one layman, all of whom shall be men of distinguished talents and piety." By Art. XIII. it was provided that no person should be eligible as a visitor under the age of forty years ; and, with the exception of the original visitors, a visitor ceases to hold his office when he completes his seventieth year.

The board was to meet every year at the aforesaid theological institution to execute the business of their appointment; and "also, upon emergencies, when called thereto, as hereinafter directed." Art. XIV.

By Art. XIX. it was provided that every visitor, before taking his seat at the board, should make and subscribe a declaration as follows: "Approving the statutes of the aforesaid theological institution, and those of the associate founders, I solemnly declare, in the presence of God and of this board, that I will faithfully exert my abilities to carry into execution the statutes of the said founders, and to promote the great object of the institution." Every visitor was also required to subscribe "the same theological creed which every professor elect is required to subscribe, and a declaration of his faith in the same creed shall be repeated by him at every successive period of five years."

The powers and duties of the board of visitors thus constituted and organized were set forth in Art. XX., which is as follows: "The power and duties of the board of visitors thus constituted and organized shall be as follows: namely, to visit the foundation once in every year, and at other times when regularly called thereto; to inquire into the state of this our fund, and the management of this foundation, with respect both to professors and students; to determine, interpret, and explain the statutes of this foundation in all cases brought before them in their judicial capacity; to redress grievances, both with respect to professors and students; to hear appeals from decisions of the Board of Trustees, and to remedy, upon complaint, duly exhibited in behalf of the said professors or students; to review and reverse any censure passed by said trustees upon any professor or student on this foundation; to declare void all rules and regulations made by the said trustees, relative to this foundation, which may be inconsistent with the original statutes thereof; to take care that the duties of every professor on this foundation be intelligibly and faithfully discharged, and to admonish or remove him either for misbehavior, heterodoxy, incapacity, or neglect of the duties of his office; to examine into the proficiency of the students, and to admonish, suspend, or deprive any student for negligence, contumacy, or any heinous crime committed against the laws of God or the statutes of this foundation; and, in general, to see that our true intentions, as expressed in these our statutes, be faithfully executed, always administering justice impartially, and exercising the functions of their office in the fear of God, according to the said statutes, the constitution of this seminary, and the laws of the land."

Art. XXII. is as follows: "The visitors shall appoint a standing committee to ascertain the qualifications of applicants for the advantages of this foundation. Those whom they approve may be recommended for admission as resident applicants on trial for two months; and, if at the expiration of this term the faculty approve them, they may be placed on the list of resident students until the next annual meeting of the visitors. And, if upon examination by the board of visitors, they be then approved, they shall be registered as associate students; but, if not approved by the visitors, after careful examination and the best information respecting them, they shall be dismissed from the foundation."

Art. XXVI. is as follows: "Every annual meeting of the board of visitors shall be introduced with prayer, after which these statutes shall be read by the president."

I do not propose to inquire how far Moses Brown and William Bart-

let and John Norris in establishing these statutes adopted the original statutes of the institution established by Phœbe Phillips and others, or to discuss any differences that may be suggested between the original statutes of the institution as modified by the additional statutes of the original founders and the associate statutes. I assume, without considering it, that the Brown Professor of Ecclesiastical History, holding his office, as I understand, under the associate statutes, might be removed from his office by the trustees, acting under Art. XIV. of the original statutes of the Theological Institution, "for gross neglect of duty, scandalous immorality, mental incapacity, or any other just and sufficient cause," and that heterodoxy is a just and sufficient cause. Still it is evident that for the protection of the institution from heterodoxy, Moses Brown and his associates relied mainly upon the board of visitors established by them. The board of visitors was to be composed ultimately of two clergymen and one layman of distinguished talents and piety, in the prime of life, who were to read or to listen to the reading of the statutes every year, and who, before taking their seat at the board, were required to declare their faith in the creed prescribed by these statutes, and to repeat this declaration of faith every five years. They were required to examine the persons proposed for professors, with reference to their religious principles, and to examine the applicants for admission as students, and to approve or reject both professors and students. The trustees might be of any or no theological belief, and a majority of them were laymen, and no qualifications were required which would enable them to decide intelligently theological questions. It is manifest that the associate founders were unwilling to trust the management of their foundation on its theological side to the trustees. Accordingly the associate statutes gave the visitors established by them not only general visitatorial powers, but special powers, both original and appellate, and it is in the exercise of one of these special powers that the visitors acted in the present case. No question arises in the case of the incidents of general visitatorial powers. So far as the visitors may attempt to supervise the action of the trustees, justice may require that the trustees should have notice and an opportunity to be heard. So far as the visitors are authorized "to hear appeals from decisions of the board of trustees," that board would be in a sense a party, as their record must be produced before the visitors, and as the trustees might be both prosecutors and judges the trustees might have an interest in maintaining the propriety of their action.

But the duty imposed on the visitors "to take care that the duties of every professor on this foundation be intelligibly and faithfully discharged, and to admonish or remove him, either for misbehavior, heterodoxy, incapacity, or neglect of the duties of his office," as well as the duty "to examine into the proficiency of the students, and to admonish, suspend, or deprive any student for negligence, contumacy, or any heinous crime committed against the laws of God or the statutes of this foundation," is a duty directed, not against the trustees, but against the professors and students, and is one that must be performed by the visitors according to their own judgment, and not according to the judgment of the trustees. It is an original and not a supervisory power. The complaint of Mr. Wellman and others against Professor Smyth, filed with the visitors, charged no maladministration on the part of the trustees; and the conduct of the trustees was not in any way involved in the proceedings. It was the primary duty of the visitors to entertain the complaint,

if it seemed to them to require consideration. The visitors, in determining the matter of the complaint, could render no decree or judgment against the trustees. If the trustees, as a corporation, had been cited to appear, it is difficult to see in what capacity they would appear in the proceedings, whether for the prosecution or the defense, or sometimes for one and sometimes for the other. If Professor Smyth had pleaded that he was guilty of the charges and specifications, could the trustees have pleaded that he was not guilty, or if he had pleaded that he was not guilty, could the trustees have pleaded that he was guilty? If the trustees are made a party, what is or can be the issue tried between them and the complainants, or between them and Professor Smyth? Suppose Professor Smyth had admitted in evidence before the visitors that the doctrines he taught were inconsistent with the creed established by the associate founders in manner and form as charged, and had consented to be removed from his office, or had asked leave to resign his office, could the trustees have prevented it?

There may be some embarrassment on the part of the trustees after Professor Smyth has been removed from his office by the visitors pending an appeal to this court. If the court affirms the decree, then he is removed from office, as of the date of the original decree; if the complaint is dismissed, or the decree is set aside, then he remains a professor until he dies, resigns, or is removed from office by a new decree. But the status of Professor Smyth pending an appeal to this court, if he is removed by the visitors, is a consequence of the action of the visitors, and the embarrassment of the trustees arises not during the trial but only after the visitors have determined the matter of the complaint. The relation of the trustees to Professor Smyth after the decree of the visitors pending an appeal to this court is the same whether they have been admitted as a party to the original proceedings or not. The same embarrassment arises in every case where one body has the power of removing an officer and another body pays him his salary while he holds his office. It arises in most ecclesiastical trials. It arises in the case of the policemen of Boston appointed by the Board of Police, who may be removed by the board, but while they continue in office are paid by the city. It was never supposed that the city of Boston was a necessary party to a complaint against a policeman before the Board of Police. *Ham v. Boston Board of Police*, 142 Mass. 90. In the present case the visitors are a special tribunal under the statutes of the associate founders and the statute of the Commonwealth for the trial of Professor Smyth on such a complaint as was made in this case. Professor Smyth had the rights of any incumbent of an office who can only be removed for cause, and these are defined in *Murdock v. Phillips Academy*, 12 Pick. 262. The trustees were not the prosecutors. The members of the board of trustees, if they knew anything of the matters charged, could be called as witnesses, but the conduct of the trustees as a corporation was not involved in the proceedings, and the opinion of this corporation on the truth or falseness of the charges, or whether, if true, they constituted heterodoxy, could not lawfully be used to influence the judgment of the visitors. Even if the opinion of the trustees could be received for this purpose, it would be competent as evidence, but the competency of such evidence would not require that the trustees be made a party. If this were an appeal from the decision of the trustees the opinion of that board could not lawfully be used to affect the judgment of the visitors. This is the general rule

in proceedings on appeal. "They [the visitors] are bound on appeal to hear the cause *de novo*, and without any regard to antecedent steps except that the cause shall be regularly brought before them." *Murdock*, appellant, 7 Pick. 328, 329. *A fortiori* when the visitors take original jurisdiction of a complaint the opinion of the trustees who never heard the complaint cannot be admissible.

I think that the appeal cannot be disposed of on the ground that the trustees were not made a party to the proceedings before the visitors, and that it should be considered on its merits so far as under the Statute of January 17, 1824, this court is authorized to consider it. I refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits for the reason, among others, that there may be a new trial of the complaint by the visitors, and another appeal to this court.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

RESPONSE TO THE CHARGES AND SPECIFICATIONS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESBYTERY OF NEW YORK.¹

MR. MODERATOR, MINISTERS, AND ELDERS OF THE PRESBYTERY OF NEW YORK :

Gentlemen, — I appear before you at this time in compliance with your citation, dated October 6, 1891, to plead to the charges and specifications placed in my hands by the Presbytery at that time. It is now my right, in accordance with the Book of Discipline, § 22, to "file objections," if I have any, "to the regularity of the organization, or to the jurisdiction of the judicatory, or to the sufficiency of the charges and specifications in form and in legal effect, or any other substantial objection affecting the order or regularity of the proceeding."

I have no objections to the regularity of the organization, nor to the jurisdiction of the Presbytery of New York; but it is necessary, both in my own interest and in the interest of the order and regularity of the judicial proceedings in the Presbytery, to file objections "to the sufficiency of the charges and specifications in form" and "in legal effect."

It is far from my purpose to raise any objections of a technical kind, that may in any way directly or indirectly delay the probation of charges that are approved as sufficient, and specifications that are recognized as relevant by the Presbytery of New York; but the order of the Book of Discipline requires that the question of *relevancy* should first be decided

¹ The Prosecuting Committee, appointed by the Presbytery of New York in the case of Dr. Briggs, have formulated and taken an appeal from the Presbytery to the next General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. The document numbers 24 pages. We should suppose that the first question for the Assembly to determine must be, whether such a committee has any standing before the Assembly; whether its occupation was not gone when the Presbytery which appointed it dismissed the case.

A complaint of the decision of the Presbytery, addressed to the Synod of New York, has also been filed. It is signed by Rev. Dr. William G. T. Shedd, Dr. R. R. Booth, and thirty-two others. It is sufficient for the purposes of this *Review* thus to refer to these documents. As we have published the charges against Dr. Briggs, we give also his response. — ED.

by the Presbytery, before I can with propriety plead "guilty," or "not guilty."

No one has made this clearer than the Rev. E. R. Craven, D. D., the chairman of the Committee of the General Assembly which prepared the present Book of Discipline, when he said:—

"In every trial there are two issues: first, do the facts alleged, if true, sustain the charge? and, second, are the facts true? Ordinarily the affirmative of the former question is tacitly assumed by both the judicatory and the accused person. In such cases the only question to be decided is the latter. Cases sometimes arise, however, especially where there is an individual prosecutor, in which both issues must be tried. They cannot, with propriety, be tried together, for one is a question of law, the other of evidence. In such cases it is manifest wisdom to dispose of the legal question first, and thus possibly prevent a useless waste of time and laceration of feeling."—*Presbyterian Review*, 1884, p. 57.

Adopting the course thus recommended, I do hereby file the following objections to the "sufficiency of the charges and specifications in form and in legal effect."

I.—THE PREAMBLE.

The report of the Committee of the Presbytery, which presented the charges and specifications, contains, in its preamble, intimation of charges and specifications which they have not proposed for trial, as follows:—

"It has been decided by your committee that it is neither necessary nor advisable to embrace in the list of charges all the doctrinal errors contained in the inaugural address, and, while its teachings respecting miracles, the original condition of man, the nature of sin, race redemption, and Dr. Briggs' scheme of Biblical theology in general, are not in harmony with the Scriptures, and are calculated to weaken confidence in the Word of God, and to encourage presumption on the clemency and long-suffering of God, yet in order that we may avoid an undue extension of the trial, and the confusion of thought that might follow an attempt to compass all the errors contained in said address, we have deemed it best to confine attention to a few departures from the teachings of the Scriptures which are fundamental to the entire discussion.

"Furthermore, your committee is not unmindful of the fact that the erroneous and ill-advised utterances of Dr. Briggs in the inaugural address have seriously disturbed the peace of the Church and led to a situation full of difficulty and complication, and have produced such wide-spread uneasiness and agitation throughout the Church as to cause sixty-three Presbyteries to overture the General Assembly with reference to the same, yet for the reasons above given we have determined not to include this grave offense against the peace of the Church in the list of formal charges" (pp. 4, 5).

I object (1) that, if there are any such errors contained in my inaugural address as the committee allege in the preamble of their report, it was their duty to formulate them into charges and specifications sufficient in form and in legal effect.

(2) That, if the committee did not think best so to do, they should have refrained from alleging doctrinal errors which they did not propose to submit to probation, and which so alleged without opportunity of refutation, seem calculated to exert prejudice against me in the minds of the members of the court.

(3) That, if, as the report alleges, "The erroneous and ill-advised utterances of Dr. Briggs in the inaugural address have seriously disturbed the peace of the Church," and these constitute a "grave offense against the peace of the Church," it was the duty of the committee to

formulate this grave offense into a charge and specification "sufficient in form and legal effect."

(4) That, if it was not deemed best so to do, the report should have refrained from alleging a grave offense which was not proposed for probation, the allegation of which might prejudice the decision of those charges and specifications offered for probation.

The Presbytery are requested therefore to blot out from the report these insinuations and imputations of doctrinal errors and grave offense.

If I have in any way, directly or indirectly, been the occasion of disturbing the peace of the Church, I deeply regret it. If I have given pain and anxiety to my brethren in the ministry, or to the people of Christ's Church, by any utterances in the inaugural address, I am very sorry. But after repeated re-readings of the address, away from the seat of strife, in a foreign land, I cannot honestly say that there are any such doctrinal errors in the address as the report alleges, and at the bar of my own conscience, I feel no guilt as regards the grave offense of disturbing the peace and harmony of the Church.

II. — THE CHARGES.

I object "to the sufficiency of the *Charges*" "in form" and "legal effect."

The rules relating to the charge in the Book of Discipline are: (1) "The charge shall set forth the alleged offense" (§ 15); (2) "A charge shall not allege more than one offense" (§ 16); (3) The supreme court of the Church has decided that "All charges for heresy should be as definite as possible. The article or articles of faith impugned should be specified, and the words supposed to be heretical shown to be in repugnance to these articles; whether the reference is made directly to the Scripture as a standard of orthodoxy; or to the Confession of Faith, which our Church holds to be a summary of the doctrines of Scripture" (*Craighead case*, 1824, p. 121).

I object that the charges comply with none of the rules.

(1) *Charge I. sets forth "more than one offense."* It alleges "teaching doctrines which conflict irreconcilably with, and are contrary to, the cardinal doctrine taught in Holy Scripture," etc. (p. 5). If, as alleged, more than one doctrine, or a plurality of doctrines is taught, which conflict with a cardinal doctrine of Holy Scripture, there is a plurality of offenses, and each one of these cardinal offenses should be mentioned in a separate charge. Charge I: alleges several offenses.

(2) *Charge I. does not "set forth the alleged offense."* It alleges "teaching doctrines that conflict with, and are contrary to," etc. It does not specify what doctrine it is, or what doctrines these are which "conflict irreconcilably with, and are contrary to the cardinal doctrine." I object (a), that I cannot with propriety plead guilty, or not guilty, to teaching such doctrines, until I know what doctrines the prosecution have in mind.

(b) So far as I know, I have never taught any doctrines that conflict with a cardinal doctrine of Holy Scripture. It is conceivable that I may be mistaken, and that I might acknowledge my error if such doctrines were specified by the prosecution.

(c) The charge is so general, vague, and obscure, that it comprehends any and every reason that any one may find for judging that my teachings are contrary to my ordination vow, "that the Scriptures of the Old

and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice ;” and thus enables the jurors to vote for my condemnation, one for one reason, another for a second reason, a third for a third reason, and so on, securing by the cumulation of votes for different reasons, a judgment that might not be secured if each reason were proved and voted upon by itself.

(3) *The charges are not specific and definite.* It is true that Charge I. is so far definite that it alleges the cardinal doctrine that “the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice ;” as that doctrine with which the doctrines taught by me are in irreconcilable conflict. This implies that I have taught some other doctrine than said cardinal doctrine. But the charge is not definite and specific in that it fails to define what doctrine it is that has been taught in the inaugural address, that is in conflict with, and contrary to, said cardinal doctrine.

Charge II. is less general and vague than Charge I., for whereas Charge I. alleges “teaching doctrines” which conflict, Charge II. alleges teaching “a doctrine of the character, state, and sanctification of believers after death” (p. 39), which irreconcilably conflicts; but this latter is yet indefinite and vague, for the reason that it does not define what precise doctrine it is, out of the many different doctrines taught by theologians in this department of Eschatology, that is an offense. Charge II., while more specific than Charge I. in its reference to the doctrine taught by Dr. Briggs, is more seriously at fault than Charge I., in that Charge I. mentions the cardinal doctrine that “the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice,” but Charge II. does not state what doctrine it is of Holy Scripture or of the Westminster Confession with which the doctrine taught by me is in irreconcilable conflict.

I would be entirely willing to waive this objection to the charges as not specific and definite, if this were the only ground of objection, and there were any proper way of reaching definite charges by means of the specifications. But this way out of the difficulty is closed against us, as we shall soon see. I am obliged in the interest of the orderly procedure, in a case which is subject to the review of a superior and of a supreme court, to file this objection, even if it be less serious than others which are now to be adduced.

(4) I object to the sufficiency of Charge II. for the reason that *it does not indicate that the offense charged is against an essential and necessary article of the system of doctrine contained in the Westminster Confession.* The Law of the Church as expressed in the Book of Discipline (§ 4) is, that —

“Nothing shall therefore be the object of judicial process which cannot be proved to be contrary to the Holy Scriptures, or to the regulations and practice of the Church founded thereon; nor anything which does not involve those evils which Discipline is intended to prevent.”

In the second term of subscription, the offense in doctrine is limited as follows: “Do you sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this Church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?” This subscription is in accordance with the Adopting Act of 1729, which requires subscription to the Confession of Faith and Catechisms, “as being in all the essential and necessary articles, good forms of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine.” The supreme

court of the Church, in the Harker case, 1765, defined this when it said, "essential to the system of doctrine contained in our Westminster Confession of Faith considered as a system." These regulations and decisions of the supreme court of the Presbyterian Church require that nothing shall be considered as an offense which is not contrary to an essential and necessary article of the Westminster Confession. Charge I. complies with this rule in so far as it represents that the doctrine "that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice" is a "cardinal doctrine;" but Charge II. does not comply with the regulations of the Church, in that it neglects to state what cardinal doctrine, or what essential and necessary article, of the Westminster Confession of Faith it is with which the doctrine taught by me is in irreconcilable conflict.

When these two charges are placed side by side, the one exposes the faults of the other, and convicts it of insufficiency. Each is insufficient where the other is sufficient. Each is indefinite and vague where the other is more definite and specific. Charge I. defines the doctrine to which the doctrines taught by me are opposed; Charge II. makes no statement at all of any doctrine of Scripture or Confession to which my teachings are opposed. Charge II. mentions a general group of doctrines taught by me which, it is claimed, is opposed to Scripture and Confession, but Charge I. makes no definition whatever of any doctrines taught by me. Charge II. alleges one offense where Charge I. alleges several. Charge I. states cardinal doctrine where Charge II. makes no mention of cardinal doctrine. *Charges I. and II. are therefore "insufficient in form and legal effect."*

III. — THE SPECIFICATIONS.

I object to the specifications as irrelevant, "insufficient in form and legal effect," for the following reasons: The law of the specification as given in the Book of Discipline is that "*The specifications shall set forth the facts relied upon to sustain the charge*" (§ 15). The committee seem to have an indefinite conception of the nature of specifications. Some of the specifications seem to have been framed as if they were particular items of the general charge, others as if they were particulars of a still more general charge than that alleged in Charge I., and still others as if they were striving to state the facts required by the rule for specifications in our Book of Discipline. Lest there should be obscurity in the minds of the members of the court on this point, I shall take the liberty of citing from that ancient and classic authority in Presbyterian law, upon which the American Book of Discipline is based. The libel in the Scottish law-books comprehends the three parts, — charge, specification, and judgment.

"A Libel is a Law Syllogism, consisting of the Proposition or Relevancy, which is founded upon the Laws of God, or some Ecclesiastical Constitution agreeable thereto, as, whosoever is absent from publick Divine Service on the Lord's Day, ought to be censured. The second Part consists of the subsumption, or probation, which condescends on matter of Fact, viz., But such a person did, upon such or such a Lord's Day, absent unnecessarily from the publick Worship of God. The third Part consists of the Conclusion or Sentence, which contains a Desire, that the Profaner of the Lord's Day, according to the Laws and Customs mentioned in the first part, may be censured." — Walter Stewart, "*Collections and Observations concerning the Worship, Discipline, and Government of the Church of Scotland*," p. 268.

The standard authority of the Church of Scotland at the present time gives a similar statement: —

“The body of the libel consists of three parts, which together should form a regular syllogism. The first, or major proposition, sets forth the criminality of the *species facti* charged, and alleges the guilt of the accused; the second, or minor, narrates the *facts* of the particular offense; and the third, or conclusion, deduces the justice of punishing the individual offender. The major proposition should be made as brief and comprehensive as possible. By overloading it, the logical structure of the libel is impaired, and unnecessary discussions on relevancy may be raised. It may be difficult to bring ecclesiastical offenses under specific and generic names to the degree in which crimes are classified in the civil law. But it is desirable that this should be done as far as possible, in order to facilitate certainty and simplicity in the criminal proceedings of church courts. Where it is necessary to use circumlocution in expressing the general nature of the offense, nothing should be introduced which is not essential to the criminal charge. Where it is impossible, from the nature of the offense, to bring it under any generic denomination, the particular offense intended to be charged should be set forth in the major as criminal in the abstract, and should be repeated in the minor as having been committed by the accused at a certain time and place.” — Cook, “*Styles of Writs, Forms of Procedure, and Practice of the Church Courts of Scotland*,” pp. 119, 120.

The standard authority of the Free Church of Scotland is in entire accord therewith: —

“It has been established by long practice that no judicial process of a serious kind can be carried out against a minister or a probationer, except by the use of what is called a libel. This is a document consisting of three parts, and forming a regular syllogism. The first, or major proposition, sets forth the nature of the alleged offense, declares its contrariety to the Word of God and the laws of the Church, and indicates the kind of consequences which ought to follow from it. The second, or minor proposition, asserts the guilt of the minister or probationer, and specifies what are believed to be the leading facts involving guilt, and particularizing time, place, and other circumstances. This proposition may contain one or more counts of indictment. The third part connects the major and minor proposition together, and thereby deduces the conclusion that the minister or probationer, as guilty of the offense mentioned in the major proposition, ought to be subjected to the consequences, provided the minor proposition be made good, either by confession or by adequate evidence. It is of great importance that care be taken to frame the libel with accuracy, so as to avoid grounds for questioning its relevancy.” — Sir Henry Moncrieff, “*The Practice of the Free Church of Scotland*,” pp. 118, 119.

The rules of our Book of Discipline are based upon the practice of the Church of Scotland. The charge corresponds with the first or major proposition of the Libel; the specification corresponds with the second or minor proposition; the sentence, with the third part or conclusion. It is essential that the minor premise, or the specification, should be relevant to the major proposition or the charge; otherwise a person may be judged innocent or guilty of a charge with which the facts adduced have no manner of relevancy, and sentenced to unrighteous suffering. A Presbytery cannot with propriety enter upon the probation of a specification, which specification if proven would not substantiate the charge.

With these preliminary statements I shall now proceed to file objections to the relevancy of the specifications.

1. — SPECIFICATION OF CHARGE II.

I prefer to dispose first of the single specification under Charge II.

Charge II. is followed by a heading entitled "Specification;" but in fact there is no specification whatever, but only the general statement: "In the said inaugural address, delivered, published, extensively circulated, and republished as above described, Dr. Briggs teaches as follows" (p. 39). Turning to Charge I. we find that a statement corresponding to this is made as the second section of the charge. Place the two side by side and this will be evident at a glance: —

CHARGE I.

"These hurtful errors, striking at the vitals of religion, and contrary to the regulations and practice of the Presbyterian Church, were promulgated in an inaugural address which Dr. Briggs delivered at the Union Theological Seminary in the city of New York, Jan. 20, 1891, on the occasion of his induction into the Edward Robinson Chair of Biblical Theology, which address has, with Dr. Briggs' approval, been published and extensively circulated, and republished in a second edition with a preface and an appendix" (p. 5).

SPECIFICATION OF CHARGE II.

"In the said inaugural address, delivered, published, extensively circulated, and republished as above described, Dr. Briggs teaches as follows" (p. 39).

If such a statement belong to Charge I., it does not belong to the specification of Charge II. The only item under the so-called specification of Charge II., not corresponding to the statement made under Charge I., is the clause "teaches as follows." In all the previous specifications, the references under the head of "Inaugural Address" are a part of the proof; here, however, they are made a part of the specification. This so-called specification is a heaping up of extracts from six pages of the inaugural address. I shall admit the correctness of the citations. If therefore no objection is taken to their propriety in the specification, or to their relevancy under the charge, the defendant is placed in a disadvantageous position as to the verdict which might be rendered against him on the basis of any one of the thirty-four verses of Scripture cited, or any clause of the several extracts from the Standards.

There is nothing whatever in the specification. It makes no specification of fact such as could be admitted or refuted. If the specification had pointed to any erroneous doctrine taught by me; if I had been charged with teaching second probation or any probation whatever after death, — I might have pointed to several of my writings in which this doctrine is distinctly disclaimed. If the doctrine of purgatory had been imputed, or regeneration after death, or transition after death from the state of the condemned to the state of the justified, any and all of these could have been disproved from my writings. If any insinuation had been made that I had taught that the redeemed enter the middle state guilty and sinful, this could easily have been refuted. But no such doctrines are specified. No specific doctrine whatever is mentioned. There is nothing in the specification that can be tested by the defendant or challenged by the Presbytery.

There was no sufficient reason for indefiniteness and vagueness here. The doctrine taught in the inaugural address is Progressive Sanctification after Death. The doctrine alleged to be in conflict with it is Immediate Sanctification at Death.

It will be necessary for the prosecution to prove (1) that immediate sanctification at death is taught in the Scriptures and the Standards, (2) that it is a cardinal doctrine of the Westminster Confession, and (3) that the two doctrines are in irreconcilable conflict with each other, ere the Presbytery would be justified in condemning me. The charge and so-called specification do not make a definite issue. They put the charge and specification in such an obscure, indefinite, and empty form that the defendant is placed at a serious disadvantage in pleading, and the jurors may be justified in voting to condemn, on any plausible ground that might seem to them sufficient, to prove that in any way the views of the future state expressed in the inaugural address are in conflict with their own views of Scripture and Confession.

2. — SPECIFICATION 5 OF CHARGE I.

Having disposed of the specification under Charge II., we may now devote our attention to the seven specifications of Charge I. These specifications may be grouped under several heads. I shall review them in an order more suitable to my purpose than that of the Report itself. I shall first consider specification 5; (2) specifications 1 and 6; (3) specifications 2, 3, and 4; (4) specification 7. The first of the specifications to which I object is specification 5:—

“Dr. Briggs makes statements in regard to the Holy Scriptures which cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of the true and full inspiration of those Scriptures as the Word of God written” (p. 21).

It should now be kept distinctly in mind that a specification must confine itself to setting forth “*the facts relied upon to sustain the charge*” (§ 15). This specification does not state a fact, but makes an allegation which is of the nature of a charge. This will be clear if one compares this specification with Charges I. and II. Charge I. alleges that Dr. Briggs teaches “doctrines which conflict.” Charge II. alleges that he teaches a doctrine of “the character, state, and sanctification of believers after death” which conflicts. This specification alleges that he makes “statements in regard to the Holy Scriptures which cannot be reconciled with,” etc. Specification 5 is therefore really as much of a charge as Charges I. and II., and has been improperly brought under Charge I. But even as a charge, it is no true charge. It shares the faults of the other charges. This specification uses the plural “*statements*,” involving several offenses, and it does not specify what one of the many statements in regard to the Holy Scripture it is designed to allege against me. Placing this specification side by side with Charge I., it is clear that this specification cannot be brought under Charge I., for it deals with a different doctrine. In Charge I. the cardinal doctrine, that “the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice,” the first of the terms of subscription, is the doctrine against which it is alleged that I offend. In this specification it is “the true and full inspiration of Holy Scripture as the Word of God written” (Confession of Faith, I. 2) against which offense is alleged. These two doctrines may be brought under the general doctrine of Holy Scripture; but the one of these doctrines cannot be brought under the other. Therefore Specification 5 is irrelevant to Charge I.

When one compares this report, with its charges and specifications, with the report of the committee to examine the inaugural address, made to the Presbytery in May last, and recognizes that the chairman and

the majority of both committees are the same, one is entitled to ask how they can reconcile the two reports. What they then, in their first report, made their second charge, and what they then argued as their principal offense, namely, the offense against the inerrancy of the original autographs of Scripture, has been reduced in this report to a specification under Charge I. Here was a definite, a distinct difference of doctrine as to the inerrancy of Scripture, which should have been formulated into a definite charge with specifications, so that the Presbytery might vote on the question: Does the Westminster Confession teach the inerrancy of the original autographs of Holy Scripture? The charge definitely made and argued last May has been depreciated in this report. It has been subordinated as a specification under a different charge. It has been couched in such general, obscure, and indefinite language as not to enable a juror to vote on the direct question of the inerrancy of the original autographs of Scripture; but to induce him to vote the defendant guilty of a general charge for any private reasons of objection against his doctrine of the Bible, whatever they may be.

Specification 5 ought to be restored to its original position as given in the report of the committee to the Presbytery in May last, and made as a distinct charge, and it should state definitely the issue involved, namely, what doctrine is it that Dr. Briggs teaches that is irreconcilable with the cardinal doctrine of Scripture and Confession, as to the inerrancy of Holy Scripture? Is it a cardinal doctrine of Holy Scripture and Confession that the original autographs of Holy Scripture were inerrant? If such a definite charge had been made, then the Presbytery could test it intelligently and decide with precision.

3. — SPECIFICATIONS 1 AND 6 OF CHARGE I.

Specifications 1 and 6 may be considered together, because they are the only two of the eight specifications that can be recognized as in any sense true and real, as alleging actual facts.

A. — SPECIFICATION 1.

It is a fact that the Inaugural Address declares that there are "historically three great fountains of divine authority, the Bible, the Church, and the Reason," but Specification 1 is illegal in form, in that it introduces an inference from the fact, by the prosecution, that cannot be recognized as either true or valid. It is not altogether clear what the prosecution mean to infer by their word "*sufficient*." If they mean to intimate that the inaugural teaches that the Church and the Reason are each alike *sufficient* fountains of divine authority, and that the Church and the Reason are no less "*sufficient* to give that knowledge of God and His will which is necessary unto salvation" than Holy Scripture, they infer what they have no right to infer from anything taught in the inaugural address. It is unlawful to put in specifications inferences of the prosecution not recognized by the accused, as if they were facts. For the supreme court of the Church has decided in the Craighead case —

"That a man cannot fairly be convicted of heresy for using expressions that may be so interpreted as to involve heretical doctrines, if they may also admit of a more favorable construction: because no one can tell in what sense an ambiguous expression is used but the speaker or writer, and he has a right to explain himself; and in such cases candor requires that a court should favor the accused by putting on his words the more favorable rather than the less favorable construction. Another principle is, that no man can rightly be

convicted of heresy by inference or implication ; that is, we must not charge an accused person with holding those consequences which may legitimately flow from his assertions. Many men are grossly inconsistent with themselves ; and while it is right, in argument, to overthrow false opinions by tracing them in their connections and consequences, it is not right to charge any man with an opinion which he disavows." — Craighead case : "*Minutes of the General Assembly*," 1824, p. 122.

Specification 1, though it cites a fact, when the invalid inference is stricken out, is yet irrelevant ; for the specification does not attempt to prove that this fact conflicts with, and is contrary to, the cardinal doctrine that "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice." Furthermore there is no process of logic by which this specification can be brought under the charge. The Reason is a "great fountain of divine authority," and yet not an "infallible rule of faith and practice." The Church is a "great fountain of divine authority," and yet not an "infallible rule of faith and practice." The Bible is a "great fountain of divine authority," and it is also "the only infallible rule of faith and practice." Here are two different statements of truths that may be embraced under a more general truth, but to affirm the one, as to Bible, Church, and Reason, that "they are great fountains of divine authority," is not to deny that the Bible is the only one of which the other can be affirmed, namely, that "the Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice." When God speaks through the conscience, He speaks with divine authority and the conscience becomes a "great fountain of divine authority ;" but the conscience does not become thereby an "infallible rule of faith and practice." God speaks through the holy sacrament with divine authority, and the sacrament of the Church is then a "great fountain of divine authority ;" but it does not become thereby an "infallible rule of faith and practice." I affirm that I have never anywhere, or at any time, made any statements or taught any doctrines that in the slightest degree impair what I ever have regarded as a cardinal doctrine, that "the Holy Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice."

B. — SPECIFICATION 6.

It is a fact that I have taught and most firmly hold and assert "that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch, and that Isaiah is not the author of half of the book which bears his name," but Specification 6 does not indicate by what method of reasoning it brings this fact under the charge. It is irrelevant to the charge. If it be a valid offense, it ought to have been made the ground of a distinct charge, and it ought to have been definitely stated what relation Moses has to the Pentateuch, and Isaiah to the book that bears his name, according to the Confession, and in what way the doctrine stated by me conflicts therewith, or with Holy Scripture. Though Moses be not the author of the Pentateuch, yet Mosaic history, Mosaic institutions, and Mosaic legislation lie at the base of all the original documents ; and the name of Moses pervades the Pentateuch as a sweet fragrance, and binds the whole together with irresistible attraction into an organism of divine law. Even though Moses be not the author of the Pentateuch, yet the Pentateuch may be, as I firmly believe, one of the books of Holy Scripture, having divine authority ; and the Pentateuch is, as I have always taught, one of those Holy Scriptures which together constitute "the only infallible rule of faith and practice."

Even though "Isaiah did not write half the book which bears his name," yet I firmly believe that holy prophets no less inspired than Isaiah wrote the greater half of the book under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, so that the book with different authors is as truly one of the books of Holy Scripture, "the only infallible rule of faith and practice," as if it were written by Isaiah alone. The fact adduced has no manner of relevancy to the charge.

If the Presbytery should decide that these two specifications, 1 and 6, are relevant to the charge, they would put the accused in a false position and expose him to the peril of a condemnation on the basis of these two facts, which, after rejecting the illegal inferences, he must acknowledge as true, but which he claims need explanation, and are entirely irrelevant to the charge. If it be true that the Scriptures and the Confession teach that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, and that Isaiah wrote the whole of the book which bears his name, these doctrines should be affirmed in charges, as cardinal doctrines, and the doctrines taught by me should be placed in such a sufficient legal form that the jurors might vote clearly and directly upon them.

It is conceivable that I might be proven guilty of teaching doctrines contrary to the Confession in regard to both Moses and Isaiah, and the Church and the Reason as fountains of divine authority; but it would still remain unproven that such teaching was opposed to cardinal doctrines of the Confession. Much less would it be proven that these doctrines conflict irreconcilably with the cardinal doctrine "that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice."

4. — SPECIFICATIONS 2, 3, AND 4 OF CHARGE I.

Specifications 2, 3, and 4 may be grouped, because the same objections hold against the three. They all make false inferences and erroneous statements. It might be proper in a civil court to challenge the proof of these so-called specifications of fact; but in the ecclesiastical court, according to the decision already quoted in the Craighead case, inferences and statements, not recognized by the accused, are not valid in the specification of offenses. And it is certainly in the interest of truth and the saving of valuable time, that exception should at once be taken to them as irrelevant and invalid specifications under the charge.

A. — SPECIFICATIONS 2 AND 3.

Specification 2 alleges that: —

"Dr. Briggs affirms that, in the case of some, the Holy Scriptures are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and His will which is necessary unto salvation, even though they strive never so hard; and that such persons, setting aside the supreme authority of the word of God, can obtain that saving knowledge of Him through the Church" (p. 12).

Specification 3 alleges that: —

"Dr. Briggs affirms that some (such as James Martineau, who denies the doctrines of the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection of the Body, the Personality of the Holy Ghost, who rejects the miracles of the Bible and denies the truth of the Gospel narratives, as well as most of the theology of the Epistles), to whom the Holy Scripture is not sufficient to give that knowledge of God, and of His will which is necessary unto salva-

tion, may turn from the Supreme Authority of the Word of God and find that knowledge of Him through the Reason" (p. 15).

These specifications, as they now stand, are false to truth and to fact. No such facts are recorded in the inaugural address. If, however, they were true, and it could be proven, or I should admit, that I had affirmed that the Scriptures "are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and His will which is necessary unto salvation," even then, in that case, the specifications would be irrelevant to the charge, for the charge alleges that I teach doctrines that irreconcilably conflict with the cardinal doctrine that "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice." But these specifications allege a very different thing which cannot be brought under that cardinal doctrine, namely, that I affirm that the Scriptures "are not sufficient to give that knowledge necessary unto salvation." The *sufficiency* of Holy Scripture is one doctrine, its *infallibility* another doctrine, both true and cardinal doctrines of Holy Scripture, taught in the Westminster Confession, but two different and distinct doctrines; therefore Specifications 2 and 3 are irrelevant to the charge.

Furthermore, the specifications are invalid statements of fact. For nowhere in the inaugural address, or in any other writing that I have written, is it affirmed that "in the case of some, the Holy Scriptures are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and His will which is necessary unto salvation;" or "that some, to whom the Holy Scripture is not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and of His will which is necessary to salvation, may turn from the supreme authority of the Word of God and find that knowledge of Him through the Reason." I have nowhere denied the *sufficiency* of Holy Scripture. I have ever maintained that it is sufficient for the salvation of all men, of the entire human race. The redemption through Jesus Christ is sufficient for all mankind. The Word of God, which proclaims that redemption to the world in the gospel of the grace of God, is sufficient for every one and for all the world. But the *sufficiency* of Holy Scripture is one thing, the *efficacy* of Holy Scripture is another and a different thing. The Westminster Confession teaches that "our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof (of Holy Scripture), is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts" (I. 5). The Larger Catechism represents that "the Spirit of God maketh the reading, but especially the preaching of the Word, an effectual means of enlightening, convincing, and humbling sinners, of driving them out of themselves, and drawing them unto Christ; of conforming them to His image and subduing them to His will; of strengthening them against temptations and corruptions; of building them up in grace and establishing their hearts in holiness and comfort through faith unto salvation" (Quest. 155).

It is evidently the teaching of our Standards that, while the Scriptures are always sufficient, they are not always efficacious to those who use them; but that their efficacy depends upon the presence and power of the Divine Spirit in and with the Scriptures in their use. I affirm both the sufficiency of the Scriptures and the efficacy of the Scriptures, when the Divine Spirit accompanies them; but this is not to affirm that in fact all those who use the Scriptures as a means of approach to God do certainly find them efficient in their case, or that the Divine Spirit may not work effectually upon some men through the Church or the Reason.

It is a cardinal doctrine of the Reformed churches that the Divine Spirit is free, and is not confined to any one or to all of the means of grace. This doctrine finds expression in the words of our Confession, where it says, "the Spirit who worketh when, and where, and how He pleaseth" (x. 3).

I have taken the late Cardinal Newman at his word when he said he did not find certainty of divine authority through the Scriptures, but did find certainty of divine authority through the Church. I have not affirmed that Newman found divine certainty without the influence of the Divine Spirit. I have said that he found divine certainty by the influence of the Divine Spirit working through Church and Sacrament, which are means of grace as truly as Holy Scripture. I have not said that Newman did not find the Scripture *sufficient* for salvation. Newman himself never said that. He was always devout in his use of Holy Scripture. I said that he did not find *certitude* in the Scripture, but that in his case the Divine Spirit gave that certitude through the Church as a means of grace.

So also in the case of Martineau. I did not affirm that he found the Scriptures *insufficient* for his salvation, but I said that he did not gain *certitude* either through the Scriptures or the Church; but that he claimed, and I recognized his claim, that he found this *certitude*, this *certainty* of divine authority, in the forms of the Reason, using Reason as Martineau and others have commonly used it, to include the conscience and the religious feeling.

It is in accordance with the common doctrine of the Reformed churches, that the Spirit of God may work directly upon the souls of men apart from Bible, Church, and Sacraments. It is a simple question of fact whether the Divine Spirit has not thus worked in the case of Martineau. My judgment may be challenged for accepting Martineau's own testimony in the case; but my orthodoxy cannot be rightly challenged for recognizing Martineau as a case, in the category of cases, recognized by our Confession, of those directly approached by the Spirit, "who worketh when, and where, and how He pleaseth" (x. 3).

The prosecution, with great impropriety, have inserted in the midst of the fact so wrongly imputed to me a summary, of their own composition, setting forth the errors of James Martineau. This is entirely irrelevant. I have nowhere affirmed the orthodoxy of Martineau. On the other hand I selected him, as a man entirely outside of the camps of evangelicals and churchmen, to represent a class of men who found divine certainty in the Reason. The prosecution may find it difficult to believe that God would grant certitude to such a man through the Reason; but they do not, and they cannot, adduce from Holy Scripture or Confession any evidence to show that God may not in fact grant even such a man as Martineau access to Him through the Reason, notwithstanding all his heterodoxy and neglect of the means of grace so necessary to other men. If I have in the cases of Newman and Martineau taught erroneous doctrine when I have said that the one found divine certainty in the Church and the other in the Reason, when they could not find that certainty in the Bible, then that passage of the Confession should be pointed out which teaches as a cardinal doctrine, that the Bible is the *only means* used by the Divine Spirit to grant *certitude, certainty, assurance of grace, and salvation*; and that cardinal doctrine, if it can be found, should be put in a definite charge, sufficient in form and legal effect.

B. — SPECIFICATION 4.

Specification 4 also comes under this head. It alleges that "Dr. Briggs asserts that the temperaments and environments of men determine which of the three ways of access to God they may pursue" (p. 19). This is also a false inference. The specification makes two important changes in my doctrinal statement. The inaugural says, "Men are influenced by their temperaments and environments." The specification changes the passive construction into the active, and thus gives greater emphasis to the verb. It also uses, instead of the verb "influence," the much stronger word "determine." I have never said that "the temperaments and environments of men *determine* which of the three ways of access to God they may pursue." I used the expression "*influenced by*," advisedly, because it does not exclude other influences than these. Indeed, it would be quite proper, so far as the language of the inaugural is concerned, if one should say, "Men are influenced by their temperaments and environments which of the three ways of access to God they may pursue," but it is the Spirit of God who alone determines in which of the three ways they shall find the divine certainty of which they are in quest.

But even if the specification were recognized as valid and true, it is irrelevant to the charge; for it does not appear from anything in the specification itself that the doctrine of the specification is irreconcilably in conflict with the cardinal doctrine that "the Holy Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice."

5. — SPECIFICATION 7 OF CHARGE I.

Specification 7 alleges that "Dr. Briggs teaches that predictive prophecy has been reversed by history, and that much of it has not and never can be fulfilled" (p. 35).

This specification makes invalid inferences and statements. The specification makes two serious changes in the sentence of the inaugural: (1) It omits altogether the qualifying clause, "if we insist upon the fulfillment of the details of the predictive prophecy of the Old Testament;" and (2) it substitutes for "many of these predictions" the careful statement of the inaugural address, "predictive prophecy," a general and comprehensive term, and thus alleges that the address teaches that "predictive prophecy has been reversed by history." This allegation is entirely without justification from anything taught in the inaugural address, or any other of my writings. I have ever taught that the predictive prophecy of the Old Testament has been fulfilled in history, or will yet be fulfilled in history. I have shown, in my book entitled "Messianic Prophecy," that "the details of predictive prophecy" belong to the symbolical and typical form, and were never designed to be fulfilled. I have shown the historical development of the entire series of Messianic predictions of the Old Testament, and pointed them towards the fulfillment in Jesus Christ our Saviour; and have urged that either they have been fulfilled at His first advent, are being fulfilled in His reign over His Church, or will be fulfilled at His second advent.

The specifications have now been tested as to their relevancy, and have all of them been found to be irrelevant. Only two of the eight specifications state what can be recognized as facts, and these two can, by no

process of logic, be brought under the charge. If there be sufficiency in form or in legal effect in any of the charges and specifications, the respondent fails to see it. He submits his objections to the Presbytery, in the confidence that they will receive due consideration, and that the Presbytery will take proper action with regard to them.

IV. — THE PROOFS.

The objections might be brought to an end here, were it not important to save the valuable time of the Presbytery by calling attention to all such faults in connection with the charges and specifications as should be considered.

The citations from the inaugural, from Holy Scripture, and from the Westminster Confession and Catechisms have the same fault that we have found in the charges and specifications. There is a general vagueness and indefiniteness.

I object (1) that it is not in good form *to cite any more from the inaugural address than is sufficient for the proof of the specification under which the citation is made.* Under the so-called specification of Charge II. a long citation is made from three pages of the inaugural address, and a second long citation from two pages of the appendix of said address is given to prove one knows not what fact or charge.

(2) *The citations from the Westminster Confession are commonly of entire sections.* The committee do not claim in their charges and specifications that there is offense against the entire doctrine of these sections of the Confession. They should be required therefore to limit their citations to those portions of these sections that furnish probable proof of the position taken by them; *e. g.*, what possible advantage is gained from the citation of all the books of the Bible under two different specifications, when no charge or specification is made that the inaugural address questions any one of these books as a part of the canon of Holy Scripture?

(3) *Large numbers of texts of Holy Scripture are cited, which are entirely without value for the proof of the specification.* It is unnecessary to pick and choose, to set this forth. The passages mentioned first under the specifications will suffice.

(a) *Many texts are torn from their context.* The first passage cited is from Isa. viii. 20. The passage is incorrectly translated in the version used, for the meaning "there is no light in them" is not justified. The Revised Version renders "surely there is no morning for them," they have no hope of a dawn of brighter things. The proper rendering is:—

"When they say unto you, Seek unto the necromancers and unto wizards;
Ye chirpers and mutterers, should not a people seek unto their God?
On behalf of the living will they seek unto the dead for instruction and for testimony?
If they say not so, who have no dawn," etc.

This passage has no reference whatever to the Holy Scriptures, or any part of them, but is a rebuke of the people of Judah for seeking necromancers and wizards rather than the living God.

(b) Many of the texts are given in *King James's Version* in cases where the Revised Version gives the correct rendering. In the first citation under Specification 2, the passage from 2 Tim. iii. 16 is given from *King James's Version*; but the Revised Version renders, "Every Scrip-

ture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." There is a difference of doctrine here which is of some importance in the use of this text for purposes of probation.

(c) *The Confession requires that in all controversies of religion the Church is finally to appeal to the original Old Testament in Hebrew and the New Testament in Greek* (§ 18). No such appeal is made in the specifications, even in cases where the version quoted is regarded by scholars as incorrect or wrong. The first citation under Specification 3 is from King James' Version of John v. 10. If one turn to the original Greek he will see that the translation, "believeth not the record that God gave of his Son," does not correspond with the original, which reads "*witness*" and that "*witness*" is not Holy Scripture either in whole or in part. The passage is therefore irrelevant to the specification to prove that I am in error in teaching that Martineau found divine certainty through the Reason. In that this passage of Holy Scripture teaches a direct and immediate testimony of God within a man without the mediation of Holy Scripture, it rather favors the doctrine that God may, as in the time of the apostles, pursue this direct method with some men in our days.

(d) *A considerable portion of the verses cited have no manner of relevancy to the specifications under which they are given.* If they are suffered to remain, they will tend to needlessly prolong the trial. The three citations from Holy Scripture under Specification 4, from 1 Peter i. 23, 25; Gal. i. 8, 9; John xiv. 6, have no manner of relevancy to the question whether men are or are not "influenced by their temperaments and environments which of the three ways of access to God they may pursue." That men are "begotten again" through "the Word of God," "which liveth and abideth;" that an "anathema" is pronounced upon any one who preaches "any other gospel" than the gospel preached by Paul; that Jesus is "the way, the truth, and the life," and "no one cometh unto the Father but through Him,"—are doctrines taught in these passages and are firmly believed by me, but they have nothing whatever to do with the doctrine that I have taught as to the temperaments and the environments of men.

(e) *I question the propriety of quoting any passages of Scripture in proof of doctrines not defined by the Westminster Confession and Catechisms.* The constitution of the Church defines the limits of obligation, and also protects the minister as regards all matters of belief and practice, outside of those limits. If this Presbytery had the right to decide the interpretation of passages of Scripture for the official determination of doctrines undefined in our constitution, there would be a new way of amending and enlarging the Confession of Faith by judicial decisions in heresy trials, which would contravene and subvert the constitutional method of revision, which has been made an essential part of our constitution. A study of these proof-texts exposes the fault of the specifications in this particular.

The passages from Holy Scripture cited under Specification 6 of Charge I. are sixty in number to prove that Moses wrote the Pentateuch and Isaiah wrote the whole of the book that bears his name. Only seven of these are used in the Confession of Faith, and five of these seven under other chapters of the Confession than the first, leaving only two of the sixty that were used by the Westminster divines to prove their doctrine

of the Bible; and these two not to prove, as the specification would use them, the authorship of the Pentateuch and the Book of Isaiah; but Luke xxiv. 27, 28, to prove that the Apocrypha are no part of the canon of Scripture; and John v. 46, in the original edition of the Confession, to prove that the Church is to appeal to the original texts of Scripture; but this last is very properly omitted from the American edition of proof-texts. This fact that the Westminster divines use only two of the sixty texts cited by the prosecution for proof of their doctrine of Scripture, and not one of them to prove that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch, or that Isaiah was the author of the book that bears his name, ought to convince you that, even if they are relevant to the specification, they are not relevant to any doctrine taught by the Confession.

Indeed, it would be quite easy to show that not a single one of the large number of Scripture passages adduced has any force for the proof of the specifications under which they are adduced.

All of these passages of Holy Scripture are accepted and firmly believed by me, when properly rendered according to the original Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek, which "being immediately inspired by God, and by His singular care and providence kept pure in all ages, and therefore authentic," "in all controversies of religion the Church is finally to appeal unto them."

These objections to the sufficiency of the charges and specifications placed in my hand by order of the Presbytery of New York, as to their form and legal effect, are hereby respectfully submitted to the Presbytery for their judgment.

C. A. Briggs.

NOVEMBER 4, 1891.

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.¹ (*Concluded.*)

PART III. PAUPERISM.

TOPIC V. THE SPHERE OF PRIVATE CHARITY.

1. THE PRINCIPLE OF PRIVATE CHARITY.

It is voluntary, direct, and personal in its origin, and may be in its action. When, however, it is said to be voluntary, the obligation to charity is not to be overlooked, an obligation which increases with the increase of wealth.

For full discussion of the doctrine of the surplus of wealth, see review of Mr. Carnegie's "Gospel of Wealth" in June, 1891, number of *Andover Review*.

See, also, *North American Review*, June and December, 1889. (Carnegie.)

¹ For statement of the different parts of the course, and their relation to each other, see *Andover Review*, January, 1889, or February, 1891.

Nineteenth Century, November, 1890. (Gladstone.)

Nineteenth Century, December, 1890. (Manning, Adler, Hughes.)

Nineteenth Century, March, 1891. (Carnegie.)

North American Review, April, 1891. (Gibbons.)

North American Review, May, 1891. (Potter, Phelps, Chamberlain.)

2. THE FIELD OF PRIVATE CHARITY.

It is intermediary as respects the State. It seldom represents mere almsgiving. It deals with the secondary stages of charity. It operates upon communities through endowments for relieving the public want, or for developing the public resources. It establishes schools, libraries, hospitals, churches. Its legitimate work is in those charities which enrich a community without pauperizing individuals. Or if applied to individuals, it seeks out those who would escape the public eye.

3. THE METHOD OF PRIVATE CHARITY.

There are three types : —

(1.) Scientific charity — the study at first hand of social problems.

(2.) Sympathetic charity — the art of personal helpfulness.

(3.) Reformatory charity — the work of rescue.

TOPIC VI. THE DEFENSES OR BARRIERS AGAINST POVERTY.

1. INHERITANCE.

The majority of individuals in prosperous countries find when they arrive at conscious existence that something intervenes between them and poverty. That something is the accumulation in their behalf of those who have gone before them. If properly used, they never know the meaning of poverty.

2. CHARACTER.

Character is the poor man's capital. It may assert itself in the use of the stronger physical powers which lead to industry and thrift, or in the use of moral qualities which insure self-restraint and self-denial. Self-denial reaching to the point of self-preservation is a virtue of which the rich have no knowledge.

3. ORGANIZATION FOR WORK.

Here we touch the struggle for existence among the unemployed or irregularly employed. The work of John Burns in connection with the dockers' strike is illustrative of the method of defense against poverty in organized labor.

4. PROVISION FOR THE FUTURE.

The creation of a small surplus. This effected through banks for small savings, or through voluntary insurance, or through compulsory insurance coupled with state aid, as in Germany.

5. COÖPERATION.

The surplus now rises to the dignity of capital, and may take the active form of coöperative stores, loan associations, or productive agencies.

For authorities under this Topic, see —

Charles Booth, *Life and Labor of the People*.

Riis, *How the Other Half Lives*.

Woods, English Social Movements.
 Holyoake, History of Coöperation.
 Dexter, Coöperative Savings and Loan Association.
 Gilman, Profit Sharing.
 Dawson, Bismarck and State Socialism; chapter on Insurance of Working Classes.

TOPIC VII. THE SOCIALISTIC THEORY OF RELIEF.

Two questions are to be asked in estimating the value of this proposed relief.

First, What is the Socialistic Theory?

Second, How far is it applicable to Pauperism?

1. WHAT IS THE SOCIALISTIC THEORY?

Socialism means the substitution of public for private *capital*. Emphasize capital and the distinction comes out between socialism and communism. Communism substitutes public for private property. Socialism cares nothing for property which is not capital.

Nationalism is the political term for socialism, Collectivism the economic term.

Socialism means in detail —

- (1.) The abolition of private capital.
- (2.) The consequent abolition of the competitive system.
- (3.) The removal of all the accessories of the present business system, — money, rents, credit, exchange, wages.
- (4.) The centralization of power for productive uses.
- (5.) The regulation of all labor.
- (6.) The distribution of all products.

Socialism does not necessarily mean —

- (1.) That all private property would be abolished.
- (2.) That all would receive equally or according to want.
- (3.) That all private activities would be eliminated.
- (4.) That social and religious life would be revolutionized.
- (5.) That individuality would be destroyed.

Socialism would effect a tremendous change in everything that goes to make economic life. It would completely and absolutely revolutionize production and distribution, and would regulate consumption.

2. HOW FAR IS THE SOCIALISTIC THEORY APPLICABLE TO PAUPERISM?

Pauperism represents four classes : —

- (1.) The vicious and criminal.
- (2.) The idle and lazy.
- (3.) The dependent — the sick and disabled.
- (4.) The unemployed.

1. What effect would it have upon vicious pauperism? It would do away presumably with crimes against property. It would not do away with the social vices — drunkenness and licentiousness.

2. What effect would it have upon lazy pauperism? That would depend upon the amount of motive or of violence applied to the individual. It does not follow that a man who is active in crime will expend his energy in work. There is an excitement about crime which is lacking in work. Mr. Bellamy's analogy of the army does not hold entirely. The

army does not include all. It appeals to motives drawn from danger rather than from comfort. And it is based altogether upon force.

3. What effect would it have upon dependent pauperism—the sick and disabled? These are now cared for by the State. Possibly socialism would introduce a better relation between the able and the unable in society. Possibly it would take away the refining and sympathetic influences which attend individual charity.

4. What would be its effect upon enforced pauperism—upon the unemployed? Here socialism, to the degree in which it is practicable, would effect a complete remedy. The unemployed class would be eliminated from the ranks of pauperism. Certainly the line of poverty would be raised. The only question at this point would be whether this result was gained at too great a cost to society.

For authorities on this Topic, see —

The works of the greater socialists, Lasalle, Marx, Proudhon.

Schäffle, *The Quintessence of Socialism*.

Laveleye, *The Socialism of To-day*.

Rae, *Contemporary Socialism*.

Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism*.

The Fabian Essays.

Webb, *Socialism in England*.

Bellamy, *Looking Backward*.

Gunton, *Wealth and Progress*.

Andover Review, April, 1891 (Miss Dawes).

Andover Review, July, 1891 (Miss Scudder).

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

A FEW weeks ago a remarkably significant event took place in Wales. Bala Theological College was opened with fitting ceremony, and began its work of educating men for the Welsh ministry; it is the first theological college in Britain which has been opened, not only on a distinct unsectarian basis, but by men of different denominations of the Christian church uniting as founders and supporters. It is to give a theological training for the ministry to all who seek admission, and who show that they possess an adequate education in arts. Mansfield College at Oxford is free to all students, and has numbered Methodists, Episcopalians, Baptists, and Presbyterians under its roof, but its founders, its governing body and teaching staff (with very few exceptions) are Congregationalist. The Bala Theological College is professedly as well as actually unsectarian. It is all the more striking that this should be the case in a Welsh institution, as it has been the fashion to point at Wales as the hot-bed of all the evils of sectarian difference.

Probably this event would have produced more comment if Wales were not at the present time excited with the beginning of what may prove the final struggle for the disestablishment of the Episcopal Church in Wales. This struggle is becoming so keen and strong, in view of the approval, by the leaders as well as by the rank and file of the Liberal party, of the policy of disestablishment. Undoubtedly the great mass of Welshmen desire it, and the Welsh members of Parliament are in the

proportion of twelve to one in its favor. On the other side, the Established Church defends the present state of things on the ground that the Established Church is growing in Wales in numbers and popular favor, and also on the second and more reasonable ground, that from a legal and constitutional point of view, the Established Church in England and Wales is one, and that the cry for Welsh disestablishment is a covert attack on the position of the English Church.

With the view of making a great demonstration against the disestablishment movement, the annual Church Congress was lately held at Rhyl, and a number of bishops, headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, delivered philippics on the subject. Disestablishment for Wales is, however, already decided upon in the popular mind, and cannot long be without Parliamentary enactment. The "*London Punch*," whose satire is so often full of reason and truth, and whose political verdict is never given till a perfectly safe judgment is possible, has decided against the bishops in the following lines on the Rhyl Congress:—

If Cleric Congresses could only care
 A little less for the mere Church and Steeple,
 Parochial pomp and power in lion's share,
 And have one aim — to purify the People,
 They need not shrink from Disestablishment
 Or any other secular enormity;
 Unselfish love of Man destroys Dissent
 True Charity provokes no Nonconformity.

Wales has long claimed to be a nationality, though many have denied it that honor. There have just appeared the first two numbers of a new monthly magazine, which is started to give further expression to the national voice. The "*Welsh Review*" is starting with good promise, and is likely to succeed; it aims at being popular rather than authoritative, and seems more likely to follow than to form popular opinion.

Two recent magazine articles have lately appeared which have been much commented upon, and which show that the democratic voice will make itself heard even in ecclesiastical matters.

Mr. W. H. Horwill has been writing "*On Theological Degrees for Nonconformists*;" he points out the anomaly by which the theological degrees of Oxford and Cambridge (B. D. and D. D.) can only be conferred on clergymen of the Church of England, while the London University cannot confer any theological degrees. This is a real hardship and discouragement to theological scholarship among Nonconformists, and certainly cannot long be maintained. The exception to the rule, that only the clergy can be bachelors or doctors of divinity in Oxford and Cambridge, is in favor of Roman Catholics or clergy of the Greek Church, — a curious commentary on the pretended Protestantism of the Church of England.

In a more audacious and radical spirit Mr. H. W. Massingham has written an article, which Mr. Gladstone even went out of his way to criticise. Calling attention to the fact that the deaneries and canonries attached to the English cathedrals, and certain other offices, which are only open to Anglican clergymen, are supposed to offer peculiar facilities to men of scholarship and learning, Mr. Massingham points out how very much weaker intellectually is the relative strength of the Anglican clergy to-day than it was a couple of generations ago. The universities used to belong almost exclusively to the clergy, when all the heads of colleges and

almost all the professors, tutors, and fellows of colleges were clergymen. Gradually this has changed, and the clergy, though perhaps numbering as many learned and able scholars as ever, are relatively much weaker intellectually than the laity; from this undoubtedly true contention the conclusion is drawn that the deaneries and canonries should be given to laymen of learning who would make the use of them for which they have long been held famous. This proposal cannot be made a practical question until the disestablishment of the church is actually within reach; but when that is the case, it becomes an interesting suggestion for the endowment and advancement of learning.

From this discussion another has arisen concerning the masters of our public schools being clergymen. Our great and historic public schools are the training homes of the sons of the upper and middle class of English society; many of them are, like Eton and Harrow, rich corporations as well as of venerable antiquity; they are practically all Church of England institutions; and in some of them only a clergyman is eligible as headmaster. Mr. Gladstone pointed to the distinguished headmasters of public schools, who are clergymen, as evidence that intellect was still strong among the clergy. This gave rise to considerable discussion on the advisability of having clergymen as headmasters, on the conditions imposed in certain schools, where pressure is brought to bear to induce masters to enter holy orders, and on the question as to which public schools were really the most successful and best. All these discussions go to show how strongly the permeation of the spirit of opposition to all privilege is going on in educational and ecclesiastical as well as political affairs.

That religion is, in spite of the material and social tendencies of the day, the prime factor in our civilization is a truth which has been receiving fresh corroboration from an unexpected quarter. The talk of the newspapers at that time of year when they are always hard pressed for matter for their columns has been nothing less than the conversion of Mrs. Annie Besant from the principles of Atheism to those of Theosophy. It might seem at first sight a small thing that an impulsive woman should swing over from one extreme of belief to another. But Mrs. Besant is a woman whose family connections have been and are prominent in public and literary life; she herself has been a very popular lecturer in political clubs and secular halls; as a philanthropist and educationalist she has accomplished great things, both in a leading position on the London school board and as an organizer of labor movements among women and unskilled laborers; she has advocated the views of the Neo-Malthusians on the population question in pamphlets, the wide sale of which has brought her in a little income; lastly, she has been a leading figure in several notable trials in the law courts. Now she is giving up all her educational and most of her philanthropic work, and has withdrawn her Malthusian and secularist pamphlets from publication because she has become a convert to Theosophy. She intends devoting her great eloquence and marvelous energies henceforth to the dissemination of the truths of her new religion.

This action on the part of Mrs. Besant most undoubtedly means a great attractive power for the Theosophists, and for a time Theosophy will attract considerable attention.

Joseph King, Jr.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

WHAT IS REALITY? An Inquiry as to the Reasonableness of Natural Religion, and the Naturalness of Revealed Religion. By FRANCIS HOWE JOHNSON. Pp. xxvii, 510. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1891.

The author, laying a basis in philosophic and scientific certainty for the beliefs of natural and revealed religion, furnishes as important a contribution to resolving the deeper problems of philosophy as to reaffirming the higher truths of religion. The argument is thoroughly philosophical, the application only is religious.

Too high praise cannot be given to the lucidity of thought, which is nowhere impeded by a single obscure sentence; to the combined nerve and finish of the style; to the felicity of illustration, especially from scientific sources; to the careful verification of every fact furnished by zoölogy, chemistry, and other natural sciences; and to that most convincing mode of argument, the avoidance of overstatement and of claiming too much. A book rarely appears which exhibits from end to end the spirit of intellectual conscientiousness, both in matter and style, which is found in this work.

It is not easy to indicate, in a brief notice, the course of an argument which is a chain of connected links throughout, and only a few salient points can be touched. At the outset, theories which find reality in the self alone apart from the universe, and in the universe alone apart from the self, are criticised and dismissed. On the one hand, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, representing subjective idealism, and on the other hand Spencer, as representing physical realism, are shown to present one-sided and inadequate theories. The author evidently relishes the criticism of materialism more keenly than the criticism of idealism. He searches out with unerring skill the weak points of Spencer's philosophy, and exposes his fallacies with such effect that a gleam of humor is not quite concealed under the respectful tone of argument. Indeed, a predilection for scientific studies is illustrated all along by a happy use of the freshest facts from laboratory and museum. And objection to idealism is at the point of inadequacy rather than falsity, for, in sympathy with the subjectivism which is found wanting, the author himself makes the *ego* the starting point of his inquiry and the basis of his philosophy. The reality of knowledge—the reality from which we proceed to belief in the reality of the universe, of other men, and of God—is the self of consciousness. This is the true thing-in-itself. But unlike Kant's thing-in-itself, which is a thing minus its relations, the true reality is the *ego* plus its relations to other objects. This *ego* is a unity of being, intelligence, and cause, and its relations are threefold—to the body of organized animal tissues, to the whole external nature of its own creation, and to other real beings known to it through analogy and experience. By means of these relationships of man, who is one finite reality, a true, though limited knowledge of God, the soul of the sum of things, is gained. The method of analogy is employed to pass from man, a centre in his realm, to the universe as a unity governed by one central principle; to other beings like himself, whom he knows as conscious and intelligent only by analogy with himself; to animals with their intelligence; and to a Supreme intelligence and will. From this point on, that

which is peculiar to the author, or rather original with him, gives his book its greatest interest. After arguing that consciousness may exist very far down in the scale of being, and that it is impossible to draw a line below which there is no intelligence, he advocates the view that there are subordinate centres of consciousness in each human personality, in its various organs and functions; that these, some of which at first must be trained, learn to act of themselves, and yet under the direction of the central *ego*. It is also maintained that each person is a subordinate consciousness of the social body, and that God is supreme in this, as the *ego* is over its subordinate *egos*. These two analogies (and they are employed only as analogies) are traced out at many points to show the reasonableness of belief in God as at once immanent and transcendent. Evolution and creation are considered, with the conclusion that progress towards an end indicates a supreme intelligence, but who originates and develops, as matter of fact, and perhaps of necessity, under limitations. The evil in the world, which is due to conflict, may be a necessary incident; and combination, even on lower stages of life, is a factor of constantly increasing importance. Revelation is not unnatural, but, as the appearance of a new and higher type of that truth which is mighty, is in analogy with all evolution, which proceeds by breaks in that which has become encrusted, the breaks occurring by means of the superiority of the new type. The truth of revelation becomes a possession for the individual and society only by the search of reflection, and even of struggle, and not by the mechanical agency of an infallible church or an infallible book. Miracles could accompany and illuminate the purpose of revelation, since all evolution has proceeded in part by surprises, but miracles occupy a subordinate and provisional place. Continuity appears in the fact that creation and salvation are different phases of the same process. All illumination of moral truth brings a deeper condemnation of sin, and so the fall of primitive man, which was a result of his illumination, is a type which is repeated when the clearer truth and the higher law of Christianity appear.

In an appendix, the Evolution of Conscience and the Necessity of Conflict are treated in an interesting manner.

The book is one of the stimulating sort. It is well abreast of the newest discoveries and the latest accepted theories of science. It does not waste time in proving what educated readers already believe, but starts out at once, from points of agreement, on the broad highway of the argument. It is, therefore, as compact in size as in thought. Its greatest service is in suggesting at every point, even when writer and reader do not fully agree, the harmony of science, philosophy, and religion.

George Harris.

PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL MORALS. By Rev. HENRY HUGHES, M. A., formerly Junior Student of Christ Church, Oxford. Vol. I., pp. 369. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1890.

The preface sounds the keynote of the present volume in a rather interesting manner. The author says that "the main purpose of his book is to establish the thesis that there are, not one, but three sciences of morals. There appears to be, first, a science of the motives and ends of conduct that belong to pagan or non-religious man, to man regarded simply as a voluntary agent forming a part of the world of nature. There

appears to be, secondly, a science which, while it includes the former, takes account, also, of other phenomena arising from man being brought into conscious relations with God. Of the whole body of phenomena with which this science has to do, Jewish morality may be taken as a type. And there appears to be, thirdly, a science which embraces within its scope all the phenomena of the moral life of the present day, those which are at the same time Jewish together with others which are distinctively Christian.

There can, perhaps, be some objection taken to this way of stating the matter. That there are more ways than one to discuss problems of ethics is quite true and indisputable; but that they should be considered as giving rise to three "sciences of morals" is not so readily admitted. The author either confuses the conception of "science," or fails to remark mere differences of aspect in the same science. The distinction which he has in mind is unquestionably a good one, but it can hardly be dignified with so much importance as the author attaches to it. It has value, but this value is of another kind than that which he has given it. The first distinction corresponds, in effect, to that between the *teleological* and the *theological* point of view; and the second corresponds to that between the first two points of view and the *historical* conception of ethics. When thus stated, there will hardly appear any reason for recognizing three "sciences" of morals. The author's object in the distinction is quite apparent in his division of the subject into "natural" and "supernatural morals." In fact, this division determines his point of view and his theory of moral conduct.

The first chapter shows very clearly that the author is a disciple of Butler. His view cannot be distinguished from that celebrated philosopher's. He thinks that nature puts us under some constraint to seek our happiness. Butler had maintained that "rational self-love" was a legitimate object of conduct; by which he meant that the rational pursuit of happiness was not only permissible, but to some extent a duty and a necessity for man. He recognized, and so does our author, that "nature" has made us for happiness, or that there are instincts in us prompting us to that end, and hence they must be recognized as more or less imperative. This is represented as the "constraint of nature" upon us to seek happiness. This fact is considered by the author as "the first fundamental fact of natural morals; the first fundamental fact, that is, of the science of the regulation of conduct according to the purpose and design of nature." It is not a little interesting to remark some further observations which summarize his whole position. "By reason of its existence," the author continues, "the pursuit of happiness becomes to a certain extent elevated from the region of unmoral to that of moral conduct. So far as the constraint of happiness, as we may conveniently call it, is present as an operating motive, distinguishable from the wish for happiness, so far our adoption of the best means for promoting our own greatest happiness, being in conscious obedience to a behest of nature, appears to be moral conduct. The mere wish for happiness is an unmoral motive; the constraint of happiness is a moral one."

To many writers this would seem to be the very contrary of the truth. In the first place, if morality consists in the "constraint of happiness," would not the wish for it be moral also, because we are constrained by our nature to wish for it? Again, a Kantian would hold that the "constraint" to pursue happiness was the essence of the unmoral, because there is no freedom in such conduct. But the author does not intend

that this shall be the conception of "constraint," and here lies the confusion of his view ; although there is a hint in his position of the difference between objective and subjective morality. The "constraint of happiness," however, to be a moral motive, must mean the duty to pursue it, and not the instinct or necessity of it, as a blind law of our nature.

The thesis, however, which is mainly peculiar of the author's position, and which is closely connected with his conception of the "constraint of happiness," is the distinction between "natural" and "supernatural morals." Of course we are not able to say exactly what he would include in the latter, because the subject remains to be discussed in the second volume. But enough is found in the first book to determine the general fields to be traversed, and these are represented by Greek morals and Christian morals. Natural morals are supposed to be conduct under the constraint of happiness ; and supernatural morals, conduct under divine direction. The criticism that will occur to every one in this connection is founded upon the fact or belief that morals are essentially one. To talk of two kinds of morality, and then to represent this difference by the terms "natural" and "supernatural," with all the traditional implications of those terms, is to so far contrast them as to divide the sense of obligation in connection with the law of virtue. Unless there is a difference in the sense of duty regarding such morals, there is no use in making the distinction. Besides, it can but perpetuate the antagonism between Greek and Christian doctrines when so much has been done by moralists to show that they are essentially the same in their principles, although the latter is a better practical realization and extension of preceding conceptions. Christian morals are continuous with the Greek, not opposed to them.

The whole distinction is burdened too much with the scholastic antithesis between the idea of "nature" and of God. It is essentially a survival of dualism, and is out of place in a monistic age. The reconstruction of our ideas upon these questions is bringing the "natural" and the "supernatural" into harmony by denying the opposition between them and asserting their essential identity with each other. Hence, before the author has a right to assume the difference between them in his division of morals, his duty is to establish the error of existing thought regarding this main distinction. This, however, seems to be no part of the task he has undertaken. He assumes the distinction without question.

In spite of this feature, which we must regard as a defect, we are bound to say that the present volume has some characteristics of freshness. The chapters are thoroughly worked out, and the matter is the author's own in respect of treatment. There is nothing striking or original, but neither is the work a mere reproduction. The author has thought for himself upon ethical problems.

In the historical part he is less appreciative of Kant than might be expected after so much contemporary exposition of that writer. He is evidently more familiar with English than with German thought. Not a little surprising, also, is it to find Martineau criticised so fully. We should have expected more sympathy with Martineau than is displayed, because the religious conception is so fully emphasized by that writer, and easily falls into place with our author's view. It may be possible to say more when the second volume appears.

J. H. Hyslop.

Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche. In Verbindung mit Dr. A. Harnack, Professor der Theologie in Berlin, Dr. W. Herrmann, Professor der Theologie in Marburg, Dr. J. Kaftan, Professor der Theologie in Berlin, Lic. M. Reischle, Gymnasial professor in Stuttgart, Dr. K. Sell, Professor der Theologie in Bonn, herausgegeben von Dr. J. Gottschick, Professor der Theologie in Giessen. Erster Jahrgang, 1891. Heft 1, 2. Freiburg i. B.: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). — The purpose and plan of this new review is well defined by Professor Kaftan in the opening article of the first number, "Theology and the Church." Theology and the church influence and condition each other in various ways. Theology exists to serve the church, and the church cannot do without its service in the defense of the truth and its reasoned presentation. On the other hand, the church gives a set to theology or imposes upon it limits; its life to no inconsiderable degree reflects itself in its theology. Theology and the church are therefore dependent upon each other. The normal relation between them is one of harmony, in which theology fulfills its task with a full recognition of its duty to the church, and the church, counting upon such service, gladly avails itself of it. The actual state of things does not correspond to this ideal. The representatives of theological science and the leaders of the church, instead of working together, are often opposed to each other; there is alienation and mutual mistrust. The causes of this lie partly in the direction given to the life of the church by the reaction against rationalism, partly in the direction of modern theological studies. Especially, it is the predominance of the historical method in theology, and the changed attitude to Bible and dogma which necessarily follows from the application of this method, which has made and seems to be ever widening the breach between the revived confessionalism of the church, as represented by the majority in its synods and by the church newspapers and its teachers of theology.

This situation is unnatural, and cannot be lasting. The interests of theology, no less than those of the church, demand a *rapprochement*. This cannot be reached by surrender on either side, or by compromises which neither can make in good faith. Theology must relieve the church of the apprehension that its present movement is a return wave of rationalism, must show that its change of attitude is not due to philosophical prepossessions, but to the better understanding of the facts which the historical study of the Scriptures and of the history of the church have brought us. It must show that the new apprehension of Christian truth which it has thus gained is not only not antagonistic to faith, but is capable of giving it a new immediateness and certainty; that its influence is not unfavorable to the religious life of the church, but stimulating and fructifying. It must prove by its works what spirit it is of.

To contribute to this understanding between theology and the church, to enable theology better to fulfill its mission of service in our own time, the new review has been founded. It will not add to the number — already too large for the best interests of theological science — of periodicals which serve as repositories for learned monographs and special investigations; its end is not the advancement of science, but the presentation of such of its results as have a practical bearing on the faith and life of the church and a present usefulness. It will not be the organ of a school or party, but will unite in the work men of different opinions but of one spirit.

That there is room and need for such a review can hardly be doubted. The names of the scholars who are associated in its editorial management are a pledge that the work they have undertaken will be thoroughly done, and the articles in the numbers which have reached us fully confirm this expectation.

Kaftan's opening article has been already mentioned. It is followed by a doctrinal article by Professor Herrmann on the "Repentance of the Evangelical Christian," which is well fitted to clear up the obscurity and confusion which is so widely prevalent — not in Germany alone — about this fundamental article. The second number is filled by an extremely interesting historical article by Professor Harnack on the "History of the Doctrine of Salvation through Faith Alone in the Early Church." Professor Harnack shows with painful clearness how the character of the various teachers and parties who in the early church stood for this doctrine hardly left the church any alternative to the Augustinian doctrine of justification. "Almost everywhere, if not everywhere, moral laxity, unwillingness to suffer for the faith, want of brotherly love, and lack of sincere repentance sought to cover themselves with the mantle of the *sola fide*. How can we wonder that the church rejected it?" And the moral of this lesson in history for the Protestant church, which has made this doctrine its corner-stone, is briefly but pointedly indicated.

The readers of the "Andover Review" will, doubtless, unite with me in the wish that this attempt to bring theology and the church nearer together by ways of practical service may have deserved success.

George F. Moore.

Life and Letters of Robert Browning. By Mrs. Sutherland Orr. In two volumes. Pp. xii, viii, 646. \$3.00 a set. — If the poet's family was connected with the knightly and squirely families of his name in South England, the connection was remote. "Both the vivid originality of his genius and its healthy assimilative power stamp it as, in some sense, the product of virgin soil." The Jewish admixture has been disproved. The negro admixture, through his West Indian grandmother, is not established, nor even made probable. Any one as well acquainted with the West Indies as the present writer is well aware that such a mixture is always to be presumed where West Indian neighbors affirm it. But there is no evidence of that in this case. There is therefore, at most, a mere possibility that Browning's veins were enriched by a strain of the glowing blood of Africa. The grandmother's portrait shows no traces of mixed blood. The Empress Josephine was probably a colored woman, but Browning was probably not a colored man.

Browning's parents were dissenters, though not narrow ones, and though he commonly attended the church service when he attended any, he never detached himself from dissenting intimacies. Between the two he may the easier have become indifferent to theology and fallen back on Christianity, though assuredly not in a looseness of feeling independent of thought. With all his vigor there was interwoven a fibre of nervous suffering which, the biographer remarks, may have been needed to quicken the healthy talent of his father into the intensity of genius in him. From his mother's German father he may have derived his power of infinite psychological analysis. The quiet perfection of his mother's character drew to her such an adoring love from her son as even wedded bliss and early fatherhood were powerless to bear up from an intensity of sorrow at her death that long threatened health.

The biographer thinks that Browning's purely literary education left his genius too much to itself, and that some coercion of mathematics or logic might have rendered his works easier for normally constituted minds to follow. Very probably. In point of language he made one good beginning for his vocation: he read and digested the whole of Johnson's Dictionary.

Americans are continually coming into his life and his wife's, and always in the most agreeable connections, wound up by their son's marriage with an American. They were deeply grateful, with the best reason, for the early American anticipation of his fame, which was so slow in coming at home.

The account of the Brownings' intercourse with George Sand is very interesting. Browning's grave courtesy seems to have stung her. It marked his silent disgust with the coarse and dirty men whom she allowed to fall on their knees and beslobber her hands. The enthusiasm was evidently his wife's.

The one note of discord in the awful bliss of his married life seems to have been in his intense dislike of spiritualism and persuasion of its absolute emptiness. Even a suspense of judgment in others drove him wild. Doubtless it was the ghastly uncleanness of the whole thing as a concrete reality, daring to approach the angelic simplicity of his wife's nature, which made it intolerable. He overshot all logical limit in his agony of desire to detach her from it.

The high-water mark of the long-delayed recognition at home was in 1867, when Oxford made him honorary Master of Arts, a much higher distinction, it was officially explained, than D. C. L., one since Dr. Johnson scarcely given except to princes. Fame came at last with a flood, and even the great loss yet left his latter years full of sunshine.

His letters, in themselves, are neither clear nor remarkably interesting. Fortunately there are a good many of his wife's. The biography itself, though deep, is not very lucid. One thing, however, keeps the author always on the alert. She is ever watchful to minimize the meaning of Browning's religion. She allows, indeed, that his conviction of his indestructible personality survived all the teachings of experience, and even imposed itself upon them, — in other words, that he interpreted the lower by the higher, and not the higher by the lower. She maintains that the Christmas and Easter Day poems at least bring religion into no practical correspondence with life or human experience, and upholds it as probable that they are a sympathetic appropriation of his wife's religion. She will have it that Shelley is the master-key to the real Browning, and that this implies his actual maintenance of everything which the two Christian poems appear to condemn. To the complaint that in details he accepts this age, but in fundamental principles is behind it, in denying that experiment can control the foundations of belief, she pleads for large allowance to "the transcendental imagination," although she admits that the deductions of this very deeply determined the attitude of his mind towards God and Immortality. She makes him out to have held Christ as a message and mystery of Divine Love, but not a messenger of the divine intentions towards mankind. In what way He could possibly be the one and not the other, especially as He so emphatically affirms himself to be both, is left undetermined. She represents Browning as fully possessed by the idiotic pagan assumption that every affirmation of an attribute in the Supreme Being is a denial of his exist-

ence, as if the qualities of pure Being were mutually exclusive, — a devout way of inducing infinite Emptiness in the place of infinite Fullness. Yet she sympathetically remarks that the poet could not easily be persuaded that conscious life is not real and persistent, and that affirmations concerning God, however false, are not at least a witness to the reality.

Now that we have this biography by a Christian unbeliever, it would be interesting if we could have one, of equal ability, knowledge, and candor, by a Christian believer.

Studies in Letters and Life. By George Edward Woodberry. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1890. Pp. 296. \$1.25. — The first paper of this series is on Landor. Why is it that, having received such enthusiastic appreciation from the elect spirits of literature, he is dying out, even for them? The author explains it by his lack of unifying power. He does not fuse his work in his personality. Therefore magnificent material, magnificently handled, still remains piece-work. His fine thoughts and wise apothegms, overwhelming in their number, "crown no achievement." They are flowers without a root.

Crabbe comes next. He "does not, in a true sense, give expression to the life of the poor; he merely narrates it." "Crabbe's description is perhaps the most nakedly realistic of any in English poetry, but it is an uncommonly good one. Realism has a narrow compass, and Crabbe's powers were confined strictly within it; but he had the best virtues of a realist." Men like Scott and Fox could supply the tenderness and the genius, and they loved Crabbe because he enlarged their experience. Moreover, his style, formed in the school of Pope, impressed them as it does not us. But Crabbe gives us, at his best, human life and the human heart, and this is more than "Scott's romantic tradition, or Moore's melting, sensuous Oriental dream, or Byron's sentimental, falsely heroic adventure."

The next paper is on "The Promise of Keats." The author differs entirely with those who hold that Keats had essentially achieved himself when he died. He holds him to have been "born for the future, to the future lost." He believes him, amid all the crudeness and boyish effervescence of his years, to show plainly "the elemental spark, the saving power of genius, the temperance, sanity, and self-reverence of a fine nature gradually coming to the knowledge of its faculties, and unriddling the secret of its own moral beauty." He quotes many sayings of Keats in his letters which lift him "out of and above the sphere of the purely sensuous, and reveal at once the spiritual substance which underlies his poetry."

The next paper is "Aubrey de Vere on Poetry." Of this the critic says that, by rare good fortune, "the ideas are more excellent than the manner, and the spirit finer than the ideas." The whole nature of the man speaks in it. "He is a Christian idealist, and he refuses to regard poetry except in the light of those great ideas which belong to the spirit, and, being nobly and beautifully interpreted, are the substance of the poets who live by their wisdom as well as by charm." "With Spenser, naturally, he has many affinities. The mediævalism, the sentiment of chivalry, the allegorizing spirit, and not less the Puritan elevation of the first of the Elizabethan poets, exercise a special fascination over a Catholic mind for whom the Ages of Faith, as he likes to call

them, have in a peculiar degree the ideality that clothes the past." "He reveals his own theory of poetry, and it is one that derives its philosophy from the great historic works of our literature, and is grounded on the practice of the English masters whose fame is secure. Its cardinal principle is, that man is the only object of interest to man, all else being subordinate, and valuable only for its relations to this main theme; and more particularly this subject is the spiritual life, not the material manifestations of his energies in deeds apart from their meaning." Wordsworth did not altogether escape the pantheism incident to a constant preoccupation with nature, and his poetry is therefore less distinctively Christian than Spenser's; "but Aubrey de Vere easily makes it out that Wordsworth's philosophy, much as it differed from Spenser's, is concerned with the same topics of moral and spiritual life, and is the substance of his poetry." The author, however, maintains, even against De Vere, that Wordsworth's poetry is deficient in passion. He will not allow that moral enthusiasm is just the same thing.

To Milton, the author thinks, De Vere is hardly just. The current of sympathy is broken between the Catholic and the iconoclast regicide, and he does not well perceive how thoroughly Milton is "bone and flesh of the English nation in the substance of his genius." The "noble spirituality" which the author ascribes to him, we think it might be difficult to find except in the poems of his youth. "Towards Shelley" Mr. De Vere "exhibits a respect, a penetration of the elements of his thoughtful temperament, and a comprehension of the remarkable and intimate changes of his incessant growth, that are almost unexampled in authors writing from Aubrey de Vere's standpoint." "The general decline in the moral weight and the spirituality of late poetic literature" is recognized by De Vere, and rightly connected with the decline in the authority of religion.

"The æsthetic lover of beauty, the artist who is satisfied with feats of poetic craft, will not find anything to his liking in Aubrey de Vere's essays. They are presided over by a severe Platonism intellectually, by an exacting and all-including Christianity when the subject touches upon man's life, and they will prove somewhat difficult reading, perhaps, because the thought continually reverts to great ideas, to that doctrine of life which the author seeks for in the poets, and prizes as the substance of their works. But it is well, in poetic days like these, to be brought back to the more serious muses which inspired the great ideal works of our literature, and to converse with them under the guidance of such a spirit as fills these essays with a sense of the continual presence in great literature of the higher interests of man, his life on earth, and his spiritual relations to the universe."

Next come Illustrations of Idealism. Of these the most remarkable appears to us to be the criticism of Mr. Pater's "Marius the Epicurean." It is marvelous in the searching exactness of its appreciations. Mr. Woodberry concludes his observations on the Italian Renaissance Literature with the remark that "the Renaissance was a movement of civilization not less important than the Reformation or the Revolution, and to Italy, as its source, the debt of the world is great. But the Renaissance was not conveyed to Europe by the literature of its corruption; it was conveyed in far different ways." The Italian mind, he remarks, is definite, hard, practical, and therefore irreligious. Its religion is of the emotions, flaming up and dying down. Therefore, we may remark, its

saints, as Sainte-Beuve says, have not been thinkers, which implies that its thinkers have not been saints. Even in Dante and Thomas Aquinas the outlines are too hard to cherish the deeper life of the spirit.

The author's remarks on Shelley are very extended and very thorough. He has an exceedingly exalted opinion of him. Not pretending to understand it very thoroughly, nor to sympathize with it very deeply, we will refer the reader to it as abundantly worth attention. The remarks on actors' criticisms of Othello, Iago, and Shylock are interesting. But we find Shylock a much more magnificent figure than the author seems to do, though it is true he has no heart and we rejoice in his ruin. The pleas, the author well remarks, are futile in law, but work out the higher ends of a nobler equity.

The remarks on Bunyan are an admirable vindication of him from Matthew Arnold's flippant sneer at him as "a Philistine of genius." The noble sanity of his spirit is appreciated to the full. The paper on Cowper is not unjust, except in seeming to attribute to his creed a madness that broke out before he had a creed, that was stayed for years by his creed, and that reverted in a form of impracticable contradiction to his creed. As to Channing, is it true that he helped Unitarianism to divest itself of the belief in the mystery of Christ's mission? We doubt it very much. We should rather say that Channing's spirit is presiding over the large present reflux into Trinitarian Christianity. If, however, as seems not unlikely, the author uses "mysterious" in the sense of "non-natural," he is doubtless right. See Newman's criticism on Jacob Abbott for an illustration of non-naturalness, even after deducting all the truth in his strictures which Abbott was glad to acknowledge. Of such a conception of Christ, Channing has, indeed, done much to cure the world.

The paper on Darwin is exceedingly fine and just. His moral beauty of character is fully appreciated, while yet the gradual atrophy in his mind of the highest interests of man is acknowledged. Byron is dealt with as an unworthy but not negligible character and genius. There is a gentle but very firm criticism on Browning's apparent depreciation of moral self-restraint. The largeness of his sympathies is rightly regarded as somewhat depressing his love of righteousness. His extraordinary power of reasoning in verse, and his usual neglect of the inexorable requirements for poetry of beauty and form, are hardly thought the best guaranty of literary immortality. "He belongs with Johnson, with Dryden, with the heirs of the masculine intellect, the men of power not unvisited by grace, but in whom mind is predominant. Upon the work of such poets time hesitates, conscious of their mental greatness, but also of their imperfect art, their heterogeneous matter; at last the good is sifted from that whence worth has departed."

These two hundred and ninety-six pages are compact of intellectual appreciation, love of beauty, moral soundness, and religious reverence. They are the high-water mark of literary criticism.

College Series of Greek Authors. Edited under the Supervision of John Williams White and Thomas D. Seymour. *Plato: Protagoras.* With the Commentary of Hermann Sauppe. Translated, with Additions, by James A. Towle, Principal of the Robbins School. Boston, U. S. A., and London: Published by Ginn & Company. 1889. — This beautifully printed classic, with its pleasant and handy shape, is enriched by a very thorough commentary, chiefly for the grammar, but largely for the sense.

From the introduction of Simonides' poem to the end of the dialogue, however, the commentator does not increase his pains in the latter regard so much as the increasing complexity of the treatment might well deserve. Still the ample introduction helps here, and introduces us thoroughly into this brilliant dialogue, with its perfect and brilliant dramatic art, and the number of celebrated characters figuring in it, — Socrates, Protagoras, Prodicus, Critias, Callias, Charmides, Alcibiades, Pericles' two sons, and others. The comparative youth of Socrates, the less developed enmity to the Sophists, and Protagoras' condescending prediction that Socrates is likely to be heard of some day, casting over the dialogue the freshness of a dewy morning, agree well with the inviting appearance of the edition.

The Odyssey of Homer. Translated by George Herbert Palmer, Alford Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company. 1891. Pp. vi, 387. \$2.00. — The translator's ideal has been, he says, "to give to the thought of Homer a more direct and simple expression than has hitherto been judged admissible, . . . in the wording, to discard originality, and to make free use of the fortunate phrases of preceding translators; but to employ persistently the veracious language, the language of prose, rather than the dream language, the language of poetry;" yet to mark "the permeating joy" by a simple, unobtrusive rhythm; to make it plain that this ideal is unattainable, and yet to commend its attainment to others. As compared with Lang and Butcher, the rendering has less charm, but more body. The rhythm does not succeed in being quite as unobtrusive as the translator purposed, and might, therefore, well have been somewhat more varied. But it is a worthy and satisfying rendering of this the more charming of the two great epics of Homer, that one whose commingling of classic perfection with Germanic romance and domesticity makes it so endlessly delicious to us, the children of the north.

Publications of the University of Pennsylvania. Series in Philology, Literature, and Archæology. Vol. I., No. 1. *Poetic and Verse Criticism of the Reign of Elizabeth.* By Felix E. Schelling, A. M., Assistant Professor of English Literature in the University of Pennsylvania. N. D. C. Hodges, Agent for United States, Canada, and England, 47 Lafayette Place, New York, N. Y. Max Niemeyer, Agent for the Continent of Europe, Halle a. S. Germany. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1891. Pp. 97. \$2.00 (subscribers, \$1.50). — This monograph gives a full account of the confused impressions and endeavors of English critics when as yet English poetry meant little except Chaucer, and our forefathers were either unconscious that they were about to assist at the birth of the greatest of all poetical literatures, or that it was already born but they did not yet recognize it. It is interesting to watch the fluctuations to and fro of thought and taste, between the desire to cramp the muse that was to be in the fetters of classical verse, and the perception that our language is of another make, and is capable of things as great in its own way. Sidney and even Spencer were, happily only for the moment, seduced into the school of senility. But the voices were already strong that claimed for our tongue its own metrical rights, which Spenser and Marlowe and Shakespeare and their fellows, without waiting for the final verdict of the theorists, proceeded to demonstrate *par voie du fait*.

There is a full account of Gosson's attack on poetry itself, and Sid-

ney's magnificent defense of it. We need nothing better to justify all that was hoped of him by Elizabeth and England.

Much of the monograph, of course, is made up of technical matter, hard for most to understand even now, and particularly obscure when beaten out into the still confused terms of the Elizabethan vocabulary. The treatise is interesting from its many points of life, but especially to students of metrical theory. King James the Sixth, among the scholars, contributes "Ane Schort Treatise conteneing some Revlis and Cautelis to be obseruit and escheuit in Scottis Poesie." This doubly outlandish tractate illustrates to the full the jumble of sagacity and pedantry which distinguished this curious creature.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

James H. Earle, Boston. The Sunday Question ; or, The Lord's Day. Its Sacredness, Permanence, and Value, as shown by its Origin, History, and Use. By Sir Edward Warren, C. E., formerly Professor in the Rens. Polytechnic Institute, Fellow A. A. A. S., etc. Pp. vii, 290. \$1.50.

Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri. Translated by Charles Eliot Norton. I. Hell. Pp. xxvi, 193. 1891. \$1.25. — Conduct as a Fine Art. The Laws of Daily Conduct. By Nicholas Paine Gilman. Character Building. By Edward Payson Jackson. Pp. vi, 149 ; viii, 230. 1891. \$1.50. — Bishop Wilberforce. By G. W. Daniell, M. A. Pp. 220. \$1.00. — Betty Alden. The First-born Daughter of the Pilgrims. By Jane G. Austin. Pp. ix, 384. \$1.25. — Christopher Columbus, and How he Received and Imparted the Spirit of Discovery. By Justin Winsor. Pp. xi, 674. \$4.00. — What is Reality ? An Inquiry as to the Reasonableness of Natural Religion, and the Naturalness of Revealed Religion. By Francis Howe Johnson. Pp. xxvii, 507. 1891. \$2.00.

Thomas Whittaker, New York. Sons of God. Sermons by the Rev. S. D. McConnell, D. D., Rector of St. Stephen's Church, Philadelphia, author of "History of the American Episcopal Church," etc. Pp. 259. 1891. \$1.50. — Christian Theism. A Brief and Popular Survey of the Evidence upon which it rests ; and the Objections urged against it Considered and Refuted. By the Rev. C. A. Row, M. A. Oxon., Honorary D. D. of the University of the South United States, Prebendary of St. Paul's Cathedral, and Bampton Lecturer for 1877. Pp. viii, 318. \$1.75.

Lee & Shepard, Boston. White Slaves ; or, the Oppression of the Worthy Poor. By Rev. Louis Albert Banks, D. D., author of "The People's Christ," etc. Pp. 327. 1892. \$1.50.

Longmans, Green & Co., New York. Darkness and Dawn ; or, Scenes in the Days of Nero. An Historic Tale. By Frederic W. Farrar, D. D., F. R. S., Archdeacon and Canon of Westminster, author of "The Life of Christ," etc., etc. Pp. xiii, 594. 1891. — An Introduction to Cudworth's Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, with Life of Cudworth, and a few Critical Notes. By W. R. Scott, First Senior Moderator in "Logics and Ethics," Trinity College, Dublin. Pp. x, 64. — Manual of the Science of Religion. By P. D. Chaudepie de la Saussaye, Professor of Theology at Amsterdam. Translated from the German by Beatrice S. Collyer-Fergusson (née Max Müller). Pp. vii, 672. \$3.50. 1891. For sale by Houghton, Mifflin & Co. — The Spirit of Man. An Essay in Christian Philosophy. By Arthur Chandler, M. A., Rector of Poplar, E., Fellow and late Tutor of Brasenose College, Oxford. Pp. xii, 227. \$1.75. 1891. For sale by Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

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